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AMENDED AND RESTATED CREDIT AGREEMENT 
THIS AMENDED AND RESTATED CREDIT AGREEMENT dated as of 
June 24, 1992, is by and between LANDMARK PETROLEUM INC., a 
Delaware corporation (the "Company") , and THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, 
N.A., a national banking association (together with its successors 
and assigns, the "Bank"). 
RECITAL? 
WHEREAS, pursuant to that certain Credit Agreement dated as 
of November 5, 1990 (such agreement, as amended by that certain 
First Amendment and Supplement dated as of February 20, 1991, the 
"Original Credit Agreement"). by and among the Company, The Chase 
Manhattan Bank, N.A., as agent (in such capacity, the "Agent"), and 
the banks that are a signatory thereto, the Company received 
certain loans; 
WHEREAS, The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. is the only bank that 
is a signatory to the Original Credit Agreement (in such capacity,r 
the "Original Bank"); 
WHEREAS, such loans received by the Company are evidenced by 
that certain promissory note dated November 5, 1990, issued by the 
Company in the original principal amount of $10,000,000.00, and 
made payable to the order of the Original Bank (the "Original Term 
Note"), and that certain promissory note dated November 5, 1990, 
issued by the Company in the original principal amount of 
$25,000,000.00, and made payable to the order of the Original Bank 
(the "Original Revolving Credit Note": the Original Term Note and 
the Original Revolving Credit Note shall hereinafter be 
collectively referred to as the "Original Notes"); 
WHEREAS, the Original Notes are secured by the Security 
Instruments (as defined in the Original Credit Agreement and 
hereinafter defined as the "Original^ Security Instruments"); 
WHEREAS, upon the terms and conditions herein stated, the 
Company has requested and the Bank has agreed, inter alia, to 
renew, rearrange, modify and extend the indebtedness evidenced by 
the Original Notes and to provide a new revolving credit/letter of 
credit facility; 
WHEREAS, pursuant to the Option Agreement (CPI) (as 
hereinafter defined), the Company is granting to Colorado 
Processing, Inc. ("CPI"), a Utah corporation and wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Flying J Inc., an option to acquire substantially all 
of the assets and business of the Company, subject to CPI's 
assumption of all indebtedness and liabilities of the Company; 
WHEREAS, pursuant to that certain Option Agreement (Chase) (as 
hereinafter defined), Flying J Inc. is granting to the Bank an 
option to acquire a 25% equity interest in CPI; and 
WHEREAS, the Bank is accepting such option from Flying J Inc. 
as interest on the loans herein provided. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and 
agreements herein contained, the aforesaid option to be granted to 
the Bank, and of the loans and commitments hereinafter referred to, 
the parties hereto agree as follows: 
Section 1. Definitions and Accounting Matters. 
1.01 Terms Defined Above. As used in this Agreement, 
the terms "Agent". "Bank". "Company". "CPI". "Original Bank". 
"Original Credit Agreement". "Original Notes". "Original Revolving 
Credit Note", "Original Term Note" and "Original Security 
Instruments" shall have the meanings indicated above. 
1.02 Certain Defined Terms. As used herein, ther 
following terms shall have the following meanings (all terms 
defined in this Section 1 or in other provisions of this Agreement 
in the singular to have the same meanings when used in the plural 
and vice versa): 
"Affiliate" of any Person shall mean (i) any Person 
directly or indirectly controlled by, controlling or 
under common control with such first Person and (ii) any 
director, officer, partner or stockholder of such first 
Person or of any Person referred to in clause (i) above. 
"Agreement" shall mean this Amended and Restated 
Credit Agreement, as the same may be further amended, 
supplemented or modified from time to time. 
"Borrowing Reguest" shall mean a request for a Loan 
or a Letter of Credit pursuant to Section 2.01 to be 
substantially in the form attached as Exhibit G. 
"Business Day" shall mean any day on which commer-
cial banks are not authorized or required to close in New 
York, New York. 
"Calciner" shall mean the calciner referred to in 
the Calciner Operating Agreement. 
"Calciner Operating Agreement" shall mean that 
certain Operating Agreement dated as of November 5, 1990, 
between the Company and Western Slope, as assigned to the 
Calciner Operating Subsidiary by the Company pursuant to 
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that certain General Assignment and Assumption Agreement 
dated as of November 5, 1990, and as amended by that 
certain First Amendment to Operating Agreement dated as 
of June 3, 1992, by and between the Calciner Operating 
Subsidiary and Western Slope, and as the same may be 
further amended, supplemented or modified from time to 
time. 
"Calciner Operating Subsidiary11 shall mean landmark 
Carbon Inc., a Subsidiary formed by the Company to 
operate the Calciner pursuant to the Calciner operating 
Agreement. 
"Cash Flow" shall mean for each calendar month an 
amount equal to the sum of (a) net income for such period 
determined in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles, (b) all deferred taxes deducted 
in determining such net income, (c) Interest Expense for 
such period, and (d) depreciation, depletion, amortiza-
tion and other non-cash charges deducted in determining 
such net income less capital expenditures not in excess 
of $125,000 per month and the Unused Cap Ex Amount. 
"Code11 shall mean the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 
as amended. 
"Commitment11 shall mean the Revolving Credit/Letter 
of Credit Commitment, the Term Loan Commitment and the 
Special Purpose Credit Commitment. 
"Consultation and Service Agreement" shall mean that 
certain Consultation and Service Agreement dated as of 
June 19, 1992, by and between the Company, Flying J Inc., 
a Utah corporation and Big West Oil Company, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Flying J Inc. 
"Debt" shall mean, for any Person the sum of the 
following (without duplication): (a) all obligations of 
such Person for borrowed money or evidenced by bonds, 
debentures, notes or other similar instruments; (b) all 
obligations of such Person (whether contingent or 
otherwise) in respect of letters of credit, bankers1 
acceptances, surety or other bonds and similar instru-
ments; (c) all obligations of such Person to pay the 
deferred purchase price of Property or services, except 
trade accounts payable (other than for borrowed money) 
arising in the ordinary course of business of such 
Person; (d) all obligations under leases which shall have 
been, or should have been, in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles in effect on the date of 
this Agreement, recorded as capital leases in respect of 
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which such Person is liable, contingently or otherwise, 
as obligor, guarantor or otherwise, or in respect of 
which obligations such Person otherwise assures a 
creditor against loss; (e) all Debt and other obligations 
secured by a Lien (other than Excepted Liens provided 
that the portion of such Debt which has not been paid 
when due does not exceed $100,000 in the aggregate at any 
one time) on any asset of such Person, whether or not 
such Debt or other obligations are assumed by such 
Person; (f) all Debt and other obligations of others 
guaranteed by such Person; and (g) all obligations or 
undertakings of such Person to maintain or cause to be 
maintained the financial position or covenants of other 
Persons. 
"Default11 shall mean an Event of Default or an event 
which with notice or lapse of time or both would become 
an Event of Default. 
"Deferred Accrued Interest11 shall mean all interest 
accrued on the Notes for the period commencing on the 
date of this Agreement to and including August 31, 1992 
and any other interest accrued and unpaid on the Notes. 
"Dollars" and "£" shall mean lawful money of the 
United States of America. 
"Drawdown Termination Date" shall mean the earlier 
to occur of (a) June 15, 2002 or (b) the date on which 
the Commitments are terminated or cancelled pursuant to 
Section 2.03(a) or Section 10. 
"Environmental Laws" shall mean any and all applic-
able laws, statutes, ordinances, rules, regulations, 
orders, or determinations of any Governmental Authority 
pertaining to health or the environment applicable to the 
Company and/or its Subsidiaries or any of its Property 
in effect in any and all jurisdictions in which the 
Company and/or its Subsidiaries is conducting or at any 
time has conducted business, or where the Mortgaged 
Properties are located, or where any hazardous substances 
generated by or disposed of by the Company and/or its 
Subsidiaries are located, including but not limited to 
the Clean Air Act, as amended, the Comprehensive 
Environmental, Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
of 1980 as amended by the Super fund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("CERCLA"), as amended, the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, as amended, 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as 
amended by the Used Oil Recycling Act of 1980, the Solid 
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Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, and the Hazardous 
and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 ("RCRA"), as amended, 
the Safe Drinking Water Act, as amended, the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, as amended, the Hazardous 
Materials Transportation Act, as amended and other 
environmental conservation or protection laws. The terms 
"hazardous substance," "release," and "contaminants" 
shall have the meanings specified in CERCLA, and the 
terms "solid waste", "hazardous waste" and "disposal" (or 
"disposed") shall have the meanings specified in RCRA; 
provided, however, that (i) in the event either CERCLA 
or RCRA is amended so as to broaden the meaning of any 
term defined thereby, such broader meaning shall apply 
subsequent to the effective date of such amendment, and 
(ii) to the extent the laws of the state in which the 
Mortgaged Properties are located establish a meaning for 
"hazardous substance," "release," "hazardous waste," 
"solid waste" or "disposal" which is broader than that 
specified in either CERCLA or RCRA, such broader meaning 
shall apply to the extent relevant to those state laws. 
"ERISA" shall mean the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, as amended from time to time. 
"ERISA Affiliate" shall mean any corporation or 
trade or business which is a member of the same 
controlled group of corporations (within the meaning of 
Section 414(b) of the Code) as the Company or a 
Subsidiary or is under common control (within the 
meaning of Section 414(c) of the Code) with the Company 
or a Subsidiary. 
"Event of Default" shall have the meaning assigned 
to that term in Section 10. 
"Excepted Liens" shall mean: 
(a) Liens for taxes, assessments or other 
governmental charges or levies not yet due or which 
are being contested in good faith by appropriate 
action by the Company or any Subsidiary; 
(b) Liens in connection with workmen's compen-
sation, unemployment insurance or other social 
security, old age pension or public liability 
obligations not yet due or which are being contested 
in good faith by appropriate action by the Company 
or any Subsidiary; 
(c) vendors•, carriers•, warehousemenf s, 
repairmen's, mechanics•, workmen•s, materialmenf s, 
-5-
construction or other like Liens arising by 
operation of law in the ordinary course of business 
in respect of obligations which shall have been 
outstanding not more than 90 days or which are being 
contested in good faith by appropriate action by 
the Company or any Subsidiary; 
(d) inchoate Liens and charges imposed by law 
and incidental to construction, maintenance, 
development or operation of Properties in the 
ordinary course of business if payment of the 
obligation secured thereby is not yet due or if the 
validity or amount of which is being contested in 
good faith by appropriate action by the Company or 
any Subsidiary; 
(e) Liens reserved in any oil, gas or other 
mineral lease for rent, royalty or delay rental 
under such lease and for compliance with the terms 
of such lease; 
(f) Liens for any judgments or attachments if, 
and only if, such judgments do not constitute an 
Event of Default under Section 10(j) and such 
attachments do not exceed (individually or in the 
aggregate) $25,000 outstanding at any time; 
(g) Liens arising under joint operating 
agreements for obligations (other than Debt) that 
are not delinquent and that will be paid or 
discharged in the ordinary course of the Company's 
or any Subsidiary's business, or if delinquent, that 
are being contested in good faith by appropriate 
action in the ordinary course of the Company's or 
any Subsidiary's business; 
(h) easements, servitudes, rights-of-way and 
other rights, exceptions, reservations, conditions, 
limitations, covenants and other restrictions which 
do not materially interfere with the operation, 
value or use of the Properties affected thereby; 
(i) conventional provisions contained in any 
contracts or agreements affecting Properties under 
which the Company or any Subsidiary is required 
immediately before the expiration, termination or 
abandonment of a particular Property to reassign to 
the Company's or such Subsidiary's predecessor in 
title all or a portion of the Company's or such 
Subsidiary's rights, titles and interests in and to 
all or a portion of such Property; 
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(j) any Lien upon any Property of a Subsidiary 
in favor of the Company or another Subsidiary as 
security for Debt or other obligation permitted 
under this Agreement owing to the Company or such 
other Subsidiary; 
(k) any Lien consisting of (i) statutory and 
contractual landlordfs liens under leases to which 
the Company or any Subsidiary is a party for rent 
or for compliance with the terms of such leases, 
(ii) rights reserved to or vested in any munici-
pality or governmental, statutory or public 
authority to control or regulate any Property of 
the Company or any Subsidiary or to use such 
Property in any manner which does not materially 
impair the use of such Property for the purposes 
for which it is held by the Company or any such 
Subsidiary, and (iii) zoning laws and ordinances 
and municipal regulations; 
(1) Liens described in the Mortgagee Title 
Policy delivered to the Agent pursuant to the terms 
of the Original Credit Agreement; 
(m) all other Liens (other than Liens securing 
any Debt), encumbrances, defects and irregularities 
that are customary in the industry and not, in the 
aggregate, material in amount as compared to the 
value of the Mortgaged Property; and 
(n) Liens, if any, created by that certain 
Mutual Access Easement and Use Agreement dated 
November 5, 1990, by and between the Company and 
Western Slope (including the non-exclusive easement 
with respect to water rights to be granted to 
Western Slope by the Company upon the satisfaction 
of the conditions set forth in that certain Purchase 
Agreement (WS) dated June 3, 1992, between the 
Company, Western Slope and the Bank), and that 
certain Services Agreement dated as of November 5, 
1990, by and between the Company and Western Slope, 
as amended by that certain First Amendment to 
Services Agreement dated June 3, 1992, by and 
between the Company and Western Slope, as such 
agreements may be further modified from time to time 
in the ordinary course of business and in good faith 
to reflect bona fide operation requirements. 
"Excess Cash Flow" shall have the meaning assigned 
to that term in Section 2.05. 
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"Financial Statements11 shall mean the consolidated 
financial statement or statements of the Company and its 
Subsidiaries described or referred to in Section 7.02. 
"Garv-Williams Subordinated Note" shall mean that 
certain promissory note dated June 14, 1991, executed by 
the Company and payable to the order of Gary-Williams 
Energy Corporation, which promissory note has been 
assigned by Gary-Williams Energy Corporation to the Bank 
pursuant to that certain Assignment of Note and Liens 
(GWEC) dated June 3, 1992. 
"Governmental Authority" shall include the United 
States, the state, county, city and political subdivi-
sions in which any Property of the Company and/or its 
Subsidiaries is located or which exercises jurisdiction 
over any such Property, and any agency, department, 
commission, board, bureau or instrumentality of any of 
them which exercises jurisdiction over any such Property. 
"Governmental Requirement" shall mean any applicable 
law, statute, code, ordinance, order, rule, regulation, 
judgment, decree, injunction, franchise, permit, certifi-
cate, license, authorization or other lawful direction 
or requirement (including, without limitation, Environ-
mental Laws, energy regulations and occupational, safety 
and health standards or controls) of any (domestic or 
foreign) federal, state, county, municipal or other 
government, department, commission, board, court, agency 
or any other instrumentality of any of them. 
"Highest Lawful Rate" shall mean the maximum 
nonusurious interest rate, if any, that at any time or 
from time to time may be contracted for, taken, reserved, 
charged or received on the Notes or on other Indebtedness 
under laws applicable to the Bank which are presently in 
effect or, to the extent allowed by law, under such 
applicable laws which may hereafter be in effect and 
which allow a higher maximum nonusurious interest rate 
than applicable laws now allow. 
"Indebtedness" shall mean any and all amounts owing 
or to be owing by the Company to the Bank in connection 
with the Notes or any Security Instrument, including this 
Agreement and the Letter of Credit Agreements, and all 
renewals, extensions and/or rearrangements thereof. 
"Indemnity Matters" shall have the meaning assigned 
to that term in Section 11.03. 
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"Interest Expense" shall mean, for any period, the 
gross interest expense of the Company for such period. 
"Letters of Credit" shall mean the standby letters 
of credit, commercial letters of credit and direct pay 
letters of credit hereafter issued by the Bank pursuant 
to Section 2.01(c), and all reimbursement obligations 
pertaining to any such letters of credit, and "Letter of 
Credit" shall mean any one of the Letters of Credit and 
the reimbursement obligation pertaining thereto. 
"Letter of Credit Agreements" shall mean the written 
agreements with the Bank executed or hereafter executed 
in connection with the issuance by the Bank of the 
Letters of Credit, such agreements to be on the Bank's 
customary form for such letters of credit of comparable 
amount and purpose, as from time to time in effect. 
"Liens" shall mean, with respect to any asset, any 
mortgage, lien, pledge, charge, security interest or 
encumbrance of any kind in respect of such asset. For 
the purposes of this Agreement, the Company and its 
Subsidiaries shall be deemed to own subject to a Lien any 
asset which any of them has acquired or holds subject to 
the interest of a vendor or lessor under any conditional 
sale agreement, capital lease or other title retention 
agreement relating to such asset. 
"Loan" shall mean a Revolving Credit Loan, the Term 
Loan or a Special Purpose Credit Loan and "Loans" shall 
mean the Revolving Credit Loans, the Term Loan and the 
Special Purpose Credit Loans. 
"Material Adverse Effect" shall mean any material 
and adverse effect on (i) the assets, liabilities, 
financial condition, business or operations of the 
Company and its Subsidiaries taken as a whole from those 
reflected in the Financial Statements or from the facts 
represented or warranted in this Agreement or any other 
Security Instrument, or (ii) the ability of the Company 
and its Subsidiaries taken as a whole to carry out in all 
material respects its business as at the date of this 
Agreement or as proposed at the date of this Agreement 
to be conducted or meet its obligations under the Notes, 
this Agreement or the other Security Instruments on a 
timely basis. 
"Mortgaged Property" shall mean the Property owned 
by the Company or in which the Company owns an undivided 
interest and which is subject to the Liens, privileges, 
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priorities and security interests existing and to exist 
under the terms of the Security Instruments. 
"Multiemployer Plan" shall mean a Plan defined as 
such in Section 3(37) of ERISA to which contributions 
have been made by the Company or any ERISA Affiliate and 
which is covered by Title IV of ERISA. 
"Notes" shall mean the Term Note, the Revolving 
Credit Note and the Special Purpose Credit Note. 
"Option Agreement (Chase)" shall mean that certain 
Option Agreement (Chase) dated as of June 24, 1992, by 
and between the Flying J Inc., CPI and the Bank. 
"Option Agreement (CPI)" shall mean that certain 
Option Agreement (CPI) dated as of June 24, 1992, by and 
between the Company and CPI. 
"PBGC" shall mean the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation or any entity succeeding to any or all of its 
functions under ERISA. 
"Person" shall mean any individual, corporation, 
company, voluntary association, partnership, joint ven-
ture, trust, unincorporated organization or government 
or any agency, instrumentality or political subdivision 
thereof, or any other form of entity. 
"Plan" shall mean an employee pension benefit or 
other plan established or maintained by the Company or 
any Subsidiary or any ERISA Affiliate and which is 
covered by Title IV of ERISA, other than a Multiemployer 
Plan. 
"Post-Default Rate" shall mean, in respect of any 
principal of any Loan or any other amount payable by the 
Company under this Agreement or any Note which is not 
paid when due (whether at stated maturity, by accelera-
tion or otherwise), a rate per annum during the period 
commencing on the due date until such amount is paid in 
full or the default is cured or waived equal to 2% per 
annum above the Prime Rate as in effect from time to 
time, but in no event to exceed the Highest Lawful Rate. 
"Prime Rate" shall mean the rate of interest from 
time to time announced by the Bank at the Principal Of-
fice as its prime commercial lending rate. Such rate is 
set by the Bank as a general reference rate of interest, 
taking into account such factors as the Bank may deem 
appropriate, it being understood that many of the Bank's 
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commercial or other loans are priced in relation to such 
rate, that it is not necessarily the lowest or best rate 
actually charged to any customer and that the Bank may 
make various commercial or other loans at rates of inte-
rest having no relationship to such rate. Changes in the 
rate of interest on Loans will take effect simultaneously 
with each change in the Prime Rate. 
"Principal Office" shall mean the principal office 
of the Bank, presently located at 1 Chase Manhattan 
Plaza, New York, New York 10081. 
"Property" shall mean any interest in any kind of 
property or asset, whether real, personal or mixed, or 
tangible or intangible. 
"Refinery" shall mean the real property, fixtures 
and equipment purchased by the Company pursuant to the 
WS Purchase Agreement. 
"Revolving Credit/Letter of Credit Commitment" shall 
mean the obligation of the Bank to make Revolving Credit 
Loans or to issue, reissue, renew or extend Letters of 
Credit for the account of the Company, in an aggregate 
amount at any one time outstanding equal to $3,500,000.00 
(as the same may be reduced pursuant to Section 2.03 
hereof). 
"Revolving Credit Loans" shall mean the revolving 
credit loans as provided for by Section 2.01(b). 
"Revolving Credit Note" shall mean the promissory 
note of the Company provided for in Section 2.04 and 
being in the form of Exhibit B-l hereto, together with 
any and all renewals, extensions for any period, 
increases or rearrangements thereof. 
"Security Instruments" shall mean this Agreement, 
the Letter of Credit Agreements, the agreements or in-
struments described or referred to in Exhibit F, and any 
and all other agreements or instruments now or hereafter 
executed and delivered by the Company, the Calciner Oper-
ating Subsidiary, or any other Person (other than parti-
cipation or similar agreements between the Bank and any 
other bank or creditor with respect to any Indebtedness 
pursuant to this Agreement) in connection with, or as 
security for the payment or performance of, the Notes, 
the Letter of Credit Agreements or this Agreement, as 
such agreements may be amended or supplemented from time 
to time. 
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"Subordinated Debt" shall mean the Western Slope 
Subordinated Note and the Gary-Williams Subordinated 
Note. 
"Subsidiary" shall mean any corporation of which at 
least a majority of the outstanding shares of stock 
having by the terms thereof ordinary voting power to 
elect a majority of the board of directors of such 
corporation (irrespective of whether or not at the time 
stock of any other class or classes of such corporation 
shall have or might have voting power by reason of the 
happening of any contingency) is at the time directly or 
indirectly owned by the Company. 
"Special Purpose Credit cnimnit'.inftnt'.w shall mean the 
obligation of the Bank to make an initial Special Purpose 
Credit Loan equal to the maximum amount of $3,000,000.00 
and certain subsequent Special Purpose Credit Loans. 
"Special Purpose Credit Loans" shall mean the 
special purpose credit loans as provided for by Section 
2.01(d). 
"Special Purpose Credit Maximum Availability" shall 
mean an amount equal to the aggregate of all prepayments 
on the Special Purpose Credit Note with Unused Cap Ex 
Amounts, as required by Section 2.05(d). 
"Special Purpose Credit Note" shall mean the 
promissory note of the Company provided for in Section 
2.01(d) and being in the form of Exhibit B-2 hereto, 
together with any and all renewals, extensions for any 
period, increases or rearrangements thereof. 
"Term Loan Commitment" shall mean the obligation of 
the Bank to rearrange $25,500,000 of the principal 
balance outstanding on the Original Notes into a Term 
Loan in an amount equal to $25,500,000.00. 
"Term Loan" shall mean the term loan provided for 
by Section 2.01(a). 
"Term Note" shall mean the promissory note of the 
Company provided for in Section 2.04 and being in the 
form of Exhibit A hereto, together with any and all 
renewals, extensions for any period, increases or 
rearrangements thereof. 
"Trigger Date" shall mean the date on which 
$1^,500,000 of principal of the Term Note has been paid. 
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"Unused Cap Ex Amount" shall mean for each month an 
amount (if a positive number) equal to $125,000 less the 
Capital Expenditure made by the Company in such month. 
"Western Slope" shall mean Western Slope Refining 
Company, a Colorado corporation. 
"Western Slope Properties" shall mean all of the 
assets of Western Slope and Gary-Williams Energy 
Corporation acquired by the Company pursuant to the WS 
Purchase Agreement and the Purchase Agreement (WS) dated 
June 3, 1992, between the Company, Western Slope and the 
Bank. 
"Western Slope Subordinated Note" shall mean that 
certain promissory note dated November 5, 1990, executed 
by the Company and payable to the order of Western Slope, 
which promissory note has been assigned by Western Slope 
to the Bank pursuant to that certain Assignment of Note 
and Liens (WS) dated June 3, 1992. 
"WS Purchase Agreement" shall mean that certain 
Asset Purchase Agreement made and entered into as of 
August 17, 1990, between Western Slope and the Company, 
as amended by First Amendment to Asset Purchase Agreement 
dated September 20, 1990 and by Second Amendment to Asset 
Purchase Agreement dated November 1, 1990, together with 
the Agreement made and entered into by and between Gary-
Williams Energy Corporation and the Company dated 
August 17, 1990. 
1.03 Accounting Terms and Determinations. Unless 
otherwise specified herein, all accounting terms used herein shall 
be interpreted, all determinations with respect to accounting 
matters hereunder shall be made, and all financial statements and 
certificates and reports as to financial matters required to be 
furnished to the Bank hereunder shall be prepared, in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles as in effect, applied 
on a basis consistent with the Financial Statements (except for 
changes concurred with by the Company's independent public 
accountants). 
Section 2. Commitments. 
2.01 Loans and Letters of Credit. The Bank agrees, on 
the terms of this Agreement, to make the following loans to the 
Company, and agrees to issue, reissue, renew or extend Letters of 
Credit for the account of the Company in accordance with the 
following: 
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(a) Term Loan - Upon the request of the Company as 
hereinafter provided, $25,500,000 of the principal 
balance outstanding on the Original Notes shall be 
rearranged into a Term Loan. 
(b) Revolving Credit Loans - During the period from 
the date of this Agreement to and including the Drawdown 
Termination Date, Revolving Credit Loans in an aggregate 
principal amount at any one time outstanding up to, but 
not exceeding, the amount of the Revolving Credit/Letter 
of Credit Commitment as then in effect; provided. 
however, that the aggregate principal amount of all such 
Revolving Credit Loans made by the Bank hereunder at any 
one time outstanding shall not exceed (A) the Revolving 
Credit/Letter of Credit Commitment minus (B) the 
outstanding Letters of Credit (together with all amounts 
previously drawn on Letters of Credit but not yet funded 
as a Revolving Credit Loan pursuant to Section 4.05(b) 
or reimbursed). Subject to the terms of this Agreement, 
during the period from the date of this Agreement to and 
including the Drawdown Termination Date, the Company may 
borrow, repay and reborrow the amount of the Revolving 
Credit/Letter of Credit Commitment. 
(c) Letters of Credit - (i) During the period from 
the date of this Agreement to and including the Drawdown 
Termination Date, the Bank agrees to extend credit to the 
Company at any time and from time to time by issuing, 
renewing, extending or reissuing Letters of Credit; 
provided, however, the aggregate amount of all Letters 
of Credit at any one time outstanding shall not exceed 
(A) the Revolving Credit/Letter of Credit Commitment 
minus (B) the sum of all outstanding Revolving Credit 
Loans, plus all amounts previously drawn on Letters of 
Credit but not yet funded as a Revolving Credit Loan 
pursuant to Section 4.05(b) or reimbursed. 
(ii) Each of the Letters of Credit shall (A) be 
issued by the Bank, (B) contain such terms and 
provisions as are reasonably required by the Bank, 
(C) be for the account of the Company, and (D) with 
respect to standby Letters of Credit, expire not 
later than 390 days from the date of issuance and 
with respect to non-standby Letters of Credit, 
expire not later than 180 days from the date of 
issuance, unless prior approval of the Bank is 
obtained for a longer period, but in no event shall 
any Letter of Credit have an expiration date beyond 
the Drawdown Termination Date. 
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(iii) In conjunction with the issuance of a 
Letter of Credit, the Company shall execute a Letter 
of Credit Agreement. In the event of any conflict 
between any provision of a Letter of Credit 
Agreement and this Agreement, the Company and the 
Bank hereby agree that the provisions of this 
Agreement shall govern. 
(d) Special Purpose Credit Loams - Upon the request 
of the Company as hereinafter provided, $3,000,000 of the 
principal balance outstanding on the Original Notes shall 
be rearranged into an initial Special Purpose Credit 
Loan. On and after the date of the initial Special 
Purpose Credit Loan through the earlier of the date the 
Term Note is paid in full or the maturity of the Special 
Purpose Credit Note, the Company may reborrow principal 
amounts repaid from time to time on the Special Purpose 
Credit Note to the extent of the Special Purpose Credit 
Maximum Availability provided the proceeds of such 
reborrowing are used for Capital Expenditures. 
2.02 Borrowings and Issuances. 
(a) The Company shall give the Bank advance notice 
as hereinafter provided of each borrowing and each 
request for issuance of a Letter of Credit hereunder, 
which shall specify the aggregate amount of such Loan or 
such Letter of Credit and the date (which shall be a 
Business Day) of the Loans to be borrowed or the Letters 
of Credit to be issued and the beneficiary and other 
terms of such Letter of Credit, all of which (other than 
the beneficiary) must be reasonably acceptable to the 
Bank. 
(b) All Loans (as part of the same borrowing) shall 
be in amounts of at least $100,000 or any whole multiple 
of $50,000 in excess thereof or the remaining unused 
portion of the applicable Commitment, as the case may be. 
(c) All borrowings or requests for issuance of 
Letters of Credit shall require advance written notice 
to the Bank in the form of a Borrowing Request, which in 
each case shall be irrevocable, from the Company to be 
received by the Bank not later than 11:00 a.m. New York 
time on the date such Loan is to be obtained and one (1) 
Business Day prior to the date such Letter of Credit is 
to be issued. 
(d) Not later than 2:00 p.m. New York time on the 
date specified for each borrowing hereunder, the Bank 
shall make available the amount of the Loan to be made 
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by it on such date to the Company by depositing the same, 
in immediately available funds, in an account of the 
Company, designated by the Company and maintained with 
the Bank at the Principal Office. 
(e) Not later than 10:00 a.m. New York time on the 
date specified for the issuance of a Letter of Credit, 
the Bank shall make available to the Company at the 
Bank's Principal Office such Letter of Credit. 
2.03 Changes of Commitments. 
(a) The Company shall have the right to terminate 
or to reduce the amount of the Revolving Credit/Letter 
of Credit Commitment at any time or from time to time 
upon not less than two (2) Business Days prior notice to 
the Bank of such termination or each such reduction, 
which notice shall specify the effective date thereof and 
the amount of any such reduction (which shall be in 
amounts of at least $100,000 or any whole multiple of 
$50,000 in excess thereof) and shall be irrevocable and 
effective only upon receipt by the Bank. 
(b) The Revolving Credit/Letter of Credit 
Commitment once terminated or reduced may not be 
reinstated. 
2.04 Notes. 
(a) The Term Loan made by the Bank shall be 
evidenced by a single promissory note of the Company in 
substantially the form of Exhibit A hereto, dated on or 
before the date such Term Loan is made, payable to the 
order of the Bank in a principal amount equal to the Term 
Loan Commitment and otherwise duly completed. 
(b) The Revolving Credit^ Loans made by the Bank 
shall be evidenced by a single promissory note of the 
Company in substantially the form of Exhibit B hereto, 
dated on or before the date of the initial borrowing 
under this Agreement, payable to the order of the Bank 
in a principal amount equal to the Revolving 
Credit/Letter of Credit Commitment as originally in 
effect and otherwise duly completed. 
(c) The Special Purpose Credit Loans made by the 
Bank shall be evidenced by a single promissory note of 
the Company in substantially the form of Exhibit B-2 
hereto, dated on or before the date of the initial 
Special Purpose Credit Loan under this Agreement, payable 
to the order of the Bank in a principal amount equal to 
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the Special Purpose Credit Commitment and otherwise duly 
completed. 
(d) The date and amount of each Loan made by the 
Bank, and all payments made on account of the principal 
thereof, shall be recorded by the Bank on its books for 
the applicable Note, and prior to any transfer of any 
Note held by it, endorsed by the Bank on the schedule 
attached to such Note or any continuation thereof. 
2.05 Prepayments. 
(a) The Company may prepay Loans at any time, 
provided such prepayment is made on or before 11:00 a.m. 
New York time and such prepayment is in an amount of at 
least $100,000 or any whole multiple of $50,000 in excess 
thereof or the remaining aggregate principal balance 
outstanding on the Notes and provided that interest on 
the principal prepaid, accrued to the prepayment date, 
shall be paid on the prepayment date. 
(b) If, after giving effect to any termination or 
reduction of the Revolving Credit/Letter of Credit 
Commitment, pursuant to Section 2.03, the sum of (i) out-
standing aggregate principal amount of the Revolving 
Credit Loans, (ii) the face amount of all outstanding 
Letters of Credit and (iii) all amounts previously drawn 
on Letters of Credit, but not yet funded as a Revolving 
Credit Loan pursuant to Section 4.05(b) or reimbursed, 
exceeds the amount of the Revolving Credit/Letter of 
Credit Commitment, then the Company shall on the date of 
such termination or reduction pay or prepay the amount 
of such excess for application first towards reduction 
of all amounts previously drawn, but not yet funded as 
a Revolving Credit Loan pursuant to Section 4.05(b) or 
reimbursed, and second, if necessary, towards reduction 
of the outstanding principal balance of the Revolving 
Credit Note and, third, if necessary, towards prepaying 
the amount of the Letters of Credit, which amount shall 
be held by the Bank as cash collateral to secure the 
Company's obligation to reimburse the Bank for drawings 
under the Letters of Credit, together with interest on 
such excess accrued to the date of such payment or 
prepayment. 
(c) Mandatory Prepayments of Notes. 
(i) Prior to the occurrence of the Trig-
ger Date, the Company will apply on or before 
30 days after the end of each month any Cash 
Flow remaining after the interest payments 
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required by Section 3.02 as a prepayment on 
the Term Note. 
(ii) On and after the occurrence of the 
Trigger Date, the Company will apply on or 
before 30 days after the end of each month any 
Cash Flow remaining after the interest pay-
ments required by Section 3.02 as a prepayment 
on the Term Note until the principal of the 
Term Note is paid in full. After the prin-
cipal of the Term Note is paid in full, the 
Company will then apply the aforesaid prepay-
ment from Cash Flow on the Special Purpose 
Credit Note until the principal of the Special 
Purpose Credit Note is paid in full. After 
the principal of the Special Purpose Credit 
Note is paid in full, the Company will then 
apply the aforesaid prepayment from Cash Flow 
on the Revolving Credit Note until the princi-
pal of the Revolving Credit Note is paid in 
full. The amount of principal prepayments 
required by this Section 2.05(c)(ii) shall not 
exceed $450,000 per calendar quarter. 
(iii) On and after the occurrence of the 
Trigger Date, the Company will also apply on 
or before 30 days after the end of each month 
fifty percent (50%) of any Cash Flow remaining 
after the interest payments required by 
Section 3.02 and the prepayments required by 
Section 2.05 (c) (ii) (the "Excess Cash Flow") , 
as a prepayment on the Term Note until the 
principal of the Term Note is paid in full. 
After the principal of the Term Note is paid 
in full, the Company will then apply the 
aforesaid prepayment from Excess Cash Flow on 
the Special Purpose Credit Note until the 
principal of the Special Purpose Credit Note 
is paid in full. After the principal of the 
Special Purpose Credit Note is paid in full, 
the Company will then apply the aforesaid 
prepayment from Excess Cash Flow on the 
Revolving Credit Note until the principal of 
the Revolving Credit Note is paid in full. 
The remaining fifty percent (50%) of Excess 
Cash Flow shall be paid by the Company to 
Flying J Inc., as a consulting fee pursuant to 
the Consultation and Service Agreement. 
(d) The Company will apply on or before 30 days 
after the end of each month the Unused Cap Ex Amount for 
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such month as a prepayment on the Special Purpose Credit 
Note. 
(e) Prepayments permitted under this Section 2.05 
shall be without premium or penalty, and shall be applied 
in inverse order of maturity. 
Section 3. Payments of Principal and Interest. 
3.01 Principal. The Company will pay to the Bank the 
principal of each Note when due. The principal amount of each Note 
outstanding on June 15, 2002 shall be due and payable on that date. 
3.02 Interest. 
(a) The Company will pay to the Bank interest on 
the unpaid principal amount outstanding from time to time 
of each Loan made by the Bank for the period commencing 
on the date of such Loan to, but excluding, the date such 
Loan shall be paid in full, at a varying rate per annum 
equal to the Prime Rate (as in effect from time to time), 
but in no event to exceed the lesser of nine percent (9%) 
per annum or the Highest Lawful Rate. Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, the Company will pay to the Bank interest 
at the applicable Post-Default Rate on any principal of 
any Loan made by the Bank, and (to the fullest extent 
permitted by law) on any other amount (including 
interest) payable by the Company hereunder or under any 
Note held by the Bank, which shall not be paid in full 
when due (whether at stated maturity, by acceleration or 
otherwise) , for the period commencing on the due date 
thereof until the same is paid in full. 
(b) Accrued interest on each Note (other than the 
Deferred Accrued Interest) shall be payable monthly on 
or before 30 days after the end of each month, commencing 
on September 30, 1992. The Deferred Accrued Interest 
shall be payable on the same date(s) the accrued interest 
described in the preceding sentence is paid until the 
Deferred Accrued Interest is paid in full. All accrued 
interest on the Notes (including the Deferred Accrued 
Interest) shall be payable by the Company from the Cash 
Flow. The Company shall apply the Cash Flow to the 
payment of interest as follows: 
(i) first to the payment of all interest 
accrued on the Term Note during the month; 
(ii) second to the payment of all 
interest accrued on the Special Purpose Credit 
Note during the month; 
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(iii) third to the payment of all interest 
accrued on the Revolving Credit Note during 
the month; and 
(iv) fourth to the payment of any 
Deferred Accrued Interest. 
(c) Promptly after the determination of any 
interest rate provided for herein or any change therein, 
the Bank shall notify the Company thereof. 
Section 4. Payments; Computations; Etc. 
4.01 Payments. Except to the extent otherwise provided 
herein, all payments of principal, interest and other amounts to 
be made by the Company under this Agreement, the Notes and the 
Letter of Credit Agreements shall be made in Dollars, in 
immediately available funds, to the Bank at such account as the 
Bank shall specify by notice to the Company from time to time, not 
later than 11:00 a.m. New York time on the date on which suchr 
payments shall become due (each such payment made after such time 
on such due date to be deemed to have been made on the next 
succeeding Business Day). The Company shall, at the time of making 
each payment under this Agreement or any Note or any Letter of 
Credit Agreement, specify to the Bank the Loans, Letters of Credit 
or other amounts payable by the Company hereunder to which such 
payment is to be applied (and in the event that it fails to so 
specify, or if an Event of Default has occurred and is continuing, 
the Bank may distribute such payment in such manner as it may 
determine to be appropriate) . If the due date of any payment under 
this Agreement or any Note or any Letter of Credit Agreement would 
otherwise fall on a day which is not a Business Day such date shall 
be extended to the next succeeding Business Day and interest shall 
be payable for any principal so extended for the period of such 
extension. 
4.02 Computations. Interest and fees shall be computed 
on the basis of a year of 365 or 366 days, as the case may be, and 
actual days elapsed (including the first day but excluding the last 
day) occurring in the period for which payable. 
4.03 Set-off The Company agrees that, in addition to 
(and without limitation of) any right of set-off, bankers' lien or 
counterclaim the Bank may otherwise have, the Bank shall be 
entitled, at its option, to offset balances held by it for the 
account of the Company at any of its offices, in Dollars or in any 
other currency, against any principal of or interest on any of the 
Bankfs Loans, or any other amount payable to the Bank hereunder or 
under any Letter of Credit Agreement, which is not paid when due 
(regardless of whether such balances are then due to the Company) , 
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in which case the Bank shall promptly notify the Company thereof, 
provided that the Bank's failure to give such notice shall not 
affect the validity thereof. Nothing contained herein shall 
require the Bank to exercise any such right or shall affect the 
right of the Bank to exercise, and retain the benefits of 
exercising, any such right with respect to any other indebtedness 
or obligation of the Company. 
4.04 Assumption of Risks. The Company assumes all risks 
cf the acts or omissions of beneficiaries of any of the Letters of 
Credit with respect to its use of the Letters of Credit. Except 
in the case of gross negligence or willful misconduct on the part 
of the Bank or any of its employees, neither the Bank nor the 
Bank's correspondents shall be responsible for the validity or 
genuineness of certificates or other documents, even if such 
certificates or other documents should in fact prove to be invalid, 
fraudulent or forged; for errors, omissions, interruptions or 
delays in transmissions or delivery of any messages by mail, telex, 
or otherwise, whether or not they be in code; for errors in 
translation or for errors in interpretation of technical terms; or 
for any other consequences arising from causes beyond the Bank'sr 
control; nor shall the Bank be responsible for any error, neglect, 
or default of any of the Bank's correspondents; and none of the 
above shall affect, impair or prevent the vesting of any of the 
Bank's rights or powers hereunder or under the Letter of Credit 
Agreements, all of which rights shall be cumulative. The Bank and 
the Bank's correspondents may accept certificates or other 
documents that appear on their face to be in order, without 
responsibility for further investigation. In furtherance and not 
in limitation of the foregoing provisions, the Company agrees that 
any action, inaction or omission taken or not taken by the Bank or 
by any correspondent for the Bank in absence of gross negligence 
or willful misconduct by the Bank in connection with any Letter of 
Credit, or any related drafts, certificates, documents or instru-
ments, shall be binding on the Company and shall not put the Bank 
or the Bank's correspondents under any resulting liability to the 
Company. 
4.05 Obligation to Reimburse and to Prepay. 
(a) If any draft or claim shall be presented for 
payment under a Letter of Credit, after confirming that 
such draft or claim complies with all requirements of the 
relevant Letter of Credit, the Bank shall promptly notify 
the Company verbally (confirming such notice promptly in 
writing) of the date and the amount of the draft or claim 
presented for payment. 
(b) If a disbursement by the Bank is made under any 
Letter of Credit and no Default under this Agreement 
shall have occurred and be continuing, the Company may 
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elect to have the amount of such disbursement up to the 
amount of the Revolving Credit/Letter of Credit 
Commitment then available treated as a Revolving Credit 
Loan to the Company as provided in Subsection 2.01(b) 
hereof, subject to the terms and conditions set forth in 
this Agreement. With respect to any disbursement under 
a Letter of Credit for which no such election is made or 
after and during the continuance of a Default, the 
Company shall pay to the Bank immediately after notice 
of any such disbursement is received by the Company in 
federal or other immediately available funds, the amount 
of each such disbursement made by the Bank under the 
Letter of Credit (if such payment is not sooner effected 
as may be required hereunder or under other provisions 
of the Letter of Credit Agreement), together with 
interest on the amount disbursed from and including the 
date of disbursement until payment in full of such 
disbursed amount at a varying rate per annum equal to the 
Prime Rate (as in effect from time to time) plus two 
percent (2%) (but in no event to exceed the Highest 
Lawful Rate). 
(c) The Company's obligation to make each such 
payment shall be absolute and unconditional and shall not 
be subject to any defense or be affected by any right of 
setoff, counterclaim or recoupment which the Company may 
now or hereafter have against any beneficiary of any 
Letter of Credit, the Bank, or any other Person for any 
reason whatsoever (but, without prejudice to any other 
provisions hereof, any such payment shall not waive, 
impair or otherwise adversely affect any claim, if any, 
that the Company may have against any beneficiary of a 
Letter of Credit, the Bank or any other Person). 
(d) In the event of the occurrence of any Event of 
Default, upon request of the Bank, an amount equal to the 
entire remaining obligation of the Bank under each 
outstanding Letter of Credit shall be deemed to be 
forthwith due and owing by the Company to the Bank as of 
the date of any such occurrence; and the Company's 
obligation to pay such amount shall be absolute and 
unconditional, and without regard to whether any 
beneficiary of any such Letter of Credit has attempted 
to draw down all or a portion of such amount under the 
terms of a Letter of Credit, and shall not be subject to 
any defense or be affected by a right of setoff, 
counterclaim or recoupment which the Company may now or 
hereafter have against any such beneficiary, the Bank, 
or any other Person for any reason whatsoever (but, 
without prejudice to any other provisions hereof, any 
such payment shall not waive, impair or otherwise 
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adversely affect any claim, if any, that the Company may 
have against any beneficiary of a Letter of Credit, the 
Bank or any other Person). The Company hereby grants a 
security interest in any such amounts to the Bank as 
security for all Indebtedness now or hereafter owing 
hereunder. In the event of any such prepayment (or 
prepayment of Letters of Credit pursuant to Section 2.05) 
by the Company of amounts contingently owing under 
outstanding Letters of Credit and in the event that 
thereafter drafts or other demands for payment complying 
with the terms of such Letters of Credit are not made 
prior to the respective expiration dates thereof, the 
Bank agrees, if no Event of Default has occurred and is 
continuing or if no other amounts are outstanding under 
this Agreement, the Notes or the Security Instruments, 
to remit to the Company amounts for which the contingent 
obligations evidenced by such Letters of Credit have 
ceased. 
Section 5. Increased Costs. 
(a) If, due to either (i) the introduction of or 
any change in or in the interpretation of any law or 
regulation or (ii) the compliance with any guideline or 
request from any central bank or other governmental 
authority (whether or not having the force of law), there 
shall be any increase in the cost to the Bank (other than 
an increase relating to taxes) specifically relating to 
the Bank's agreeing to make or making, funding or 
maintaining Loans hereunder, then the Company shall from 
time to time, upon demand by the Bank, pay to the Bank 
additional amounts sufficient to compensate the Bank for 
such increased or imposed cost. A certificate as to the 
amount of such increased cost, submitted to the Company 
by the Bank, shall be conclusive and binding for all 
purposes, absent manifest error. 
(b) If compliance with any law or regulation or any 
guideline or request from any central bank or other 
governmental authority (whether or not having force of 
law) affects or would affect the amount of capital 
required or expected to be maintained by the Bank or any 
corporation controlling the Bank and the Bank determines 
that the amount of such capital is increased by or based 
upon the existence of (i) the Bank's commitment to lend 
or extend other credit by letter of credit or otherwise 
hereunder or (ii) the Bank's obligation on one or more 
letters of credit or other similar credit enhancements 
issued pursuant hereto, then the Company shall from time 
to time, upon demand by the Bank, pay to the Bank, 
additional amounts sufficient to compensate the Bank in 
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the light of such circumstances, to the extent that the 
Bank reasonably determines such increase in capital to 
be allocable to the existence of the Bank's commitment 
or obligation. A certificate in reasonable detail as to 
the basis for and the amount of such compensation 
submitted to the Company by the Bank, shall be conclusive 
and binding for all purposes, absent manifest error. 
Section 6. Conditions Precedent. 
6.01 Initial Loan or Letter of Credit. 
The obligation of the Bank to renew, rearrange, modify 
and extend the Original Notes and to make the initial Loans 
hereunder is subject to the receipt by the Bank of the following 
documents and satisfaction of the other conditions provided in this 
Section 6.01 and as called for, Sections 6.02 and 6.03, each of 
which shall be satisfactory to the Bank in form and substance: 
(a) Certificates of the Secretary or Assistant 
Secretary of the Company and of the Calciner Operating 
Subsidiary setting forth (i) resolutions of its board of 
directors in form and substance satisfactory to the Bank 
with respect to the authorization of the Notes, this 
Agreement and the other Security Instruments provided 
herein, (ii) the officers of the Company and of the 
Calciner Operating Subsidiary (y) who are authorized to 
sign this Agreement, the Notes, and the other Security 
Instruments and (z) who will, until replaced by another 
officer or officers duly authorized for that purpose, 
act as its representative for the purposes of signing 
documents and giving notices and other communications in 
connection with this Agreement and the transactions 
contemplated hereby, (iii) specimen signatures of the 
officers so authorized, and (iv) that the articles or 
certificates of incorporation and the bylaws of the 
Company and the Calciner Operating Subsidiary have not 
been amended since June 3, 1992. The Bank may 
conclusively rely on such certificates until the Bank 
receives notice in writing from the Company or the 
Calciner Operating Subsidiary, as the case may be, to the 
contrary. 
(b) Certificates of the appropriate state agencies 
with respect to the valid existence and good standing of 
the Company and of the Calciner Operating Subsidiary. 
(c) A compliance certificate which shall be true 
and correct in all material respects and in the form of 
Exhibit C, duly and properly executed by an executive 
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officer of the Company, and dated as of the date of the 
initial borrowing. 
(d) The Notes, duly completed and executed. 
(e) The Security Instruments listed on Exhibit F 
hereto, duly completed and executed in sufficient number 
of counterparts for recording. 
(f) An opinion of Messrs. Bracewell & Patterson, 
counsel to the Company and the Calciner Operating 
Subsidiary, substantially in the form of Exhibit E 
hereto. 
(g) An original Consultation and Service Agreement 
executed by the parties thereto. 
(h) An original of the Option Agreement (CPI) 
executed by the parties thereto. 
(i) An original of the Option Agreement (Chase) 
executed by the parties thereto. 
(j) Such other documents as the Bank or special 
counsel to the Bank may reasonably request. 
6.02 Conditions Relating to Letters of Credit. In 
addition to the satisfaction of all other conditions precedent set 
forth in this Section 6, the issuance, renewal, extension or 
reissuance of the Letters of Credit referred to in Section 2.02(c) 
is subject to the following conditions precedent: 
(a) At least one (1) Business Days prior to the 
date of the issuance, renewal, extension or reissuance 
of each Letter of Credit, the Bank shall have received 
a Borrowing Request for a Letter of Credit. 
(b) The Company shall have duly and validly 
executed and delivered to the Bank a Letter of Credit 
Agreement pertaining to the Letter of Credit. 
6.03 Initial and Subsequent Loans. The obligation of 
the Bank to make Loans to the Company upon the occasion of each 
borrowing hereunder, or of the Bank to issue Letters of Credit 
(including the initial borrowing) is subject to the further 
conditions precedent that, as of the date of such Loans or issuance 
of Letters of Credit and after giving effect thereto: (i) no 
Default shall have occurred and be continuing; (ii) no condition 
causing a Material Adverse Effect shall have occurred and be 
continuing; and (iii) the representations and warranties made by 
the Company in Section 7 shall be true in all material respects on 
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and as of the date of the making of such Loans or the issuance of 
such Letter of Credit with the same force and effect as if made on 
and as of such date and following such new borrowing, except as 
such representations and warranties are modified to give effect to 
transactions expressly permitted hereby. Each request for a 
borrowing or request for the issuance, renewal, extension or 
reissuance of a Letter of Credit by the Company hereunder shall 
constitute a certification by the Company to the effect set forth 
in the preceding sentence (both as of the date of such notice and, 
unless the Company otherwise notifies the Bank prior to the date 
of and immediately following such borrowing, as of the date 
thereof). 
Section 7. Representations and Warranties. The Company 
represents and warrants to the Bank that (each representation and 
warranty herein is given as of the date of this Agreement and shall 
be deemed repeated and reaffirmed on the dates provided in 
Section 6.03): 
7.01 Corporate Existence. The Company and each 
Subsidiary: (a) is a corporation duly organized, legally existingr 
and in good standing under the laws of the jurisdiction of its 
incorporation; (b) has all requisite corporate power, and has all 
material governmental licenses, authorizations, consents and 
approvals necessary to own its assets and carry on its business as 
now being or as proposed to be conducted; and (c) is qualified to 
do business in all jurisdictions in which the nature of the 
business conducted by it makes such qualification necessary and 
where failure so to qualify would have a Material Adverse Effect. 
7.02 Financial Condition. 
(a) The audited consolidated and consolidating 
statements of income, stockholders1 equity and cash flows 
of the Company and its Subsidiaries for the Company's 
fiscal year ended September 30, 1991, and the related 
consolidated and consolidating balance sheet of the 
Company and its Subsidiaries as at the end of such fiscal 
year, and the unaudited consolidated and consolidating 
statements of income, stockholders' equity and cash flows 
of the Company and its Subsidiaries for the period ending 
April 30, 1992, and the related consolidated and 
consolidating balance sheet as at the end of such period 
heretofore furnished to the Bank, are complete and 
correct and fairly present the financial condition of the 
Company and its Subsidiaries and the results of 
operations of the Company and its Subsidiaries as at said 
date or dates and for the period or periods stated 
(subject only to normal year-end audit adjustments with 
respect to such unaudited interim statements), all in 
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accordance with generally accepted accounting principles 
and practices applied on a consistent basis. 
(b) Neither the Company nor any Subsidiary had, on 
the date set forth above, any material contingent 
liabilities, liabilities for taxes, unusual forward or 
long-term commitments or unrealized or anticipated losses 
from any unfavorable commitments, except as referred to 
or reflected or provided for in such financial statements 
as at said respective dates or in Schedule 7.02(b) 
hereto. Since April 30, 1992, there has been no change 
or event having a Material Adverse Effect. 
7.03 Liabilities: Litigation. Except for liabilities 
incurred in the normal course of business and those permitted 
hereby, neither the Company nor any Subsidiaries has any material 
(individually or in the aggregate) liabilities, direct or 
contingent, except as disclosed or referred to in the Financial 
Statements or as disclosed to the Bank in Schedule 7.03 or Schedule 
7.16 hereto. At the date of this Agreement, there is no 
litigation, legal, administrative or arbitral proceeding, 
investigation or other action of any nature pending or, to the 
knowledge of the Company threatened against or affecting the 
Company or any Subsidiary which could reasonably be expected to 
result in a judgment or liability not fully covered by insurance, 
and which would have a Material Adverse Effect. No unusual and 
unduly burdensome restriction, restraint, or hazard exists by 
contract, law or governmental regulation or otherwise relative to 
the business or Properties of the Company or any Subsidiary, except 
as disclosed to the Bank in Schedule 7.03 or Schedule 7.16 hereto. 
7.04 No Breach. Neither the execution and delivery by 
the Company or any Subsidiary of this Agreement, the Notes, or the 
other Security Instruments to which it is a party, nor compliance 
with the terms and provisions hereof by the Company or any 
Subsidiary will conflict with or result in a breach of, or require 
any consent under, the respective charter or by-laws of the Company 
or any Subsidiary, or (other than actions required to maintain 
compliance with Section 8.03(a)) any law or regulation applicable 
to the Company or any Subsidiary, or any order, writ, injunction 
or decree applicable to the Company or any Subsidiary of any court 
or governmental authority or agency, or any agreement or instrument 
to which the Company or any Subsidiary is a party or by which it 
is bound or to which it is subject, or constitute a default under 
any such agreement or instrument, or result in the creation or 
imposition of any Lien upon any of the revenues or assets of the 
Company or any Subsidiary pursuant to the terms of any such 
agreement or instrument. 
7.05 Corporate Action. Each of the Company and the 
Subsidiaries has all necessary corporate power and authority to 
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execute, deliver and perform its obligations under this Agreement, 
the Notes, or the other Security Instruments to which it is a 
party; and the execution, delivery and performance by each of the 
Company and the Subsidiaries of this Agreement, the Notes, or the 
other Security Instruments to which it is a party have been duly 
authorized by all necessary corporate action on its part; and this 
Agreement, the Notes and the Security Instruments constitute the 
legal, valid and binding obligations of each of the Company and the 
Subsidiaries to the extent they are respectively parties thereto, 
enforceable in accordance with their terms, subject to bankruptcy, 
insolvency, moratorium and other similar laws affecting generally 
the rights of creditors and to principles of equity. 
7.06 Approvals. No authorizations, approvals or 
consents of, and no filings or registrations with, any governmental 
or regulatory authority or agency are necessary for the execution, 
delivery or performance by the Company or any Subsidiary of this 
Agreement, the Notes, or the Security Instruments to which it is 
a party or for the validity or enforceability thereof against the 
Company or such Subsidiary other than such actions required to 
maintain compliance with Section 8.03(a) and such filings as arer 
required to properly perfect and record the Liens created by the 
Security Instruments. 
7.07 Use of Loans. The proceeds of the Term Loan and 
the initial Special Purpose Credit Loan shall be used to renew, 
rearrange, modify and extend the indebtedness evidenced by the 
Original Notes, and the proceeds of the Revolving Credit Loans 
shall be used for working capital or other general corporate 
purposes of the Company. The proceeds of all Special Purpose 
Credit Loans other than the initial Special Purpose Credit Loan 
shall be used for Capital Expenditures. Neither the Company nor 
any Subsidiary is engaged principally, or as one of its important 
activities, in the business of extending credit for the purpose, 
whether immediate, incidental or ultimate, of buying or carrying 
margin stock (within the meaning of Regulation U or X of the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) and no part of the 
proceeds of any Loan hereunder will be used to buy or carry any 
margin stock. 
7.08 ERISA. Each of the Company, the Subsidiaries and 
the ERISA Affiliates have fulfilled its obligations under the 
minimum funding standards of ERISA and the Code with respect to 
each Plan and are in compliance in all material respects with the 
presently applicable provisions of ERISA and the Code, and do not 
have any liability (other than current required payments to the 
Plan) to the PBGC or any Plan or Multiemployer Plan. 
7.09 Taxes. The Company and its Subsidiaries have at 
the date of this Agreement filed all United States Federal income 
tax returns and all other material tax returns which are required 
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to be filed and have paid all taxes due pursuant to such returns 
or pursuant to any assessment received by the Company or any 
Subsidiary. The charges, accruals and reserves on the books of the 
Company and its Subsidiaries in respect of taxes and other 
governmental charges are, in the opinion of the Company, adequate. 
7.10 Titles, etc. The Company and its Subsidiaries have 
good and defensible title to their respective material 
(individually or in the aggregate) Properties, free and clear of 
all Liens except Excepted Liens, Liens permitted by Section 9.02, 
and Liens disclosed to the Bank in Schedule 7.10. 
7.11 No Material Misstatements. No information, 
statement, exhibit, certificate, document or report furnished to 
the Bank by the Company or any Subsidiary in connection with the 
negotiation of this Agreement contained any material misstatement 
of fact or omitted to state a material fact or any fact necessary 
to make the statement contained therein not materially misleading 
which fact or statement could reasonably be expected to have a 
material effect on the Bank's decision to enter into this 
Agreement. 
7.12 Investment Company Act. Neither the Company nor 
any Subsidiary is an "investment company11 within the meaning of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended. 
7.13 Public Utility Holding Company Act. The Company 
is not a "holding company," or a "subsidiary company" of a 
"registered holding company," or an "affiliate" of a "registered 
holding company" or of a "subsidiary company" of a "registered 
holding company," or a "public utility" within the meaning of the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, as amended. 
7.14 Subsidiaries and Partnerships. As of the date of 
this Agreement, the Company has no Subsidiaries (except those 
identified in Section 9.03 hereof) and no interest in any partner-
ships. 
7.15 Location of Business and Offices. As of the date 
of this Agreement, the Companyfs principal place of business and 
chief executive office are located at the addresses stated on the 
signature page of this Agreement. 
7.16 Environmental Matters. Except as provided in 
Schedule 7.16 and except as would not have a Material Adverse 
Effect (or with respect to (c), (d), and (e) below, where the 
failure to take such actions would not have such a Material Adverse 
Effect): 
(a) Neither any Mortgaged Properties nor any other 
Properties owned by the Company or any Subsidiary nor the 
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operations conducted thereon violate any Environmental 
Laws or the order of any court or Governmental Authority 
with respect to Environmental Laws; 
(b) Without limitation of clause (a) above, neither 
the Mortgaged Properties nor any other Properties owned 
by the Company or any Subsidiary nor the operations 
currently conducted thereon or by any prior owner or 
operator of such Property or operation, are subject to 
any existing, pending or (to the knowledge of the 
Company) threatened action, suit, investigation, inquiry 
or proceeding by or before any court or Governmental 
Authority with respect to Environmental Laws or to any 
remedial obligations under Environmental Laws; 
(c) All notices, permits, licenses or similar 
authorizations, if any, required to be obtained or filed 
by the Company or any Subsidiary in connection with the 
operation or use of any and all Mortgaged Properties and 
other Property of the Company or any Subsidiary, 
including without limitation, the treatment, storage, 
disposal or release of a hazardous substance or solid 
waste into the environment, have been duly obtained or 
filed; 
(d) Since the inception of the applicable 
requirements of RCRA, all hazardous wastes generated at 
any and all Mortgaged Property and other Property of the 
Company or any Subsidiary and requiring disposal have 
been transported only by carriers then maintaining valid 
authorizations under RCRA and any other Environmental Law 
and treated and disposed of only at treatment, storage 
and disposal facilities then maintaining valid 
authorizations under RCRA and any other Environmental 
Law, which carriers and facilities to the knowledge of 
the Company have been and are operating in compliance 
with such authorizations; 
(e) The Company has taken the steps outlined in 
Schedule 7.16 to make a reasonable determination that no 
hazardous substances or solid waste have been disposed 
of or otherwise released and that there has been no 
threatened release of any hazardous substances on or to 
any Mortgaged Property or other Property of the Company 
or any Subsidiary except in compliance with Environ-
mental Laws; and 
(f) Neither the Company nor any Subsidiary has any 
material contingent liability in connection with any 
release or threatened release of any hazardous substance, 
-30-
solid waste or oil and gas exploration and production 
waste into the environment. 
7.17 Mortgaged Property. The Security Instruments 
delivered cover substantially all material Property of the Company 
and of the Calciner Operating Subsidiary. 
7.18 Defaults. 
(a) After giving effect to the transactions called 
for in Section 6.01, neither the Company nor any 
Subsidiary is in default nor has any event or 
circumstance occurred which, but for the passage of time 
or the giving of notice, or both, would constitute a 
default (in any respect which would have a Material 
Adverse Effect) under any material agreement or other 
instrument to which the Company or any Subsidiary is a 
party or by which the Company or any Subsidiary is bound. 
No Default hereunder has occurred and is continuing. 
(b) The Bank hereby waives all defaults and events 
of default under the Subordinated Debt existing on the 
date of this Agreement. Nothing in this Section 7.18(b) 
shall be construed to be a waiver by the Bank of any 
default or event of default which may occur after the 
date of this Agreement. 
7.19 Compliance with the Law. Except for environmental 
matters covered by Section 7.16, neither the Company nor any 
Subsidiary has violated any Governmental Requirement nor failed to 
obtain any license, permit, franchise or other governmental 
authorization necessary for the ownership of any of their 
respective Properties or the conduct of their respective 
businesses, which violation or failure would have (in the event 
such violation or failure were asserted by any Person through 
appropriate action) a Material Adverse Effect. 
Section 8. Affirmative Covenants. The Company agrees 
that, so long as any of the Commitments are in effect and until 
payment in full of all Indebtedness, all interest thereon and all 
other amounts payable by the Company hereunder: 
8.01 Financial Statements. The Company shall deliver, 
or shall cause to be delivered, to the Bank: 
(a) As soon as available and in any event within 
90 days after the end of each fiscal year of the Company, 
the audited consolidated and consolidating statements of 
income, stockholders' equity and cash flows of the 
Company and its Subsidiaries for such fiscal year, and 
the related consolidated and consolidating balance sheet 
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of the Company and its Subsidiaries as at the end of such 
fiscal year, and commencing on September 30, 1992, 
setting forth in each case in comparative form the 
corresponding figures for the preceding fiscal year, and 
accompanied by the related opinion of KPMG Peat Marwick 
or other independent public accountants of recognized 
national standing reasonably acceptable to the Bank 
which opinion shall state that said consolidated 
financial statements fairly present the financial 
condition and results of operations of the Company and 
its Subsidiaries as at the end of, and for, such fiscal 
year. 
(b) As soon as available and in any event within 
30 days after the end of each of the first three (3) 
fiscal quarterly periods of each fiscal year of the 
Company, consolidated and consolidating statements of 
income, stockholders1 equity and cash flows of the 
Company and its Subsidiaries for such period and for the 
period from the beginning of the respective fiscal year 
to the end of such period, and the related consolidated 
and consolidating balance sheet as at the end of such 
period, and commencing December 31, 1992, setting forth 
in each case in comparative form the corresponding 
figures for the corresponding period in the preceding 
fiscal year, accompanied by the certificate of the senior 
financial officer of the Company, which certificate shall 
state that said financial statements fairly present the 
financial condition and results of operations of the 
Company and its Subsidiaries in accordance with general-
ly accepted accounting principles, consistently applied, 
as at the end of, and for, such period (subject to normal 
year-end audit adjustments). 
(c) As soon as possible, and in any event within 
30 days of the end of each calendar month, consolidated 
and consolidating financial statements of the Company and 
its Subsidiaries for each such month in form and 
substance reasonably acceptable to the Bank. 
(d) As soon as available and in any event within 
30 days after the end of each fiscal quarterly period of 
each fiscal year of the Company, the Environmental 
Compliance Certificate of a responsible officer of the 
Company in the form of Exhibit D, certifying for such 
quarterly period either that (i) the Properties and 
operations of the Company and its Subsidiaries are in 
compliance with the provisions of Section 9.13, or, 
(ii) if the Company or any Subsidiary is not in 
compliance with Section 9.13, providing detail in form 
and substance satisfactory to the Bank as to the nature 
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of such non-compliance and what action the Company or 
such Subsidiary has taken or proposes to take with 
respect thereto. 
(e) As soon as possible, and in any event within 
ten days after the Company knows that any of the events 
or conditions specified below with respect to any Plan 
or Multiemployer Plan have occurred or exist, a statement 
signed by a senior financial officer of the Company 
setting forth details respecting such event or condition 
and the action, if any, which the Company, its 
Subsidiaries or its ERISA Affiliate proposes to take with 
respect thereto (and a copy of any report or notice 
required to be filed with or given to PBGC by the 
Company, its Subsidiaries or an ERISA Affiliate with 
respect to such event or condition): 
(i) any reportable event, as defined in 
Section 4043(b) of ERISA and the regulations issued 
thereunder, with respect to a Plan, as to which PBGC 
has not by regulation waived the requirement of 
Section 4043(a) of ERISA that it be notified within 
30 days of the occurrence of such event (provided 
that a failure to meet the minimum funding standard 
of Section 412 of the Code or Section 302 of ERISA 
shall be a reportable event regardless of the 
issuance of any waivers in accordance with Section 
412(d) of the Code); 
(ii) the filing under Section 4041 of ERISA of 
a notice of intent to terminate any Plan or the 
termination of any Plan; 
(iii) this institution by PBGC of proceedings 
under Section 4042 of ERISA for the termination of, 
or the appointment of a trustee to administer, any 
Plan, or the receipt by the Company or any 
Subsidiary or any ERISA Affiliate of a notice from 
a Multiemployer Plan that such action has been taken 
by PBGC with respect to such Multiemployer Plan; 
(iv) the complete or partial withdrawal by the 
Company or any Subsidiary or any ERISA Affiliate 
under Section 4201 or 4204 of ERISA from a Multi-
employer Plan, or the receipt by the Company or any 
Subsidiary or any ERISA Affiliate of notice from a 
Multiemployer Plan that is in reorganization or 
insolvency pursuant to Section 4241 or 4245 of ERISA 
or that it intends to terminate or has terminated 
under Section 4041A of ERISA; and 
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(v) the institution of a proceeding by a 
fiduciary of any Multiemployer Plan against the 
Company or any Subsidiary or any ERISA Affiliate to 
enforce Section 515 of ERISA, which proceeding is 
not dismissed within 30 days. 
(f) Promptly after the Company knows of the 
occurrence of any Event of Default, a notice of such 
Event of Default, describing the same in reasonable 
detail. 
(g) From time to time such other information 
regarding the business, affairs or financial condition 
of the Company and its Subsidiaries (including, without 
limitation, any Plan or Multiemployer Plan and any 
reports or other information required to be filed under 
ERISA) as the Bank may reasonably request. 
The Company will furnish to the Bank, at the time it furnishes each 
set of financial statements pursuant to paragraph (a) or (b) above, 
a certificate of a senior financial officer of the Company (i) tor 
the effect that no Default has occurred and is continuing (or, if 
any Default has occurred and is continuing, describing the same in 
reasonable detail) and (ii) setting forth in reasonable detail the 
computations necessary to determine whether the Company and its 
Subsidiaries are in compliance with Section 9.12 as of the end of 
the respective fiscal quarter or calendar year. 
8.02 Litigation. The Company, once it has notice, shall 
promptly give to the Bank notice of all legal or arbitral 
proceedings, and of all proceedings before any Governmental 
Authority, affecting the Company or any Subsidiary, except 
proceedings which, if adversely determined, would not reasonably 
be expected to have a Material Adverse Effect. 
8.03 Corporate Existence, Etc. 
(a) The Company shall and shall cause each 
Subsidiary to: preserve and maintain its corporate 
existence and all of its material rights, privileges and 
franchises except as provided by Section 9.08; keep books 
of record and account in which full, true and correct 
entries will be made of all dealings or transactions in 
relation to its business and activities; comply with the 
requirements of all applicable laws, rules, regulations 
and orders of governmental or regulatory authorities if 
failure to comply with such requirements would have a 
Material Adverse Effect; pay and discharge all material 
taxes, assessments and governmental charges or levies 
imposed on it or on its income or profits or on any of 
its Property prior to the date on which penalties attach 
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thereto, except for any such tax, assessment, charge or 
levy the payment of which is being contested in good 
faith and by proper proceedings and against which 
adequate reserves are being maintained; and permit 
representatives of the Bank, during normal business 
hours, to examine, copy and make extracts from its books 
and records, to inspect its Properties, and to discuss 
its business and affairs with its officers, all to the 
extent reasonably requested by the Bank. 
(b) The Company shall and shall cause each 
Subsidiary to keep insured by financially sound and 
reputable insurers all Property of a character usually 
insured by corporations engaged in the same or similar 
business similarly situated against loss or damage of the 
kinds and in the amounts customarily insured against by 
such corporations and carry such other insurance as is 
usually carried by such corporations. Upon request of 
the Bank, the Company will furnish or cause to be 
furnished to the Bank from time to time a summary of the 
insurance coverage of the Company and its Subsidiaries 
in form and substance reasonably satisfactory to the Bank 
and if requested will furnish the Bank copies of the 
applicable policies. In the case of any fire, accident 
or other casualty causing loss or damage to any material 
Properties of the Company, the proceeds of such policies 
shall be used, if such loss or damage is material (i) to 
repair or replace the damaged Property, or (ii) to prepay 
the Indebtedness. The Company will obtain endorsements 
to the policies pertaining to all physical Properties in 
which the Bank shall have a Lien under the Security 
Instruments, naming the Bank as a loss payee and 
containing provisions that such policies will not be 
cancelled without 30 days1 prior written notice having 
been given by the insurance company to the Bank. 
(c) The Company will and will cause each Subsidiary 
to, at its own expense, do or cause to be done all things 
reasonably necessary to preserve and keep in good repair, 
working order and efficiency all of the material 
Properties owned by the Company and its Subsidiaries 
including, without limitation, all material equipment, 
machinery and facilities, and from time to time will make 
all the reasonably necessary repairs, renewals and 
replacements so that at all times the state and condition 
of the material Properties owned by the Company and its 
Subsidiaries will be fully preserved and maintained. The 
Company will operate its material Properties or cause or 
use its best efforts to cause such Properties to be 
operated in a careful and efficient manner in accordance 
with the practices of the industry and in compliance in 
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all material respects with all applicable contracts and 
agreements and in compliance in all material respects 
with all Governmental Requirements. Nothing herein shall 
prevent the Company from discontinuing the operation, 
maintenance or repair or from failing to renew or replace 
any of its Properties, if such Property is not of 
material value and is otherwise not material in the 
operation of the Company. 
8.04 Further Assurances. The Company will and will 
cause each Subsidiary to cure promptly any defects in the creation 
and issuance of the Notes and the execution and delivery of the 
Security Instruments, including this Agreement. The Company at its 
expense will and will cause each Subsidiary to promptly execute and 
deliver to the Bank upon request all such other and further 
documents, agreements and instruments in compliance with or 
accomplishment of the covenants and agreements of the Company or 
any Subsidiary in the Security Instruments, including this 
Agreement, or to further evidence and more fully describe the 
collateral intended as security for the Notes, or to correct any 
omissions in the Security Instruments, or more fully state ther 
security obligations set out herein or in any of the Security 
Instruments, or to perfect, protect or preserve any Liens created 
pursuant to any of the Security Instruments, or to make any 
recordings, to file any notices, or to use its best efforts to 
obtain any consents, all as may be necessary or appropriate in 
connection therewith. 
8.05 Performance of Obligations. The Company will pay 
the Notes according to the reading, tenor and effect thereof; and 
the Company will and will cause each Subsidiary to do and perform 
every act and discharge all of the obligations provided to be 
performed and discharged by the Company or any Subsidiary under the 
Security Instruments, including this Agreement, at the time or 
times and in the manner specified. 
8.06 Calciner Agreement. The Company will and will 
cause the Calciner Operating Subsidiary to perform in all material 
respects all obligations to be performed by it under the Calciner 
Operating Agreement and maintain said agreement in full force and 
effect and will take such action as is necessary to keep the prior 
Liens of the U.S. Small Business Administration encumbering the 
Calciner current. The Company will and will cause the Calciner 
Operating Subsidiary to promptly notify the Bank of any default 
known to the Company or the Calciner Operating Subsidiary, as the 
case may be, in the prior Liens on the Calciner. 
8.07 Consultation and Service Agreement. The Company 
will perform in all material respects all obligations to be 
performed by the Company under the Consultation and Service 
Agreement pursuant to the terms thereof. 
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8.08 Option Agreement (CPI). The Company will perform 
in all material respects all obligations to be performed by the 
Company under the Option Agreement (CPI) pursuant to the terms 
thereof. The Company shall not enter into any amendment or 
supplement to the Option Agreement (CPI) without the prior written 
consent of the Bank. 
Section 9. Negative Covenants. The Company agrees that, 
so long as any of the Commitments are in effect and until payment 
in full of the Indebtedness, all interest thereon and all other 
amounts payable by the Company hereunder: 
9.01 Debt. Neither the Company nor any Subsidiary will 
incur, create, assume or suffer to exist any Debt, including, 
without limitation, the guarantee of the Debt of any other Person, 
except: 
(a) the Notes or other Indebtedness; 
(b) Debt of the Company and its Subsidiaries 
existing on the date of this Agreement which is reflected 
in the Financial Statements or is disclosed in 
Schedule 9.01, and any renewals and extensions (but not 
increases) thereof; 
(c) accounts payable (for the deferred purchase 
price of Property or services) from time to time incurred 
in the ordinary course of business and which, if greater 
than 90 days past the invoice or billing date, are being 
contested in good faith by the Company or its Subsidiary, 
as the case may be; 
(d) the Subordinated Debt; 
(e) obligations incurred in connection with surety 
and performance bonds purchased in the ordinary course 
of business; and 
(f) intercompany Debt permitted by Section 9.03 (b) . 
9.02 Liens. Neither the Company nor any Subsidiary will 
create, incur, assume or permit to exist any Lien on any of its 
Properties (now owned or hereafter acquired), except: 
(a) Liens securing the payment of any Indebt-
edness ; 
(b) Excepted Liens; 
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(c) Liens existing on Property owned by the Company 
or any Subsidiary on the date of this Agreement which 
have been disclosed to the Bank in Schedule 7.10, and any 
renewals and extensions thereof; and 
(d) Liens securing the Subordinated Debt. 
9.03 Investments. Loans and Advances. Neither the 
Company nor any Subsidiary will make or permit to remain 
outstanding any loans or advances to or investments in any Person, 
except that the foregoing restriction shall not apply to: 
(a) investments, loans or advances reflected in the 
Financial Statements or which are disclosed to the Bank 
in Schedule 9.03; and 
(b) the investments in the Calciner Operating 
Subsidiary and in Landmark Resources Inc. on the date 
hereof as reflected in the Financial Statements. 
9.04 Dividends. Distributions and Redemptions. Ther 
Company will not declare or pay any dividend, purchase, redeem or 
otherwise acquire for value any of its stock now or hereafter 
outstanding, return any capital to its stockholders, or make any 
distribution of its assets to its stockholders; provided, however, 
so long as no Default exists, the Company may redeem its stock so 
long as the total cost to the Company of such redemptions does not 
exceed $1,000.00 in the aggregate. 
9.05 Sales and Leasebacks. Neither the Company nor any 
Subsidiary will enter into any arrangement, directly or indirectly, 
with any Person whereby the Company or any Subsidiary shall sell 
or transfer any Property whether now owned or hereafter acquired, 
and whereby the Company or any Subsidiary shall then or thereafter 
rent or lease as lessee such Property or any part thereof or other 
Property which the Company or any Subsidiary intends to use for 
substantially the same purpose or purposes as the Property sold or 
transferred. 
9.06 Nature of Business. The Company will not allow any 
material change to be made in the character of its principal 
business of owning and operating the Western Slope Properties. 
9.07 Limitation on Leases. Neither the Company nor any 
Subsidiary will create, incur, assume or suffer to exist any 
obligation for the payment of rent or hire of Property of any kind 
whatsoever (real or personal), under leases or lease agreements 
which would cause the aggregate amount of all payments made by the 
Company and its Subsidiaries (determined on a consolidated basis) 
pursuant to such leases or lease agreements to exceed $750,000 in 
any period of twelve consecutive calendar months. 
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9.08 Mergers, Etc. The Company will not merge into or 
with or consolidate with any other Person, or sell, lease or 
otherwise dispose of (whether in one transaction or in a series of 
transactions) all or any substantial part of its Property or assets 
to any other Person, or permit any Subsidiary to do so; provided. 
however, any Subsidiary may be merged into the Company with the 
Company being the surviving corporation, provided such merger will 
not create a Default hereunder. 
9.09 Proceeds of Notes. The Company will not permit the 
proceeds of the Notes to be used for any purpose other than those 
permitted by Section 7.07. 
9.10 ERISA Compliance. The Company and the Subsidiaries 
will not at any time permit any Plan maintained by it to: 
(a) engage in any "prohibited transaction" as such 
term is defined in Section 4975 of the Code; 
(b) Except as provided in Schedule 9.10, incur any 
"accumulated funding deficiency" in excess of $100,000 
as such term is defined in Section 302 of ERISA; or 
(c) terminate any such Plan in a manner which could 
result in the imposition of a Lien on the Property of the 
Company or any Subsidiary pursuant to Section 4068 of 
ERISA. 
9.11 Sale or Discount of Receivables. Neither the 
Company nor any Subsidiary will discount (except pursuant to 
standard industry terms in the ordinary course of business) or sell 
(with or without recourse) any of its notes receivable or accounts 
receivable. 
9.12 Current Ratio. The Company will not permit its 
ratio of (i) current assets to (ii) current liabilities to be less 
than 1.0 to 1.0 at the end of any fiscal quarter. As used in this 
Section, current assets shall include unused credit availability 
under the Revolving Credit/Letter of Credit Commitment and the 
Special Purpose Credit Commitment and current liabilities will not 
include current maturities of Debt permitted under Section 9.01 
other than Section 9.01(c). 
9.13 Environmental Matters. Except for those 
pre-existing matters disclosed on Schedule 7.16, neither the 
Company nor any Subsidiary will cause or permit any of its Property 
to be in violation of, or do anything or permit anything to be done 
which will subject any such Property to any remedial obligations 
(other than customary closure obligations) under any Environmental 
Laws, assuming disclosure to the applicable Governmental Authority 
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of all relevant facts, conditions and circumstances, if any, 
pertaining to such Property, except for any such violations or 
remedial obligations (individually or in the aggregate) which would 
not have a Material Adverse Effect. The Company will establish and 
implement such procedures as may be necessary to determine and 
provide reasonable assurance, consistent with generally accepted 
industry standards and practices and any applicable Environmental 
Laws, that (i) except for integral Refinery operations where 
adequate reserves or other financial assurances have been 
established to cover all such closure or cleanup obligations, no 
solid wastes are disposed of on any Property owned by the Company 
or any Subsidiary in quantities or locations that would require 
remedial action under any Environmental Laws, (ii) no hazardous 
substance will be released on or to any such Property except in 
compliance with Environmental Laws, (iii) no hazardous substance 
is released on or to any such Property so as to pose an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to public health or welfare or the 
environment; (iv) all hazardous wastes generated by the Company or 
any Subsidiary or on any Property of the Company or any Subsidiary 
and requiring disposal will be transported only by carriers 
maintaining valid RCRA authorizations and treated, stored, andr 
disposed of only by facilities operating in compliance with RCRA, 
and (v) the Company and the Subsidiaries and their respective 
Property and operations will maintain and operate in compliance 
with all permits, licenses, and similar authorizations required 
pursuant to any Environmental Laws. The Company covenants and 
agrees to, and will cause its Subsidiaries to, take any remedial 
action required on its Property under any Environmental Laws 
promptly upon discovery of such remedial obligations. 
9.14 Transactions with Affiliates. Neither the Company 
nor any Subsidiary shall enter into any transaction, including, 
without limitation, any purchase, sale, lease or exchange of 
property or the rendering of any service, with any Affiliate unless 
such transactions are in the ordinary course of the Company's or 
Subsidiary's business, are upon fair and reasonable terms no less 
favorable to the Company or Subsidiary than it would obtain in a 
comparable arm's length transaction with a Person not an Affili-
ate and are not prohibited by this Agreement. 
9.15 Subordinated Debt. The Company will neither prepay 
nor amend the Subordinated Debt. 
Section 10. Events of Default. If one or more of the 
following events (herein called "Events of Default") shall occur 
and be continuing: 
(a) The Company shall default in the payment when 
due of any principal of any Loan or of any reimbursement 
obligations for disbursements made under any Letter of 
Credit; or 
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(b) The Company shall default in the payment when 
due of (i) interest for any three calendar months in any 
twelve (12) month period or (ii) any fees or other amount 
payable by it hereunder and not described in (a) above 
and such default shall continue unremedied for 3 Business 
Days; or 
(c) The Company shall default in the payment when 
due of any principal of or interest on any of its other 
Debt incurred after the date hereof in an amount in 
excess of $100,000; or any event specified in any note, 
agreement, indenture or other document evidencing or 
relating to any such Debt shall occur if the effect of 
such event is to cause, or (with the giving of any notice 
or the lapse of time or both) to permit the holder or 
holders of such Debt (or a trustee or agent on behalf of 
such holder or holders) to cause, such Debt to become due 
prior to its stated maturity; or 
(d) Any representation, warranty or certification 
made or deemed made herein or in any other Security 
Instrument by the Company or any Subsidiary, or any 
certificate furnished to the Bank pursuant to the 
provisions hereof or any other Security Instrument, shall 
prove to have been false or misleading as of the time 
made or furnished in any material respect; or 
(e) The Company shall default in the performance 
of any of its obligations under Section 9 (except Section 
9.13); or 
(f) The Company shall default in the performance 
of any of its other obligations in this Agreement, other 
than its obligations under Section 9 (with the exception 
of Section 9.13), and such default shall continue 
unremedied for a period of 30 days after notice thereof 
to the Company by the Bank; or 
(g) The Company shall admit in writing its 
inability to, or be generally unable to, pay its debts 
as such debts become due; or 
(h) The Company shall (i) apply for or consent to 
the appointment of, or the taking of possession by, a 
receiver, custodian, trustee or liquidator of itself or 
of all or a substantial part of its Property, (ii) make 
a general assignment for the benefit of its creditors, 
(iii) commence a voluntary case under the Federal 
Bankruptcy Code (as now or hereafter in effect) , (iv) fi-
le a petition seeking to take advantage of any other law 
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relating to its bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, 
winding-up, or composition or readjustment of its debts, 
(v) fail to controvert in a timely and appropriate 
manner, or acquiesce in writing to, any petition filed 
against it in an involuntary case under the Federal 
Bankruptcy Code, or (vi) take any corporate action for 
the purpose of effecting any of the foregoing; or 
(i) A proceeding or case shall be commenced, 
without the application or consent of the Company, in any 
court of competent jurisdiction, seeking (i) its liquida-
tion, reorganization, dissolution or winding-up, or the 
composition or readjustment of its debts, (ii) the 
appointment of a trustee, receiver, custodian, liquidator 
or the like of the Company or of all or any substantial 
part of its assets, or (iii) similar relief in respect 
of the Company under any law relating to bankruptcy, 
insolvency, reorganization, winding-up, or composition 
or adjustment of debts, and such proceeding or case shall 
continue undismissed, or an order, judgment or decree 
approving or ordering any of the foregoing shall be 
entered and continue unstayed and in effect, for a period 
of 60 days; or an order for relief against the Company 
shall be entered in an involuntary case under the Federal 
Bankruptcy Code; or 
(j) A final judgment or judgments for the payment 
of money in excess of $100,000 in the aggregate shall be 
rendered by a court or courts against the Company and 
the same shall not be discharged (or provision shall not 
be made for such discharge) , or a stay of execution 
thereof shall not be procured, within 30 days from the 
date of entry thereof and the Company shall not, within 
said period of 30 days, or such longer period during 
which execution of the same shall have been stayed, 
appeal therefrom and cause the execution thereof to be 
stayed during such appeal; or 
(k) An event or condition specified in Section 9.10 
shall occur or exist with respect to any Plan or 
Multiemployer Plan and, as a result of such event or 
condition, together with all other such events or 
conditions, the Company or any Subsidiary or any ERISA 
Affiliate shall incur or in the opinion of the Bank shall 
be reasonably likely to incur a liability to a Plan, a 
Multiemployer Plan or PBGC (or any combination of the 
foregoing) which is, in the determination of the Bank, 
material in relation to the financial position of the 
Company; or 
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(1) The Company or any Subsidiary shall default 
in the due observance or performance of any of the 
covenants or agreements contained in any Security 
Instrument other than this Agreement, and such default 
shall continue unremedied for a period of 30 days after 
notice thereof to the Company or such Subsidiary by the 
Bank; or 
(m) Except as otherwise permitted in Section 9.04, 
any stockholder of the Company shall transfer stock in 
the Company to any Person other than a Person who is a 
stockholder in the Company on the date hereof other than 
transfers to heirs by reason of death; or 
(n) Any Subsidiary takes, suffers or permits to 
exist as to such Subsidiary any of the events or 
conditions referred to in clause (g), (h), (i) or (j) of 
this Section 10; or 
(o) The Company shall default in the due observance 
or performance of any of the Company's agreements or 
obligations contained in the Consultation and Service 
Agreement and such default shall continue unremedied 
beyond the expiration of any applicable grace period 
therein provided, or the Consultation and Service 
Agreement shall have terminated; or 
(p) The Option Agreement (CPI) after delivery 
thereof shall for any reason, except to the extent 
permitted by the terms thereof, cease to be in full force 
and effect and valid, binding and enforceable in 
accordance with its terms; 
THEREUPON: (i) in the* case of an Event of Default other than one 
referred to in clause (g), (h) or (i) of this Section 10, or in 
clause (n) of this Section 10 to the extent that such clause refers 
to such clauses (g), (h) or (i), the Bank shall, by notice to the 
Company, cancel the Commitments and/or declare the principal amount 
then outstanding of and the accrued interest on the Loans and all 
other amounts payable by the Company hereunder and under the Notes 
to be forthwith due and payable, whereupon such amounts shall be 
immediately due and payable without presentment, demand, protest, 
notice of intent to accelerate, notice of acceleration or other 
formalities of any kind, all of which are hereby expressly waived 
by the Company; and (ii) in the case of the occurrence of an Event 
of Default referred to in clause (g) , (h) or (i) of this 
Section 10, or in clause (n) of this Section 10 to the extent that 
such clause refers to such clauses (g) , (h) or (i) , the Commitments 
shall be automatically cancelled and the principal amount then 
outstanding of, and the accrued interest on, the Loans and all 
other amounts payable by the Company hereunder and under the Notes 
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shall become automatically immediately due and payable without 
presentment, demand, protest, notice of intent to accelerate, 
notice of acceleration or other formalities of any kind, all of 
which are hereby expressly waived by the Company. 
Section 11. Miscellaneous. 
11.01 Waiver. No failure on the part of the Bank to 
exercise and no delay in exercising, and no course of dealing with 
respect to, any right, power or privilege under this Agreement or 
any Note shall operate as a waiver thereof, nor shall any single 
or partial exercise of any right, power or privilege under this 
Agreement or any Note preclude any other or further exercise 
thereof or the exercise of any other right, power or privilege. 
The remedies provided herein are cumulative and not exclusive of 
any remedies provided by law. 
11.02 Notices. All notices and other communications 
provided for herein and in the other Security Instruments 
(including, without limitation, any modifications of, or waivers 
or consents under, this Agreement or the other Security* 
Instruments) shall be given or made by telex, telecopy, telegraph, 
cable or in writing and telexed, telecopied, telegraphed, cabled, 
mailed or delivered to the intended recipient at the "Address for 
Notices" specified below its name on the signature pages hereof or 
in the other Security Instruments; or, as to any party, at such 
other address as shall be designated by such party in a notice to 
each other party. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement 
or in the other Security Instruments, all such communications shall 
be deemed to have been duly given when transmitted by telex or 
telecopier, delivered to the telegraph or cable office or 
personally delivered or, in the case of a mailed notice, upon 
receipt, in each case given or addressed as aforesaid. 
11.03 Payment of Expenses, Indemnities, etc. The 
Company agrees to: 
(a) whether or not the transactions hereby 
contemplated are consummated, pay all reasonable expenses 
of the Bank in the administration (both before and after 
the execution hereof and including advice of counsel as 
to the rights and duties of the Bank with respect 
thereto) of, and in connection with the negotiation, 
investigation, preparation, execution and delivery of, 
recording or filing of, preservation of rights under, 
enforcement of, and refinancing, renegotiation or 
restructuring of, this Agreement, the Notes, the Letters 
of Credit, the Letter of Credit Agreements and the other 
Security Instruments and any amendment, waiver or consent 
relating thereto (including, without limitation, the 
reasonable fees and disbursements of counsel for the 
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Bank); and promptly reimburse the Bank for all amounts 
expended, advanced or incurred by the Bank to satisfy any 
obligation of the Company under this Agreement, the 
Letters of Credit, the Letter of Credit Agreements or any 
Security Instrument; 
(b) pay and hold the Bank harmless from and against 
any and all present and future stamp and other similar 
taxes with respect to the foregoing matters and save the 
Bank harmless from and against any and all liabilities 
with respect to or resulting from any delay or omission 
to pay such taxes; and 
(c) indemnify the Bank, its officers, directors, 
employees, representatives, agents and affiliates from, 
hold each of them harmless against, promptly upon demand 
pay or reimburse each of them for, and refrain from 
creating or asserting against any of them, any and all 
actions, suits, proceedings (including any 
investigations, litigation or inquiries), claims, 
demands, causes of action, costs, losses, liabilities, 
damages or expenses of any kind or nature whatsoever 
regardless of whether foreseeably caused by the ordinary 
negligence of the Bank (collectively the tf Indemnity 
Matters") which may be incurred by or asserted against 
or involve any of them (whether or not any of them is 
designated a party thereto) as a result of, arising out 
of or in any way related to (i) any actual or proposed 
use by the Company of the proceeds of any of the Loans 
or Letters of Credit or (ii) any other aspect of this 
Agreement, the Notes, the Letters of Credit, the Letter 
of Credit Agreements and the other Security Instruments, 
including, without limitation, the reasonable fees and 
disbursements of counsel and all other expenses incurred 
in connection with investigating, defending or preparing 
to defend any such action, suit, proceeding (including 
any investigations, litigation or inquiries) or claim, 
but excluding from this clause (ii) all Indemnity Matters 
to the extent resulting from claims between the Bank and 
a Bank shareholder or from the gross negligence or 
willful misconduct on the part of the Bank; and 
(d) indemnify and hold the Bank, its officers, 
directors, employees, representatives, agents and 
affiliates harmless against, promptly to pay on demand 
or reimburse each of them with respect to, any and all 
claims, demands, causes of action, loss, damage, 
liabilities, costs and expenses regardless of whether 
foreseeably caused by the ordinary negligence of the Bank 
of any and every kind or nature whatsoever asserted 
against or incurred by any of them by reason of or 
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arising out of or in any way related to (i) the breach 
of any representation or warranty as set forth herein 
regarding Environmental Laws, or (ii) the failure of the 
Company to perform any obligation required to be 
performed pursuant to Environmental Laws. The foregoing 
indemnity shall not apply with respect to matters caused 
by or arising out of the sole negligence, sole gross 
negligence or sole willful misconduct of the Bank. The 
Bank shall give notice to the Company of any such claim 
or demand being made against the Bank and the Company 
shall have the non-exclusive right to join in the defense 
against any such claim or demand. 
11.04 Amendments. Etc. Any provision of this Agreement 
or any other Security Instrument may be amended, modified or waived 
if, but only if, such amendment, modification or waiver is in 
writing and is signed by the Company (and/or any other Person which 
is a party to any Security Instrument being amended or with respect 
to which a waiver is begin obtained) and the Bank. 
11.05 Successors and Assigns. All covenants andr 
agreements contained by or on behalf of the Company or any 
Subsidiary in the Notes, this Agreement and any other Security 
Instrument shall bind its successors and assigns and shall inure 
to the benefit of the Bank and its successors and assigns. The 
Company shall not, however, have the right to assign its rights 
under this Agreement, any Letter of Credit Agreement, or any 
interest herein or therein, without the prior written consent of 
the Bank. In the event that the Bank sells participations in the 
Notes or other Indebtedness of the Company incurred or to be 
incurred pursuant to the Agreement or any Letter of Credit 
Agreement, to other lenders, each of such other lenders shall have 
the rights of set off against such Indebtedness and similar rights 
or Liens to the same extent as may be available to the Bank. 
11.06 Invalidity. In the event that any one or more of 
the provisions contained in the Notes, this Agreement or in any 
other Security Instrument shall, for any reason, be held invalid, 
illegal or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, 
illegality or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision 
of the Notes, this Agreement or any other Security Instrument. 
11.07 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in 
any number of counterparts, all of which taken together shall 
constitute one and the same instrument and any of the parties 
hereto may execute this Agreement by signing any such counterpart. 
11.08 References. The words "herein,11 "hereof," 
"hereunder" and other words of similar import when used in this 
Agreement refer to this Agreement as a whole, and not to any 
particular article, section or subsection. Any reference herein 
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to a Section or Subsection shall be deemed to refer to the 
applicable Section or Subsection of this Agreement unless otherwise 
stated herein. Any reference herein to an exhibit or schedule 
shall be deemed to refer to the applicable exhibit or schedule 
attached hereto unless otherwise stated herein. 
11.09 Survival. The obligations of the Company under 
Sections 5 and 11.03 shall survive the repayment of the 
Indebtedness, the expiration of the Letters of Credit and the 
termination of the Commitments. 
11.10 Captions. Captions and section headings appearing 
herein are included solely for convenience of reference and are not 
intended to affect the interpretation of any provision of this 
Agreement. 
11.11 GOVERNING LAW: SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION. 
(a) THIS AGREEMENT AND THE NOTES SHALL BE GOVERNED 
BY. AND CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH. THE LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK. 
(b) ANY LEGAL ACTION OR PROCEEDING WITH RESPECT TO 
THIS AGREEMENT
 f THE NOTES OR THE OTHER SECURITY 
INSTRUMENTS MAY BE BROUGHT IN THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK OR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR THE 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, AND# BY EXECUTION AND 
DELIVERY OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE COMPANY HEREBY ACCEPTS 
FOR ITSELF AND (TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW) IN 
RESPECT OF ITS PROPERTY, GENERALLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY, 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE AFORESAID COURTS. THE COMPANY 
HEREBY IRREVOCABLY WAIVES (TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY 
LAW) ANY OBJECTION, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY 
OBJECTION TO THE LAYING OF VENUE OR BASED ON THE GROUNDS 
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS. WHICH IT MAY NOW OR HEREAFTER 
HAVE TO THE BRINGING OF ANY SUCH ACTION OR PROCEEDING IN 
SUCH RESPECTIVE JURISDICTIONS^. THIS SUBMISSION TO 
JURISDICTION IS NONEXCLUSIVE AND DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE 
BANK FROM OBTAINING JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPANY IN ANY 
COURT OTHERWISE HAVING JURISDICTION. 
(c) The Company hereby irrevocably designates 
CT Corporation System located at 277 Park Avenue, New 
York, New York 10017, as the designee, appointee and 
agent of the Company to receive, for and on behalf of the 
Company, service of process in such respective 
jurisdictions in any legal action or proceeding with 
respect to this Agreement, the Notes or the other 
Security Instruments. It is understood that a copy of 
such process served on such agent will be promptly 
forwarded by overnight courier to the Company at its 
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address for notices pursuant to Section 11.02 set forth 
opposite its signature below, but the failure of the 
Company to receive such copy shall not affect in any way 
the service of such process. The Company further irrevo-
cably consents to the service of process of any of the 
aforementioned courts in any such action or proceeding 
by the mailing of copies thereof by registered or 
certified mail, postage prepaid, to the Company at its 
said address, such service to become effective 30 days 
after such mailing. 
(d) Nothing herein shall affect the right of the 
Bank or any holder of a Note to serve process in any 
other manner permitted by law or to commence legal 
proceedings or otherwise proceed against the Company in 
any other jurisdiction. 
11.12 Interest. It is the intention of the parties 
hereto that the Bank shall conform strictly to usury laws 
applicable to it. Accordingly, if the transactions contemplated 
hereby would be usurious as to the Bank under laws applicable to 
it (including the laws of the United States of America and the 
State of New York or any other jurisdiction whose laws may be 
mandatorily applicable to the Bank notwithstanding the other 
provisions of this Agreement), then, in that event, notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary in the Notes, this Agreement or in any 
other Security Instrument or agreement entered into in connection 
with or as security for the Notes, it is agreed as follows: 
(i) the aggregate of all consideration which constitutes interest 
under law applicable to the Bank that is contracted for, taken, 
reserved, charged or received by the Bank under the Notes, this 
Agreement or under any of the other aforesaid Security Instruments 
or agreements or otherwise in connection with the Notes shall under 
no circumstances exceed the maximum amount allowed by such 
applicable law, and any excess shall be cancelled automatically and 
if theretofore paid shall be credited by the Bank on the principal 
amount of the Indebtedness (or, to the extent that the principal 
amount of the Indebtedness shall have been or would thereby be paid 
in full, refunded by the Bank to the Company); and (ii) in the 
event that the maturity of the Notes is accelerated by reason of 
an election of the holder thereof resulting from any Event of 
Default under this Agreement or otherwise, or in the event of any 
required or permitted prepayment, then such consideration that 
constitutes interest under law applicable to the Bank may never 
include more than the maximum amount allowed by such applicable 
law, and excess interest, if any, provided for in this Agreement 
or otherwise shall be cancelled automatically by the Bank as of the 
date of such acceleration or prepayment and, if theretofore paid, 
shall be credited by the Bank on the principal amount of the 
Indebtedness (or, to the extent that the principal amount of the 
Indebtedness shall have been or would thereby be paid in full, 
_/1 Q _ 
refunded by the Bank to the Company). All sums paid or agreed to 
be paid to the Bank for the use, forbearance or detention of sums 
due hereunder shall, to the extent permitted by law applicable to 
the Bank, be amortized, prorated, allocated and spread in equal 
parts throughout the full term of the Loans evidenced by the Notes 
until payment in full so that the rate or amount of interest on 
account of any Loans hereunder does not exceed the maximum amount 
allowed by such applicable law. If at any time and from time to 
time (i) the amount of interest payable to the Bank on any date 
shall be computed at the Highest Lawful Rate applicable to the Bank 
pursuant to this Section and (ii) in respect of any subsequent 
interest computation period the amount of interest otherwise 
payable to the Bank would be less than the amount of interest 
payable to the Bank computed at the Highest Lawful Rate applicable 
to the Bank, then the amount of interest payable to the Bank in 
respect of such subsequent interest computation period shall 
continue to be computed at the Highest Lawful Rate applicable to 
the Bank until the total amount of interest payable to the Bank 
shall equal the total amount of interest which would have been 
payable to the Bank if the total amount of interest had been 
computed without giving effect to this Section. 
Without limiting the intent of the parties expressed 
under Sections 11.11 and 11.12, to the extent, if any, that 
Article 5069-1.04 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes is relevant 
to the Bank for the purpose of determining the Highest Lawful Rate, 
the Bank hereby elects to determine the applicable rate ceiling 
under such Article by the indicated (weekly) rate ceiling from time 
to time in effect and, in no event, shall Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
Art. 5069, ch. 15 (which regulates certain revolving credit loan 
accounts and revolving tri-party accounts) apply to this Agreement 
or the Notes. 
11.13 Senior Debt. The Indebtedness incurred and to be 
incurred hereunder is and shall be Senior Debt, as defined in the 
Subordinated Debt and is and shall be entitled to all of the rights 
and benefits afforded to such Senioif Debt. 
11.14 Effectiveness. This Agreement shall not be 
effective until the date that it is delivered to the Bank in the 
State of New York, accepted by the Bank in such State, and executed 
by the Bank in such State. 
The parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be duly 
executed as of the day and year first above written. 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM INC. 
By: 
H.'R. 
President 
Address for Notices and Chief 
Executive Office: 
50 West 990 South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Telecopier No.: (801) 734-6400 
Telephone No.: (801) 734-6556 
Attention: Robert W. Anderson 
Address for principal place of 
business: 
1193 Highway 6 & 50 
Fruita# Colorado 81521 
THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANKf N.A. 
By: ./); 'H-U<: - /
 c^-^ ^ -^ 
ss:, 'f^imm^ 
Address for Notices: 
The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza 
New York, New York 10005 
Telecopier No.: (212) 552-1687 
Telephone No.: (212) 552-6362 
Attention: Vito Cipriano 
with a copy to: 
Chase National Corporate Services, Inc. 
1100 Milam, Suite 2345 
Houston, Texas 77002 
Telecopier No.: (713) 751-9122 
Telephone No.: (713) 751-5661 
Attention: Peter Licalzi 
EXHIBIT A 
[Form of Term Note] 
$ New York, New York , 1992 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, LANDMARK PETROLEUM INC., a Delaware 
corporation (the "Company"), hereby promises to pay to the order 
of THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A. (the "Bank"), at the Principal 
Office of the Bank located at 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, 
New York 10005, the principal sum of 
Dollars ($ ) , in lawful money of the United States of 
America and in immediately available funds, on the dates and in the 
principal amounts provided in the Credit Agreement referred to 
below with respect to the Term Loan, and to pay, to the extent 
permitted by law, interest on the unpaid principal amount of, and 
any overdue interest on, the Term Loan, at such office, in like 
money and funds, for the period commencing on the date of the Term 
Loan until the Term Loan shall be paid in full, at the rates perr 
annum and on the dates provided in the Credit Agreement. 
This Note is one of the Notes referred to in the Amended 
and Restated Credit Agreement (together with all amendments or 
supplements thereto, the "Credit Agreement") dated as of , 
1992, between the Company and the Bank, and evidences the Term Loan 
made by the Bank thereunder. Capitalized terms used in this Note 
have the respective meanings assigned to them in the Credit 
Agreement. 
The Credit Agreement provides for the acceleration of the 
maturity of this Note upon the occurrence of certain events and for 
prepayments upon the terms and conditions specified therein. 
THIS NOTE SHALL BE GOVERNED BY AND CONSTRUED IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM INC. 
By: 
Name: 
Title: 
A-l 
EXHIBIT B-l 
[Form of Revolving Credit Note] 
$ New York, New York , 1992 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, LANDMARK PETROLEUM INC., a Delaware 
corporation (the ftCompany'M , hereby promises to pay to the order 
of THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A. (the "Bank") . at the Principal 
Office of the Bank located at 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, 
New York 10005, the principal sum of 
Dollars ($ ) (or such lesser amount as shall equal the 
aggregate unpaid principal amount of the Revolving Credit Loans 
made by the Bank to the Company under the Credit Agreement referred 
to below), in lawful money of the United States of America and in 
immediately available funds, on the dates and in the principal 
amounts provided in the Credit Agreement referred to below with 
respect to Revolving Credit Loans, and to pay, to the extent 
permitted by law, interest on the unpaid principal amount of, andP 
any overdue interest on, each such Revolving Credit Loan, at such 
office, in like money and funds, for the period commencing on the 
date of such Revolving Credit Loan until such Revolving Credit Loan 
shall be paid in full, at the rates per annum and on the dates 
provided in the Credit Agreement. 
The date and amount of each Revolving Credit Loan made 
by the Bank to the Company, and each payment made on account of the 
principal thereof, shall be recorded by the Bank on its books and, 
prior to any transfer of this Note, endorsed by the Bank on the 
schedule attached hereto or any continuation thereof. 
This Note is one of the Notes referred to in the Amended 
and Restated Credit Agreement (together with all amendments or 
supplements thereto, the "Credit Agreement") dated as of 
__, 1992, between the Company and the Bank, and evidences 
Revolving Credit Loans made by the Bank thereunder. Capitalized 
terms used in this Note have the respective meanings assigned to 
them in the Credit Agreement. 
The Credit Agreement provides for the acceleration of the 
maturity of this Note upon the occurrence of certain events and for 
prepayments of Revolving Credit Loans upon the terms and conditions 
specified therein. 
B-l-1 
THIS NOT? ?ffMrTr BE GOVERNED BY AND CONSTRUED IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM INC. 
By: 
Name: 
Title: 
B-l-2 
LOANS 
Date Principal Amount Amount of Unpaid 
of Amount Paid or Interest Principal Notation 
Loan of Loan Prepaid Paid Amount Made By 
B-l-3 
EXHIBIT B-2 
[Form of Special Purpose Credit Note] 
$ New York, New York , 1992 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, LANDMARK PETROLEUM INC., a Delaware 
corporation (the "Company"), hereby promises to pay to the order 
of THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK# N.A. (the "Bank") . at the Principal 
Office of the Bank located at 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, 
New York 10005, the principal sum of 
Dollars ($ ) (or such lesser amount as shall equal the 
aggregate unpaid principal amount of the Special Purpose Credit 
Loans made by the Bank to the Company under the Credit Agreement 
referred to below), in lawful money of the United States of America 
and in immediately available funds, on the dates and in the 
principal amounts provided in the Credit Agreement referred to 
below with respect to Special Purpose Credit Loans, and to pay, to 
the extent permitted by law, interest on the unpaid principalr 
amount of, and any overdue interest on, each such Special Purpose 
Credit Loan, at such office, in like money and funds, for the 
period commencing on the date of such Special Purpose Credit Loan 
until such Special Purpose Credit Loan shall be paid in full, at 
the rates per annum and on the dates provided in the Credit 
Agreement. 
The date and amount of each Special Purpose Credit Loan 
made by the Bank to the Company, and each payment made on account 
of the principal thereof, shall be recorded by the Bank on its 
books and, prior to any transfer of this Note, endorsed by the Bank 
on the schedule attached hereto or any continuation thereof. 
This Note is one of the Notes referred to in the Amended 
and Restated Credit Agreement (together with all amendments or 
supplements thereto, the "Credit^ Agreement") dated as of 
, 1992, between the Company and the Bank, and evidences 
Special Purpose Credit Loans made by the Bank thereunder. 
Capitalized terms used in this Note have the respective meanings 
assigned to them in the Credit Agreement. 
The Credit Agreement provides for the acceleration of 
the maturity of this Note upon the occurrence of certain events 
and for prepayments of Special Purpose Credit Loans upon the terms 
and conditions specified therein. 
B-2-1 
THIS NOTE STTAT.T. BE GOVERNED BY AND CONSTRUED IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM INC. 
By: 
Name: 
Titles 
B-2-2 
LOANS 
Date Principal Amount Amount of Unpaid 
of Amount Paid or Interest Principal Notation 
Loan of Loan Prepaid Paid Amount Made Bv 
B-2-3 
EXHIBIT C 
FORM OF 
COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he is the 
of Landmark Petroleum Inc., a Delaware 
corporation (the "Company"), and that as such he is authorized to 
execute this certificate on behalf of the Company. With reference 
to the Amended and Restated Credit Agreement dated as of 
, 1992 (together with all amendments or supplements 
thereto being the "Agreement") between the Company and The Chase 
Manhattan Bank, N.A., the undersigned further certifies, represents 
and warrants as follows (each capitalized term used herein having 
the same meaning given to it in the Agreement unless otherwise 
specified): 
(a) The representations and warranties of the 
Company contained in Section 7 of the Agreement and 
otherwise made in writing by or on behalf of the Company 
pursuant to the Agreement were true and correct in all 
material respects when made, and are repeated at and as 
of the time of delivery hereof and are true and correct 
in all material respects at and as of the time of 
delivery hereof. 
(b) The Company has performed and complied with 
all conditions contained in the Agreement required to be 
performed or complied with by it prior to or at the time 
of delivery hereof. 
(c) Since the date of the Financial Statements, no 
change has occurred and is continuing in the condition, 
financial or otherwise, of the Company or any Subsidiary 
which would have a Material Adverse Effect. 
(d) There exists, and, after giving effect to the 
Loans or Letters of Credit with respect to which this 
certificate is being delivered, will exist, no Default 
under the Agreement. 
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EXECUTED AND DELIVERED this day of 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM INC, 
By: 
Title: 
C-l 
EXHIBIT D 
FORM OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he is the 
of Landmark Petroleum Inc., a Delaware corporation (the "Company"), 
and that as such he is authorized to execute this certificate on 
behalf of the Company. With reference to the Amended and Restated 
Credit Agreement dated as of , 1992 (together with all 
amendments or supplements thereto being the "Agreement") between 
the Company and The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., the undersigned 
further certifies, represents and warrants, as follows (each 
capitalized term used herein having the same meaning given to it 
in the Agreement unless otherwise specified): 
Except as specified on Schedule 7.16 attached to the Agreement 
and Schedule D-1 attached hereto, the Company and all Subsidiaries 
are in full compliance with the requirements of Section 9.13 of the 
Agreement. 
With respect to those matters disclosed on Schedule 7.16 to 
the Agreement and Schedule D-1 attached hereto, the Company and 
its Subsidiaries are taking the actions described on Schedule D-1 
in order to establish and maintain compliance with the requirements 
of Section 9.13 of the Agreement. 
EXECUTED AND DELIVERED this day of 
19 . 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM INC. 
By: 
Title: 
D-1 
EXHIBIT E 
[FORM OF OPINION OF COMPANY'S COUNSEL] 
[Date of loan closing] 
The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza 
New York, New York 10005 
Gentlemen: 
We have acted as counsel for Landmark Petroleum Inc., a 
Delaware corporation (the "Company"), and Landmark Carbon 
Inc., a Delaware corporation ("Carbon"), in connection with 
the Amended and Restated Credit Agreement dated as of June 24, 
1992 (the "Credit Agreement"), between the Company and The 
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. (the "Bank"). This opinion is 
delivered to you pursuant to Section 6.01 of the Credit 
Agreement. Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein are 
defined as set forth in the Credit Agreement. 
In connection with the opinions hereinafter expressed, we have 
(i) investigated such questions of law, (ii) examined such 
corporate documents and records of the Company and Carbon and 
certificates of public officials, and (iii) received such 
information and certificates from officers and representatives 
of the Company and Carbon, as we have deemed necessary or 
appropriate for the purposes of this opinion. We have 
examined the following documents (those identified in items 
(a) through (i) below being referred to collectively as the 
"Identified Documents"): 
(a) A copy of the Credit Agreement executed by the 
Company; 
(b) The executed Notes; 
(c) A copy of the Second Amendment and Supplement to 
Deed of Trust and Security Agreement of even date 
with the Credit Agreement executed by the Company; 
(d) A copy of the Second Amendment and Supplement to 
Security Agreement (Equipment and Other Property) 
of even date with the Credit Agreement executed by 
the Company; 
(e) A copy of the Second Amendment and Supplement to 
Security Agreement (Accounts, Inventory and Other 
Property) of even date with the Credit Agreement 
executed by the Company; 
(f) A copy of the Second Amendment and Supplement to 
Security Agreement (Stock, Bonds and Other 
Securities) of even date with the Credit Agreement 
executed by the Company; 
(g) A copy of the Third Amendment and Supplement to 
Security Agreement (Accounts and Other Property) of 
even date with the Credit Agreement executed by 
Carbon; 
(h) A copy of the Consultation and Service Agreement 
dated as of June 19, 1992, executed by the Company; 
and 
(i) A copy of the Option Agreement (CPI) of even date 
with the Credit Agreement executed by the Company 
(the "Option Agreement (CPI)"). 
We have assumed the following: the genuineness of all 
signatures on all documents and instruments (other than the 
signatures of the officers of the Company and Carbon); the 
authenticity of all documents submitted to us as originals; 
the conformity to originals of all documents submitted to us 
as copies; the correctness and accuracy of all facts set forth 
in all certificates referred to in this opinion; each 
instrument and agreement reviewed by us is a legal, valid and 
binding obligation of and is enforceable in accordance with 
its terms against the parties thereto (other than the Company 
and Carbon); each individual executing or otherwise taking any 
action with respect, to any of the Identified Documents or any 
related document or other certificate, instrument or agreement 
(other than officers of the Company or Carbon to the extent 
representing or acting on behalf of the Company or Carbon) has 
the legal capacity to effect such execution or action. 
On the basis of, and in reliance upon, all of the foregoing 
and subject to the qualifications set forth herein, we are of 
the opinion that: 
1. The Company is a corporation duly organized, 
validly existing and in good standing under the laws of 
the State of Delaware, with all requisite corporate power 
and authority to own, operate and lease its Properties 
and to carry on in all material respects its business as 
is now being conducted and as currently proposed to be 
conducted. Carbon is a corporation duly organized, 
validly existing and in good standing under the laws of 
the State of Delaware, with all requisite corporate power 
and authority to own, operate and lease its Properties 
and to carry on in all material respects its business as 
is now being conducted and as currently proposed to be 
conducted. 
2. The Company is duly qualified or licensed as 
a foreign corporation authorized to do business in the 
States of Colorado and Texas. Carbon is duly qualified 
or licensed as a foreign corporation authorized to do 
business in the State of Colorado. 
3. The Company has the requisite corporate power 
and authority to execute, deliver and perform the 
Identified Documents to which it is a party and to 
consummate the transactions contemplated thereby. The 
execution delivery and performance by the Company of the 
Identified Documents to which it is a party and the 
consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby by 
the Company have been duly authorized by all necessary 
corporate action on the part of the Company. The 
Identified Documents to which the Company is shown as a 
party have been duly and validly executed and delivered 
by the Company. 
4. Carbon has the requisite corporate power and 
authority to execute, deliver and perform the Identified 
Documents to which it is a party and to consummate the 
transactions contemplated thereby to be consummated by 
it. The execution, delivery and performance by Carbon 
of the Identified Documents to which it is a party and 
the consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby 
by Carbon have been duly authorized by all necessary 
corporate action on the part of Carbon. The Identified 
Document to which Carbon is shown as a party has been 
duly and validly executed and delivered by Carbon. 
5. At the date of the Credit Agreement, except for 
the litigation described on-Schedule 7.03 to the Credit 
Agreement, no litigation, investigation, legal or 
administrative proceeding or arbitration known to us 
after due inquiry, of or before any court, arbitrator or 
governmental authority is pending or threatened against 
the Company or Carbon which could reasonably be expected 
to result in a judgment or liability not fully covered 
by insurance and which would have a Material Adverse 
Effect. 
6. The execution and delivery of the Identified 
Documents by the Company and Carbon and the performance 
by the Company and Carbon of their respective obligations 
thereunder do not violate, conflict with or result in a 
default under any provision of (i) any existing law, rule 
or regulation applicable to the Company or Carbon, or 
(ii) to the best of our knowledge after due inquiry, any 
order, injunction or decree of any court or governmental 
agency having jurisdiction over the Company or Carbon. 
7. The Option Agreement (CPI) constitutes a legal, 
valid and binding obligation of the Company enforceable 
against the Company in accordance with its terms, 
8. In connection with the choice of law provisions 
of the Identified Documents, we bring to your attention 
the recent Supreme Court of Texas case styled Edward 
DeSantis, et al. v. Wackenhut Corporation, 793 S.W. 2d 
670 (Tex. 1990) which generally provides that contractual 
choice of law provisions may not be valid if application 
of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a 
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially 
greater interest than the chosen state in the 
determination of the particular issue. However, based 
on the factual assumptions set forth below, if the issue 
is properly presented to a court of competent 
jurisdiction, the choice of New York law to govern the 
Credit Agreement and the Notes, and the choice of 
Colorado law to govern the other Identified Documents, 
should be found by a court sitting in the State of Texas 
to be a valid choice of law under the laws of the State 
of Texas. 
The opinions above are subject in all respects to the 
following: 
1. We are licensed to practice law in the State 
of Texas and do not purport to be experts on, generally 
familiar with, or expressing legal conclusions based on, 
laws other than the law of the State of Texas, the 
federal laws of the United States of America and the 
General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware. 
2. Our opinion i9~ subject to applicable 
bankruptcy, insolvency, moratorium and other similar laws 
affecting generally creditors/ rights, including without 
limitation, laws pertaining to fraudulent conveyances and 
preferences. 
3. Whenever our opinion is based on circumstances 
"known to us after due inquiry" or is stated to be "to 
the best of our knowledge after due inquiry," we have 
relied exclusively on certificates of officers (after the 
discussion of the contents thereof with such officers) 
of the Company and Carbon or certificates of others as 
to the existence or nonexistence of the circumstances 
upon which such opinion is predicated. We have no reason 
to believe, however, that any such certificate is untrue 
or incorrect in any material respect. 
4. In rendering the opinions herein relating to 
the absences of any litigation, investigation, proceeding 
or arbitration, we express no opinion with respect to the 
possible effect of litigation, arbitration, proceedings 
and investigations as to which the Company or Carbon is 
not a named party. 
5. With respect to the choice of law provisions 
in the Option Agreement (CPI), we assume the enforce-
ability of such provision but express no opinion with 
respect thereto. 
6. With respect to the enforceability of the 
Option Agreement (CPI), we express no opinion as to the 
availability of specific performance or any other 
equitable remedy (regardless of whether such question is 
considered in a proceeding in equity or at law). 
7. With respect to the enforceability of the 
option granted in the Option Agreement (CPI), we have 
assumed that all documents necessary to exercise the 
option will be properly authorized, executed and 
delivered and that all consents needed from third parties 
(other than the directors and stockholders of the 
Company) in connection with the exercise of the option 
and the transfer of assets pursuant thereto will be 
obtained. 
8. We have assumed that (i) the Bank is a national 
banking association domiciled in New York and is the only 
lender party to the Credit Agreement, (ii) the Credit 
Agreement was executed by the Bank in New York, (iii) 
advances and payments under the Credit Agreement and the 
Notes will be made in New York, and (iv) substantially 
all the property covered by the Identified Documents is 
located in Colorado. 
9. We express no opinion as to the creation, 
existence, perfection or priority of any Lien. 
This opinion is to be delivered only to the Bank and its 
counsel and only in connection with the transactions 
contemplated by the Identified Documents and may not be 
quoted, circulated or published in whole or in part or 
furnished to any other Person without our prior written 
consent. 
Very truly yours, 
Bracewell & Patterson 
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EXHIBIT F 
Security Instruments 
Amended and Restated Credit Agreement 
Deed of Trust and Security Agreement by the Company, dated as 
of November 5, 1990, as amended by First Amendment and 
Supplement to Deed of Trust and Security Agreement dated as 
of June 3, 1992 and Second Amendment and Supplement to Deed 
of Trust and Security Agreement 
Security Agreement (Equipment and Other Property) by the 
Company, dated as of November 5, 1990, as amended by First 
Amendment and Supplement to Security Agreement (Equipment and 
Other Property) dated as of June 3, 1992 and Second Amendment 
and Supplement to Security Agreement (Equipment and Other 
Property) 
Security Agreement (Accounts, Inventory and Other Property), 
by the Company, dated as of November 5, 1990, as amended by 
First Amendment and Supplement to Security Agreement 
(Accounts, Inventory and Other Property) dated as of June 3, 
1992 and Second Amendment and Supplement to Security Agreement 
(Accounts, Inventory and Other Property) 
Security Agreement (Accounts and Other Property) by the 
Calciner Operating Subsidiary, dated as of November 5, 1990, 
as amended by First Amendment and Supplement to Security 
Agreement (Accounts and Other Property) dated as of June 14, 
1991, Second Amendment and Supplement to Security Agreement 
(Accounts and Other Property) dated as of June 3, 1992, and 
Third Amendment and Supplement to Security Agreement (Accounts 
and Other Property) 
Security Agreement (Stock, Bonds and Other Securities) by the 
Company dated as of November 5, 1990, as amended by First 
Amendment and Supplement to Security Agreement (Stock, Bonds 
and Other Securities) dated as of June 3, 1992 and Second 
Amendment and Supplement to Security Agreement (Stock, Bonds 
and Other Securities) 
a. Certificate(s) representing 100% of the issued and 
outstanding shares of Calciner Operating Subsidiary 
stock 
b. Certificate(s) representing 100% of the issued and 
outstanding shares of Landmark Resources Inc. stock 
c. Stock Powers related to 6a and 6b 
F-l 
EXHIBIT G 
FORM OF 
BORROWING REQUEST 
, 199 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM INC., a Delaware corporation (the 
"Company1') , pursuant to the Amended and Restated Credit Agreement 
dated as of , 1992, between the Company and THE CHASE 
MANHATTAN BANK, N.A. (together with all amendments or supplements 
thereto, the "Credit Agreement") hereby makes the requests 
indicated below (unless otherwise defined herein capitalized terms 
are defined in the Credit Agreement): 
I I 1. Revolving Credit Loans: 
(a) Aggregate amount of new Revolving Credit Loans to be made 
is $ ; 
(b) Requested funding date is , 199 . 
| | 2. Letter(s) of Credit: 
(a) Amount of Letter of Credit to be issued, reissued, 
renewed or extended is $ ; 
(b) Requested date of issuance is , 199 ; 
(c) Beneficiary: ; 
and 
• 
(d) Terms of Letter of Credit:, 
3. Term Loan: 
Requested funding date is 
I I 4. Special Purpose Credit Loans: 
(a) Aggregate amount of new Special Purpose Credit Loans to 
be made is $ ; 
(b) Requested funding date is . 
The undersigned certifies that he is the 
of the Company, and that as such he is authorized to execute this 
certificate on behalf of the Company. The undersigned further 
certifies, represents and warrants on behalf of the Company that 
G-l 
the Company is entitled to receive the requested Loan or Letter of 
Credit under the terms and conditions of the Credit Agreement 
(including, but not limited to, the conditions set forth in 
Sections 2.02, 6.02 and 6.03 of the Credit Agreement). 
If delivered as a request for Revolving Credit Loans or 
Letter(s) of Credit, Schedule G-l is attached to this Borrowing 
Request for the purpose of showing the availability of credit under 
the Credit Agreement. Each amount thereon is correctly stated. 
If delivered as a request for Special Purpose Credit Loans, 
Schedule G-2 is attached to this Borrowing Request for the purpose 
of showing the availability of credit under the Credit Agreement. 
Each amount thereon is correctly stated. 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM INC. 
By: 
Name: 
Title: 
G-2 
SCHEDULE G-l 
to 
Borrowing Request 
Date , 199 
Revolving Credit/Letter of Credit $ 
Commitment 
Less outstanding Revolving Credit Loans $ 
Less outstanding Letters of Credit issued $ 
under the Revolving Credit/Letter of 
Credit Commitment 
Less all amounts drawn on Letters of $ 
Credit, but not yet reimbursed 
Excess (deficit) of remaining Revolving $ 
Credit/Letter of Credit Commitment over 
amounts outstanding (#1- #2 - #3- #4 
above) 
Request for new Revolving Credit Loan(s) $ 
Request for new Letter(s) of Credit under $ 
Revolving Credit/Letter of Credit 
Commitment 
Remaining excess (deficit) of Revolving $ 
Credit/Letter of Credit Commitment over 
amounts outstanding (#5 - #6 - #7 above) 
G-3 
SCHEDULE G-2 
to 
Borrowing Request 
Date , 199 
Special Purpose Credit Maximum 
Availability 
Less aggregate amount of all outstanding 
Special Purpose Credit Loans 
Excess (deficit) of remaining Special 
Purpose Credit Maximum Availability over 
all outstanding Special Purpose Credit 
Loans (#1 - #2) 
Request for new Special Purpose Credit 
Loans 
c:\wp50\lpi\arca-5. lpi 
0732:4024 June 23, 1992 
G-4 
SCHEDULE 7.02(b) 
Under a Feedstock Agreement with Petrosource, Petrosource 
has possession of $300,000 delivered to it by the Company, 
The Company has been advised from time to time that 
Petrosource believes that additional sums are owed to it by 
the Company. The parties are no longer operating under the 
Feedstock Agreement. Petrosource has not made any claim as 
to any specific amount alleged to be owed it by the Company. 
The Company has a contract with the United States 
government for the sale of jet fuel. The contract requires 
a price adjustment based on factors set forth therein. This 
price adjustment process may result in a refund owing to the 
United States government. 
The Company is in default under all of its equipment 
leases. 
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SCHEDULE 7.03 
(LITIGATION AND LIABILITIES) 
VENDOR 
A & B Asbestos 
A l l Waste (Western Ind. 
Cleaning Service Inc. and 
Vac-N-Jet Environmental) 
Basic Industries 
Falcon Pump & Supply Co.x 
J. & J. Protect ive Coating2 
Roe Fire 6c Safety 
Webb Crane 
LIEN 
X 
X 
X 
SUIT 
X 
X 
X 
X 
AMOUNT 
61,741.27 
40,134.25 
156,686.49 
20,098.55 
18,000.00 
2,637.42 
! 30,427.44 
Plus attorney's f e e s , court 
costs and in teres t not l e s s 
than $10,000.00 
Plus i n t e r e s t , a t torney's 
fees and other c o s t s . 
Plus court c o s t s . Offered to 
s e t t l e for $15,000.00 
Plus 8% i n t e r e s t / y r . plus 
court c o s t s . 
Rec'd intent to f i l e l i e n . 
RESPONSE TO 
CPTT1 PMPUT f PTTPPlI 
YES 
X 
X 
NO 
X 
NO II 
REPLY 
X 
X 
X 
1
 Plaintiff agreed to terms of settlement ar\d has filed Motion to Set Aside Judgment and 
Dismiss with Prejudice. Presently awaiting court order. 
2
 (a) Action No. 1: Satisfaction of judgment filed with the court. Filed for 
certificate of satisfaction necessary to release judgment lien. 
(b) Action No. 2: Filed Stipulation for Dismissal. Presently awaiting court order. 
Possess a signed release of mechanics lien to be filed. 
C27W] SDSW\07710585.CHT 
Lessor Description 
Bank One 
BFI 
BF1 
First Interstate Leasing 
GATX 
Pitney Bowes 
PulIman Leasing 
J 
A
 Total Annualized Expense 
J 
1 
3 
U [27W] SDSW\0001.CHT 
Diesel Tank Lease REF #19 
Cleaning Equipment REF #8 
Cleaning Equipment REF #9 
REF #13 (no equipment schedule) 
Railcar Lease REF #16, 17 
Office Equipment REF #10 
Railcar Lease REF #20 
J 
Schedule of Leases Due 
Annualized Totals 
Due 
1992 
$120,000.00 
8,168.79 
1,893.35 
21,330.00 
52,500.00 
1,870.99 
79,200.00 
$284,963.13 
Due 
1992 
$120,000.00 
21,330.00 
52,500.00 
2,494.66 
$196,324.66 
Due 
1994 
$120,000.00 
21,330.00 
52,500.00 
623.67 
$194,453.67 
Due 
1995 
$120,000.00 
5,332.50 
52,500.00 
$177,832.50 
Due 
1996 
$60,000.00 
39,375.00 
$99,375.00 
Total Balance 
$540,000.00 
8,168.79 
1,893.35 
69,322.50 
249,375.00 
4,989.32 
79,200.00 
$952,948.96 
SHCEDULE 7.10 
(Disclosure of Liens other than Excepted Liens) 
1. See Schedule 7.03. 
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Schedule 7#16 
Disclosures as to Section 7*16 
Environmental matters disclosed to the Bank, Including: 
1. The matters described in the report entitled "Western 
Slope Refining Company: Confidential Memorandum," 
prepared by Turner, Mason & Company, dated January 1990• 
2. CDH Notice of Violation issued January 30, 1990 for 
failure to have continuous emission monitoring for S02 
and H2S. See Item 3 below. 
3* CDH Compliance Order issued April 5, 1990 requiring 
implementation of a continuous emission monitoring 
program for H2S. in addition, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency Notice of Violation issued April 18, 
1990 for failure to continuously monitor H2S and S02 
emissions under the PSD permit. H2S and S02 monitors have 
been installed but are undergoing certification testing* 
4. CDH Final Order for Compliance issued July 27, 1990 
concerning exceedance of S02 per bbl* oil processed 
emission standard for S02 sources. The Company is now 
operating in compliance with the Order* 
5. CDH Compliance Order on Consent No. 88-09-29-01 dated 
September 29, 1988 and closure plans submitted and 
approved pursuant to that Order. The Company understands 
that Gary-William has received an approved closure plan 
and is implementing such plan. 
6. The matters described in the letter pursuant to Section 
6.01(o) of the Original Credit Agreement or in the letter 
from Purvin & Gertz, Inc. to the Bank dated August 21, 
1990. 
7. In addition as to Section 7.16(e) of the Original Credit 
Agreement, Pilko & Associates, Inc. conducted a limited 
environmental assessment of the Mortgaged Property on 
behalf of the Company. PilJco's assessment process 
included a visit to and review of the Mortgaged Property 
and the operations therein, discussions with 
environmental staff, and review of a variety of 
environmental information sources such as facility 
records, reports, regulations and industry standards. 
See also the letters referenced above. 
8. The NPDES permit has expired, and the Company is now 
operating on an interim basis as instructed by the 
appropriate regulatory agency *nd is negotiating a new 
permit. 
9. The Company is currently operating under a Colorado 
Department of Health compliance order dated December 3, 
1991 dealing with visible emissions (fugitive dust) 
emanating from calcined coke handling facilities. 
10. Completion of the enclosure of the Refinery's process 
sever system and subsequent closure of the present open 
hydrocracker ditch may be necessary upon restarting 
facility operations. While the Refinery is not operating 
and is not in closure, these do not constitute 
violations. Should the Refinery be returned to operation 
as a fuel products refinery, these closures would have 
to be completed• 
11. The lab underground storage tank closure must be 
completed. This could result in the discovery of, and 
remediation and clean-up of, contamination. 
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Schedule 9.01 
(Debt not reflected in Financial Statements) 
[None] 
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Schedule 9.03 
(Investments, loans or advances 
not reflected in Financial Statements) 
[None] 
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Schedule 9.10 
(Accumulated Funding Deficiencies) 
[None] 
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Exhibit A 
to Bill of Sale 
LIENS 
1. Tax Lien 
[Wescourt shall set forth here a description of any 
liens (including appropriate recording information) 
securing the Tax Obligations.] 
Wescourt and Landmark agree that Wescourt may remove 
this reference in the Bill of Sale with respect to the 
Sale of any Asset upon the agreement of the County of 
Mesa to release such Asset from the such liens in 
connection with such Sale. 
2. Chase Liens 
[Wescourt shall set forth here a description of the 
Chase Liens (including appropriate recording 
information).] 
This description of liens may include an express 
reference to the release provisions set forth in 
Section 5.1 of this Marketing Agreement. Alternatively, 
Wescourt and Landmark agree that Wescourt may remove 
this reference to the extent Wescourt obtains from Chase 
proper releases of the Chase Liens and records such 
releases in the proper filing location on or prior to 
the delivery of the Bill of Sale. 
3. Additional Liens 
[Wescourt shall set forth here any liens, claims or 
encumbrances affecting the Assets being conveyed which 
liens, claims or encumbrances are set forth in the 
Owners' Policy of Title Insurance delivered pursuant to 
the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement.] 
Wescourt and Landmark agree that Wescourt may remove the 
reference to any lien, claim or encumbrance that is 
properly satisfied and released of record on or prior to 
the date of the execution of the Bill of Sale. 
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Assets to third parties, in one or more sales, pursuant to a 
marketing agreement in the form of attached Exhibit A (the 
"Marketing Agreement"). 
2.3 Nonassumption of Liabilities. Buyer shall not 
assume, and shall not be liable to pay, perform or discharge 
when due, any Obligation of Seller known or unknown, 
anticipated or unanticipated, contingent or matured, with 
respect to the Transferred Assets arising on or prior to 
Closing or with respect to the Retained Assets at any time, 
including, without limitation, Obligations with respect to 
(i) Seller's employees (under any employment agreement, 
under any benefit plan, under any Legal Requirement 
applicable to employee benefits, health, or safety, or 
otherwise), (ii) the existence or disposal of Hazardous 
Materials on, in, or under the Assets, or (iii) any 
violation of Environmental Law with respect to the Assets 
(or the operation or decommission thereof). Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, from and after the Closing, Buyer shall be 
responsible for all real estate taxes and assessments and 
personal property taxes relating to the Transferred Assets 
and accruing on or after the date of Closing. Further, from 
and after Closing, Buyer shall be responsible for all 
utility charges relating to the Transferred Assets and Buyer 
shall notify all appropriate utilities as to the transfer of 
the Transferred Assets and instruct all such utilities to 
change their billing records accordingly. 
3. CLOSING 
3.1 Time and Place. The consummation ("Closing") 
of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement shall 
take place by facsimile exchange of all documents required 
to be delivered hereunder, with originals to follow 
immediately by overnight courier, on February 28, 1994, or 
as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing (the actual 
date of Closing, the "Closing Date"). Except as otherwise 
indicated, all such transactions will be deemed effective as 
of the close of business on the Closing Date. 
3.2 Consideration. At Closing, in consideration 
of the sale, transfer, assignment, conveyance and delivery 
by Seller to Buyer of the Transferred Assets, Buyer will pay 
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) (the "Purchase Price") to 
Seller. The sale, transfer, assignment, conveyance and 
delivery by Seller to Buyer of the Transferred Assets shall 
be subject to the Chase Liens on the terms set forth in the 
Chase Consent and subject to the Tax Lien on such terms as 
may be agreed upon by Buyer and the Treasurer of Mesa 
County, Colorado. 
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3.3 Allocation. The Purchase Price will be 
allocated among the Transferred Assets as determined by 
Buyer, in its reasonable discretion, after the Closing and 
notified to Seller within ninety (90) days after the 
Closing. Neither Seller nor Buyer will take a position in 
its tax returns which is inconsistent with such allocation. 
Seller and Buyer will comply with and furnish any 
information required by Section 1060 of the Code and the 
Treasury Regulations thereunder. 
4. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER 
Seller hereby represents and warrants to Buyer that 
each of the following statements are true and correct: 
4.1 Organization. Seller is a corporation duly 
organized, validly existing and in good standing under the 
laws of the State of Delaware. Seller is qualified to do 
business and is in good standing as a foreign corporation in 
the State of Colorado. 
4.2 Power and Authority. Seller has full 
corporate power and authority to enter into this Agreement 
and to perform its obligations hereunder. 
4.3 Execution, Delivery and Performance. The 
execution, delivery and performance by Seller of this 
Agreement have been duly authorized by all necessary 
corporate action. The execution, delivery and performance 
by Seller of this Agreement do not violate, breach or cause 
a default under (a) its certificate of incorporation or 
bylaws, (b) any Legal Requirement, or (c) to the Knowledge 
of Seller, except with respect to any consents provided for 
in Section 4.5 (including, without limitation, the Chase 
Consent) and the terminations provided for in Section 7.5, 
any agreement, contract or instrument to which it is a party 
or by which it, or any of the Assets, is bound. 
4.4 Binding Effect. Upon execution and delivery 
to Buyer, this Agreement and the other agreements to be 
executed and delivered by Seller at the Closing will each 
constitute a valid and binding Obligation of Seller, 
enforceable against Seller in accordance with its terms 
except as enforceability may be limited by bankruptcy, 
insolvency and other similar laws affecting creditors' 
rights generally or by general equitable principles. 
4.5 Consents and Approvals. To the Knowledge of 
the Seller, other than the consents described in 
Schedule 4.5, no consent, approval, authorization, 
registration or qualification of or by any Person is 
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required in connection with the execution, delivery and 
performance by Seller of this Agreement and the consummation 
by Seller of the transactions contemplated hereby. 
4.6 Compliance with Legal Requirements. To the 
Knowledge of Seller, except as disclosed in the records of 
the Seller maintained at the Refinery (the "Refinery 
Records") (a) the ownership, operation and decommission by 
Seller of the Assets does not violate or infringe, and has 
not in the past during Seller's ownership of the Assets 
violated or infringed, any Legal Requirement, (b) there are 
no outstanding Orders against Seller, any Affiliate of 
Seller or any other Person relating to the ownership, 
operation, or decommission of the Assets, (c) none of the 
Assets is in violation of any Legal Requirement and 
(d) there are no special assessment, condemnation, zoning or 
other land-use regulation proceedings either instituted or 
planned to be instituted with respect to the Assets. 
4.7 Litigation. To the Knowledge of Seller, 
except as disclosed in the Refinery Records, there is no 
Action pending or threatened with respect to the ownership, 
operation, or decommission of the Assets. Without limiting 
the foregoing, to the Knowledge of Seller, except as 
disclosed in the Refinery Records, there is no Action 
pending or threatened with respect to the ownership, 
operation, or decommission of the Assets (a) under any 
Environmental Law, or (b) directly or indirectly arising out 
of an Environmental Occurrence or the presence of Hazardous 
Materials or a condition of nuisance on, in, or under the 
Assets (including the Real Property). 
4.8 Title to Transferred Assets. Seller has good 
and marketable title to the Transferred Assets other than 
the Real Property (as to which Buyer shall rely solely on 
the title policy to be obtained pursuant to Section 7.4), 
free and clear of Encumbrances except for (a) the Tax Lien, 
(b) the Chase Liens, (c) the Encumbrances listed on the 
Title Policy and reflected as encumbering Assets other than 
the Real Property, (d) the Encumbrances listed on searches 
of the Uniform Commercial Code Records obtained by Buyer, 
and (e) Encumbrances for current Taxes not yet due and 
payable. Other than this Agreement, the Chase Documents, 
and the agreements to be terminated pursuant to the 
Termination Agreements as a condition to the Closing, there 
are no contracts, commitments, understandings, or 
arrangements relating to the sale or other disposition of 
any Transferred Asset. To the Knowledge of Seller, 
Schedule 4.8 and the Refinery Records collectively contain a 
complete description of all Assets leased by Seller from or 
to any Person. 
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4.9 Permits. To the Knowledge of Seller, 
Schedule 4.9 and the Refinery Records contain a complete and 
accurate description of all Permits. To the Knowledge of 
Seller, except as disclosed in Schedule 4.9 or the Refinery 
Records, each Permit is in full force and effect, there has 
been no default or breach thereunder, and there is no 
pending or threatened proceeding under which any Permit may 
be revoked, terminated or suspended. To the Knowledge of 
Seller, other than the Permits described in Schedule 4.9 and 
the Refinery Records, Seller is not required to hold or 
maintain any license, permit, authorization, certification, 
or approval with respect to the ownership or sale of the 
Assets. 
4.10 Insurance. To the Knowledge of Seller, 
Schedule 4.10 sets forth a complete and accurate list of all 
Insurance Policies, including, with respect to each 
Insurance Policy, carrier, type and amount of coverage, 
deductible (if any) and all claims thereunder (or under its 
predecessor policy, if any) in the 36-month period ending on 
the date of this Agreement. 
4.11 Environmental Matters. To the Knowledge of 
Seller, the Refinery Records contain a complete description 
of each instance in which, during Seller's ownership of the 
Refinery, there has occurred in, on, from, or under any 
Asset (including the Real Property) a release, threatened 
release, disposal, discharge, spillage, loss, seepage, 
transport or migration of Hazardous Materials, other than 
releases incidental to the ordinary operation of the Assets 
that could not, either individually or in the aggregate, be 
reasonably expected to have a material adverse effect on the 
ownership, value or operation of the Assets, or upon 
Seller's operating results (each such event, an 
"Environmental Occurrence") and a description of the current 
status of any investigation thereof by any Governmental 
Body. Buyer has been provided with full access to originals 
or copies of all of Seller's documents concerning, and 
correspondence to or from any Governmental Body concerning, 
any Environmental Occurrence (the foregoing, "Environmental 
Records") including any investigation thereof. 
4.12 Financial Records. Buyer has been provided 
with full access to originals or copies of all of Seller's 
books of account, documents, correspondence and other books 
and records with respect to the Assets (collectively, 
"Financial Records"). 
4.13 Taxes. All Returns required to be filed by 
Seller with respect to the ownership or operation of the 
Assets have been duly filed on a timely basis and such 
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Returns are true, complete and correct. Except for the Tax 
Obligations, all Taxes shovm to be payable on the Returns or 
on subsequent assessments with respect thereto have been 
paid in full on a timely basis, and no other Taxes are 
payable by Seller or by any other Person with respect to the 
ownership or operation of the Assets for the periods covered 
by such Returns (whether or not shown on or reportable on 
such Returns) or with respect to any other period prior to 
the date of this Agreement. Seller has withheld and paid 
over all Taxes required to have been withheld and paid over, 
and complied with all information reporting and backup 
withholding requirements, including maintenance of required 
records with respect thereto, in connection with amounts 
paid or owing to any employee, creditor, independent 
contractor, or other Person. Except for the Tax 
Obligations, there are no pending questions relating to, nor 
claims asserted for, Taxes on the ownership or operation of 
the Assets. There are no outstanding agreements or waivers 
executed by or on behalf of Seller extending the statutory 
period of limitation applicable to any Return for any 
period. 
4.14 Disclosure. Seller has provided Buyer with 
access to each of the documents described in this Article 4 
(including the Refinery Records, the Environmental Records, 
and the Financial Records). No representations or 
warranties made by Seller in this Agreement and, to the 
Knowledge of Seller, no statement made by Seller in any 
document or other writing furnished by Seller to Buyer 
pursuant to this Agreement contain any untrue statement of 
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary 
in order to make such statements not misleading. 
5. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES BY BUYER 
Buyer hereby represents and warrants to Seller that 
the following statements are true and correct: 
5.1 Organization. Buyer is a corporation duly 
organized, validly existing and in good standing under the 
laws of the State of Delaware. Buyer is qualified to do 
business and is in good standing as a foreign corporation in 
the State of Colorado. 
5.2 Power and Authority. Buyer has full corporate 
power and corporate authority to enter into this Agreement 
and to perform its obligations hereunder. 
5 .3 Execution, Delivery and Performance. The 
execution, delivery and performance by Buyer of this 
Agreement have been duly authorized by all necessary 
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corporate action. The execution, delivery and performance 
by Buyer of this Agreement do not violate, breach or cause a 
default under (a) its certificate of incorporation or 
bylaws, (b) any Legal Requirement, or (c) any agreement, 
contract or instrument to which it is a party or by which 
it, or any of its assets, is subject or bound. 
5.4 Binding Effect. Upon execution and delivery 
to Seller, this Agreement will constitute a valid and 
binding Obligation of Buyer, enforceable against Buyer in 
accordance with its terms except as enforceability may be 
limited by bankruptcy, insolvency and other similar laws 
affecting creditors' rights generally or by general 
equitable principles. 
5.5 Consents and Approvals. No consent, approval, 
authorization, registration or qualification of or by any 
Person is required in connection with the execution, 
delivery and performance by Buyer of this Agreement and the 
consummation by Buyer of the transactions contemplated 
hereby. 
6. OBLIGATIONS PRIOR TO CLOSING 
6.1 Negative Covenants. From the date of this 
Agreement until the Closing Date, Seller shall not take any 
action which, if taken immediately prior to the date hereof, 
would render any of Seller's representations and warranties 
inaccurate or incomplete in any respect. Without limiting 
the foregoing, from the date of this Agreement until the 
Closing Date Seller shall not, directly or indirectly, 
(a) make, create, incur, assume or suffer to exist any 
Encumbrance on or with respect to any Asset (other than 
those existing on the date hereof), or (b) sell, assign, 
lease, convey, transfer or otherwise dispose of any Asset. 
6.2 Notice of Default. From the date of this 
Agreement until the Closing Date, Seller shall give written 
notice to Buyer of Seller's receipt of notice of any 
(a) default under, or dispute with respect to, any Permit, 
agreement, contract or instrument to which it is a party, 
including, without limitation, the Chase Documents, and 
(b) the commencement of, or any material development in, any 
Action involving Seller or any Asset, such notice to be 
given to Buyer prior to Closing or within five (5) Business 
Days after Seller learns of such event, whichever is sooner. 
6.3 Employee Matters. Seller agrees that it shall 
make any terminations of its employees in full compliance 
with all applicable Legal Requirements, including, without 
limitation, to the extent applicable, the Worker Adjustment 
and Retraining Notification Act. 
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6.4 Maintenance of Permits/Insurance Policies. 
Notwithstanding the decommissioning of the Assets, from the 
date of this Agreement until the Closing Date, Seller shall 
maintain each Permit and Insurance Policy in full force and 
effect. 
6.5 Partition of Assets. Promptly after the 
execution of this Agreement, Buyer and Seller shall commence 
such steps as are necessary or appropriate to accomplish the 
partition of the Retained Assets from the Transferred 
Assets, including the steps described below. Buyer and 
Seller shall diligently pursue such steps with the goal of 
completing such partition prior to Closing or, if not, as 
soon thereafter as is reasonably practicable. 
(a) Real Property Survey. Buyer shall 
arrange for the preparation, by a surveyor or civil engineer 
licensed in the State of Colorado, of an "as-built" survey 
("Survey") of the Real Property and the improvements located 
thereon, including, without limitation, lines for water, 
sewer, electricity, steam, gas, fuel oil, telephone and 
other utilities and the easements relating thereto. The 
Survey shall be reasonably acceptable to, and certified to, 
Buyer, Seller and Title Company, signed by the surveyor or 
civil engineer, and in sufficient detail to provide the 
basis for the title policy referred to in Section 7.4 
without boundary, encroachment or survey exceptions. 
(b) Partition of Real Property. Buyer and 
Seller shall take such steps as are necessary to effect the 
subdivision of the Real Property into the Retained Real 
Property and the Transferred Real Property in compliance 
with all Legal Requirements. Such steps shall include, to 
the extent applicable, (i) preparation by Buyer of a 
subdivision map, reasonably acceptable to Seller and Buyer, 
based on the Survey and (ii) the filing by Buyer of such map 
with all appropriate Governmental Bodies. 
(c) Partition of Other Assets. Seller and 
Buyer shall cooperate in identifying the other steps that 
may be reasonably required to separate the Retained Assets 
and the Transferred Assets, including, without limitation, 
the segmentation and re-routing of piping, utilities, and 
other operational links between the Retained Assets and the 
Transferred Assets. 
6.6 Cooperation in Due Diligence. From the date 
of this Agreement until the Closing Date, Seller shall 
reasonably cooperate with Buyer in connection with Buyer's 
due diligence review of the Assets. Without limiting the 
foregoing: 
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(a) Access to Records. Seller shall afford 
to Buyer and its employees, agents and authorized 
representatives full and free access to all Environmental 
Records, Records and Returns and to such other materials as 
Buyer may reasonably request (whether in the possession of 
Seller or its professional advisors). Seller shall ensure 
that its advisors fully cooperate with Buyer in connection 
with its review of the foregoing. 
(b) Access to Assets. Seller shall permit 
Buyer and its employees, agents and authorized 
representatives, upon reasonable notice and during regular 
business hours, to enter the Refinery at their own risk for 
such purposes as Buyer may reasonably deem appropriate in 
connection with the transactions contemplated hereby. 
Seller agrees that, as part of such access, Buyer shall have 
the right to have a representative present at the Refinery 
during Seller's normal business hours to observe the 
decommissioning and partition of the Assets as contemplated 
hereby. Seller further agrees that Buyer and its 
representatives shall have the right to enter the Refinery 
at their own risk in connection with its environmental 
assessment of the Assets, including, without limitation, to 
make tests and take samples (including, in the case of the 
Real Property, soil borings and groundwater samples) in 
order to determine (i) if any Hazardous Materials exist 
therein or thereon (including on, in, or under the Real 
Property), and (ii) if any condition exists (including on, 
in, or under the Real Property) as to which a Governmental 
Body could require investigation or corrective action under 
any Environmental Law. Buyer shall indemnify and hold 
Seller and each Seller Indemnitee harmless from and against 
any and all Losses of Seller or any Seller Indemnitee 
arising out of the negligence or intentional misconduct of 
Buyer, its employees, agents or authorized representatives 
in conducting due diligence pursuant to this Section 6.6(b). 
Buyer shall provide to Seller, at Seller's request, copies 
of any environmental reports with respect to the Assets 
produced for Buyer by third party consultants (to the extent 
not subject, in Buyer's view, to the attorney-client 
privilege). 
6.7 No Solicitation or Negotiation. From the date 
of this Agreement until the Closing Date, Seller will not 
directly or indirectly solicit, initiate or continue any 
discussions or negotiations with, or encourage or respond to 
any inquiries or proposals by, any Person (other than Buyer 
and its employees, representatives, and agents) concerning 
the sale or other disposition of all or any part of the 
Assets. 
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7. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO OBLIGATIONS OF BUYER 
The obligation of Buyer to consummate the 
transactions contemplated by this Agreement is subject to 
the satisfaction of each of the following conditions. Buyer 
may waive any or all of these conditions by giving written 
notice of such waiver to Seller on or before the Closing 
Date. 
7 .1 Representations; Compliance with Covenants. 
All representations and warranties of Seller shall be true 
and correct in all material respects on the Closing Date as 
though restated on and as of that date. Seller shall have 
performed all covenants required by this Agreement to have 
been performed by Seller on or before the Closing Date. 
7.2 Litigation Affecting Closing. No Action shall 
be threatened or pending by any Person other than Buyer 
which seeks to restrain or prohibit the consummation of the 
transactions contemplated by this Agreement. 
7.3 Chase Consent. Seller shall have obtained a 
consent of Chase with respect to the transactions 
contemplated hereby in the form of attached Exhibit B (the 
"Chase Consent"). 
7.4 Title Policy. Buyer shall have received an 
irrevocable commitment for ALTA Owner's Policies of Title 
Insurance (Form B, rev. 10/17/70) in the aggregate amount of 
the Purchase Price, at no more than Title Company's standard 
rates, insuring fee simple title to the Transferred Real 
Property, all appurtenances related thereto and all 
improvements located thereon, subject only to the Chase 
Liens, the Tax Lien and such other exceptions as Buyer shall 
have approved in writing, and providing such special 
endorsements as Buyer may reasonably require, including, 
without limitation, a Subdivision Map Act endorsement. 
7.5 Seller's Deliveries at Closing. On or before 
Closing, Seller shall have delivered to Buyer the following 
documents: 
(a) An original grant deed for each parcel of 
the Transferred Real Property in substantially the form of 
attached Exhibit C, duly executed by Seller and 
acknowledged; 
(b) An original Assignment of Rights in 
substantially the form of attached Exhibit D assigning from 
Seller to Buyer all rights of Seller under the contracts and 
leases described in Schedule 5 with respect to the 
Transferred Assets, duly executed by Seller; 
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(c) A counterpart original of the Marketing 
Agreement, duly executed by Seller; 
(d) A counterpart original of the Management 
Agreement, duly executed by Seller; 
(e) An original Termination Agreement in 
substantially the form of attached Exhibit E, with respect 
to each of the agreements described in Schedule 6, duly 
executed by the parties thereto; 
(f) An original Bill of Sale in substantially 
the form of attached Exhibit F; and 
(g) Such other documents and instruments as 
may be reasonably necessary to effectuate the transactions 
contemplated hereby. 
7.6 Chase's Deliveries at Closing. On or before 
Closing, Chase shall have delivered to Buyer (a) a 
counterpart original of the Marketing Agreement, duly 
executed by Chase and (b) an original Chase Consent, duly 
executed by Chase. 
8. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO OBLIGATIONS OF SELLER 
The obligation of Seller to consummate the 
transactions contemplated by this Agreement is subject to 
the satisfaction of each of the following conditions. 
Seller may waive any or all of these conditions by giving 
written notice of such waiver to Buyer on or before the 
Closing Date. 
8.1 Representations; Compliance with Covenants. 
All representations and warranties of Buyer shall be true 
and correct in all material respects on the Closing Date as 
though restated on and as of that date. Buyer shall have 
performed all covenants required by this Agreement to have 
been performed by Buyer on or before the Closing Date. 
8.2 Litigation Affecting Closing. No Action shall 
be threatened or pending by any Person other than Seller 
which seeks to restrain or prohibit the consummation of the 
transactions contemplated by this Agreement. 
8.3 Buyer's Deliveries at Closing. At Closing, 
Buyer shall pay to Seller the Purchase Price by certified 
check or bank cashier's check. In addition, on or before 
Closing, Buyer shall have delivered to Seller (a) a 
counterpart original of the Marketing Agreement, duly 
executed by Buyer, (b) a counterpart original of the 
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Management Agreement, duly executed by Buyer, and (c) such 
other documents and instruments as may be reasonably 
necessary to effectuate the transactions contemplated 
hereby. 
8.4 Partition of Assets. Seller shall be 
satisfied with the progress of, and prospects for completion 
of, the partition of the Assets (including the Retained Real 
Property and the Transferred Real Property) pursuant to 
Section 6.5. 
9. COVENANTS AFTER CLOSING 
9.1 Indemnification bv Seller. From and after 
Closing, Seller shall indemnify and hold Buyer and each 
Buyer Indemnitee harmless from and against any and all 
Losses that Buyer or any Buyer Indemnitee may incur or 
suffer which arise out of or result from: 
(a) any breach of any representation, 
warranty or covenant of Seller in this Agreement or in any 
agreement, document or other writing furnished by Seller to 
Buyer pursuant to this Agreement; 
(b) the ownership, use, possession, 
operation, or decommissioning of the Transferred Assets 
prior to Closing; 
(c) except for the Tax Obligations, any 
failure by Seller to pay Taxes with respect to the 
Transferred Assets that are allocable to any period prior to 
and including the Closing Date; 
(d) any failure by Seller to comply with any 
applicable bulk transfer statute in connection with the 
transactions contemplated by this Agreement; or 
(e) the existence, release, threatened 
release, or disposal of Hazardous Materials on, in, or under 
the Transferred Assets on or prior to Closing, or any 
violation of Environmental Law with respect to the 
Transferred Assets (or the operation or decommission 
thereof) on or prior to Closing. For purposes of the 
foregoing, any release or disposal of Hazardous Materials 
on, in, or under the Transferred Assets as to which timing 
cannot be established shall be deemed to have occurred prior 
to Closing. 
9.2 Indemnification bv Buver. From and after 
Closing, Buyer shall indemnify and hold Seller and each 
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Seller Indemnitee harmless from and against any and all 
Losses that Seller or any Seller Indemnitee may incur or 
suffer which arise out of or result from: 
(a) any breach of any representation, 
warranty or covenant of Buyer in this Agreement or in any 
document or other writing furnished by Buyer to Seller 
pursuant to this Agreement; 
(b) the ownership, use, possession or 
operation of the Transferred Assets from and after Closing; 
or 
(c) any failure by Buyer to pay Taxes with 
respect to the Transferred Assets that are allocable to any 
period after the Closing Date. 
9.3 Indemnification Claims. If any liability is 
asserted or Action is commenced by a third Person against a 
party indemnified pursuant to this Article 9 ("Indemnitee") 
which might give rise to an obligation, on the part of the 
other party ("Indemnitor") to indemnify hereunder: 
(a) Notice. The Indemnitee shall give prompt 
written notice to the Indemnitor of the asserted liability 
or Action, stating the nature, basis and (to the extent 
known) amount thereof; provided, however, that the failure 
of an Indemnitee to provide such notice to the Indemnitor 
shall not limit the right to indemnification of the 
Indemnitee unless such failure prejudices the Indemnitor's 
ability to contest such asserted liability or Action. 
(b) Defense of Claim. Upon the written 
agreement of the Indemnitor that it is obligated to 
indemnify hereunder, the Indemnitee shall afford the 
Indemnitor the right to assume responsibility for the 
defense (including all proceedings on appeal or review which 
counsel for the defendant shall deem appropriate) of any 
such asserted liability or Action ("Indemnified Proceeding") 
involving a claim by a Person other than the Indemnitor or 
any of its respective Affiliates. The Indemnitee shall have 
the right to employ its own counsel in any such case, but 
the fees and expenses of such counsel shall be at the 
expense of the Indemnitee unless Indemnitee shall have 
reasonably concluded that such matter involves to a 
significant extent matters beyond the scope of the indemnity 
agreements contained herein or the Indemnitor shall not have 
agreed promptly, and in any event within thirty (30) days, 
after receipt of the notice described above that it is 
obligated to indemnify hereunder and it is ultimately 
determined that Indemnitor was required to provide 
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indemnification for the matters raised in such Indemnified 
Proceeding. The Indemnitee shall be kept fully informed of 
such matter at all stages thereof whether or not it is so 
represented. The parties hereto shall render to each other 
such assistance as may be reasonably required in order to 
ensure the proper and adequate defense of any such asserted 
liability or Action. The Indemnitor shall not make any 
settlement of any Action without the written consent of the 
Indemnitee, which consent shall not be withheld unless the 
Indemnitee shall have reasonably concluded that the claim or 
settlement thereof involves to a significant extent matters 
beyond the scope of the indemnity agreements contained 
herein. 
(c) Buyer's Knowledge. Notwithstanding 
anything in this Agreement to the contrary, Seller shall not 
be liable to Buyer for any claim for indemnification for a 
breach of representation or warranty set forth in this 
Agreement of which breach Buyer had knowledge, as defined 
below, at the time of the Closing. For purposes of this 
section, Buyer shall be deemed to have "knowledge" if Buyer 
knew of the untruth of such representation or warranty. In 
the determining whether Buyer had such knowledge, Keith 
Holder shall be deemed to have read this Agreement and the 
attached schedules and exhibits and the knowledge of Keith 
Holder shall be imputed to Buyer. 
9.4 Further Assurances. 
(a) Generally. From and after Closing, 
Seller and Buyer shall, at their own expense, prepare, 
execute and deliver such further instruments of conveyance, 
sale, assignment or transfer, and shall take or cause to be 
taken such other or further action, as Seller or Buyer shall 
reasonably request at any time or from time to time in order 
to perfect, confirm or evidence the transactions 
contemplated hereby or to give effect to the provisions of 
this Agreement. If requested by Buyer, Seller agrees at 
Buyer's expense to prosecute or otherwise enforce in its own 
name for the sole benefit of Buyer any claims, rights, or 
benefits that are transferred to Buyer by this Agreement and 
that require prosecution or enforcement in Seller's name, 
including, without limitation, any warranty or indemnity 
rights with respect to any of the Assets. Any prosecution 
or enforcement of any claims, rights, or benefits under the 
preceding sentence shall be solely at Buyer's expense, 
unless the prosecution or enforcement is in connection with 
an indemnification obligation of Seller pursuant to 
Section 9.1. 
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(b) Additional Instruments: Consents. The 
parties recognize that a separate instrument or instruments 
of assignment (in addition to the Assignment) and/or 
termination (in addition to the Termination Agreements) may 
be necessary or appropriate with respect to certain of the 
contracts, leases, agreements, undertakings and commitments 
that are part of or applicable to the Transferred Assets, or 
that the signatures of all parties to the Assignment and the 
Termination Agreements may not be obtained on or prior to 
Closing. If any such instruments or additional signatures 
are required after the Closing in connection with the 
Assignment of Rights, the parties agree to use their best 
efforts to obtain all such instruments and/or additional 
signatures promptly after the Closing. If additional 
signatures are required to be obtained after Closing with 
respect to any instrument of consent or assignment, the lack 
of such signatures shall not affect the validity of such 
instrument to effectuate the consent or assignment described 
therein at Closing as with respect to each of the parties 
that has then executed such instrument, and such instrument 
shall thereafter become effective as to each additional 
signatory as and when signed by such additional signatory. 
(c) Partition of Assets. The parties 
recognize that certain of the steps under Section 6.5 that 
are necessary or appropriate to partition the Retained 
Assets from the Transferred Assets may not be completed on 
or prior to the Closing. In such event, the parties agree 
to diligently pursue all such outstanding steps with the 
goal of completing such partition as soon after the Closing 
as is reasonably practicable. 
(d) Certain Easements. 
(i) Seller acknowledges that it may be 
necessary for Buyer to acquire certain easements after 
Closing in connection with the operation of the Transferred 
Assets, including easements to assure the continued supply 
of utilities to the Transferred Assets and/or to expand such 
supply in connection with the operation of such Assets after 
the Closing. If so requested during the six month period 
following the Closing, Seller agrees to grant to Buyer such 
easements and rights of way with respect to the Retained 
Real Property as Buyer may deem reasonably necessary from 
time to time. 
(ii) Buyer acknowledges that it may be 
necessary for Seller to acquire certain easements after 
Closing in connection with the effective use (in a 
decommissioned state) or disposition of the Retained Assets, 
including easements to assure the continued supply of 
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utilities to the Retained Assets and/or to expand such 
supply in connection with the maintenance of such Assets in 
a decommissioned state, and/or to insure the access of the 
Retained Real Property to a public highway. If so requested 
during the six month period following the Closing, Buyer 
agrees to grant to Seller such easements and rights of way 
with respect to the Transferred Real Property as Seller may 
deem reasonably necessary from time to time. In connection 
with the foregoing, Buyer agrees to permit Seller to utilize 
after the Closing the utility systems included within the 
Transferred Personal Property to the extent that use thereof 
is required in connection with the maintenance of the 
Retained Assets in a decommissioned state. The use 
described in the preceding sentence will be without charge, 
but any resulting utility payments will be the sole 
responsibility of Seller. 
(e) Permits. Seller acknowledges that it may 
be necessary for Buyer to acquire certain permits after 
Closing in connection with the operation of the Transferred 
Assets. If so requested after the Closing, Seller shall 
assign to Buyer such Permits as (a) are assignable, 
(b) relate to the Transferred Assets, and (c) are not 
required for maintenance of the Retained Assets in a 
decommissioned state. Seller shall also cooperate with 
Buyer to the extent the Buyer reasonably requests in 
connection with divisions of existing Permits or Buyer's 
applications for additional permits that are required as a 
result of the transactions contemplated hereby for the 
post-Closing operation of the Transferred Assets. 
(f) Marketing Agreement. From and after 
Closing, Buyer and Seller shall cooperate to effect the sale 
of the Retained Assets under and as provided in the 
Marketing Agreement. 
9.5 Access. After Closing, for so long as the 
Management Agreement remains in effect, Seller will upon 
reasonable notice and during business hours afford Buyer 
such access to the Records and Returns as Buyer may 
reasonably require in connection with the resolution of tax 
questions, the conduct of tax audits, and any related 
matters. Seller will not, during such period, dispose of or 
destroy any material Records or Returns without providing 
thirty (30) days' prior written notice to Buyer so that 
Buyer may at its expense examine, copy, or repossess the 
Records and Returns to be disposed of or destroyed. 
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10. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
10.1 Termination. 
(a) Cause for Termination. This Agreement 
and the transactions contemplated hereby may be terminated 
prior to Closing: 
(i) By mutual written agreement of Buyer 
and Seller at any time; 
(ii) By either Buyer or Seller if Closing 
has not occurred on or before March 15, 1994 and 
the party electing to terminate is not in breach of 
its obligations hereunder; 
(iii) By Buyer if there has been a 
casualty to or condemnation of any of the Assets 
prior to Closing entitling Buyer to terminate this 
Agreement pursuant to Section 10.16; 
(iv) By Buyer if there has been a 
material breach on the part of Seller of the 
representations, warranties, or covenants of Seller 
in this Agreement; or 
(v) By Seller if there has been a 
material breach on the part of Buyer of the 
representations, warranties, or covenants of Buyer 
in this Agreement. 
(b) Effect of Termination. Upon any 
termination of this Agreement pursuant to Section 10.1(a), 
this Agreement shall be void and neither Buyer nor Seller, 
nor any other Buyer Indemnitee or Seller Indemnitee, shall 
have any liability hereunder except that Section 6.6(b) and 
Section 10.2 shall survive such termination. A breaching 
party shall be liable for such damages, costs and expenses 
as are the direct and proximate result of its breach but 
shall not be liable for or on account of any consequential 
damages of any kind suffered as a result thereof. 
10.2 Costs and Expenses. Except as otherwise 
provided herein or in the Marketing Agreement, the parties 
shall each bear their own costs and expenses (including 
attorneys' fees) incurred in connection with the negotiation 
and preparation of this Agreement and consummation of the 
transactions contemplated hereby. Seller shall pay the cost 
of all title insurance premiums and endorsements and all 
surveys associated therewith. All sales, use and 
documentary taxes payable in connection with the 
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transactions contemplated hereby and any escrow fees 
associated herewith shall be shared equally by Buyer and 
Seller. 
10.3 Communications. All notices, requests, 
demands and other communications under this Agreement shall 
be in writing and shall be deemed to have been given 
(a) when delivered personally, or (b) 48 hours after being 
sent by facsimile with duplicate sent by courier service. 
Such communications shall be directed as follows: 
To Seller at: 
Landmark Petroleum,Inc. 
1493 Highway 6 & 50 
Fruita, Colorado 81521 
Att'n: Mr. Richard Means 
Fax: (303) 858-9194 
with a copy to: 
Bracewell & Patterson 
711 Louisiana, Suite 2900 
Houston, TX 77002-2781 
Att'n: Richard Rice 
Fax: (713) 221-1212 
To Buyer at: 
Wescourt Group, Inc. 
2401 River Road 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81505 
Att'n: Keith Holder 
Fax: (303) 329-2902 
with a copy to: 
Morrison & Foerster 
345 California Street 
San Francisco, CA 94104 
Att'n: Ken Siegel, Esq. 
Fax: (415) 677-7522 
Any party may change its address for purposes of this 
Section 10.3 by giving the other party notice of the new 
address in the manner set forth above. 
10.4 Schedules and Exhibits. The schedules and 
exhibits attached hereto are made a part hereof. References 
herein to this Agreement include such schedules and 
exhibits. 
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10.5 Captions and Headings. The captions contained 
herein are for convenience and reference only and shall not 
affect the meaning, scope, intent, or interpretation of this 
Agreement or its provisions. 
10.6 Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes 
the entire agreement between the parties with respect to its 
subject matter and supersedes all prior agreements and 
understandings, written and oral with respect thereto. No 
prior draft of this Agreement nor any parole evidence shall 
be admissible to prove the meaning or intent of any 
provision of this Agreement. 
10.7 Amendment or Modification. This Agreement may 
only be amended, modified or supplemented by a written 
instrument specifically referring to this Agreement and 
signed by Seller and Buyer. 
10.8 Waiver. The failure of either party to 
enforce at any time any provision of this Agreement will not 
be construed to be a waiver of any such provision and will 
not affect the validity of this Agreement or any part hereof 
or the right of either party to enforce such provision. No 
waiver of any breach hereof will be construed to be a waiver 
of any other breach. 
10.9 Assignment. Neither party may assign its 
rights and obligations under this Agreement either prior to 
or after the Closing except that Buyer may assign all or a 
portion of its rights hereunder to one or more Affiliate of 
Buyer; provided, that, as between Buyer and Seller, no such 
assignment by Buyer shall relieve Buyer of any of its 
obligations under this Agreement. Without limitation of the 
foregoing, Buyer may elect, by written notice to Seller on 
or prior to Closing, to have the Transferred Real Property 
transferred to one Affiliate of Buyer and the other 
Transferred Assets transferred to another Affiliate of 
Buyer. 
10.10 Parties in Interest. Subject to Section 10.9, 
this Agreement will inure to the benefit of and be binding 
upon Seller and Buyer and their respective successors, 
assigns and legal representatives. Nothing in this 
Agreement express or implied is intended to confer upon any 
Person other than Buyer, Seller and, to the limited extent 
expressly provided herein, the Buyer Indemnitees and the 
Seller Indemnitees, any right or remedy by reason of this 
Agreement. 
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10.11 Survival. The representations and warranties 
of Buyer and Seller in this Agreement shall survive only 
until the second (2nd) anniversary of the Closing Date and 
any claim for breach of any of such representations and 
warranties made after that date shall be barred; provided, 
however. that the representations, warranties, covenants and 
indemnities of Seller with respect to the environmental 
matters (including, without limitation, pursuant to 
Section 4.11) and with respect to Taxes (including, without 
limitation, pursuant to Section 4.13) shall continue in full 
force and effect until the fourth (4th) anniversary of the 
Closing Date and any claim for breach of any of such 
representations and warranties made after that date shall be 
barred. 
10.12 Governing Law. This Agreement will be 
governed by, and construed and enforced in accordance with, 
the laws of the State of New York. 
10.13 Severability. Any provision of this Agreement 
which is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction 
will, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent 
of such prohibition or unenforceability without invalidating 
the remaining provisions of this Agreement or affecting the 
validity or enforceability of any such provision in any 
other jurisdiction, unless such prohibition or 
unenforceability frustrates the overall objective of this 
Agreement. 
10.14 Time of the Essence. Time shall be of the 
essence of this Agreement and of every part hereof. 
10.15 Finder's or Broker's Fees. Each of the 
parties represents and warrants that it has not dealt with 
any broker or finder in connection with any of the 
transactions contemplated by this Agreement and that, 
insofar as it knows, no broker or other Person is entitled 
to any commission or finder's fee in connection with any of 
these transactions. Each of the parties shall be 
responsible for, and shall indemnify and hold the other 
party harmless against, the fees of its finder's or 
broker's, if any. 
10.16 Risk of Loss. Seller shall promptly notify 
Buyer if, prior to Closing, any of the Transferred Assets 
(a) are damaged or destroyed by casualty, or (b) taken 
pursuant to the power of eminent domain (or any proceeding 
with respect to such a taking is instituted or threatened). 
Buyer shall have the right, at its option, to terminate this 
Agreement by delivering notice of such termination to Seller 
not later than ten (10) Business Days after the date Buyer 
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receives any such notice from Seller. In the event Buyer 
does not elect to terminate this Agreement by reason hereof, 
then Closing shall occur and the Purchase Price shall not be 
reduced by any costs associated with such casualty or 
taking. 
10.17 Bulk Sales. The parties hereby waive 
compliance with the provisions of any bulk transfer or bulk 
sales law of any jurisdiction. 
10.18 Counterparts. This Agreement will be executed 
in counterparts, and the several counterparts shall 
constitute one executed Agreement. 
10.19 DISCLAIMER. EXCEPT AS IS EXPRESSLY STATED IN 
THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY OTHER AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN CONNECTION 
HEREWITH TO THE CONTRARY, SELLER HEREBY DISCLAIMS TO THE 
FULLEST EXTENT ALLOWED BY LAW ANY AGREEMENT, WARRANTY, 
GUARANTY, OR REPRESENTATION, ORAL OR WRITTEN, EXPRESSED, 
IMPLIED, OR ARISING BY LAW, PAST, PRESENT OR FUTURE, OF, AS, 
TO OR CONCERNING (I) THE NATURE AND CONDITION OF THE ASSETS 
AND THE SUITABILITY THEREOF FOR ANY AND ALL USES WHICH BUYER 
MAY ELECT TO CONDUCT THEREON OR ANY IMPROVEMENTS CONSTRUCTED 
THEREON, INCOME TO BE DERIVED THEREFROM OR COSTS TO BE 
INCURRED WITH RESPECT THERETO, MERCHANTABILITY, HABITABILITY 
OR ANY OTHER MATTER RELATING THERETO OR AFFECTING SAME; 
(II) THE QUALITY AND TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION AND THE CURRENT 
CONDITION OF ANY IMPROVEMENTS LOCATED THEREON; AND (III) THE 
COMPLIANCE OF THE ASSETS WITH THE OPERATION AND USE OF THE 
ASSETS WITH ANY LAWS, ORDINANCES, RULES OR REGULATIONS OF 
ANY GOVERNMENTAL BODY. BUYER ACKNOWLEDGES ITS INSPECTION 
AND SATISFACTION WITH THE ASSETS AND EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY 
PROVIDED HEREIN OR IN ANY OTHER AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN 
CONNECTION HEREWITH TO THE CONTRARY WAIVES ALL CLAIMS, IF 
ANY NOW OR HEREAFTER ARISING. BUYER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT IS 
AWARE IN GENERAL TERMS OF SELLER'S FINANCIAL CONDITION 
INCLUDING THE FACT THAT CURRENTLY ITS LIABILITIES MAY EXCEED 
ITS ASSETS. AS BETWEEN BUYER AND SELLER, BUYER AGREES TO 
LOOK SOLELY TO THE OBLIGATIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND 
WARRANTIES OF SELLER IN THIS AGREEMENT AND THE OTHER 
AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS CONTEMPLATED HEREBY AND RELEASES 
SELLER FROM ANY CLAIM THAT BUYER MAY HAVE EXCEPT TO THE 
EXTENT THAT SUCH CLAIM ARISES OUT OF A BREACH OF ANY SUCH 
OBLIGATION, REPRESENTATION, OR WARRANTY BY SELLER. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have executed 
this Agreement on the date first written above. 
WESCOURT GROUP, INC. 
By 
Keith R. Holder, President 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC. 
By 
Richard Means, Vice President 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have executed 
this Agreement on the date first written above. 
WESCOURT GROUP, INC. 
By 
Keith R. Holder, President 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC. 
By JLtyCSUCtA-f *? ^ ^ v ^ 
Richard Means, Vice P r e s i d e n t 
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Schedule 1 
to Asset Purchase Agreement 
DEFINITIONS 
"Action" means any action, suit, claim, 
arbitration, judgment, or legal, administrative, or other 
proceeding, or governmental investigation. 
"Affiliate" means, as to any Person, any Person 
which, directly or indirectly, controls or is controlled by 
or is under common control with such Person. For the 
purposes of this definition, "control" (including, with 
correlative meanings, the terms "controlled by" and "under 
common control with") means, as to any Person, the power to 
direct or cause the direction of the management and policies 
of such Person, whether through the ownership of voting 
securities, by contract or otherwise. 
"Agreement" means this Asset Purchase Agreement 
(including all exhibits and schedules hereto), as the same 
may hereafter be amended from time to time. 
"Apportionment Statement" has the meaning specified 
in Section 3.3(b). 
"Assets" means all of Seller's right, title and 
interest in and to all property and assets of every 
description and wherever situated connected with the 
Refinery on the date hereof or purchased by Seller on or 
prior to Closing for use in connection with the Refinery 
(whether or not delivered), including, without limitation, 
the following: 
(a) Real Property. The real property 
located at 1493 Highway 6 & 50, Fruita, Colorado 81521 
consisting of the Retained Real Property and the Transferred 
Real Property (collectively, the "Real Property"); 
(b) Personal Property. All personal 
property located on the Real Property or used or usable by 
Seller in connection with the operation of the Refinery, 
including, without limitation, (i) all refinery and office 
equipment, machinery, spare-parts, tools, manuals, testing 
and maintenance devices and supplies, (ii) all computer 
hardware and software and (iii) all automobiles and 
vehicles, together with all warranties and guaranties 
pertaining thereto and all maintenance records, plans and 
specifications therefore (collectively, the "Personal 
Property"); 
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(c) Contracts. All of Seller's 
contracts, agreements, contract rights, warranty rights, 
license agreements, and other rights with respect to the 
ownership and operation of the Refinery, including, all of 
Seller's rights with respect to utilities provided to the 
Refinery (collectively, the "Contracts"); 
(d) Permits. All federal, state, local 
and foreign governmental licenses, permits, authorizations 
and approvals held by Seller with respect to the ownership 
or operation of the Refinery, including, without limitation, 
all such licenses, permits, authorizations and approvals 
relating to (i) utilities, (ii) the ownership, construction, 
operation, use and occupancy of any of the Assets, 
including, without limitation, building, zoning, 
subdivision, sewer, environmental matters, wetlands and 
drainage, (iii) the manufacture, processing, distribution, 
use, treatment, storage, recycling, disposal, release, 
transport or handling of Hazardous Materials and 
(iv) transportation of goods to and from the Refinery 
(intrastate or interstate) (collectively, the "Permits"); 
and 
(e) Insurance. All of Seller's rights 
under insurance policies or other arrangements relating to 
the Refinery (collectively, the "Insurance Policies"). 
"Business Day" means a date that is not a Saturday, 
Sunday or bank holiday in the State of Colorado. 
"Buver" means Wescourt Group, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation. 
"Buver Indemnitee" means, collectively, (a) Buyer, 
(b) each Affiliate of Buyer, and (c) each officer, director, 
employee and agent of any Person described in clauses (a) or 
(b). 
"Chase" means The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., a 
national banking association. 
"Chase Consent" has the meaning specified in 
Section 7.3. 
"Chase Documents" means the Amended and Restated 
Credit Agreement, dated as of June 24, 1992, between Chase 
and Seller and all agreements and other instruments executed 
by Chase and/or Seller as security for or in connection 
therewith or pursuant thereto, in each case as amended prior 
to the date hereof including, without limitation, the 
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Security Instruments and the Option Agreement (Chase) (as 
such terms are defined in such Amended and Restated Credit 
Agreement). 
" Chase Liens" means the liens and security 
interests with respect to the Assets granted by Seller to 
Chase pursuant to the Chase Documents. 
''Closing" has the meaning specified in Section 3.1. 
"Closing Date" has the meaning specified in 
Section 3.1. 
"Code" means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended. 
"Encumbrance" means, with respect to any tangible 
or intangible asset, any encumbrance, security interest, 
mortgage, lien, pledge, charge, equity, claim, easement, 
right-of-way, covenant, or restriction. 
"Environmental Occurrence" has the meaning 
specified in Section 4.11. 
"Environmental Laws" means any and all federal, 
state, local and foreign laws (statutory or common), rules, 
regulations, ordinances, codes, Orders, permits, or licenses 
relating to human health or the environment or to emissions, 
discharges, releases or threatened releases of pollutants, 
contaminants, chemicals or industrial, toxic or hazardous 
substances or wastes into the environment, including, 
without limitation, ambient air, surface water, groundwater 
or land, or otherwise relating to the manufacture, 
processing, distribution, use, treatment, storage, 
recycling, disposal, transport or handling of pollutants, 
contaminants, chemicals or industrial, toxic or hazardous 
substances or wastes, including, without limitation, the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. § 9601 et Beg,.) ("CERCLA") , 
as amended, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(33 U.S.C. § 1251 et sec.), and the Federal Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. § 6901 et. seq.). 
"Environmental Records" has the meaning specified 
in Section 4.11. 
"GAAP" means United States generally accepted 
accounting principles, as in effect on the date hereof. 
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"Governmental Body" means any federal, state, local 
entity exercising executive, legislative, judicial, 
regulatory or administrative functions of or pertaining to 
government, including any department, commission, board, 
bureau, agency, court or other instrumentality. 
"Hazardous Material" means any material, substance, 
chemical or waste which is (a) listed, defined or otherwise 
identified as hazardous, toxic or dangerous or regulated 
under any Environmental Law, including, without limitation, 
crude oil, petroleum (and any petroleum product or by-
product) , asbestos, and polychlorinated biphenyls, (b) a 
basis for liability under any common law theory or 
(c) potentially injurious to human health or the 
environment. 
"Indemnified Proceeding" has the meaning specified 
in Section 9.3• 
"Indemnitee" has the meaning specified in 
Section 9.3. 
"Indemnitor" has the meaning specified in 
Section 9.3. 
"Insurance Policies" has the meaning specified in 
the definition of Assets. 
"Knowledge of Seller" means the actual knowledge 
(after reasonable inquiry) of each of the officers and 
individuals with executive responsibility for any aspect of 
the Assets or the business of Seller. 
"Legal Requirement" means, as to any Person, any 
law (statutory or common), rule, regulation, ordinance, 
Order, permit, or license, including, without limitation, 
any Environmental Law, in each case applicable to or binding 
upon the Person or any of its property or to which the 
Person or any of its property is subject, including, without 
limitation, in the case of Seller, to which the ownership, 
operation, or decommission of Assets are subject. 
"Losses" means demands, claims, losses, damages, 
injuries, costs, liabilities, obligations, fines, penalties, 
and legal and administrative investigations and proceedings 
and any associated costs and expenses (including, without 
limitation, court costs, reasonable attorneys', experts' and 
consultants' fees). Without limiting the foregoing, 
"Losses" includes all necessary costs of investigation and 
response incurred with respect to any violation of 
Environmental Law, the condition of the Assets, or the 
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existence, release, or disposal of Hazardous Materials on, 
in, or under the Assets, or any release or threatened 
release resulting therefrom. 
"Management Agreement" means the Management 
Agreement, dated the date hereof, between Seller and an 
affiliate of Buyer with respect to the management of the 
Retained Assets after the Closing. 
"Marketing Agreement" has the meaning specified 
Section 2.2. 
"Obligation" means, as to any Person, any liability 
or obligation of such Person of any type whatsoever, known 
or unknown, anticipated or unanticipated, contingent or 
matured. 
"Order" means any judgment, decree, writ, 
stipulation, injunction, determination, award, or other 
order or ruling of any Governmental Body. 
"Permits" has the meaning specified in the 
definition of Assets. 
"Person" means any individual, corporation, 
partnership, firm, Governmental Body or other entity, 
whether acting in an individual, fiduciary or any other 
capacity. 
"Personal Property" has the meaning specified in 
the definition of Assets. 
"Purchase Price" has the meaning specified in 
Section 3.1. 
"Real Property" has the meaning specified in the 
definition of Assets. 
"Records" has the meaning specified Section 4.12. 
"Refinery" has the meaning specified in Recital A. 
"Retained Assets" has the meaning specified in 
Recital B. 
"Retained Real Property" means the Real Property 
described in the attached Schedule 3 (and related map) as 
Parcel 2 of Tract A, including, without limitation, all of 
Seller's right, title and interest in and to (a) all rights, 
privileges and easements appurtenant thereto, including 
(i) all minerals, oil, gas and other hydrocarbon substances 
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thereon and thereunder, (ii) all development rights, air 
rights, water, water rights and water stock relating thereto 
and (iii) all easements, rights-of-way or other 
appurtenances used in connection with the beneficial use and 
enjoyment thereof and (b) all improvements and fixtures, 
owned or leased, that are located thereon. 
"Returns" means all reports, estimates, 
declarations of estimated tax, information statements and 
returns relating to, or required to be filed in connection 
with, any Taxes, including information returns or reports 
with respect to backup withholding and other payments to 
third parties. 
"Seller" means Landmark Petroleum, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation. 
"Seller Indemnitee" means, collectively, 
(a) Seller, (b) each Affiliate of Seller, and (c) each 
officer, director, employee and agent of any Person 
described in clauses (a) or (b). 
"Survey" has the meaning specified in 
Section 6.5(a). 
"Tax Lien" means the Lien in favor of the tax 
authorities of the County of Mesa, Colorado securing the 
obligation of Seller to pay the Tax Obligations. 
"Tax Obligations" means the obligations of the 
Seller with respect to certain past due property Taxes 
payable to the County of Mesa, Colorado in an aggregate 
amount not exceeding $1,024,000. 
"Taxes" means all taxes, however denominated, 
including any interest, penalties or other additions to tax 
that may become payable in respect thereof, imposed by any 
federal, territorial, state, local or foreign government or 
any agency or political subdivision of any such government, 
which taxes shall include, without limitation, all income or 
profits taxes (including, without limitation, federal income 
taxes and state income taxes), payroll and employee 
withholding taxes, unemployment insurance, social security 
taxes, sales and use taxes, ad valorem taxes, excise taxes, 
franchise taxes, gross receipts taxes, business license 
taxes, stamp taxes, environmental taxes or fees, transfer 
taxes, workers' compensation, Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation premiums and other governmental charges, and 
other obligations of the same or of a similar nature to any 
of the foregoing, which Seller or any person with respect to 
the Business and the Assets is required to pay, withhold or 
collect. 
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"Title Company" means First American Title 
Insurance Co., Ltd. 
"Transferred Assets" means the Transferred Real 
Property and the Transferred Personal Property. 
"Transferred Personal Property" means the Personal 
Property described in Schedule 2. To the extent that any 
such Personal Property is being leased by Seller, Seller 
shall be deemed to have conveyed all of its interest in and 
under each applicable lease. 
"Transferred Real Property" means the Real Property 
described in the attached Schedule 3 (and related map) as 
Parcel 1 of Tract A, including, without limitation, all of 
Seller's right, title and interest in and to (a) all rights, 
privileges and easements appurtenant thereto, including 
(i) all minerals, oil, gas and other hydrocarbon substances 
thereon and thereunder, (ii) all development rights, air 
rights, water, water rights and water stock relating thereto 
and (iii) all easements, rights-of-way or other 
appurtenances used in connection with the beneficial use and 
enjoyment thereof and (b) all improvements and fixtures, 
owned or leased, that are located thereon. 
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Schedule 2 
to Asset Purchase Agreement 
TRANSFERRED PERSONAL PROPERTY 
PERSONAL PROPERTY LOCATED ON TRANSFERRED REAL PROPERTY 
The following Personal Property to the extent, but only 
to the extent, such property is located on the 
Transferred Real Property: 
Administration Building: All office furniture and 
equipment 
Laboratory: All laboratory equipment 
Shop/Maintenance/Warehouse Areas: All equipment, tools & 
parts in any of these areas 
Tracks 1, 2, 3 & 6 (to the extent such tracks are 
located on the Transferred Real Property) 
Track 4 (to the extent such tracks are located on the 
Transferred Real Property), including unloading/loading 
equipment 
Track 5 (to the extent such tracks are located on the 
Transferred Real Property), including unloading/loading 
equipment 
Water Rights: Shares From Headgate 540 
5.1 CFS Absolute Water Right And 4.9 CFS Conditional 
Water Right Decreed By The District Court Of 
Colorado For Water Division No. 5 In Case 
No. 88CW086, As Awarded On April 13, 1972, In Civil 
Action No. 13368 By Mesa County District Court. 
All necessary parts and components located on the 
Transferred Real Property for all utility systems 
applicable to the Transferred Assets, including the 
following systems: 
Electricity 
Natural Gas 
River Water Intake System & Clarification Equipment 
Fire Water 
Gasoline Blending Facility and all associated pumps, 
piping and equipment 
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LPG & Butane Truck Unloading/Loading Sites & Equipment: 
Tank # Service 
4402 
4403 
4431 
4432 
Sweet LPG 
Sweet LPG 
Butane 
Butane 
Vol - bbls 
1,000 
1,000 
1,371 
1,371 
Comments 
Located By Track 6 
Located By Track 6 
Located By Track 6 
Located By Track 6 
Truck Terminal, Loading Rack, Tanks & Equipment 
Tank # Service Vol - bbls Comments 
2001 
2002 
1003 
1012 
Premium Unleaded 
Jet A Fuel 
Super Diesel 
Super Diesel 
1769 
1989 
1066 
1065 
PERSONAL PROPERTY LOCATED ON RETAINED REAL PROPERTY 
The following Personal Property to the extent, whether 
or not such Personal Property is located on the Retained 
Real Property or the Transferred Real Property" 
Track 2: Unloading/Loading Equipment 
Track 3: Unloading/Loading Equipment 
Natural Gasoline Unloading/Loading Equipment 
All Tanks in Area 44 less than 11,000 bbl, and the 
following Tanks in Area 44 exceeding 11,000 bbl: 
Tank # 
313 
520 
521 
538 
652 
1030 
1031 
2032 
2033 
2034 
2035 
2036 
2039 
2042 
2072 
4051 
Service 
Alcohol Additive 
Fuel Oil 
Fuel Oil 
Acid Sludge 
Flush Oil 
API Oil 
Acid Sludge 
Acid Sludge 
Naphtha 
Reclaim Oil 
Reclaim Oil 
Reclaim Oil 
Acid Sludge 
Oil 
Oil 
Oil 
Oil 
Coker Kerosene 
#2 Diesel 
Premium Unleaded 
Vol - bbls 
499 
499 
524 
477 
993 
993 
1,989 
1,992 
2,012 
2,012 
2,006 
2,011 
2,391 
2,297 
3,886 
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32 
5041 
10053 
10054 
10055 
10064 
10070 
10071 
10073 
Coker Kerosene 
Syncrude 
Vacuum Gas Oil 
Vacuum Gas Oil 
Syncrude 
Coker Naphtha 
Syncrude 
Syncrude 
The following Butane/LPG Tanks In Area 44 
Tank # Service Vol - bbls 
416 
1,066 
956 
1,360 
1,360 
1,360 
1,360 
4401 
4408 
4409 
4420 
4421 
4422 
4423 
Sweet LPG 
C4 - C6 
C4 - C6 
Sour LPG 
Sour LPG 
Sour LPG 
Sour LPG 
The following tanks In Area 60, 
Tank # Service 
4,845 
9,773 
9,773 
9,724 
9,467 
9,623 
9,623 
9,623 
Comments 
Pressure 
Pressure 
Pressure 
Pressure 
Pressure 
Pressure 
Pressure 
Bottle 
Bottle 
Bottle 
Bottle 
Bottle 
Bottle 
Bottle 
1010 
1011 
Air Stripper 
Air Stripper 
Vol - bbls 
956 
962 
All pumps & piping associated with any of the foregoing 
Tanks 
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Schedule 3 
to Asset Purchase Agreement 
TRANSFERRED REAL PROPERTY 
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(Retained Real Property) 
PARCEL 2 OF TRACT A (REVISED 1/27/94) 
A parcel of land located in the SE1/4 of Section 2, the NE1/4 of Section 10, and Section 11 
Township I North, Range 3 West of the Ute Meridian, Mesa County Colorado, being more 
particularly described as follows; 
Commencing at the Northeast comer of Section 11, Township 1 North, Range 3 West, whence 
the East 1/4 corner of Section 11 bears S 00°07'00" E a distance of 2629 24 feet for a basis of 
bearings, with all bearings contained herein relative thereto; thence S 00°0T00" E a distance of 
872.57 feet along the East line of the Northeast quarter (NE1/4) of Section 11 to a point on the 
Southerly right-of-way line of the Denver and Rio Grand Railroad; thence North 56 degrees 41 
minutes 00 seconds West (N 56°41'00" W), a distance of 1473.79 feet along said railroad 
right-of-way; to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING, thence South 33 degrees 53 minutes 32 
seconds West (S 33053'32" W), a distance of 384.57 feet; thence South 56 degrees 34 minutes 02 
seconds East (S 56°34'02" E), a distance of 665.06 feet; thence South 33 degrees 49 minutes 38 
seconds West (S 33°49'38" W), a distance of 472 87 feet; thence North 56 degrees 35 minutes 40 
seconds West (N 56°35'40" W), a distance of 258.17 feet; thence South 33 degrees 24 minutes 17 
seconds West (S 33°24'17H W), a distance of 115 46 feet; thence South 57 degrees 40 minutes 48 
seconds East (S 57°40'48" E), a distance of 52.07 feet; thence North 33 degrees 24 minutes 17 
seconds East (N 33°24'17" E), a distance of 90.58 feet; thence South 56 degrees 17 minutes 10 
seconds East (S 56°I7I0" E), a distance of 414.12 feet; thence North 52 degrees 42 minutes 15 
seconds East (N 52°42'15" E), a distance of 81.06 feet; thence South 58 degrees 04 minutes 10 
seconds East (S 58°04'100" E), a distance of 261.08 feet; thence South 07 degrees 30 minutes 19 
seconds West (S 07°30'19" W), a distance of 94.49 feet; thence South 56 degrees 17 minutes 10 
seconds East (S 56° 17'10" E), a distance of 418.13 feet; thence South 31 degrees 19 minutes 33 
seconds West (S 3ri9*33" W), a distance of 240.00 feet; thence South 58 degrees 50 minutes 11 
seconds East (S 58°50'11" E), a distance of 115.86 feet; thence North 33 degrees 42 minutes 50 
seconds East (N 33°42'50" E), a distance of 234.64 feet; thence South 56 degrees 17 minutes 10 
seconds East (S 56°1710" E), a distance of 289.73 feet; thence South 00 degrees 07 minutes 00 
seconds East (S 00°0700" E), a distance of 842.93 feet; thence South 70 degrees 59 minutes 23 
seconds West (S 70°59*23" W), a distance of 383.97 feet; thence South 00 degrees 06 minutes 58 
seconds East (S 00°06*58" E), a distance of 374.74 feet; thence North 89 degrees 53 minutes 00 
seconds East (N 89°53'00" E), a distance of 363.28 feet; thence South 00 degrees 07 minutes 00 
seconds East (S 00°0700" E), a distance of 611.55 feet; thence South 44 degrees 02 minutes 01 
seconds West (S 44°02'01" W), a distance of 564.53 feet to a point on the North bank of the 
Colorado River, thence the following 4 courses along the North bank of the Colorado River, (1) 
North 61 degrees 31 minutes 53 seconds West (N 61°31'53" W), a distance of 541.72 feet; (2) 
North 85 degreti 19 minutes 06 seconds West (N 85°I9'06" W), a distance of 615.61 feet; (3) 
South 69 degree* 33 minutes 17 seconds West (S 69°33'17" W), a distance of 1015.56 feet; (4) 
South 45 degrees 30 minutes 57 seconds West (S 45°30'57" W), a distance of 384.19 feet to a 
point on the Northerly right-of-way of Interstate 70, thence the following 4 courses along the 
Northerly right-of-way of Interstate 70; (1) along a curve to the right having a radius of 
11359.20 feet, arc length of 4261.46 feet, delta angle of 21 degrees 29 minutes 41 seconds 
(21°29'4r), a chord bearing of North 51 degrees 44 minutes 01 seconds West (N 51o44,01" W), 
and a chord length of 4236.51 feet; (2) North 40 degrees 59 minutes 10 seconds West (N 
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40°59'10" W). a distance of 400 50 feei, (3) Nonh 32 degrees 26 minutes 20 seconds West (N 
32°2670" W), a distance of 309 30 feet; (4) along a curve to the left having a radius of 3969 70 
feet, arc length of 130.31 feet, delta angle of 1 degree 52 minutes 51 seconds (1°52'51 "). a chord 
bearing of Nonh 44 degrees 10 minutes 50 seconds West (N 44°10'50" W), and a chord length of 
130 30 feet; thence leaving said nght-of-way North 00 degrees 50 minutes 33 seconds West 
(N 00o50'33" W), a distance of 644 86 feet; thence Nonh 89 degrees 09 minutes 42 seconds East 
CS 89°09'42" E), a distance of 22.71 feet; thence South 32 degrees 55 minutes 25 seconds East 
(S 32°55'25" E). a distance of 264 97 feet; thence South 11 degrees 48 minutes 58 seconds West 
(S 11°48'58" W), a distance of 270 91 feet; thence South 48 degrees 11 minutes 15 seconds East 
(S 48°11*15" E), a distance of 859 15 feet; thence South 41 degrees 40 minutes 17 seconds East 
(S 4l°40'I7" E), a distance of 148.14 feet; thence South 20 degrees 12 minutes 02 seconds East 
(S 20° 12*02" E), a distance of 434 73 feet; thence South 31 degrees 42 minutes 25 seconds East 
(S 31042'25M E), a distance of 203.83 feet; thence South 63 degrees 51 minutes 48 seconds East 
(S 63°51'48H E), a distance of 484.33 feet; thence South 86 degrees 31 minutes 14 seconds East 
(S 86°3ri4" E), a distance of 158.42 feet; thence Nonh 41 degrees 43 minutes 28 seconds East 
(N 41043'28" E), a distance of 62.52 feet; thence South 89 degrees 56 minutes 00 seconds East 
(S 89°56,00" E), a distance of 767.57 feet; thence South 01 degrees 13 minutes 31 seconds East 
(S 01°13'31" E), a distance of 58.91 feet; thence South 89 degrees 34 minutes 20 seconds East 
(S 89°3470" E), a distance of 1003.06 feet; thence Nonh 09 degrees 38 minutes 43 seconds West 
(N 09°38'43H W), a distance of 249.49 feet; thence North 39 degrees 13 minutes 56 seconds West 
(N 39°13'56" W), a distance of 131.38 feet; thence North 59 degrees 12 minutes 29 seconds West 
(N 59°12'29" W), a distance of 125.97 feet; thence North 00 degrees 34 minutes 39 seconds East 
(N 00°34'39" E), a distance of 318.00 feet; thence North 09 degrees 38 minutes 07 seconds East 
(N 09°38'07" E), a distance of 551.22 feet; thence North 69 degrees 50 minutes 17 seconds Ecst 
(N 69°50M7" E), a distance of 307.09 feet; thence South 56 degrees 47 minutes 45 seconds East 
(S 56°4745" E), a distance of 612.77 feet; thence South 32 degrees 13 minutes 29 seconds West 
(S 32° 1379" W), a distance of 178.70 feet; thence South 56 degrees 44 minutes 51 seconds East 
(S 56°44'51" E), a distance of 66.38 feet; thence South 28 degrees 52 minutes 33 seconds West 
(S 28°52'33N W), a distance of 433.57 feet; thence South 68 degrees 32 minutes 14 seconds East 
(S 68°32*14" E), a distance of 737.09 feet; thence South 61 degrees 16 minutes 50 seconds East 
(S 61°16'50" E), a distance of 299.30 feet; thence North 31 degrees 46 minutes 50 seconds East 
(N 3 t°46*50" E), a distance of 101.53 feet; thence North 58 degrees 27 minutes 39 seconds West 
(N 58°2739" W), a distance of 298.31 feet; thence North 01 degrees 32 minutes 36 seconds West 
(N 01°32*36" W), a distance of 218.60 feet; thence North 32 degrees 56 minutes 45 seconds East 
(N 32e56'45" E), a distance of 345 01 feet; thence North 56 degrees 22 minutes 59 seconds West 
(N 56°22'59" W), a distance of 698. IS feet; thence North 22 degrees 46 minutes 44 seconds West 
(N 22°46'44* W), a distance of 312.10 feet; thence North 33 degrees 18 minutes'45 seconds East 
(N 33° 18*45' EX a distance of 296.66 feet; thence North 56 degrees 35 minutes 17 seconds West 
(N 56°35'17" W), a distance of 214.74 feet; thence South 32 degrees 28 minutes 42 seconds West 
(S 32°28'42" W), a distance of 631.90 feet; thence North 47 degrees 11 minutes 13 seconds West 
(N 47° 11*13" W), a distance of 209.61 feet; thence North 42 degrees 34 minutes 43 seconds East 
(N 42°34'43" E), a distance of 544.55 feet; thence North 29 degrees 35 minutes 16 seconds West 
(N 29°35'16" W), a distance of 298.77 feet; thence North 34 degrees 27 minutes 49 seconds East 
(N 34°2T49* E), a distance of 271.33 feet; thence South 59 degrees 05 minutes 40 seconds East 
(S 59°05'40" E), a distance of 298 49 feet; thence North 32 degrees 06 minutes 52 seconds East 
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(N 32o06'52M E). a distance of 166 80 feet; thence South 44 degrees 31 minutes 02 seconds East 
(S 44o31'02" E), a distance of 218 40 feet; thence North 33 degrees 33 minutes 41 seconds East 
(N 33°33'41" E), a distance of 45.53 feet; thence North 57 degrees 02 minutes 42 seconds West 
(N 57°02'42" W), a distance of 131 96 feet; thence North 33 degrees 33 minutes 52 seconds East 
(N 33°33*52" E), a distance of 68 49 feet; thence South 60 degrees 44 minutes 32 seconds East 
(S 60o44'32M E), a distance of 33 52 feet; thence North 33 degrees 29 minutes 45 seconds East 
(N 33°29'45" E), a distance of 86 70 feet; thence South 56 degrees 35 minutes 23 seconds East 
(S 56'35'23" E), a distance of 131 91 feet; thence North 33 degrees 04 minutes 32 seconds East 
(N 33°04,32M E), a distance of 21.50 feet; thence North 56 degrees 55 minutes 28 seconds West 
(N 56°55'28" W), a distance of 31.33 feet; thence North 33 degrees 43 minutes 06 seconds East 
CS 33°43'06" E), a distance of 36.91 feet, thence South 56 degrees 25 minutes 59 seconds East 
(S 56'25'59" E). a distance of 101.55 feet; thence South 33 degrees 01 minutes 00 seconds West 
(S 33°0r00" W), a distance of 13.57 feet; thence South 57 degrees 02 minutes 09 seconds East 
(S 57°02'09" E), a distance of 34.90 feet; thence South 32 degrees 57 minutes 51 seconds West 
(S 32057'51" W), a distance of 4.35 feet; thence South 56 degrees 29 minutes 07 seconds East 
(S 56°29'07" E), a distance of 111.95 feet; thence North 33 degrees 22 minutes 49 seconds East 
(N 33°22'49" E), a distance of 41.69 feet; thence North 56 degrees 58 minutes 03 seconds West 
(N 56°58'03" W), a distance of 65.92 feet; thence North 32 degrees 32 minutes 02 seconds East 
(N 32°32'02" E), a distance of 65.75 feet; thence North 56 degrees 58 minutes 09 seconds West 
(N 56°58'09" W), a distance of 89.51 feet; thence North 32 degrees 22 minutes 45 seconds East 
(N 32°22'45N E), a distance of 35.88 feet; thence South 57 degrees 07 minutes 02 seconds East 
(S 57°0702N E), a distance of 76.98 feet; thence North 43 degrees 10 minutes 35 seconds East 
(N 43°10'35" E), a distance of 142.24 feet; thence North 55 degrees 25 minutes 58 seconds East 
(N 55°25'58" E), a distance of 33.39 feet; thence North 33 degrees 18 minutes 50 seconds East 
(N 33e18'50" E), a distance of 106.81 feet; thence North 56 degrees 36 minutes 08 seconds West 
(N 56°36'08H W), a distance of 88.73 feet; thence North 32 degrees 34 minutes 45 seconds East 
(N 32e34'45" E), a distance of 152.28 feet to the Southerly right-of-way line of the Denver and 
Rio Grand Railroad; thence South 56 degrees 41 minutes 00 seconds East (S 56°41'00" E). a 
distance of 348.21 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. Said parcel containing 280.186 
acres as described. 
Said parcel being subject to easements and right-of-ways of record as recorded in the Mesa 
County Clerk and Recorder's Office. 
Prepared by: Dennis W. Johnson, PLS 
Professional Surveying Services 
PO Box 4506 
Grand Junction, CO 81502 
303-241-3841 
Jan. 27,1994 
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(Transferred Real Property) 
PARCEL 1 OF TRACT A (REVISED 1/27/94) 
A parcel of land located in the SE1/4 of Section 2, and East 1/2 of Section 11, Township 1 
North, Range 3 West of the Ute Meridian, Mesa County Colorado, being more particularly 
described as follows; 
Commencing at the Northeast corner of Section 11, Township 1 North, Range 3 West, whence 
the East 1/4 comer of Section 11 bears S 00°07*00M E a distance of 2629.24 feet for a basis of 
bearings, with all bearings contained herein relative thereto; thence S 00°07'00" E a distance of 
872.57 feet along the East line of the Northeast quarter (NE1/4) of Section 11 to a point on the 
Southerly right-of-way line of the Denver and Rio Grand Railroad, and the TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNING, thence South 00 degrees 07 minutes 00 seconds East (S 00°0700" E), a distance 
of 1756 67 feet to the Northeast comer of the SE1/4 of Section 11 (E 1/4 comer); thence South 
00 degrees 07 minutes 00 seconds East (S 00°0700" E), a distance of 1332.18 feet to the 
Northeast comer of the SE1/4 SE1/4 of Section 11; thence South 00 degrees 07 minutes 00 
seconds East (S 00°07'00" E), a distance of 713.82 feet to a point on the North bank of the 
Colorado River; thence along said North bank North 47 degrees 12 minutes 04 seconds West 
(N 47°12'04" W), a distance of 577.89 feet; thence leaving said North bank North 44 degrees 02 
minutes 01 seconds East (N 44o02'01" E), a distance of 564.53 feet; thence North 00 degrees 07 
minutes 00 seconds West (N 00°0700" W), a distance of 611.55 feet; thence South 89 degrees 53 
minutes 00 seconds West (S 89°53'00" W), a distance of 363.28 feet; thence North 00 degrees 06 
minutes 58 seconds West (N 00°06'58" W), a distance of 374.74 feet; thence North 70 degrees 59 
minutes 23 seconds East (N 70°59'23" E), a distance of 383.96 feet; thence North 00 degrees 07 
minutes 00 seconds West (N 00°0700" W), a distance of 842.93 feet; thence North 56 degrees 17 
minutes 10 seconds West (N 56°1710" W), a distance of 289.73 feet; thence South 33 degrees 42 
minutes 50 seconds West (S 33°42'50" W), a distance of 234.64 feet; thence North 58 degrees 50 
minutes 11 seconds West (N 58°50'11" W), a distance of 115.86 feet; thence North 31 degrees 19 
minutes 33 seconds East (N 31°19'33"E), a distance of 240.00 feet; thence North 56 degrees 17 
minutes 10 seconds West (N 56°1710" W), a distance of 418.13 feet; thence North 07 degrees 30 
minutes 19 seconds East (N 07°30'19" E), a distance of 94.49 feet; thence North 58 degrees 04 
minutes 10 seconds West (N 58°04'10" W), a distance of 261.08 feet; thence South 52 degrees 42 
minutes 15 seconds West (S 52°42'15" W), a distance of 81.06 feet; thence North 56 degrees 17 
minutes 10 seconds West (N 56°1710" W), a distance of 414.12 feet; thence South 33 degrees 24 
minutes 17 seconds West (S 33°24'17" W), a distance of 90.58 feet; thence North 57 degrees 40 
minutes 48 seconds West (N 57°40*48" W), a distance of 52.07 feet; thence North 33 degrees 24 
minutes 17 seconds East (N 33°24'17" E), a distance of 115.46 feet; thence South 56 degrees 35 
minutes 40 seconds East (S 56°35'40" E), a distance of 258.17 feet; thence North 33 degrees 49 
minutes 38 seconds East (N 33°49*38" E), a distance of 472.87 feet; thence North 56 degrees 34 
minutes 02 seconds West (N 56°34'02" W), a distance of 665.06 feet; thence North 33 degrees 53 
minutes 32 seconds East (N 33°53'32" E), a distance of 384.57 feet to a point on the Southerly 
right-of-way line of the Denver and Rio Grand Railroad; thence along said right-of-way South 56 
degrees 41 minutes 00 seconds East (S 56°41'00" E), a distance of 1473.79 feet to the TRUE 
POINT OF BEGINNING. Said Parcel containing 37.816 acres as described. 
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Said parcel being subject to easements and right-of-ways of record as recorded in the Me 
County Clerk and Recorder's Office. 
Prepared by: Dennis W. Johnson, PLS 
Professional Surveying Services 
PO Box 4506 
Grand Junction, CO 81502 
303-241-3841 
Jan. 27, 1994 
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Schedule 4.5 
to Asset Purchase Agreement 
CONSENTS 
1. Buyer will need to obtain any consents required from 
parties other than Chase and Landmark ("Third Parties") 
required for the assignment of the agreements described 
in Schedule 5 to be effective as to the Third Parties. 
2. Buyer will need to obtain any consents required for the 
transfer to Buyer of any of the Permits. 
3. In connection with any sale after Closing of any 
contract rights constituting Retained Assets, Buyer will 
need to comply with any consent requirements for the 
transfer of such contracts under their respective terms. 
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Schedule 4.8 
to Asset Purchase Agreement 
LEASED ASSETS 
To the knowledge of Seller, the following 
constitutes all of the Leases with respect to Assets 
leased by Seller and the Assets subject thereto (but 
only to the extent that the same are still in effect): 
1. Equipment Lease Agreement between Western Slope Refining 
Company ("Western") and First Interstate Leasing Company 
(formerly UCB Leasing Corp.) dated November 9, 1981, as 
amended, and assigned to Seller on November 6, 1990. 
Leased Equipment 
80,000 bbl. pitch tank 
Computer monitored loading system 
Boiler feedwater pumps 
Emergency generator 
Lisbon charge pump 
Lab bottle washer 
Diesel powered fire water pump 
HP gas chromatograph 
Equipment Lease Agreement between Western and Banc One 
Equipment Finance Inc. (formerly American Fletcher 
Leasing Corporation) dated June 22, 1983, as amended, 
and as assigned to Seller by letter agreement dated 
November 12, 1990, covering hydrocracker charge tank, 
vacuum charge tank, diesel tank and other tanks and 
associated facilities. 
Leased Equipment 
Diesel tank #20074 
Shale Oil tank #55092 
Reduced crude tank #40075 
JP-4 tank #55088 
JP-4 tank #55089 
MTBE/Toluene tank #2050 
GATX Leasing Corporation Equipment Lease with Western 
dated as of April 29, 1983, as assigned to Seller by 
letter agreement dated October 18, 1990, covering 
railcars. 
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Leased Equipment 
Sour water stripper 
Gas oil tank 
Decant oil tank 
Vacume Feed Slurry Tank #5086 
4. Equipment Lease Agreements with Browning-Ferris 
Industries, Inc. and its affiliates covering cleaning 
equipment. 
5. Railroad Equipment Lease with Itel Rail Corporation. 
6. Leases with Monex covering miscellaneous office 
equipment, furniture and computer software, etc. 
7. Lease with Pitney Bowes covering office equipment. 
8. Lease of Railroad Equipment between Western and Pullman 
Leasing Company dated July 19, 1989 covering railcars. 
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Schedule 4 . 9 
t o A s s e t Purchase Agreement 
PERMITS 
[ATTACHED] 
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£Mitet#£f<7*l r*frt\Ti 
1992 
Point 
Source 
Inven. # 
6 
8 
10 
14 
28 
35 
39 
53 
54 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
APEN/Pmt 
APEN/Pmt 
APEN/Prot 
APEN/Pmt 
APEN/Pmt 
APEN/Pmt 
APEN/Pmt 
APEN/Pmt 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC. 
Current Outstanding Permits 
Source Permit 
Description § 
TK-55088 Float Roof Tank 89ME401-2 
TK-55089 Float Roof Tank 89ME401-1 
Two Sorbent Silos 89MC319 
Removed Clayton E-60 Stm. Gen. 91ME684 
FL-4402 High Press. Flare 89ME277 
F-4004 Steam Boiler /4 C12,958 
F-3400 Platformer Furnace 83ME106 
TK-40080 C-10,577 
TK-40081 C-10,577 
TK-55082 C-12,917 
RR Coke Ldng Facil.& Bin Vent FilterC-11,008 
TK-80087 
F-4401 Pitch Tank Heater 
TK-30065 
TK-20066 
F-2501 Hydrogen Furnace 
TK-55090 
TK-5086 
TK-20074 
TK-20067 
TK-55083 Heater #1 
F-2201 Hydrocracking Furnace 
F-2202 Hydrockracking Furnace 
F-2204 HC Fractionator Reboiler 
F-2203 HC Stabilizer Reboiler 
SRU Tail Gas Incinerator 
Claus Pit.' (Same source as pt.98) 
TK-55083 Heater #2 
TK-55083 Heater #3 
TK-55084 
Gilsonite/Green Coke Unloading 
Gilsonite/Green Coke Storage 
Calcined Coke Handling/Storage 
K-4614 Baghouse (railcar loading) 
R-4615 Baghouse (railcar loading') 
C-13365-1 
C-13,365-2 
C-13,014 
C-13,015 
82ME360 
83ME107-3 
83ME107-2 
83ME107-1 
C-13,016 
C-12,008-1 
62ME358-1 
82ME358-2 
82ME3S8-3 
82ME358-4 
82ME359I 
82ME359I 
C-12,008-2 
C-12,008-3 
C-12,917 
C-12,725-1 
C-12,725-2 
C-12,725-3 
C-12,725-4 
C-12,725-5 
NPDES Water Discharge Permit CO-0000078 
Stormwater Permit COR-020251 
(The above 2 permits will be combined in the 
NPDES discharge permit in the Fall of 1993.) 
Radiation Source Control Permit COLO 232-03 
print info, vkl 
COLORADO CERTIFICATE OF BOILER 
OR PRESSURE VESSEL INSPECTION 
Certificate No. Vessel Mfg, 
238843 ABCO 
238844 BAWI 
238845 DETA 
238846 DETA 
238847 COEN 
238848 NEBR 
238849 BAWI 
238850 HOFA 
238851 MCGI 
238852 KITE 
165832 KAS1] 
r RECEIVED B2/16 10:27 1994 AT 2211212 PACE S (PRINTED PASE H) 
FEB-16-1994 IB* 26 FROM LANDMARK PETROLEUM CO. TO 
] 
STATE SERIAL NO. 
15857 
cgmwc*Tg NO. 
Z38043 
^•hwero 
09/07/1993 
i TMWgfRW<!te^B»jga>iags 7 
D S / 0 7 / 1 9 9 * 
VBaaEL MAMUMOTUMft 
A8C0 
MH) 6SWAUNB NUMBED 
NB2196 
PRESMWS ACLOWSD (LMj M J . 
CERTIFICATE OF 
BOILER or 
rncssuRE^Mj^ ^NarecTiON 
17132211212 P.04 
COLORADO 
BOILER INSPECTION BRANCH 
1 1 2 0 LINCOLN S T , S U I T S 13Q 
DENVER 
CO 80203 
SPECIFIED HEREON. 
J
 1149 
OWNER/USER 
LANDKAKK PETROLEUM 
3 HWY 6 £ 50 
FRUITA CO 81521 
I N C * * * H 
* PAID + 
0 9 / 2 7 / 1 9 9 3 
BDILEX INSPECTION BRANCH 
FEE: 2 3 . 0 0 
INSPECTED BY 
AUSTIN 
- CQLC 
LOCATION OF BOU.SO OB MISWUM VCUCL 
LANDMARK PETROLEUK* 
1493 HWY 6 £ 50 
FRUITA 
INC 
PootfMacorvnctSf ^<^»Q^Pn»o« wpwor .^po^e^^^^^op ,^^ , , , ^ , , , ^ , , ^^ ! ,^ , , , , . , ^ n«iuufUNir»«r m * T V W ^ IM^•*rv^»«dlof OMUTV««ot«tmt^ootiMi 
Mfo oofMnlon^ 
AMAKK
 W E L D E 0 REPAIRS T Q STEEL fiolLCRS, WHcN REOUIREO, SHALL BE PERFORMED £ 
DOCUMENTED BY INDIVIDUALS/ORGANIZATIONS QUALIFIEO TO CHAPTER III Gf 
THE CURRENT
 NAT*L BOARD INSPECTION CODE. QUESTIONS-* 303) 894-753S. 
I M I K W J 
STATE SERIAL NO. 
533 3 
pftTineATewo.-
238844 
bAfBtiwPtffEB" 
09/07/1993 
" Trua carin&imagBBL. 
05/07/19*4 
VESSEL MftMUCACTUHCB 
BAKI 
NB19S16 
PHGSSURX ALLOWED <LB&> PJKI. 
CERTIFICATE OP 
BOILER Of 
PRESSURE INSPECTION 
[TANI 
I UK 
ONLY 
SPECIFIED HEREON. 
OWNER/USER 
L OMARK PETRDLEDM INC*** 
93 A*T 6 E 50 
FRUITA CO 81521 
H 
COLORADO 
BOILER INSPECTION BRANCH 
1120 LINCOLN ST, SUITE 130 
DENVER 
CO 80203 
* PAID * 
0 9 / 2 7 / 1 9 9 3 
BOILER INSPECTION SRANCh 
FES: 23.DO 
INSPECTED BY 
AUSTIN - CQLC 
LOCATION OF BOILf A 0" »RCUUPC VCSSCL 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM. INC 
1493 HWY 6 t 50 
FRUITA. 
>»«BitogiHttlcrt»'"W»iq"'PMmwomcr.%pa(WW^w,ww|c>n),|ny»Mi« ti^Wiit»»««M»^ l l b t M ^ k 
DEUAMCSc WELDED REPAIRS TO STEEL BOILERS* WHEN REQUIRED. SHALL BE PERFORMED £ 
DOCUMENTED 8y INDIVIDUALS/ORGANIZATIONS QUALIFIED TO CHAPTER III OF 
THE CURRENT NAT'L BOARO INSPECTION COOE* OUESTIONS-C303) 69A-7535. 
C RECEIVED 02/16 1B1Z7 1994 AT 22UZ12 
FEB-16-1994 18:27 FROM LPNDHRRK PETROLEltf CO. 
PAGE S (PRINTED PACE 5 ) ) 
TO 
STATE SERIAL NO. 
39442 
CgHTtTCATE NC 
2388A5 
OATg IWSPgCT^P 
09/07/1993 
TMtSREBTIflCft^EXPIPES. 
05/07/1994 
VESSEL MANUFACTURE* 
OETA 
MffR SERIAL/MB NUMBER 
U&Z12. 
CERTIFICATE OF 
BOILER or 
PRE3SUREJSSSSJ NSPECT10N 
17132211212 P.B5 
COLORADO 
BOILER INSPECTION BRANCH 
1120 LINCOLN ST, SUITE 130! 
DENVER 
CO 80203 
I L A M I 
l l«%9: 
IP 
ONLY 2 
SPECIFIED HEREON 
OWNER/USER 
|L f)MARK PETROLEUM TNO* 
1* 3 HWY 6 t 50 
FRUITA CO 81521 
*•*« I 
* PAID * 
09/27/1995 
60ILER INSPECTION BRANCH 
F6E: 2 3 . 0 0 
INSPECTED 9V 
AUSTIN - COLO 
1 LOCATION or lorLcw OH PftEsauwg va&tt. 
WESTERN SLOPE REFINING 
1493 HWY 6 C SO 
FRUITA MUSSUW AIL0WI90B&J RSJ. 
Pat mm MrimMte » w« •wupmam too* o». * M U M * , m «*s»i COMUM/ IMHAM w> ««• »«»•! w m t tool Mi«earthtf«M*l.{MayWi«wkM4orftrti»«tohMatte*MA«iiin 
WELDED REPAIR5 TO STEEL BOILERS, WHEN REQUIRED, SHALL 3c PERFORMED C 
DOCUMENTED 6Y INOIVIOUALS/ORCANIZATIGNS OUALIFIED TO CHAPTER III OF 
THE CURRENT NAT'L BOARD INSPECTION CODE. CUESTI0NS-O03) 894-7535, 
M«(»»t1). 
STATE SERIAL NO. 39443 
CERtiteATENft-
238846 
MTIIWWW,. 
09/07/1993 
05/07/199* 
vesaeL MAnurACTUfEH 
OETA. 
UMUNB NUMBER 
WB219 
CERTIFICATE OF 
BOILER or 
P R E S S U R E VEBaf iL»IN3PECTION 
SPECIFIED HEREON. 
OWNER/USER 
ILANOMARK PETROLEUM 
1493 HWY 6 £ 50 
FRUITA CO 81521 
JLAN1 
1 49: 
I N C * * H 
COLORADO 
BOILER INSPECTION BRANCH 
1120 LINCOLN ST, SUITE 130! 
DENVER 
CO 80203 
+ PAID * 
0 9 / 2 7 / 1 9 9 3 
BOILER INSPECTION BRANCH 
FEE: 2 3 . 0 0 
INSPECTED BY 
AUSTIN - COLD 
1 LOCATION OfOILgMOa»aCSSUWEVMSCL 
LANOMARX PETROLEUM. INC 
1493 HWY 6 £ 50 
(FRUITA PRESSURE ALLOWED ( U S ) ftSA 
IWWgt»rt)»M»lw*>«wl»minlt»om«r. l l»onA«*iomiwoMU*wt^ 
wtagnmigiLI. 
**""* WELDED REPAIRS TO STEEL BOILERS, WHEN REQUIREO. SHALL 8E PERFORMED £ 
DOCUMENTED BY INDIVIDUALS/ORGANIZATIONS QUAHMfcU TO CHAPTER III OF 
THE CURRENT NAT»L BOARO INSPECTION CODE. QUESTIDNS-{303) 894-7535. 
FEB-16-1994 18:29 
[SERIAL NO. 
CEWTIflCiTSNO. 
238847 
JMtEIBPftttP 
0 9 / 0 7 / 1 9 9 3 
" TTlKr Cf RnFICrtTB MPBES 
05/07/1994 
VESSEL MANUPAeniMn 
CDEN 
MFMSnuUNftNUMBES 
.6;?z 
weaauwewewrre ILM) KSX 
FROM LflNDTBRK PETKQLEUn CU. 1U 
CERTIFICATE OF 
BOILER or 
PRESSURE INSPECTION 
MJLJUtVUJW 
BOILER INSPECTION BRANCH 
1 1 2 0 LINCOLN S T , S U I T E 130* 
DENVER 
CO 8 0 2 0 5 
ONLY 
SPFC1MFP HEREON. 
OWNER/USER 
I LANDMARK PETROLEUM, 
1495 HWY 6 £ 50 
FRUITA CD 81521 
LANI 
1 49. 
INC* 1 
* PA ID * 
0 9 / 2 7 / 1 9 9 3 
BOILER I N S P E C T I O N BRANCH 
fEEi 2 3 - 0 0 
INSPECTED BY 
AUSTIN - CDLO 
LOCATIQM or ooihCP on rncccune veaoci 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM , INC 
1493 HWY & £ 50 
FRUITA 
*** THIS CERTIFICATE 
WILL 3E VALID ONLY 
WHEN ALL R6QUTRFMENTS 
ARE IN COMPLIANCE *** 
^OfiBiaeOTmeMMilMMUomamfoemgr.KMn*ete.«ii*iiiC9M«ui«riiit«it«die«M«ttK«ia'm«iaaieatn«irih»««t«*i tM«yo*rava*MtorWiut»»a»«»v>*mMlln 
WELDED REPAIRS TO STEEL 8QILERSf WHEN REQUIRED, SHALL BE PERFORMED £ 
DOCUMENTED BV INDIVIDUALS/ORGANIZATIONS 0UALIFT50 TD CHAPTER III OF 
THE CURRENT NAT'L BOARD INSPECTION COOE. QUESTIGNS-<303> flW-7535i 
REMARKS; 
MR pool) 
STATE;SERIAL NO, 
CynngA^Ny,; 
236848 
b^iH^e' 
.09/07/1993 
^cin iTnwfcBtef l^ 
0 5 / 0 7 / 1 9 9 A 
VESSEL MANUFACTURER 
NEBR 
MFR 9ERIAL/R8 NUMBCR 
NB1849 
PRESSURE JUXOWED M S J P&X 
CERTJFICATEJOF 
BOILER or 
PRESSURE NSPFCTION 
TTHE 
)VESSEL 
aWBE 
S/ODAND 
/EXCEED 
0 
IATION 
l l . A N I 
11*9: 
SkfcUMbD HEREON 
OWNER/USER 
ANDHARK PETROLEUM 
3 HW.6 £ 50 
FRUITA CO 81521 
I N C * * * H 
LOCATION or M U R o * PMSSUKE VEBSCL 
LANDMARK. PETROLEUM. INC 
1493 MUY 6 £ 50 
FRUITA 
COLORADO 
BOILER INSPECTION BRANCH 
1120 LINCOLN ST, SUITE 130! 
DENVER 
CO 80203 
* PAID + 
09/27/1993 
SCILER INSPECTION BRANCH 
FEE: 23.00 
INSPECTED BY 
AUSTIN COLO 
^ « wit eartMetM m w« wavmwit room or.» aonuu. •« mm) eem«Mr JUMIW* i» » • M M I or tn i tool M C iMtrm*vMMHMwrMiMakM«bvMi»i»t»iBMiM«MMiin 
VOeMMWca} 
KMAW& WELDED REPAIRS TO STEEL SOILERS, WHEN REGUIREO* SHALL QE PERFORMED £ 
DOCUMENTED BY INDIVIDUALS/ORGANIZATIONS 6UALXFIE0 TO CHAPTER III OF 
THE CURRENT NAT»L 8QAR0 INSPECTION CODE. QUESTIONS-(303) 894-7535. 
TOTAL P.88 
( RECEIVED 02/16 16:29 1994 AT 2211212 PACE 7 (PRINTED PACE 7) 3 
FEB-16-1994 18=28 FROH LRNDTTftRK PETROLEUM CO. TO 
STATE SERrAL NO. 
5332 
CERTIFICATE OF 
BOILER or 
PRESSURE INSPECTION 
G£WTiy»C*TE W 
238849 
PATaiHBFEcTEF; 
09/07/1993 
17132211212 P.07 
COLORADO 
BOILER INSPECTION BRANCH 
1120 LINCOLN ST, SUITF 130: 
DENVER 
CO 80203 
^ t t r t ^ f H W B T 
05/07/1994 
VESSEL MANUMeruaen 
BAWI 
Mra seauL/Ma N U M K * 
N8???l? 
ONLY 
3PeCtFI£0 HEREON. 
OWNER/USER 
[LANDMARK PETROLEUM I N C * * * 
1493 HWY 6 & 50 
FRUITA CO 31521 
J LAN J 
I 4 9 : H 
* PAIO + 
09/27/1993 
60ILER INSPECTION BRANCH 
FEE: 23.00 
INSPECTED BY 
AUSTIN - CCLO 
1 LOCATION C f BOILER OH PRESSURE VESSEL 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC 
| l * 9 3 HWY 6 £ 5 0 
[FRUITA messune AUOWEO 0.094 PAL 
Po« Ms RtrWttl* « to* mvloiMnt roam or. 0 ©onj6i%,« mtlX cowior iMMnod to «• V M M I ec« * loot ewt AM< tt**m*i(W*yb«r»rtiud Mr Mtut* to hM0«i.v«*Ml In 
R»MMC& WELDED REPAIRS TO STEEL BOILERS, WHEN REOUIRED, SHALL 3E PERFORMED £ 
DOCUMENTED BY INDIVIDUALS/ORGANIZATIONS QUALIFIED TO CHAPTER III OF 
THE CURRENT NAT»L EOARO INSPECTION CODE. QUESTIONS-(303) 894-7535. 
• M RfiC-01) 
5MHP W I L , - f t 
C£HTlFlCATElg5"' 
236050 
EATg iwSFECfES" 
09/07/1993 
•TwcgwrFw i^winp 
05/07/2994 
VESSELMANUNOUBEA 
HOFA 
MfRaCAlAUMI W M S € » 
N6343 
CERTIFICATE OF 
BOILER or 
pneesunc V M ^ W N S P C C T I O N 
J THE 
•VESSEL 
Av«F 
tttfOD AND 
tfptXCEED 
fcATlOW 
SPECIFIED HEREON. 
OWNER/USER 
I LANDMARK PETROLEUM 
1493 HWY 6 L SO 
FRUITA CO 81521 
] 
1 : 
XNC**+ H 
COLORADO 
BOILER INSPECTION BRANCH 
1120 LINCOLN ST. SUITE 130 
DENVER 
CO 30203 
«• PAID + 
09/27/1993 
90ILES INSPECTION BRANCH 
FEE: 23.00 
INSPECTED BY 
AUSTIN - COLO 
1 LOCATION O f BOILER OR PRESSURE VESSEL 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, I N C . 
1493 HWY 6 £ 30 
FRUITA PRESSURE ALLOWED (LB*) ftfct 
••Ol INi«afWieai*)» U » •WDmoiM room «r > Vpeq*Dlo. i f l lMIMeoma<whMan.4i f t iM<*«»ai~>>>»ml«e*nrar i i ia»*M»i (Mar * • n m M I w t W a x lo kmp • » > 
HELDEO REPAIRS TO STEEL 80ILERS, UHEN REQUIRED, SHALL 3E PERFORMED t 
DOCUMENTED BY INOIVIOUALS/DRCANIZATIONS QUALIFIED TO CHAPTER 111 U»-
THE CURRENT NAT'L BOARO INSPECTION CODE*. _QySSTIQNS-<303>. 89,^77535. 
C RECEIVED 0 2 / 1 6 18:26 199H AT ZZI1Z1Z PAGE 6 (PRINTED PAGE 6) 3 
FEB-16-1994 18:27 FROM LPNDMMRK PETROLEUM CO. 
STATE SERIAL NO. 
4 5 3 7 5 
CERTIFICATE OF 
BOILER or 
PRESSURE INSPECTION 
ttF^lMEW, 
238551 
"hrftlHZH&kb 
09/07/1993 
TO 17132211212 P.06 
WLUKADU 
BOILER INSPECTION BRANCH 
1 1 2 0 L INCOLN ST* SUITE 1 3 0 
DENVER 
CO 8 0 2 0 3 
ONLY 
ereciriED HEHCON. 
OWNER/USER 
VE46CL MANUFACTURER 
MCGI 
MFRBERlAUNP NUMMK 
zaai 
1493 HWY.6 L 50 
FRUITA CO 31521 
* PAIO * 
09/27/1993 
80ILER INSPECTION BRANCH 
FEE: 23-00 
IN3rELCTfcU BY 
AUSTIN - CCL! 
MffgSURC ALLOWED 0>8S> PAL 
lOCATlQM OF »0«l£A © * P*C*8U*e VD4EL 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM 
1493 HWY 6 E 50 
FRUITA 
Foot tN»«rtUteate «n tn» oQniomoM too* or. # port***. In motai otMolnor Monod i« tn« vo*** or * i loai feoa notr tf* «OM«1 tfcUr bo rawoMd lor t*i*r» m I M P MM « 
WELDED REPAIRS TO STEEL BOILERS, WHEN REOUISEDo SHALL SE PERFORMED £ 
DOCUMFNTFD BY TNOTVTnUALS/ORGANTZATIONS OUALTFIED TO CHAPTER III OF 
THE CURRENT.NATfL BOARD INSPECTION CODE* QUESTIQNS-<303) 694-7535* 
REMARKS: 
• M ftftfrOf) 
STATE SERIAL NO. 
1 9 6 1 3 
CgfTTtFJCATg NO. 
238852 
09/02/1993 
Yrfflgrm^fgwra: 05 /O7 /199A 
VgSS&l MANUFACTURER 
KITE 
MFR OERUUNR NUMftfifl 
ti&7 
•«t**URft ALLOWED (LBSJ P,JJ. 
CERTIFICATE OF 
BOILER or 
PRESSORS INSPECTION 
ONLY 
SPECIFIED HEREON. 
OWNgR/USER 
I LANDMARK PETRQLSUM, 
11493 HHY 6 £ 50 
FRUITA CO S1521 
[LAKC 
2
INC 
•LOCATION OF SOILER OR FACSSURC ve&SEL 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC 
1493 KWY 6 I 50 
FRUITA 
1 
COLORADO 
BOJLER INSPECTION BRANCH 
1 1 2 0 L INCOLN S T , S U I T E 
DENVER 
CO 8 0 2 0 3 
130 
* PAID * 
09/27/1993 
BOILER INSPECTION BRANCH 
FEE: 23.OO 
INSPECTED BY 
AUSTIN - COLG 
* * * THIS CERTIFICATE 
WILL 3 £ V A L I D ONLY 
WHEN ALL R E T I R E M E N T S 
ARe I N COMPLIANCE • * * 
1 M M l CMRlGUI Ml Ul« MtiipOMt mom W tt M<ttk>*. M KM« wnUlii«> I M M * M to th. w w i » i H H l » i i m > m w w C iMarM lOTMmaanri 
VCMMtX&T WELDED REPAIRS TO STEEL BOILERS, WHEN REQUIRED. SHALL BE PERFORMED & 
DOCUMENTED BY INDIVIDUALS/ORGANIZATIONS QUALIFIED TO CHAPTER III OF 
THE CURRENT NAT'L BOARD INSPECTION CODE- QUESTI0NS-O03) 89<r-7535. 
Schedule 4.10 
to Asset Purchase Agreement 
INSURANCE POLICIES 
[ATTACHED] 
34 
W77191[KAS1] 
DATE March 8, 1993 
Landmark Petroleum Inc. 
,NSURE0
 1493 Highway 6 & 50 
Fruita, CO 81521 
Office at 
Alexander a Alexander 
Denver 
SCHEDULE OF INSURANCE 
Contacts: TtadQlU 
Phone: 303/858-9fln 
Account Manager: Shelley lirwiller 
Account Executive: Bobbie Fitzgerald 
Phone: 303/297-4682,297-4688 
Type of PolfcyfPlan Terra Premium rage Co OSt Expiration Polfcy No. Company 
PROPPITV 
Limit of Utility: S5O,00a/*># 
Sublimity 
3 Year $305,950 11/06/94 SPFDN93J2649 Hartford 
Steam Boiler 
$ 10,00Q«^  Earthquake - Aggregate 
10,000<*Flood - Aggregate 
Included Business Interruption 
250,000 Transit 
100,000 EDP Media - Extra Expense 
Deductibles: 
$500,000 Property Damage - per occurrence 
15 Day Business Interruption • per occurrence 
UABJLnT 1 Year * M 8 7 
$2,000,000 General Aggregate 
1,000,000 Products/Completed Operations Aggregate Limit 
1,000,000 Personal and Advertising Injury Limit 
1,000,000 Each Occurrence limit 
50,000 Fire Damage Limit (any one lire) 
5,000 Medical Expense Limit (aay one person) 
11/06/93 GL5439351 National Unfon 
THIS SCHEDULE DOES NOT TAKE THE PLACE OF OR ALTER AMY OF THE CONDITIOM3. EXCLUSIONS OH OTHER TERMS OF THE INSURANCE POLICIES LISTEO; 
IT IS MERELY A SHORT DESCRIPTIVE GUIDE TO THE POLICIES IN FORCE, FOR CONVENIENT REFERENCE. THE POLICIES THEMSELVES SHOULD BE REVIEWED 
CAREFULLY. AND QUESTIOMS ON COVERAGE, CLAIMS AND ALL OTHER INSURANCE MATTERS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO YOUR AAA CONTACTS. 
ittfUM 
MUD1MMH) 
DATE 
INSURED 
March 8, 1993 
Landmark Petroleum Inc. 
1493 Highway 6 ft SO 
Fniita, CO 81521 
Office al 
Alexander & Alexander 
Denver 
SCHEDULE OF INSURANCE 
Contacts: ThadCatt 
Phone: 303/858-9811 
Account Manager: Shelley Urwiller 
Account Executive: Bohhie Fitzgerald 
Phone: 303/297-4682.2974688 
Type of Policy/Plan Term Premium Averaa i Annual Expiration Policy No, Company 
AUTOMOBILE 1 Year $2,076 11/06793 34UENEQ5829 Hartford Ins. Co. 
$1,000,000 Liability 
Basic Personal Injury Protection 
1,000 Medical Payments 
1,000,000 Uninsured Motorist 
1,000,000 Hired and Non-Owned Liability 
1984 Ford Pickup, #1347 
1989 Ford Pickup, #0692 
1989 Ford Pickup, #9648 
1989 Ford, IKIOI 
1TMRR1T1I.A 1 Year $40,000 11/06/93 ZUOOQ0160 Pacific Ins. Co. 
$10,000,000 Excess Over Primary 
25,000 Self-Insured Retention 
THIS SCHEDULE DOES NOT TAKE THE PLACE OF OR ALTER ANY OF THE CONDITION^ EXCLUSIONS OR OTHER TERMS OF THE INSURANCE POLICIES JSTED; 
IT IS MERELY A SI-ORT DESCRIPTIVE GUIDE TO THE POLICES IN FORCE. FOR CONVENIENT REFERENCE. THE POLICIES THEMSELVES SHOULD BE REVIEWED 
CAREFULLY. AND QUESTIONS ON COVERAGE. CLAIMS AND ALL OTHER INSURANCE MATTERS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO YOUR A&A CONTACTS. 
.IOISUU 
AAM-ftOUm 
JL U « | f M v J A P Aleaandar 4 Alexander foe* 
JakKjXflSU l U t A ^ Denver Place-Plaza Tower 
Alexander 1099 Eighteenth Street, Suite 3000 Denver, Colorado 80202-1930 
T«l«plfuiw 303 297-3020 
Fax 303 297-4675 
June 17, 1993 
Mr. Thad Call 
General Manager - Administration 
Landmark Petroleum 
1493 Highway 6 & 50 
Fruita, CO 81521 
Re: Directors & Officers Liability 
#43*9218 
Dear Thad: 
Enclosed are endorsements 17 - 21. The are as follows. 
Endorsement 17 - Changes the your location to Utah 
Endorsement IS - Extends the policy to April 15, 1994 
Endorsement 19 • Deletes the Texas Amendatories 
Endorsement 20 - Adds the Utah Cancellation Amendatory 
Endorsement 21 - Changes the Broker of Record to A&A 
Please attach these endorsements to the current Directors & 
Officers Liability insurance policy. Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
Shelley Urwiller 
Account Manager 
/su 
Enclosure 
ENDORSEMENTS 18 
This endorsement, effective 12:01 A.M., April 15, 1993, 
forms a part of policy number 436 921S 
issued to LANDMARK PETROLEUM 
By: National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. 
In consideration of the premium charged it is hereby 
understood and agreed that Item 3 of the 
Policy Declarations, POLICY PERIOD:, is amended to read as follows: 
From: January 15, 1991 To: April 15, 1994. 
It is further understood and agreed that for purposes of 
determining the Policy Period herein, the annual aggregate 
Limit of Liability is amended to be inclusive of and 
apply to the following: 
From: January 15, 1991 To: April 15, 1994. 
id Kepresentativg •** 
Vice-President - National Union 
crcuuKstMfcnn » 20 
This endorsement, effective 12:01 AM, April 15,1993 forms a part of 
policy numPer 436-92-18 
issued to LANDMARK PETROLEUM 
by National Union Fin Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. 
UTAH 
CANCELLATION/NONRENEWAL ENDORSEMENT 
Wherever used in this endorsement: 1) "we", 'us", 'our*, and "Insurer mean the insurance 
company which issued this policy; and 2) "you', 'your, 'named Insured", "First Named Insured*, 
end "Insured" mean the Named Corporation, Named Organization, Named Sponsor, Named Insured, 
or insured stated in the declarations page; and 3) "Other Insured(s)" means all other persons or 
entities afforded coverage under the policy. 
It is hereby agreed that this insurance policy, if in effect for 60 days or more, may not be cancelled 
by the Insurer except for failure to pay a premium when due or for one of the following reasons: 
1, Material misrepresentation; 
Z Substantial breaches of contractual duties, conditions or warrantiBs; 
3. Attainment of the age specified as the terminal age for coverage (notice i* necessary, see 
Notice Section below); 
4. With automobile insursnce revocation or suspension of the drivers license of the named 
Insured or any other person who customarily drives the car; 
5. Substantial change in the risk assumed, unless the Insurer should reasonably have foreseen 
the change or contemplated the risk when entering into the contract 
Insurance policies in effect for less then 60 days may be cancelled for any reason. 
NOTICE OF CANCELLATION/NONRENEWAL 
A. Cancellation, except for nonpayment of premium, is effective 30 day* after the delivery or first 
class mailing of a written notice to the policyholder. 
B. Cancellation for nonpayment of premium ia effective 10 days after delivery or first cless 
mailing of the notice- This notice shall include a statement of the reason for cancellation. 
C. The above sections do not apply to any insurance contract that has not been previously 
renewed if tne contract nas been in effect less than sixty (60) days when the notice of 
cancellation is mailed or delivered. Cancellation in this circumstance is effective at least ten 
(10) days after delivery to the Insured of a written notice. If notice is sent by first cless mall, 
postage prepaid, to the Insured at his last known address, delivery is considered 
accomplished after the passing of the statutory mailing time. 
AUTHORIZLU IILI 'I llbLN IAIIVL JJ> 
52171 (S/»1) Vice-President - National Union 
ENDORSEMENT #21 
This endorsement, effective 12:01 A.M., January 15, 1993 
forms a part of policy number 436 92 18 
issued to LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC. 
by National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby 
understood and agreed, that the Broker of Record as set 
forth in the Declarations, is amended to read as follows; 
Alexander « Alexander, Inc. 
Denver Place - Plaza Tower 
1099 18th Street, Ste. 3000 
Denver, CO 80202-1930 
All other terms and conditions remain the same 
AUBBORIZaU RhAttUUbJUIJABIttL 
Vice-President - National Union 
Schedule 5 
to Asset Purchase Agreement 
CONTRACTS TO BE ASSIGNED 
1. Purchase Agreement (GWEC) dated as of June 3, 1992 
between Seller, Gary-Williams Energy Corporation 
("GWEC") and Chase, and all agreements and other 
instruments executed by Seller, GWEC and/or Chase 
in connection therewith or pursuant thereto as and 
to the extent of any rights against GWEC thereunder 
in respect of the Transferred Assets. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, no part of the Chase 
Liens will be assigned to Wescourt in connection 
with the transactions contemplated hereby. 
2. Special Tax Indemnity Agreement dated as of 
[June 3, 1992] by GWEC in favor of Seller and 
Chase, relating to the Purchase Agreement (GWEC) 
set forth in No. 2 above, as and to the extent it 
relates to the Transferred Assets. 
3. Mutual Access Easement and Use Agreement between 
Western and Seller dated November 5, 1990 as and to 
the extent it relates to the Transferred Assets. 
4. Equipment Lease Agreement between Western Slope 
Refining Company ("Western") and First Interstate 
Leasing Company (formerly UCB Leasing Corp.) dated 
November 9, 1981, as amended, and assigned to 
Seller on November 6, 1990, solely as the same 
relates to the following equipment: 
(a) Computer monitored loading system 
(b) Lab bottle washer 
(c) HP gas chromatograph 
34 
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Schedule 6 
to Asset Purchase Agreement 
CONTRACTS TO BE TERMINATED 
1. Consultation and Services Agreement dated as of 
June 19, 1992 between Seller, Flying J Inc. and Big 
West Oil Company ("BWOC"). 
2. Option Agreement (CPI) dated as of June 24, 1992 
between Seller and Colorado Processing, Inc. 
3. Option Agreement (Chase) dated as of June 24, 1992 
between BWOC and Chase. 
41 
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Exhibit A 
to Purchase Agreement 
MARKETING AGREEMENT 
THIS MARKETING AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is entered 
into as of February 28, 1994, between FRUITA MARKETING & 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Delaware corporation ("Wescourt") 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC., a Delaware corporation 
("Landmark") with the consent of THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, 
N.A. ("Chase") as set forth on the signature page hereof. 
RECITALS 
A. Landmark owns an oil refinery located at 1493 
Highway 6 & 50, Fruita, Colorado, and comprised of certain 
real property, fixtures, personal property and other assets 
(all as more fully described in the Purchase Agreement, the 
"Refinery Assets"). 
B. Simultaneously herewith, Landmark and Wescourt 
Group, Inc., an affiliate of Wescourt ("Purchaser"). are 
entering into an Asset Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase 
Agreement") pursuant to which Purchaser is acquiring from 
Landmark the portion of the Refinery Assets constituting the 
refinery's offices, laboratories, maintenance building, 
parking facilities, rail sidings, loading/unloading docks, 
storage tanks and truck and loading racks, all as more fully 
described in the Purchase Agreement (the "Transferred 
Assets"). 
C. Landmark wishes to appoint Wescourt, and 
Wescourt wishes to accept Landmark's appointment, as 
Landmark's exclusive representative for the marketing and 
sale to third parties of all Refinery Assets other than the 
Transferred Assets (such other Refinery Assets, the 
"Assets") on the terms and conditions set forth in this 
Agreement. 
D. The Assets are subject to certain liens and 
security interests in favor of Chase (the "Chase Liens") 
securing the obligations of Landmark under the Amended and 
Restated Credit Agreement dated as of June 24, 1992, as 
amended from time to time prior to the date hereof, between 
Landmark and Chase (the "Loan Agreement"). 
AGREEMENT 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing 
premises, and for other good and valuable consideration, 
Wescourt and Landmark hereby agree as follows: 
1 
ARTICLE 1 
APPOINTMENT 
1.1 Appointment. On the terms and conditions set 
forth in this Agreement, Landmark hereby appoints Wescourt, 
and Wescourt hereby accepts appointment, as Landmark's 
exclusive representative for the marketing and sale *' * hp 
Assets to third parties. 
AR I ICLE 2 
ASSET SALES 
2 .1 Basic Duties of the Wescourt. Dur ing th a !:• s .] : n i 
of this Agreement, Wescourt shall, at its sole cost and 
expense (subject to reimbursement from sale proceeds as 
provided in Section 2.4) (a) use its reasonable commercial 
efforts to identify, solicit and pursue opportunities for 
the sale of Assets and (b) endeavor in good faith to 
negotiate and consummate sales of Assets ("Sales") on tfc .• s 
terms and conditions set forth herein. 
2 2 Ter ms of Sale. The parties agree that, in 
carrying out its obligations hereunder, Wescourt shall have 
complete authority over, and discretion in the management 
of, the disposition of the Assets by Landmark, including, 
without limitation, selecting the Assets to be offered for 
sale, determining the order and timing of sales, identifying 
sales leads, pursuing sales leads, negotiating sales terms, 
consummating sales, and preparing Assets for sale and 
subsequent delivery, subject only to the following 
limitations: 
(a) Maximizing Sales Proceeds. Wescourt 
shall conduct Sales on an arms-length basis with the goal of 
maximizing the aggregate proceeds to Landmark of the Sales; 
(b) Minimizing Retained Liabilities. Unless 
Landmark expressly agrees in writing, Landmark shall not be 
responsible for any post-Sale liabilities with respect to 
Assets; 
(c) Tax Lien. Wescourt shall make all Sales 
xear of, and without any reduction in the sales 
* .,-., the Tax Lien (as defined in Section 7.2) except 
. .\ reduction as is applicable solely to the amount, if 
any, that would otherwise be payable to Wescourt as 
Commission on such Sale under Article 3; 
2 
(d) "As-Is" Sales. Wescourt shall arrange 
all Sales on an "as-is, where-is" basis. Wescourt shall not 
make any representation or warranty on Landmark's behalf 
with respect to the Assets (other than as to Landmark's 
title thereto) without the prior written consent of 
Landmark. Wescourt shall not be under any obligation 
make any representation or warranty on Its own behalf with 
respect to the Assets; 
(e) Major Sales, 1 1 iscourt shall provide 
Landmark and Chase with written notice of, and an 
opportunity to object to, any "Major Sale" as provided fi r 
(and defined in) Section 2.3; and 
(£) Payment of Purchase Price. Wescoin: t 
shall require all purchasers of Assets to pay the purchase 
price therefor directly into the "Deposit Account" as 
provided for (and defined in) Section 2,4, 
naior Sales. 
i) Definition. As used herein, the term 
"Maior sale" means any Sale involving (i) individually or in 
the aggregate together with other related Sales, a total 
purchase price in excess of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($250,000) or (ii) the transfer of title to any of 
the Assets listed in attached Schedule 1; 
(b) Notice. Prior to consummating any Major 
Sale, Wescourt shall provide Landmark and Chase with a 
written notd ce ("Sales Notice") of the proposed Sale 
describing the Assets subject to the proposed Sale, the 
proposed purchaser, the proposed purchase price, and any 
other material terms and conditions of the proposed Sale; 
(c) Right to Object. Either Landmark oi 
Chase shall have the right to object, for any reason, to • -^  
Major Sale within 10 days after receiving the applicable 
Sales Notice (the "Objection Period"). Any such objection 
("Objection") shall be in writing, shall be delivered to 
Wescourt within the Objection Period, and shall identify the 
Major Sale to which it relates and the reasons for the 
Objection. If Wescourt fails to receive an Objection to any 
Major Sale within the applicable Objection Period, Wescourt 
shall be free to consummate such Sale (on the terms 
described in the applicable Sales Notice or on terms more 
favorable to Landmark). If Wescourt receives an Objection 
to any Major Sale within the applicable Objection Period and 
otherwise conforming with the foregoing, Wescourt shall not 
proceed with such Sale, but such Objection shall not 
preclude Wescourt from pursuing other Major Sales on 
3 
substantially the same terms provided that Landmark and 
Chase are provided with an additional Sales Notice, and 
opportunity to object, to any such other Major Sales. 
2 .4 pavmen|- Qf purchase Price; Re :i mbi irsement of 
Sales Expenses. 
(a) Establishment of Deposit Account. Prior 
to the consummation of the first Sale, Wescourt shall 
establish on behalf of Landmark at Chase a special purpose 
restricted deposit account in Landmark's name (the "Deposit 
Account") with respect to which Chase shall have the sole 
right to make withdrawals as hereafter provided. Landmark 
hereby grants to Chase a security interest and right of 
setoff in the Deposit Account to secure the Chase Claim 
defined in Section 5.2). Wescourt shall require a] 1 
purchasers of Assets to pay the purchase price therefor 
directly into the Deposit Account 
(b) Wescourt Account: Withdrawals from 
Deposit A C C O Unt. Prior to the consummation of the first 
Sale, Wescourt shall establish at Chase a deposit account in 
Wescourt's name (the "Wescourt Account"). Upon the request 
of Wescourt in compliance with the terms hereof, Chase will 
immediately make transfers from the Deposit Account into the 
Wescourt Account to pav "Sal e Expenses," as follows: 
li. Sale Expenses. As used herein,,, the 
term "Sales Expenses" means the following: (A) all 
reasonable costs and expenses incurred by Wescourt, its 
affiliates, or any of their respective officers, directors, 
employees, or agents (each a "Wescourt Person") in the 
assessment, maintenance, marketing or sale of the Assets, 
including, without limitation, costs incurred in 
(1) assessing the initial condition and marketability of the 
Assets, both before and after the date hereof (including 
costs incurred by Purchaser under the Purchase Agreement for 
attorney's fees (after the first $20,000 thereof), 
surveying, subdividing, obtaining title insurance wiuu 
respect to, and assessing the environmental condition of 
the Refinery Assets (up to a maximum of $20,000 for suet 
environmental assessment) provided that the aggregate J 
such expenses incurred in respect of transactions 
contemplated by the Purchase Agreement shall not exceed 
$150,000, (2) settling any obligations or liabilities 
relating to the Assets and arising out of activities of 
Landmark prior to Closing, including, without limitation, 
any such obligations or liabilities for taxes (other than 
the Tax Obligations as defined in Section 7.2), 
(3) preparing inventories of the Assets and related permits 
and maintaining the Assets and such permits pending the 
4 
completion of the Sales, (4) maintaining and insuring the 
Assets pending the completion of the Sales, (5) marketing 
the Assets (including for the reasonable fees of attorneys, 
appraisers, and brokers), and (6) preparing the Assets for 
sale (including dividing, partitioning, and packaging the 
Assets); (B) all taxes (other than the Tax Obligations), 
levies, fees, and assessments imposed or assessed by any 
governmental authority on the Assets or any Sale, (C) all 
reasonable costs and expenses incurred in complying with 
reporting and access requirements under Article 3, (D) al 1 
reasonable costs and expenses incurred by any Wescourt 
Person under the Management Agreement, (E) any Commission 
payable to Wescourt pursuant to Section 3.1. 
(ii) sales Expenses - Env ii onmental 
Matters. Without limiting the foregoing, Sales Expenses 
shall include an allocable portion of the salary and 
benefits of any employees of Wescourt Persons preform! . 
services relating to the environmental condition of r -
Assets, including assessments of the environmental condition 
of the Assets and remediation and compliance activities with 
respect thereto. • In addition, in the event that a release, 
threatened release, disposal, discharge, spillage, loss, 
seepage, transport or migration of Hazardous Materials (as 
defined in the Asset Purchase Agreement) shall occur on the 
Assets during the term of this Agreement, including any 
release of asbestos in connection with the partition of 
Assets or preparation of Assets for Sale, all remediation 
and compliance costs incurred in connection therewith shall 
be a Sales Expense provided that the same does not result 
from the gross negligence or willful misconduct of Wescourt. 
(iii) withdrawals, wescourt shall make a 
written request ("Withdrawal Notice") to Chase for transfer 
from the Deposit Account to pay or to reimburse Sales 
Expenses, such request to reasonably detail such Sales 
Expenses. Upon receipt of such written request, Chase shall 
immediately make the requested transfer into the Wescourt 
Account (unless the expense described in such request cannot 
reasonably be deemed a Sales Expense); provided, that, with 
respect to any individual Sales Expense exceeding Two 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500) Chase shall have the 
right to object if, within 10 days after receiving the 
applicable Withdrawal Notice, it reasonably deems that the 
Sales Expense described therein is excessive or not 
reasonably related to the satisfaction of Wescourt's duti • s s 
hereunder. Any such objection ("Objection") shall be i 
writing, shall be made within the such 10 day period, and 
shall identify the Sales Expense to which it relates and the 
reasons for the Objection in reasonable detail. Chase 
shall, within such 10 day period, either make an Object 
5 
as provided herein, or transfer the requested amount from 
the Deposit Account to the Wescourt Account. Chase shall 
have no duty or obligation to Landmark with respect to any 
Withdrawal Notice or its determination of the reasonableness 
thereof. 
' ) Cash Sweep. 
(i) Determination of Projected Monthly 
Expenses. On or promptly after the first business day of in 
June 1994, and thereafter on or promptly after the first 
business day of each succeeding February, May, August and 
November during the term, of this Agreement, Wescourt, 
Landmark and Chase shall meet (in person or by telephone 
conference) in an effort, based on Sales Expenses incurred 
during the immediately preceding three calender months, to 
agree upon projected monthly Sales Expenses ("Projected 
Monthly Expenses") for the next succeeding three calender 
months (e.g. in the case of the May meeting, Projected 
Monthly Expenses for the months of June, July and August). 
Projected Monthly Expenses, as of any date, shall be either 
(a) as agreed upon by Wescourt, Landmark and Chase at the 
most recent such meeting or (b) if the parties fail to agree 
on Projected Monthly Expenses at any such meeting by the 
15th day of the month during which such meeting is to take 
place, the average of the monthly Sales Expenses incurred 
during the two immediately preceding calender months (e g. 
in the case of the May meeting, average Sales Expenses 
during the months of March and April ) . 
(ii) Deposit of Projected Monthly 
^"P 0 0. Commencing on the first business day of June 
±2!*4, and continuing thereafter on the first business day 
each succeeding calender month, Chase shall automatically, 
and without the further request of Wescourt, transfer from 
the Deposit Account to the Wescourt Account an amount equal 
to the Projected Monthly Expenses for such calender month 
(or such lesser amount as is the total amount then on 
deposit in the Deposit Account) less the then-current 
balance in the Wescourt Account. Wescourt shall have the 
right to use all funds so transferred to the Wescourt 
Account for payment or reimbursement of Sales Expenses; 
provided, that, Wescourt shall first provide Chase with a 
Withdrawal Notice as to any individual Sales Expense 
exceeding Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500) and 
Chase shall have the right to object thereto as provided in 
Section 2.4 if, within 10 days after receiving such 
Withdrawal Notice, it reasonably deems that the Sales 
Expense described therein is excessive or not reasonably 
related to the satisfaction, of Wescourt"s duties hereunder. 
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(iii) Cash Sweep, After making the deposit to 
the Wescourt Account described in the preceding 
paragraph (ii), Chase may deduct from the Chase Account: aI I 
"Excess Proceeds" and apply such amounts to the Chase CI a in i 
(as defined in Section 5.2(a)). As used herein, the term 
"Excess Proceeds" means the excess, if any, by which the 
amount on deposit in the Deposit Account as of the first day 
of any calender month exceeds two times the Projected 
Monthly Expenses for such calender month. Until the Chase 
claim has been paid in full, Landmark hereby irrevocably 
authorizes Chase to deduct and apply Excess Proceeds to the 
Chase Claim as provided in the preceding sentence. If Sales 
Expenses exceed, at any time, the amount on deposit in the 
Deposit Account, Chase agrees to pay Sales Expenses to 
Wescourt on demand; provided that in no event shall the 
total amount of such payments by Chase to Wescourt exceed 
the total amount of Excess Proceeds previously deducted by 
Chase from the Deposit Account and further, provided, that, 
in any such event, the Chase Claim shall be reinstated and 
revived to the extent of such payment. 
2.5 Dispute Resolution. Any dispute 
concerning any sales Expense or Withdrawal that cannot be 
promptly resolved by the parties shall be referred to 
Coopers & Lybrand for resolution "The determination of s"ir'"f/i 
accounting firm shall be made promptly and in writing and 
shall be final, binding and conclusive as to all items in 
dispute If the foregoing accounting firm refuses or is 
unable to participate in the resolution of any such dispute, 
then the parties hereto shall, acting in good faith, appoint 
an alternative national accounting firm acceptable to all 
parties. 
ARTICLE 3 . 
" I M S M mi1 "ih" I 11 
n. In consideration of Wescourt's 
?e« u'~ . er proceeds of "Subject Sales" (as 
; e of Sales Expenses and taxes (hereinafter 
called "Net Proceeds") in an aggregate amount of $5,250,000 
have been deposited in the Deposit Account pursuant to 
Section 2.4 and made available for application to the Chase 
Claim, Wescourt shall receive a sales commission 
("Commission") equal to thirty five percent (35%) < 
subsequent Net Proceeds. As used herein, the term 
"Subject Sales" means any sale or other disposition of 
Assets consummated (a) during the term of this Agreement i 
(b) after the term of this Agreement to a purchaser (or 
affiliate of a purchaser) identified by Wescourt during the 
term,, of thi e Agreement or notified to Landmark w?*-,?-5~ "* ' 
days after the expiration or earlier termination of this 
Agreement. Any Commission payable to Wescourt hereunder 
shall be a "Sales Expense" subject to the applicable terms 
of Section 2 hereof. 
3 . dl Report inn 
(a I Expense Reporting. Promptly after the 
closing under the Purchase Agreement, Wescourt shall forward 
to Landmark and Chase a statement describing, in reasonable 
detail on an item by item basis, all Sales Expenses incurred 
prior to such closing. Promptly after the end of each 
calender month, Wescourt shall forward to Landmark and Chase;: 
a statement describing, in reasonable detail on an item by 
item basis, all Sales Expenses incurred during such calender 
month , 
(b) Sa 1 es Reporting, Promptly after the end 
of each calender q us J : !::• *r, Wescourt shal 1 forward to Landmdik 
and Chase a statement describing, in reasonable detail, 
(i) all Sales consummated by Wescourt during such calender 
quarter and (ii) all Sales projected to be consummated by 
Wescourt during the next-succeeding six calender months, 
3 3 Access. I)i ir :i iig the t:e:i mi of this Agreement, 
W e s c o u r t gh-Qi afford Landmark, Chase and their respective 
representatives with such access, upon reasonable notice and 
during Wescourt1's regular business hours, to Wescourt' s 
financial records of its activities hereunder as Landmark or 
Chase may reasonably request in order to verify the accuracy 
of the reports provided by Wescourt pursuant to the 
preceding Section, 3.2 
ARTICLE 4. 
COVENANT' . "M LANDMARK 
4.1 Negative Covenants. Landmark hereby covenants 
nun;! agrees that, until the expiration or earlier termination 
of this Agreement in accordance with its terms: 
(a) No Solicitation. Except as otherwise 
iipressly contemplated by this Agreement, Landmark shall 
not, and shall not grant to any other person the right to, 
solicit or pursue opportunities for the sale of Assets; 
(b) No Sale. Except as otherwise expressly 
contemplated by this Agreement, Landmark shall not sell. 
lease, assign, convey, transfer, or otherwise dispose ol
 2 
I I Hllf i f 1 1 III , 
(c) No Liens. Except for the Chase Liens and 
such liens existing on the date of this Agreement, Landmark 
shall not create, incur, assume or suffer to exist any 
encumbrance, lien, mortgage, pledge, or other security 
interest with respect to the Assets; and 
(d) No Operation of Refinery. Landmark shall 
not operate, or permit the operation, of the Assets or any 
portion thereof. 
4.2 Affirmative Covenants. Landmark hereby 
covenants and agrees that, until the expiration or earlier 
termination of this Agreement in accordance with its terms: 
(a) Employees. Landmark shall make its 
employees ("Employees") (other than Richard Means to the 
extent that he is no longer employed at the Refinery), 
available to Wescourt and its affiliates on a full-time 
basis to assist in the maintenance and disposition of the 
Assets pursuant hereto and shall use reasonable commercial 
efforts to retain the Employees in Landmark's employ; 
provided, however, that Landmark shall be under no 
obligation to replace any Employee who elects to quit 
notwithstanding Landmark's efforts to the contrary 
hereunder; and provided, further. that Wescourt shall be 
responsible for the Employees' compensation, subject to 
reimbursement pursuant to Section 2.4; 
(b) Referral of Sales Leads. If 
notwithstanding Section 4.1(a), Landmark becomes aware of 
any opportunities for the sale of Assets to third parties, 
Landmark shall promptly appraise Wescourt of such 
opportunities and cooperate with Wescourt's pursuit thereof; 
(c) Further Assurances. In addition to such 
acts as are expressly required of Landmark hereunder, 
Landmark shall promptly upon request by Wescourt take such 
further acts as Wescourt may reasonably request from time to 
time in order to effectuate the purposes of this Agreement, 
including, without limitation, executing and delivering such 
documents as may be necessary or appropriate, in Wescourt's 
judgment, to maintain the Assets (including the permits 
applicable thereto) in their existing condition, and to 
prepare the Assets for, and consummate, Sales. 
ARTICLE 5. 
COVENANTS OF CHASE 
5.1 Release of Chase Liens. By execution below, 
Chase hereby agrees that upon the Sale of any Asset in 
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compliance with the terms of this Agreement, the Chase Liens 
shall automatically, and without any further action by 
Chase, be released as to the sold Assets. Chase agrees 
promptly upon deposit of the Sales proceeds into the Deposit 
Account, and in any event within 20 days thereafter, to 
execute and deliver to Wescourt such documents as Wescourt 
may reasonably request and Chase may reasonably approve in 
order to evidence any such release provided that Wescourt 
(a) makes such request in writing (identifying with 
reasonable specificity the Assets subject to Sale), 
(b) certifies that the Sale complies in all material 
respects with the provisions hereof and (c) agrees to 
deliver such documents (and to file such documents in 
appropriate jurisdictions) only on or after the consummation 
of the applicable Sale. 
5.2 Enforcement. 
(a) Definitions. As used herein, (i) the 
term "Enforcement" means, collectively or individually, for 
Chase to exercise any right or remedy under the Chase Liens, 
including, without limitation, to repossess any Refinery 
Assets, or to commence a judicial or non-judicial 
enforcement of any of the rights and remedies relating 
thereto; (ii) the term "Insolvency Proceeding" means, 
collectively or individually, any case, action or proceeding 
before any court or other governmental authority relating to 
bankruptcy, reorganization, insolvency, liquidation, 
receivership, dissolution, winding-up or relief of debtors, 
and (iii) the term "Chase Claim" means all present and 
future obligations of Landmark to Chase in connection with 
or in any way related to the Loan Agreement, any Security 
Instrument (as such term is defined therein), or any other 
documents related thereto or executed in connection 
therewith (and any modifications, amendments, supplements, 
restatements, renewals, and extensions thereof). 
(b) Enforcement. For so long as (i) this 
Agreement remains in force and effect in accordance with its 
terms and (ii) Wescourt remains in material compliance with 
the terms hereof, Chase agrees that it shall not commence or 
maintain any Enforcement, including, without limitation, any 
attachment, levy, distraint, or foreclosure upon or against 
any of the Refinery Assets; provided, however, that Chase 
shall have the right to (A) seek relief from the automatic 
stay imposed in any Insolvency Proceeding with respect to 
Landmark, and upon obtaining such relief to commence and 
maintain a foreclosure proceeding with respect to the 
Assets, and (B) commence and maintain such other Enforcement 
as may be required to protect the priority or perfection of 
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the Chase Liens from the claims of third parties (other than 
Landmark); provided, further, that any amounts realized by 
Chase in such foreclosure proceeding or other Enforcement 
(or any subsequent sale of the Assets or any portion 
thereof) shall constitute Sale proceeds subject to the terms 
hereof, including, without limitation, Wescourt's commission 
rights under Section 3.1; 
(c) Insolvency Proceeding. For so long as 
(i) this Agreement remains in force and effect in accordance 
with its terms and (ii) Wescourt remains in material 
compliance with the terms hereof, Chase agrees that it shall 
not commence or maintain any Insolvency Proceeding with 
respect to Landmark; provided, however, that Chase shall 
have the right to commence and maintain an Insolvency 
Proceeding to the extent that such proceeding would serve to 
void or stay a wrongful or fraudulent conveyance of assets 
by Landmark that Chase otherwise is unable to prevent or 
enjoin. 
5.3 Affirmative Covenants. Chase hereby agrees 
that, until the expiration or earlier termination of this 
Agreement in accordance with its terms, if Chase becomes 
aware of any opportunities for the sale of Assets to third 
parties, Chase shall promptly appraise Wescourt of such 
opportunities and cooperate with Wescourt's pursuit thereof. 
5.4 No Other Obligations. Wescourt acknowledges 
that Chase's relationship with Landmark is solely that of 
secured lender/borrower and agrees that Chase shall have no 
obligations to Wescourt other than those expressly set forth 
herein and in the Chase Consent (as defined in the Asset 
Purchase Agreement) to be executed simultaneously herewith. 
ARTICLE 6. 
TERM AND TERMINATION 
6.1 Term. This Agreement shall commence on the 
date hereof and, unless earlier terminated in accordance 
with the terms hereof, shall remain in effect until the 
second (2nd) anniversary of the date hereof. The term of 
this Agreement shall not be extended without the prior 
written consent of Wescourt, Landmark and Chase. 
6.2 Termination. If Wescourt defaults in the 
performance of any of its material obligations hereunder or 
under the Management Agreement dated as of the date hereof 
between Wescourt and Landmark (the "Management Agreement"), 
Landmark or Chase may give written notice to Wescourt 
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thereof. If such default is not corrected or otherwise 
addressed by Wescourt to the reasonable satisfaction of the 
party giving such notice within sixty (60) days after 
Wescourt's receipt of such notice, then the party giving 
such notice may terminate this Agreement upon thirty (30) 
days prior written notice to Wescourt. If Wescourt elects 
to terminate the Management Agreement, Landmark or Chase may 
terminate this Agreement, upon written notice to Wescourt, 
within 30 days after the effectiveness of the termination of 
the Management Agreement. The fact that Wescourt has not 
consummated Sales, or has consummated a limited number of 
Sales, during any period will not itself constitute a 
default hereunder provided that Wescourt is using reasonable 
commercial efforts to identify, solicit and pursue 
opportunities for Sales on the terms and conditions set 
forth herein. 
6.3 Rights upon Termination. Upon the expiration 
or earlier termination of this Agreement, Wescourt's status 
as Landmark's representative hereunder shall terminate and 
Wescourt shall immediately cease to represent that it is 
Landmark's representative and to solicit and pursue 
prospective Sales. No such expiration or termination of 
this Agreement shall limit Wescourt's right to reimbursement 
of Sales Expenses incurred prior to the effective date 
thereof or affect the validity of Section 3.1 (including 
Wescourt's right to receive Commissions on Subject Sales as 
provided therein), this Article 6, or Articles 7 or 8, each 
of which shall survive. 
ARTICLE 7. 
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT: INDEMNIFICATION 
7.1 Attorney-in-Fact. In connection with any 
Sales consummated pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, 
Wescourt shall convey the Assets so sold pursuant to the 
terms of a bill of sale in substantially the form attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. Landmark hereby irrevocably 
constitutes and appoints Wescourt as Landmark's true and 
lawful attorney-in-fact, with full authority in the place 
and stead of Landmark, from time to time in Wescourt's 
discretion, to take any action and to execute any document 
or instrument which Wescourt may deem necessary or desirable 
to accomplish the purposes of this Agreement. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Wescourt shall not have any 
rights, duties or responsibilities except those expressly 
set forth herein, nor shall Wescourt have or be deemed to 
have any fiduciary relationship with Landmark, and no 
implied covenants, functions, responsibilities, duties, 
obligations or liabilities shall be read into this Agreement 
other than to act in good faith in connection herewith. 
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7.2 Settlement of Tax Lien. As of the date 
hereof, the Refinery Assets are subject to a tax lien in 
favor of the tax authorities of the County of Mesa, Colorado 
(the "Tax Lien") securing the obligation of Landmark to pay 
past due property taxes on the Refinery Assets in an 
aggregate amount of $1,024,000 (the "Tax Obligation"). 
Pursuant to Landmark's appointment of Wescourt as Landmark's 
attorney-in-fact under Section 7.1, Wescourt shall have full 
authority, in the place and stead of Landmark, from time to 
time in Wescourt's discretion, to negotiate concerning the 
payment, discharge, settlement, compromise, or adjustment of 
the taxes giving rise to the Tax Lien and the release of the 
Tax Lien from all or any portion of the Refinery Assets; 
provided, in each case, that any such payment, discharge, 
settlement, compromise, or adjustment shall be at the sole 
cost and expense of Wescourt and its Affiliates and shall 
not be a Sales Expense that may be reimbursed out of the 
proceeds of Asset Sales. 
7.3 Delegation of Duties. Wescourt may execute 
any of its duties under this Agreement by or through agents, 
employees or attorneys-in-fact. Wescourt shall not be 
responsible for the negligence or misconduct of any agent or 
attorney-in-fact that it selects with reasonable care. 
7.4 Reliance by Wescourt. Wescourt shall be fully 
justified in failing or refusing to take any action that it 
reasonably deems to be beyond the scope of its Sales-related 
obligations under this Agreement unless it shall first 
receive such advice or concurrence of Landmark and Chase as 
it deems appropriate and, if it so requests, it shall first 
be indemnified to its satisfaction by Landmark against any 
and all liability and expense which may be incurred by it by 
reason of taking or continuing to take any such action. 
7.5 Indemnification. 
(a) Landmark Indemnification. Landmark 
hereby indemnifies the Wescourt Persons from and against any 
and all liabilities, obligations, losses, damages, 
penalties, actions, judgments, suits, costs, expenses and 
disbursements of any kind whatsoever which may at any time 
(including at any time following the termination of this 
Agreement) be imposed on, incurred by or asserted against 
any such person in any way relating to or arising out of 
this Agreement, or any document contemplated by or referred 
to herein or the transactions contemplated hereby or any 
action taken or omitted by any such Person under or in 
connection with any of the foregoing; except to the extent 
resulting from such person's gross negligence or willful 
misconduct. 
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(b) Wescourt Indemnification. Wescourt 
hereby indemnifies Landmark and its officers, directors, 
employees and agents (collectively, the "Landmark Persons") 
from and against any and all liabilities, obligations, 
losses, damages, penalties, actions, judgments, suits, 
costs, expenses and disbursements of any kind whatsoever 
which may at anytime (including at anytime following the 
termination of this Agreement) be imposed on, incurred by or 
asserted against any such person in any way relating to or 
arising out of a breach by the Wescourt Persons of this 
Agreement or the gross negligence or willful misconduct of 
any Wescourt Person in carrying out its obligations 
hereunder; except to the extent that the same results from 
the gross negligence or willful misconduct of Landmark. 
7.6 Limitation of Liability. Not withstanding any 
other provision hereof, no Wescourt Person shall (a) be 
liable for any action taken or omitted to be taken by any of 
them under or in connection with this Agreement (except for 
a breach by a Wescourt Person of this Agreement or its own 
gross negligence or willful misconduct), or (b) be 
responsible in any manner to Chase or to any third party for 
any recital, statement, representation or warranty made by 
Landmark in this Agreement or in any certificate, report, or 
other document referred to or provided for in this 
Agreement. WITHOUT LIMITING THE FOREGOING, IN NO EVENT 
SHALL ANY WESCOURT PERSON BE LIABLE TO ANY PARTY FOR ANY 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (MEANING DAMAGES THAT DO NOT ARISE OUT 
OF THE SUBJECT TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES HERETO OR 
CHASE BUT DAMAGES THAT ARISE OUT OF THE DEALINGS BETWEEN 
LANDMARK OR CHASE AND A THIRD-PARTY) , INCLUDING, WITHOUT 
LIMITATION, ARISING OUT OF THE SALE OF THE ASSETS, WHETHER 
UNDER A THEORY OF CONTRACT, TORT, INDEMNITY, OR OTHERWISE; 
OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF ANY KIND. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE 
TOTAL LIABILITY OF ALL WESCOURT PERSONS HEREUNDER EXCEED THE 
TOTAL COMMISSIONS PAID TO WESCOURT HEREUNDER, EXCEPT TO THE 
EXTENT THAT THE SAME RESULTS FROM THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR 
WILLFUL MISCONDUCT OF WESCOURT. 
ARTICLE 8. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
8.1 Assignment. No party may assign its rights 
and obligations under this Agreement except that Wescourt 
may assign all or a portion of its rights hereunder to one 
or more of its wholly-owned affiliates. 
8.2 Communications. All notices, requests, 
demands and other communications under this Agreement shall 
be in writing and shall be deemed to have been given 
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(a) when delivered personally, or (b) 48 hours after being 
sent by facsimile with duplicate sent by courier service. 
Such communications shall be directed as follows: 
To Wescourt at: 
Fruita Marketing & Management, Inc. 
c/o Wescourt Group, Inc. 
2401 River Road 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81505 
Att'n: Keith Holder 
Fax: (303) 241-5319 
To Landmark at: 
Landmark Petroleum, Inc. 
1493 Highway 6 & 50 
Fruita, Colorado 81521 
Att'n: Mr. Richard Means 
Fax: (303) 858-9194 
with copies to: 
The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 
One Chase Manhattan Plaza 
Tenth Floor 
New York, New York 10081 
Att'n: Mr. Stanley M. Guralnick 
Fax: (212) 422-6249 
To Chase at: 
The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A, 
One Chase Manhattan Plaza 
New York, NY 10081 
Att'n: Stanley M. Guralnick 
Fax: (212) 422-6249 
Any party may change its address for purposes of this 
section by giving the other parties notice of the new 
address in the manner set forth above. 
8.3 Captions and Headings. The captions contained 
herein are for convenience and reference only and shall not 
affect the meaning, scope, intent, or interpretation of this 
Agreement or its provisions. 
8.4 Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes 
the entire agreement between the parties with respect to its 
subject matter and supersedes all prior agreements and 
understandings, written and oral with respect thereto. No 
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prior draft of this Agreement nor any parole evidence shall 
be admissible to prove the meaning or intent of any 
provision of this Agreement. 
8.5 Amendment or Modification. This Agreement may 
only be amended, modified or supplemented by a written 
instrument specifically referring to this Agreement and 
signed by Wescourt, Landmark and Chase. 
8.6 Governing Law. This Agreement will be 
governed by, and construed and enforced in accordance with, 
the laws of the State of New York. 
8.7 Severability. Any provision of this Agreement 
which is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction 
will, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent 
of such prohibition or unenforceability without invalidating 
the remaining provisions of this Agreement or affecting the 
validity or enforceability of any such provision in any 
other jurisdiction, unless such prohibition or 
unenforceability frustrates the overall objective of this 
Agreement. 
8.8 Counterparts. This Agreement will be executed 
in counterparts, and the several counterparts shall 
constitute one executed Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have executed 
this Agreement on the date first written above. 
FRUITA MARKETING & MANAGEMENT, INC., 
a Delaware corporation 
By: 
Keith R. Holder, President 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC. 
a Delaware corporation 
By: 
Richard Means, Vice President 
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THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A. EXECUTES BELOW TO CONSENT TO 
THE FOREGOING AND TO AGREE TO THE SPECIFIC TERMS THEREOF 
APPLICABLE TO IT: 
THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A. 
By: 
Its 
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Schedule 1 
to Marketing Agreement 
MAJOR ASSETS 
"Major Assets" means the following Refinery Assets: 
1. Vacuum Crude Unit 
2. Coker 
3• Reformer 
4. Hydrogen Plant 
5. Hydrocracker 
6. The Retained Real Property (as defined in 
the Purchase Agreement) 
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Exhibit A 
to Marketing Agreement 
BILL OF SALE 
THIS BILL OF SALE ("Bill of Sale"), dated as of 
, is made by LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC., a 
Delaware corporation ("Landmark") in favor of 
("Purchaser"). 
For good and valuable consideration, receipt of 
which is hereby acknowledged, Landmark hereby sells, 
conveys, transfers, assigns and delivers unto Purchaser, its 
successors and assigns, all of Landmark's right, title and 
interest in the assets described in attached Schedule l (the 
"Assets"). 
THE ASSETS ARE SOLD, CONVEYED, TRANSFERRED, 
ASSIGNED AND DELIVERED UNTO PURCHASER ON AN "AS IS, WHERE 
IS" BASIS, WITHOUT ANY REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES 
WHATSOEVER WITH RESPECT THERETO, INCLUDING, WITHOUT 
LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A 
PARTICULAR PURPOSE, except that Landmark hereby represents 
and warrants to the Purchaser that, upon delivery hereof, 
the Purchaser shall receive good and marketable title to the 
Assets, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, other 
than those listed on Exhibit A, if any. 
BY EXECUTING THIS BILL OF SALE, THE PURCHASER 
HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THIS BILL OF SALE IS BEING EXECUTED 
ON BEHALF OF LANDMARK BY FRUITA MARKETING & MANAGEMENT, INC. 
("WESCOURT") SOLELY IN ITS CAPACITY AS LANDMARK'S SALES 
REPRESENTATIVE UNDER A MARKETING AGREEMENT DATED FEBRUARY 
28, 1994 AND THAT WESCOURT IS MAKING NO REPRESENTATIONS OR 
WARRANTIES WHATSOEVER WITH RESPECT TO THE ASSETS, INCLUDING, 
WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR 
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN ADDITION, BY EXECUTING 
THIS BILL OF SALE, THE PURCHASER ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES 
THAT ITS SOLE RECOURSE IN THE EVENT OF ANY CLAIM OR DISPUTE 
WHATSOEVER WITH RESPECT TO OR ARISING OUT OF THE PURCHASER'S 
ACQUISITION OF THE ASSETS SHALL BE AGAINST LANDMARK, AND 
THAT THE PURCHASER SHALL NOT HAVE, AND HEREBY IRREVOCABLY 
WAIVES, ANY CLAIM AGAINST WESCOURT (WHETHER AS AGENT FOR 
LANDMARK OR IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY) . 
To have and to hold the Assets unto the Purchaser, 
its successors and assigns, for its and their use forever. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Landmark has caused this Bill 
of Sale to be executed as of the date first above written. 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC., a 
Delaware corporation 
By: 
as Agent 
By: 
Its: 
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Exhibit B 
to Purchase Agreement 
CONSENT AND AGREEMENT 
THIS CONSENT AND AGREEMENT (this "Consent") is made 
as of February 28, 1994, by THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A., 
a national banking association ("Chase"). 
RECITALS 
A. Landmark Petroleum, Inc., a Delaware 
Corporation ("Seller"), owns an oil refinery located at 1493 
Highway 6 & 50, Fruita, Colorado, and comprised of certain 
real property, fixtures, personal property and other assets 
(collectively, the "Assets"). 
B. The Assets are subject to certain liens and 
security interests in favor of Chase (the "Chase Liens") 
securing the obligations of Seller under the Amended and 
Restated Credit Agreement dated as of June 24, 1992, as 
amended from time to time prior to the date hereof, between 
Seller and Chase. 
C. The Assets are also subject to a tax lien in 
favor of the tax authorities of the County of Mesa, Colorado 
(the "Tax Lien") securing the obligation of Seller to pay 
past due property taxes on the Assets in an aggregate amount 
of $1,024,000, 
D. Seller wishes to sell to Wescourt Group, Inc., 
a Delaware corporation ("Buyer"). a portion of the Assets 
comprised of the Transferred Assets, as defined in and 
pursuant to the terms of, an Asset Purchase Agreement dated 
as of the date hereof between Seller and Buyer (the 
"Purchase Agreement"). 
E. Seller also wishes to appoint Buyer's 
affiliate, Fruita Marketing & Management, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation ("Wescourt"). as Seller's exclusive 
representative for the marketing and sale to third parties 
of all Assets other than the Transferred Assets (such other 
Assets, the "Retained Assets") pursuant to the terms of a 
Marketing Agreement dated as of the date hereof between 
Seller, Buyer and Chase (the "Marketing Agreement"). 
CONSENT AND AGREEMENT 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing 
premises, and for other good and valuable consideration, 
Chase hereby agrees as follows: 
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1. Definitions. Capitalized terms used herein 
and not otherwise defined have the meanings specified in 
Schedule 1 to the Purchase Agreement. 
2. Consent to Transfer. 
(a) Acknowledgement. Chase hereby 
acknowledges notice of the proposed sale to Buyer of the 
Transferred Assets and its receipt and review of a copy of 
the Purchase Agreement. 
(b) Consent. Chase hereby consents to all of 
the terms of the Purchase Agreement, including, without 
limitation, the sale by Seller to Buyer of all of Seller's 
right, title and interest in and to the Transferred Assets, 
subject to the following limitations; 
(i) If the Retained Assets remain 
subject to the Tax Lien on the Closing Date, then Chase's 
consent hereunder is conditioned upon the Transferred Assets 
remaining subject to the Chase Liens following such transfer 
until the occurrence of an event specified in Section 4 
below; and 
(ii) If the Tax Lien is released as to 
the Retained Assets on or prior to the Closing Date, Chase 
agrees that the Chase Liens shall automatically, and without 
any further action by Chase, be released as to the 
Transferred Assets and that, at Closing, Buyer shall take 
title to the Transferred Assets free and clear thereof. In 
such event, Chase further agrees promptly, and in any event 
within 20 days, to execute and deliver to Buyer such 
documents as Buyer may reasonably request and Chase may 
reasonably approve in order to evidence such release. 
(c) Acknowledgment of Termination of Certain 
Agreements. Chase hereby acknowledges notice of and 
consents to the termination of certain documents in 
accordance with the terms of and as set forth in the 
Purchase Agreement. 
3. Enforcement; Limited Recourse. 
(a) Enforcement. Until the earlier to occur 
of (i) the second (2nd) anniversary of this Consent, 
(ii) the entry of a final, non-appealable judgment or order 
in a judicial or non-judicial proceeding enforcing the 
rights of the taxing authorities under the Tax Lien and 
proposing to divest Seller or Buyer, as the case may be, of 
possession of any Asset, and (iii) termination of the 
Marketing Agreement as a result of a default by Wescourt in 
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the performance of any of its material obligations 
thereunder or Wescourt's election to terminate the Marketing 
Agreement, Chase agrees that it shall not commence or 
maintain any Enforcement (as defined in the Marketing 
Agreement) upon or against any of the Transferred Assets, 
including, without limitation, any attachment, levy, 
distrait, or foreclosure proceeding, 
(b) Limited Recourse. If Chase commences or 
maintains any Enforcement upon or against the Transferred 
Assets, Chase agrees that its recovery thereunder shall be 
limited to an amount equal to the lesser of (i) amount 
required to satisfy the Tax Lien on the Retained Assets at 
the time of the Enforcement and (ii) $5,250,000 minus the 
aggregate Net Proceeds (as defined in the Marketing 
Agreement) received by Chase under the Marketing Agreement 
(such lesser amount, the "Lien Satisfaction Amount"). 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, 
Chase agrees to look to the Transferred Assets for payment 
and performance of the Chase Claim (as defined in the 
Marketing Agreement) solely to the extent of the Lien 
Satisfaction Amount and not to assert or attempt to assert 
any additional liability for payment or performance of 
Seller's obligations to Chase in excess of the Lien 
Satisfaction Amount against Buyer or its assets, including 
the Transferred Assets. 
(c) Proceeds in Trust. If, notwithstanding 
the foregoing, Chase shall receive, or be entitled to 
receive, proceeds from any Enforcement with respect to the 
Transferred Assets in excess of the Lien Satisfaction 
Amount, such excess amount shall be held by Chase in trust 
for the benefit of Buyer and shall be promptly paid over and 
delivered to Buyer on demand. Seller agrees that, the 
obligations of Seller with respect the the Chase Claim shall 
be reinstated and revived to the extent of any amounts paid 
over and delivered to Buyer by Chase pursuant to the 
preceding sentence. 
4. Agreement to Release Lien Upon the Occurrence 
of Certain Events. Chase hereby agrees that the Chase Liens 
shall automatically, and without any further action by 
Chase, be released as to the Transferred Assets upon the 
earliest to occur of (i) the date on which Wescourt shall 
have deposited aggregate Net Proceeds (as defined in the 
Marketing Agreement) available for application to the Chase 
Claim of $5,250,000, or (ii) the date on which .the Tax Lien 
is released as to all of the Retained Assets. Chase agrees 
promptly, and in any event within 20 days, to execute and 
deliver to Buyer such documents as Buyer may reasonably 
request and Chase may reasonably approve in order to 
evidence any such release. 
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5. Settlement of Tax Lien. Chase hereby 
acknowledges and confirms Buyer's right under the Marketing 
Agreement to negotiate concerning the payment, discharge, 
settlement, compromise, or adjustment of the taxes giving 
rise to the Tax Lien and the release of the Tax Lien from 
all or any portion of the Refinery Assets; provided, that, 
in each case, any payment, discharge, settlement/ 
compromise, or adjustment thereof shall be at the sole cost 
and expense of Buyer and its Affiliates and shall not be a 
Sales Expense that may be reimbursed out of the proceeds of 
Sales (as each of the foregoing terms is defined in the 
Marketing Agreement). 
6. Representations and Warranties. Chase hereby 
represents and warrants to Buyer and Seller that: 
(a) Power and Authority. Chase has full 
corporate power and corporate authority to enter into this 
Consent and to perform its obligations hereunder; 
(b) Due Authorization. The execution, 
delivery and performance by Chase of this Consent have been 
duly authorized by all necessary corporate action; 
(c) Binding Effect. This Consent constitutes 
a valid and binding obligation of Chase, enforceable against 
Chase in accordance with its terms except as enforceability 
may be limited by bankruptcy, insolvency and other similar 
laws affecting creditors' rights generally or by general 
equitable principles; and 
(d) No Consent. No consent, approval, 
authorization, registration or qualification of or by any 
person is required in connection with the execution, 
delivery and performance of this Consent or the performance 
by Chase of its obligations hereunder. 
7. Communications. All notices, requests, 
demands and other communications under this Consent shall be 
in writing and shall be deemed to have been given (a) when 
delivered personally, or (b) 48 hours after being sent by 
facsimile with duplicate sent by courier service. Such 
communications shall be directed to Chase at the address for 
communications with Chase set forth in the Marketing 
Agreement. 
8. Governing Law. This Consent will be governed 
by, and construed and enforced in accordance with, the laws 
of the State of New York. 
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9. Severability. Any provision of this Consent 
which is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction 
will, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent 
of such prohibition or unenforceability without invalidating 
the remaining provisions of this Consent or affecting the 
validity or enforceability of any such provision in any 
other jurisdiction, unless such prohibition or 
unenforceability frustrates the overall objective of this 
Consent. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Chase has duly executed this 
Consent and Agreement as of the date first written above. 
THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A. 
By: 
Title: 
WESCOURT GROUP, INC. EXECUTES BELOW TO ACKNOWLEDGE ITS 
CONSENT TO THE FOREGOING AND TO AGREE TO THE SPECIFIC TERMS 
THEREOF APPLICABLE TO IT: 
WESCOURT GROUP, INC., 
a Delaware corporation 
By: 
Title: 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC. EXECUTES BELOW TO ACKNOWLEDGE ITS 
CONSENT TO THE FOREGOING AND TO AGREE TO THE TERMS OF 
SECTION 3(C): 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC. 
a Delaware corporation 
By: 
Richard Means, Vice President 
W77238 (KAS1) 
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to Purchase Agreement 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
I&NDMARK PETROLEUM# INC., a Delaware Corporation j(Grantor), 
whose address is 1493 Highway 6 & 50, Fruita, Colorado 81521, for 
the consideration of Ten and No/100 Dollars ($10.00) and jother good 
and valuable considerationf in hand paid# hereby sells and conveys 
to FRUITA RP HOLDING, INC. , a Delaware corporation (Grantee), whose 
legal address is 6500 Stapleton Drive South, Suite F204, Denver, 
Colorado 80216, County of Denver and State of Colorado, the 
folloving real property in the County of Mesa and| State of 
Colorado, to-wit: 
That certain real property described upon Exhibit A, 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by this 
reference; and, 
Those certain easements which are described upon Exhibit 
It, attached hereto and incorporated herein byj this 
reference, which are appurtenant to the property 
described in Exhibit A and are for the benefit of 
Grantee, its successors and assigns, provided' with 
respect to such easements Grantor shall retain for itself 
cind its successors and assigns the right to pave ov4r and 
access over, along and across said easements tp the 
cixtent such use does not unreasonably interfere with the 
use of such easements by Grantee, 
also known as street and number 1493 Highway 6 & 50, Fruita, 
Colorado 81521, with all its appurtenances and warrants the title 
again*it all persons claiming tinder it. 
'i?his Special Warranty Deed is made and accepted subject to any 
and all restrictions, easements, reservations (including but not 
limited to all reservations of oil, gas and minerals) and/or 
encumbrances, if any, relating to the property conveyed| hereby, to 
the extent, and only to the extent, that the same may still be in 
force and effect, and shown of record in the appropriate real 
prope:cty records of Mesa County, Colorado. 
signed and delivered this day of February, 1994. 
GRANTOR: 
IANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC-, a 
Delaware corporation 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF MESA ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 
day of February, 1994, by _ . ! , the 
_______^___________ of Landmark Petroleum, Inc., a, Delaware 
corporation. 
My commission expires: 
(SEAL) 
Notary Public 
Name and Address of Person Creating Newly Created Legal Description 
(38-35-106.5 C.R.S.): Dennis W. Johnson, PLS, Professional 
Surveying Services, P.O. Box 4506, Grand Junction, CO 181502. 
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PARCEL 1 OF TRACT A 
A parcel of land located in the SE1/4 of Section 2, and East 1/2 of Section 11, Township 1 
North, Range 3 West x>f the Ute Meridian, Mesa County Colorado, being more particularly 
described as follows; 
Commencing at the Northeast corner of Section 11, Township 1 North, Range 3 West, whence 
the East .1/4 corner of Section 11 bears S 00*07*00H E a distance of 2629.24 feet for a basis of 
bearings, with all bearings contained herein relative thereto; thence S OO'OTOO" E a distance of 
872.57 feet along the East line of the Northeast quarter (NE1/4) of Section 11 to a point on the 
Southerly right-of-way line of the Denver and Rio Grand Railroad, and the1 TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNING; thence South 00 degrees 07 minutes 00 seconds East (S 00*Q7*00" E), a distance 
of 1756.67 feet to the Northeast comer of the SE1/4 of Section 11 (E 1/4 corner); thence South 
00 degrees 07 minutes 00 seconds East (S 00°0T00" E), a distance of 1332.18 feet to the 
Northeast comer of the SE1/4 SE1/4 of Section 11; thence South 00 degrees 07 minutes 00 
seconds East (S 00°07*00" E), a distance of 713.82 feet to a point on the North bank of the 
Colorado River; thence along said North bank North 47 degrees 12 minutes 04 seconds West 
(N 47*12*04" W). a distance of 577.89 feet; thence leaving said North bank North 44 degrees 02 
minutes 01 seconds East (N 44*02*01" E), a distance of 564.53 feet; thence North 00 degrees 07 
minutes 00 seconds West (N 00*07*00" W). a distance of 611.55 feet; thence South 89 degrees 53 
minutes 00 seconds West (S 89*53*00" W), a distance of 363.28 feet; thence North 00 degrees 06 
minutes 58 seconds West (N 00*06*58" W), a distance of 374.74 feet; thence North 70 degrees 59 
minutes 23 seconds East (N 70*59*23" E), a distance of 383.96 feet; thence North 00 degrees 07 
minutes 00 seconds West (N 00°0r00M W), a distance of 842.93 feet; thence North 56 degrees 17 
minutes 10 seconds West (N 56*17* 10" W), a distance of 289.73 feet; thence South 33 degrees 42 
minutes 50 seconds West (S 33*42*50" W). a distance of 234.64 feet; thence North 58 degrees 50 
minutes 11 seconds West (N 58*50*1 1" W). a distance of 115.86 feet; thence North 31 degrees 19 
minutes 33 seconds East (N 31°19*33M E). a distance of 240.00 feet; thence North 56 degrees 17 
minutes 10 seconds West (N 56*17*10" W), a distance of 418.13 feet; thenceforth 07 degrees 30 
minutes 19 seconds East (N 07*30*19" E), a distance of 94.49 feet; thence North 58 degrees 04 
minutes 10 seconds West (N 58*04*10* W), a distance of 261.08 feet; thence South 52 degrees 42 
minutes IS seconds West (S 52*42*15* W), a distance of 81.06 feet; thence North 56 degrees 17 
minutes 10 seconds West (N 56*17*10" W), a distance of 414.12 feet; thence South 33 degrees 24 
North 57 degrees 40 
North 33 degrees 24 
South 56 degrees 35 
North 33 degrees 49 
minutes 17 seconds West (S 33*24917M W), a distance of 90.58 feet; thence 
minutes 48 seconds West (N 57*40*48" W), a distance of 52.07 feet; thencej 
minutes 17 seconds East (N 33*24*17* E), a distance of 115.46 feet; thence! 
minutes 40 seconds East (S 56*35*40* E), a distance of 258.17 feet; thence! 
minutes 38 seconds East (N 33*49*38" E), a distance of 472.87 feet; thence!North 56 degrees 34 
minutes 02 seconds West (N 56*34*02" W). * distance of 665.06 feet; thence- North 33 degrees 53 
minutes 32 seconds East (N 33*53*32" E), a distance of 384.57 feet to a point on the Southerly 
right-of-way line of the Denver and Rio Grand Railroad; thence along said right-of-way South 56 
degrees 41 minutes 00 seconds East (S 56*41*00" E), a distance of 1473.J79 feet to the TRUE 
POINT OF BEGINNING. Said Parcel containing 37.816 acres as described. 
1 
t. .^ riaht-of-v/ays of record as recorded in the Mesa 
Said pa. eel being subject to easements and ngbw* **y* 
County Clerk and Recorder's Office. 
Prepare 1 by: Dennis W!" Johnson, PLS 
Profesiional Surveying Services 
PO Box 4506 
Grand Junction, CO 81502 
303-241-3841 
Jan. 27,1994 
9391A6.LGL 
EXHIBIT B 
EASEMENT DESCRIPTIONS 
EASEMENT NO. 1 
A 25.0 foot wide easement for non-exclusive ingress, egress and the installation and maintenance 
of utili ies located in the NE1/4 of Section 11, Township 1 North, Range 3 West of the Ute 
Meriditn, Mesa County Colorado, being more particularly described as follows; 
Commiacing at the Northeast comer of Section 11, Township 1 North, Range (3 West, whence 
the East 1/4 corner of Section 11 bears S 00°0T00 E a distance of 2629.24 for a basis of 
bearings, with all bearings contained herein relative thereto; thence South 26 degrees 13 minutes 
35 seconds West (S 26*13*35" W), a distance of 1628.11 feet to a point on the boundary of Parcel 
1 of Ti act A as described in Book , Page of the Records of the Mesa County Clerk 
and Recorder), and the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence North 56 degrees 17 minutes 10 
seconds West (N 56°1T10N W), a distance of 329.06 feet; thence North 52 degrees 42 minutes 14 
seconds East (N 52°42'14*t E), a distance of 26.44 feet; thence South 56 degrees 17 minutes 10 
seconds East (S 56elT10N E), a distance of 308.15 feet; thence South 07 degrees 30 minutes 20 
seconds West (S 07°30f20" W), a distance of 27.86 feet to the TRUE POINT Of BEGINNING; 
and containing .183 acres, or 7965 square feet as described. 
EASEMENT #2 
An easement for non-exclusive ingress, egress and the installation and maintenance of utilities 
locatec in the NE1/4 of Section 11, Township 1 North, Range 3 West of the Ute Meridian, Mesa 
Count} Colorado, being more particularly described as follows; 
Commencing at the Northeast corner of Section 11, Township 1 North, Range J3 West, whence 
the fiart 1/4 corner of Section 11 bears S 00°0T00 E a disunce of 2629.24 for a basis of 
bearings, with all bearings contained herein relative thereto; thence South 54 degrees 05 minutes 
51 second! West (S 54°05,51" W), a distance of 1696.92 feet to a point on the boundary of Parcel 
1 of Tract A as described in Book , Page of the Records of the Mesa County Clerk 
and Recorder), and the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence South 33 degrees 24 minutes 17 
second * West (S 33°24917M W), a distance of 25.00 feet; thence North 56 degrees 35 minutes 43 
seconds West (N 56°35'43M W), a distance of 613.78 feet; thence South 33 degrees 19 minutes 
13 seconds West (S 33° 19*13* W), a distance of 78.44 feet; thence North 56 degrees 51 minutes 
30 seconds West (N 56e51*30N W), a distance of 106.51 feet; thence North 33 degrees 08 
minutes 30 seconds East (N 33*0830" E), a distance of 103.93 feet; thence South 56 degrees 35 
minute i 43 seconds East (S 56035,43" E), a distance of 720.65 feet to the TRUE POINT OF 
BEGl£<fNING; and containing .606 acres, or 26405 square feet, as described. 
EASE) -CENT #3 
A 10.0 foot electric easement located in the NE1/4 of Section 11, Township 1| North, Range 3 
West c f the Ute Meridian, Mesa County Colorado, being more particularly described as follows; 
Commencing at the Northeast comer of Section 11, Township 1 North, Range 3 West, whence 
the Ease 1/4 comer of Section 11 bears S 00°07'00 E a distance of 2629.24: for a basis of 
bearings, with all bearings contained herein relative thereto; thence South 70 degrees 11 minutes 
32 secends West (S 70oll'32" W), a distance of 1982.17 feet to a point on the boundary of 
Easemeat No. 2 as described above and the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence North 57 
degrees 03 minutes 35 seconds West (N 57°03'35" W), a distance of 10.00 feet; thence North 32 
degrees 28 minutes 32 seconds East (N 32°28'32" E), a distance of 502.06 feet; thence South 57 
degrees 31 minutes 28 seconds East (S 57°31*28" E), a distance of 10.00 feet; thence South 32 
degrees 28 minutes 32 seconds West (S 32028'32,, W), a distance of 502.14 feet to the TRUE 
POINT OF BEGINNING; and containing .115 acres, or 5021 square feet as described.. 
Prepared by: Dennis W. Johnson, PLS 
Professional Surveying Services 
PO Box 4506 
Grand Junction, CO 81502 
303-241-3841 
Jan. 21,1994 
to Purchase Agreement 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
FAUITA RP HOLDING, INC., a Delaware corporation (Grantor), 
whose address is 6500 Stapleton Drive South, Suite P204F/:^ Denver, 
Colorado 80216, for the consideration of Ten and No/100 Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable consldaration, In hand paid, 
hereby sella and quit claims to LANDMARK PETROLEUMI INC., a 
Delaware corporation (Grantee), whose address is 1493 Highway 6 6 
50, Fiuita, Colorado 81521, the following real property, in the 
County of tfesa and State of Colorado, to-wit: 
That certain easement for ingress and egress, 
described upon Exhibit A, attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by this reference, for the; 
benefit of Grantee, its successors and 
assigns, 
with .\11 its appurtenances and warrants the title against all 
persons claiming under it. 
Signed and delivered this day of February,| 1994. 
FRUTTA RP HOLDING, INC., a 
Delaware corporation 
By , 
KEITH HOLDER, President 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
\ gg. 
COUNTY OF MESA ) 
'.iThe foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 
day of February, 1994, by . , the j of 
FRUITA KP Holding, Inc., a Delaware corporation. 
Hy commission expires: . 
(SEAL) 
Notary Public 
Name naA Address of Person creating Newly Created Legal Description 
(38-35-106.S C.R.S.): Jeffrey C Fletcher, PLS, Professional 
Surveying Services, P.O. Bo* 4506, Grand Junction, Colorado 81502v 
EXHIBIT A 
INGRESS / EGRESS EASEMENT 
An Ingress / EgKtt easement over and across the following parcel of land situated in the NE 1/4 of 
Section 11, TOT nsbip 1 North, Range 3 West of the Ute Meridian, Mesa County, Colorado, 
being more part cularty described as Mows: 
Commencing at the Northeast comer of Section 11, Township 1 North, Range 3 West, from 
whence the Easi; 1/4 comer of Section 11 bears South 00 degrees 07 minutes 00 seconds East 
(S 00°0700" E) a distance of 2629.24 feet for a basis of bearings, wfth all bearings contained 
herein relative thereto; thence South 00 degrees 07 minutes 00 seconds East (S00°0T00' E) a 
distance of 872.57 feet along the East line of the Northeast quarter (NE1/4) of Section 11 to a 
point on the So ttherry right-of-way line of the Denver and Rio Grand Railway, and the TRUE 
POINT OF BEGINNING; thence South 00 degrees 07 minutes 00 seconds East (S0O>QTO0*E) a 
distance of 1080.56 feet; thence North 89 degrees S3 minutes 00 seconds West (N 89*5y00" W") 
a distance of 30.00 feet; thence Norm 00 degrees 07 minutes 00 seconds West (N 00°0T00" W) a 
distance of 1103.27 feet to a point on the Southerly right-of*way line of the Denver and Rio 
Grand Railway; thence South 56 degrees 41 minutes 00 seconds East (S S4°4HXr E) a distance 
of 35.95 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Containing 0.7^ acres as described. 
Prepared by Jeffrey C. Fletcher, PLS 
Professional Surveying Services 
PO Box 4506 
Grand Junction, CO 81502 
S03-241-3841 
Feb. 10,1994 
9391IngXGL 
to Purchase Agreement 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC., a Delaware Corporation (Grantor), 
whose address is 1493 Highway 6 & 50, Fruita, Colorado|81521, for 
the consideration of Ten and No/100 Dollars ($10.00) and other good 
and valuable consideration, in hand paid, hereby sells and conveys 
to LAhDMARK PETROLEUM, INC. a Delaware Corporation (Grantee), whose 
addrerss is 1493 Highway 6 & 50, Fruita, Colorado £1521, the 
following real property in the County of Mesa and! State of 
Colorado, to-wit: 
Vhat certain real property described upon Exhibit A, 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by this 
reference, 
also known as street and number 1493 Highway 6 & 50, Fruita, 
Colorado 81521, with all its appurtenances and warrants the title 
against all persons claiming under it. 
£>igned and delivered this day of February, 1994. 
GRANTOR: 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC., a 
Delaware corporation 
By , 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
COUNTY OF MESA ) 
Ihe foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this . 
day of February, 1994, by , the 
of Landmark Petroleum, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation. 
My commission expires: 
(SEAL) 
Notary Public 
Name and Address of Person Creating Newly Created Legal Description 
(38-35-106.5 C.R.S.): Dennis W. Johnson, PLS, Professional 
Surveying services, P.O. Box 4506, Grand Junction, CO £1502. 
EXHIBIT k 
PARCEL 2 OF TRACT A 
A parcel of land located in the SE1/4 of Section 2.; thc.NEl/4 of « H ^ S j r f ^ 
Township 1 North, Range 3 West of the the Meridian, Mesa County Cdlorado, being more 
particularly described as follows; 
Commencing at the Northeast comer of Section 11. Township 1 H J M ^ ^ J * * * J 
the East 1/4 corner of Section 11 bears S W W W B a distance * * M ^ * £ » ° £ 
bearings with aU bearings contained herein relative thereto; thence * 0 0 " O W B • . t o n e r f 
17251rfeei along the East line of the Northeast q u a r t e r ^ A ) of S«^cm M tea pomtonthe 
South** right-of-way line of the Denver and Rio Grand * ^ i ^ £ * i f " 2 L ! d 
minutes 00 seconds West (N SfiMlW W). a distance of 1473.79 feet plong -Id raihoad 
right-of-way; to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence South133I ctegrcca 53 minutes 32 
second* West (S 33*5332- W), a distance of 384.57 feet; thence Sou* 56 degrees 34 mm 02 
seconds East (S 56'34'02" E), a distance of 665.06 feet; thence South 33 degrees 49 minutes 38 
second; West (S 33«49*38' W). a distance of 472.87 feet; thence North 56 degrees 35 minutes 40 
seconds West (N 56'35W W), a distance of 258.17 feet; thence South 33 degrees 24 minutes 17 
second West (S 33*24'17" W), a distance of 115.46 feet; thence South 57 degrees 40 mmutes 48 
seconds East (S 57°40«48" E), a distance of 5107 feet; thence North 33 decrees 24 minutes 7 
second.* East (N 33°24'ir E), a distance of 90.58 feet; thence South 56 degrees 17 minutes 0 
seconds East (S 56<>1710" E), a distance of 414.12 feet; thence North 52 decrees 42 nnnutes 5 
seconds East (N 52°42'15" E). a distance of 81.06 feet; thence South 58 degrees 04 minutes O 
seconds East (S 58°04*100'' E), a dUtance of 261.08 feet; thence South 07 degrees 30 minutes 9 
second? West (S OTSO'W W), a distance of 94.49 feer. thence South 56 decrees 17 minutes 10 
seconds East (S 56M710* E), a distance of 418.13 feer. thence South31 decrees 19 nnnutes 33 
seconds West (S 3lQW33" W), a distance of 240.00 feet; thence South 58 dterees 50 minutes 11 
second* East (S 58*S0*ir E), a distance of 115.86 feet; thence North 33 decrees 42 minutes 50 
seconds East (N 33*42!S0* E). a distance of 234.64 feet; thence South 56 degrees 17 minutes 10 
seconds East (S 56M710- E), a distance of 289.73 feet; thence South 00 degrees 07 minutes 00 
seconds East (S 00°0700H E), a distance of 842.93 feet; thence South 70 degrees 59 minutes 23 
seconds West (S 70o59,23,, W), a distance of 383.97 feet; thence South 00 degrees 06 reunites 58 
second? East (S 00*06*5** E), a distance of 374.74 feet; thence North 89 degrees 53 minutes 00 
second* East (N 89°53'00" E), a distance of 363.28 feet; thence South 00 degrees 07 minutes 00 
seconds East (S 00*0700" E). a distance of 611.55 feet, thence South 44 degrees 02 minutes 01 
second i West (S 44'02'Or W). a distance of 564.53 feet to a point on the.Nonai bank of the 
Colorado River, thence the following 4 courses along the North bank of thej Colo^o River. (1) 
North *1 degrees 31 minutes 53 seconds West (N 61°3V53" W). a distance of 541.72 feet; 2 
North 35 degrees 19 minutes 06 seconds West (N 85«19'06" W), a distance of 6 5 61 feet; 3 
South r,9 degrees 33 minutes 17 seconds West (S 69-33'ir W), a distance of 1015.56 feet: (4) 
South 45 degrees 30 minutes 57 seconds Wert (S 45'30'57« W). adistane^ of 384.19 feet to a 
point on the Northerly right-of-way of Interstate 70, thence the Mowing 4.courses along the 
Northerly right-of-way of Interstate 70; (1) along a curve to the nght having a radius of 
11359 20 feet are length of 4261.46 feet, delta angle of 21 degrees 291 minutes 41 seconds 
(2r29'41") a chord bearing of North 51 degrees 44 minutes 01 seconds West (N S W O T W), 
and a chord length of 4236.51 feet; (2) North 40 degrees 59 minutes \0 seconds West (N 
40o59,10,, W), a distance of 400.50 feet; (3) North 32 degrees 26 minutes 20^  seconds West (N 
32°26'20" W), a distance of 309.30 feet; (4) along a curve to the left having a; radius of 3969.70 
feet, arc length of 130.3J-feet, delta angle of 1 degree 52 minutes 51 seconds (l°5T$\"X a chord 
bearing of North 44 degjces 10 minutes 50 seconds West (N 44*10,50" W), and a chord length of 
130.30 feet; thence leaving said right-of-way North 00 degrees 50 minutes 33 seconds West 
(N OO°£0'33" W), a distance of 644.86 feet; thence North 89 degrees 09 minutes 42 seconds East 
(N 89°(i?'42" E). a distance of 22.71 feet; thence South 32 degrees 55 minutes 25 seconds East 
(S 3205.5*25" E), a distance of 264.97 feet; thence South 11 degrees 48 minutes 58 seconds West 
(S 11*4:3*58" W), a distance of 270.91 feet; thence South 48 degrees 11 minutes 15 seconds East 
(S 48°1 ri5" EX a distance of 859.15 feet; thence South 41 degrees 40 minutes 17 seconds East 
(S 41°40'17" EX a distance of 148.14 feet; thence South 20 degrees 12 minutb 02 seconds East 
(S 20°1?02N EX a distance of 434.73 feet; thenoe South 31 degrees 42 minutes 25 seconds East 
(S 31e42l25n E), a distance of 203.83 feet; thence South 63 degrees 51 minutes 48 seconds East 
(S 63°51'48" EX a distance of 484.33 feet; thence South 86 degrees 31 minutes 14 seconds East 
(S 8C°3 I'M" EX a distance of 158.42 feet; thence North 41 degrees 43 minutes 28 seconds East 
(N 41^3-28" E), a distance of 62.52 feet; thence South 89 degrees 56 minutes 00 seconds East 
(S 89°56'00" EX a distance of 767.57 feet; thence South 01 degrees 13 minutes 31 seconds East 
(S 01°U'3r E), a distance of 58.91 feet; thence South 89 degrees 34 minutes 20 seconds East 
(S 89*31*20" E), a distance of 1003.06 feet; thence North 09 degrees 38 minutb 43 seconds West 
(N 09°38,43N W), a distance of 249.49 feet; thence North 39 degrees 13 minutb 56 seconds West 
(N 39°13'56n W)t a distance of 131.38 feet; thence North 59 degrees 12 minutes 29 seconds West 
(N 59°12*29" W), a distance of 125.97 feet; thence North 00 degrees 34 minutes 39 seconds East 
(N 00°J439" E), a distance of 318.00 feet; thence North 09 degrees 38 minutes 07 seconds East 
(N 09°:8,07" E), a distance of 551.22 feet; thence North 69 degrees 50 minutes 17 seconds East 
(N 69o30'17' E), a distance of 307.09 feet; thence South 56 degrees 47 minutes 45 seconds East 
(S 5&4T4S* E), a distance of 612.77 feet; thence South 32 degrees 13 minutes 29 seconds West 
(S 32°1379" W), a distance of 178.70 feet; thence South 56 degrees 44 minutes 51 seconds East 
(S 56*44'5r E), a distance of 66.38 feet; thence South 28 degrees 52 minutes 33 seconds West 
(S 28°52'33* W), a distance of 433.57 feet; thence South 68 degrees 32 minutes 14 seconds East 
(S 68°32'14N E), a distance of 737.09 feet; thence South 61 degrees 16 minutes 50 seconds East 
(S 6l°16,50M E), a distance of 299.30 feet; thence North 31 degrees 46 minutb 50 seconds East 
(N 31«46'50" EX a distance of 101.53 feet; thence North 58 degrees 27 minutes 39 seconds West 
(N 58°::7t39M W), a distance of 298 J1 feet; thence North 01 degrees 32 minutb 36 seconds West 
(N 01 °r-2*36" W), a distance of 218.60 feet; thence North 32 degrees 56 minutes 45 seconds East 
(N 32°.<i6'45N EX a distance of 345.01 feet; thence North 56 degrees 22 minutes 59 seconds West 
(N 56*7X39* W), a distance of 698.15 feet; thence North 22 degrees 46 minutb 44 seconds West 
(N 22°<!6'44" W), a distance of 31110 feet; thence North 33 degrees 18 minutes 45 seconds East 
(N 33*18'45N E), a distance of 296.66 feet; thence North 56 degrees 35 minutes 17 seconds West 
(N 56e;5117w W), a distance of 214.74 feet; thence South 32 degrees 28 minutb 42 seconds West 
(S 32e28'42* W), a distance of 631.90 feet; thence North 47 degrees 11 minutb 13 seconds West 
(N 47°1 1*13" W), a distance of 209.61 feet; thence North 42 degrees 34 minutes 43 seconds East 
(N 42°.':4'43" EX a distance of 544.55 feet; thence North 29 degrees 35 minutb 16 seconds West 
(N 29°: 5'16" WX a distance of 298.77 feet: thence North 34 degrees 27 minutes 49 seconds East 
(N 34°:L7,49N E), a distance of 271.33 feet; thence South 59 degrees 05 minutes 40 seconds East 
(S 59°C5'40n E), a distance of 298.49 feet; thence North 32 degrees 06 minutes 52 seconds East 
(N 32W52" E), a distance of 166.80 feet; thence South 44 degrees 31 minutes 02 seconds East 
S 44*31'Or E). a distance of 218.40 feet; thence North 33 degrees 33 minutes 41 *&™*£* 
(N 33°3 VAX' E), a distance of 45.53 feet; thence North 57 degrees 02 minutes 42 seconds West 
(N 57W42" W), a distance of 131.96 feet; thence North 33..degrees 33 minutes 52 seconds East 
(N 33"3.3'52" E), a distance of 68.49 feet; thence South 60 degrees 44 minutes 32 seconds bast 
(S 60°44'32":E), a distance of 33.52 feet; thence North 33 degrees 29. minutes 45 seconds East 
(N 33°29'45" E), a distance of 86.70 feet; thence South 56 degrees 35 minutes 23 seconds East 
(S SCnm* E). a distance of 131.91 feet; thence North 33 degrees 04 minutes 32 seconds East 
(N 33*0432" EX a distance of 21.50 feet; thence North 56 degrees 55 minutes 28 seconds West 
(N 56*5 5'28" W), a distance of 31.33 feet; thence North 33 degrees 43 minutes 06 seconds East 
(N 33«4 3*06" E), a distance of 36.91 feet; thence South 56 degrees 25 minutes 59 seconds East 
(S 56*25'59" E), a distance of 101.55 feet; thence South 33 degrees 01 mimrtes 00 seconds West 
(S 33°0r00" W), a distance of 13.57 feet; thence South 57 degrees 02 minutes 09 seconds East 
(S STOVOr EX a distance of 34.90 feet; thence South 32 degrees 57 nrinutes 51 seconds West 
(S 32°57'5r W), a distance of 4.35 feet; thence South 56 degrees 29 ininutes 07 seconds East 
(S 561W7" E), a distance of 111.95 feet; thence North 33 degrees 22 minutes 49 seconds East 
(N 33022,49" EX a distance of 41.69 feet; thence North 56 degrees 58 minutes 03 seconds West 
(N 56°58'03" W). a distance of 65.92 feet; thence North 32 degrees 32 minutes 02 seconds East 
(N 32»3r02w E), a distance of 65.75 feet; thence North 56 degrees 58 minutes 09 seconds west 
(N 56°58'09- W), a distance of 89.51 feet; thence North 32 degrees 22 minuses 45 seconds East 
(N 32a22'45M E), a distance of 35.88 feet; thence South 57 degrees 07 minutes 02 seconds East 
(S 57»0 r02" EX a distance of 76.98 feet; thence North 43 degrees 10 minutes 35 seconds East 
(N 43°10»35" E), a distance of 14244 feet; thence North 55 degrees 25 nrimites 58 seconds East 
CN 55»25»58" E), a distance of 33.39 feet; thence North 33 degrees 18 nrinutes 50 seconds East 
(N33M8'50" EX a distance of 106.81 feet; thence North 56 degrees 36 nrinutes 08 seconds west 
(N 56*36*08" W), a distance of 88.73 feet; thence North 32 degrees 34 minutes 45 seconds East 
(N 32024*45" EX a distance of 15248 feet to the Southerly right-of-way lin^ of the.Denver and 
Rio Grind Railroad: thence South 56 degrees 41 minutes 00 seconds Easj (S 56 4100 E a 
distance: of 348.21 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. Said parcel, containing 280.186 
acres as described. 
Said parcel being subject to easements and right-of-ways of record as recorded in the Mesa 
County Cleric and Recorder's Office. 
Prepared by: Dennis W. Johnson, PLS 
Professional Surveying Services 
PO Box 4506 
Grand Junction, CO 81502 
303-241-3841 
Jan. 27,1994 
Exhibit D 
to Asset Purchase Agreement 
ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS 
THIS ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS (this "Assignment"), 
dated as of February 28, 1994, between Landmark Petroleum, 
Inc., a Delaware corporation ("Assignor"). and Wescourt 
Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation ("Assignee"). 
RECITALS 
A. Assignor owns an oil refinery located at 1493 
Highway 6 & 50, Fruita, Colorado, and comprised of certain 
real property, fixtures, personal property and other assets 
(collectively, the "Assets"). 
B. Assignor is a party to the agreements 
described on attached Schedule 1 (the "Assigned Agreements") 
with respect to certain of the Assets. 
C. Assignor has agreed to sell to Assignee and 
Assignee has agreed to purchase from Assignor a portion of 
the Assets on the terms and subject to the conditions set 
forth in that certain Asset Purchase Agreement dated the 
date hereof between Assignor and Assignee (the "Asset 
Purchase Agreement"). 
D. Pursuant to the terms of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement, Assignee has agreed to execute and deliver this 
Assignment evidencing the assignment and assumption of 
certain rights and obligations under the Assigned 
Agreements. 
AGREEMENT 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing 
premises, and for other good and valuable consideration, 
Assignor and Assignee hereby agree as follows: 
1. Assignment. Effective as of the date hereof 
and subject to the terms and conditions of the Asset 
Purchase Agreement, Assignor does hereby sell, transfer, 
assign, convey and deliver to Assignee all of Assignor's 
right, title and interest in and to each Assigned Agreement 
as and to the extent, but only to the extent, that such 
Assigned Agreement relates to the Transferred Assets. 
2. Acceptance and Assumption. Effective as of 
the date hereof and subject to the terms and conditions of 
the Asset Purchase Agreement, Assignee hereby accepts the 
1 
assignment set forth in Section 1 hereof and agrees to 
assume, perform, and discharge all of the liabilities, 
obligations and duties of Assignor, if any, under each 
Assigned Agreement as and to the extent such Assigned 
Agreement relates to the Transferred Assets, but only to the 
extent such liabilities, obligations and duties arise after 
the date hereof. 
3. No Amendment. This Assignment shall not 
alter, modify or amend the terms of any Assigned Agreement 
in any respect, nor shall it subject the Assignee or any 
other party to any Assigned Agreement to any greater 
liabilities, obligations or duties in connection therewith 
than would have been enforceable against the Assignor or 
such party if the assignment and assumption described herein 
had never occurred. 
4. Binding Effect. This Assignment shall be 
binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto 
and their respective successors and assigns. 
5. Governing Law. This Assignment will be 
governed by and construed and enforced in accordance with 
the laws of the State of New York. 
6. Conflicts. To the extent there is a conflict 
between the terms and provisions of this Assignment and the 
Asset Purchase Agreement, the terms and provisions of the 
Asset Purchase Agreement will govern. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have duly 
executed this Assignment as of the date first above written. 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC., 
a Delaware Corporation 
By: 
Richard Means, 
Vice President 
WESCOURT GROUP, INC., 
a Delaware Corporation 
By: 
Keith R. Holder, 
President 
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MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is entered 
into as of February 28, 1994, between FRUITA MARKETING & 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Delaware corporation ("Wescourt"), and 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC., a Delaware corporation 
("Landmark"). 
RECITALS 
A. Landmark owns an oil refinery located at 1493 
Highway 6 & 50, Fruita, Colorado, and comprised of certain 
real property, fixtures, personal property and other assets 
(collectively, the "Refinery Assets"). 
B. Simultaneously herewith, Landmark and Wescourt 
Group, Inc. ("Purchaser") are entering into an Asset 
Purchase Agreement pursuant to which Purchaser is acquiring 
from Landmark the portion of the Refinery Assets 
constituting the refinery's offices, laboratories, 
maintenance building, parking facilities, rail sidings, 
loading/unloading docks, storage tanks and truck and loading 
racks, all as more fully described in the Asset Purchase 
Agreement (the "Transferred Assets"). 
C. Simultaneously herewith, Landmark and Wescourt 
are entering into a Marketing Agreement (the "Marketing 
Agreement") pursuant to which Wescourt will act as 
Landmark's exclusive representative for the marketing and 
sale to third parties, in one or more sales ("Sales"), of 
all Refinery Assets other than the Transferred Assets (such 
other Refinery Assets, the "Assets"). 
D. In order to facilitate the Sales: 
(1) prior to the date hereof, Landmark has 
prepared the Assets for sale by terminating all operations 
at the refinery and storing the Assets in accordance with 
industry practice, in each case in compliance with 
applicable legal requirements; and 
(2) Landmark wishes to provide for the 
management of the Assets pending the Sales on the terms and 
conditions described herein. 
E. Capitalized terms used in this Agreement 
without definition have the respective meanings set forth in 
the Marketing Agreement. 
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AGREEMENT 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing 
premises, and for other good and valuable consideration, 
Landmark and Wescourt hereby agree as follows: 
1. Appointment of Wescourt. 
1.1 Scope of Appointment. Landmark hereby 
appoints Wescourt as manager of the Assets with the 
responsibility for (1) overseeing the on-site maintenance 
and servicing of the Assets by Landmark's employees pending 
the Sales, (2) overseeing such steps as Wescourt may deem 
necessary or appropriate to facilitate the Sales, including, 
without limitation, to segregate Assets in preparation for 
Sales, (3) maintaining in effect existing permits for the 
Assets to the extent consistent with, and in the judgement 
of Wescourt helpful in facilitating, the Sales, and 
(4) providing the other services described on attached 
Exhibit A (collectively, the "Management Services"). 
Landmark and Wescourt expressly acknowledge and agree that 
the Management Services shall in no event be construed to 
include any obligation on the part of Wescourt to operate 
the Assets or any portion thereof. 
1.2 Specific Duties of Wescourt. Without limiting 
the foregoing/ the Management Services shall include the 
following specific duties: 
(a) Repairs and Maintenance. Wescourt shall 
make, or cause to be made, all repairs and shall perform, or 
cause to be performed, all maintenance on the buildings, 
equipment, appurtenances and grounds constituting the Assets 
in accordance with industry standards for maintenance of a 
decommissioned refinery facility. Wescourt shall arrange 
for periodic inspections of the Assets in accordance with 
industry practice in the area in which the Assets are 
located; 
(b) Equipment and Supplies. Wescourt shall 
make all arrangements for the furnishing to the Assets of 
utility, maintenance and other services and for the 
acquisition of such equipment and supplies as may be 
necessary for the maintenance and servicing of the Assets, 
in their decommissioned state, pending the Sales; 
(c) Personnel. Wescourt shall employ as 
employees of Wescourt or other Wescourt Persons, such 
personnel as Wescourt may reasonably deem necessary for the 
performance of its obligations hereunder; 
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(d) Insurance. Wescourt shall cause to be 
kept in force and effect the forms of insurance currently in 
effect with respect to the Assets, subject to such 
modifications as may reasonably required by Landmark (or 
reasonably decided upon by Wescourt with Landmark's consent 
in the absence of Landmark's express instructions), 
including, without limitation, officer's and director's 
insurance, public liability insurance, fire and extended 
coverage insurance, and burglary and theft insurance. 
Wescourt shall promptly investigate and make a timely 
written report to Landmark as to all accidents and claims of 
which Wescourt has knowledge relating to the ownership and 
maintenance of the Assets, or any damage or destruction to 
the Assets, and shall prepare any and all reports required 
by any insurance company in connection therewith. Wescourt 
shall have no right to settle, compromise or otherwise 
dispose of any claims, demands or liabilities, whether or 
not covered by insurance, without prior written consent of 
Landmark; 
(e) Notices. Wescourt shall deliver 
forthwith to Landmark copies of all material written notices 
received by Wescourt from any governmental or official 
entity with respect to the Assets; and 
(f) Wescourt shall provide the services 
described on attached Exhibit A. 
1.3 Management of the Assets. Wescourt shall 
devote reasonable commercial efforts to the management of 
the Assets, and shall perform its duties hereunder in a 
accordance with industry standards. 
1.4 Use and Maintenance of the Assets. Landmark 
and Wescourt each agrees not to permit the use of the Assets 
for any purpose or in any manner that might void any policy 
of insurance with respect to the Assets or that would be in 
violation of any applicable law or governmental regulation. 
2. Records, Reports. 
2.1 Financial Records. Wescourt shall maintain a 
comprehensive system of office records, books and accounts, 
all of which shall belong to Landmark. Landmark and others 
designated by Landmark shall have access to such records, 
accounts and books upon reasonable notice during regular 
business hours. 
2.2 Reports. Wescourt shall furnish to Landmark, 
within thirty (30) days after the end of each of Wescourt's 
fiscal quarters, a report describing the activities of 
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Wescourt hereunder during the then-ended quarter and any 
material change in the condition of the Assets, 
3. Compensation for Management Services. Wescourt 
shall be entitled to receive out of the proceeds of any 
Sales, reimbursement for its actual costs in performing the 
Management Services hereunder. Any payments made pursuant 
to the terms hereof shall be Sales Expenses under the 
Marketing Agreement and shall be reimburseable to Wescourt 
as provided therein. 
4. Term and Termination. 
4.1 Term. This Agreement shall commence on the 
date hereof and, subject to Section 4.2, continue in effect 
for a period of five (5) years (the "Term"). 
4.2 Termination. 
(a) By Landmark. If Wescourt defaults in the 
performance of any of its material obligations hereunder, 
Landmark may give written notice to Wescourt thereof. If 
such default is not corrected or otherwise addressed by 
Wescourt to Landmark's reasonable satisfaction within 
sixty (60) days after Wescourt's receipt of such notice, 
then Landmark may terminate this Agreement upon thirty (30) 
days prior written notice to Wescourt. 
(b) By Wescourt. Wescourt may, at any time 
during the Term, terminate this Agreement immediately upon 
written notice to Landmark if Landmark defaults in its 
material obligations to Wescourt hereunder or if Wescourt 
concludes that its continued performance of the Management 
Services, including its performance of any tasks 
specifically requested by Landmark hereunder, could 
reasonably be expected to result in material liabilities to 
Wescourt. 
5. Landmark's Approval. Whenever Landmark's approval 
or consent is required pursuant to this Agreement with 
respect to a matter concerning the management of the Assets 
by Wescourt, such approval or consent shall be deemed 
granted unless Landmark notifies Wescourt, within ten (10) 
business days following receipt by Landmark of Wescourt's 
written request for such approval or consent, that Landmark 
is withholding its approval or consent. 
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6. Indemnification. 
6-1 Landmark's Indemnity. Landmark shall protect, 
indemnify and hold harmless each Wescourt Person from and 
against any and all liabilities, obligations, losses, 
damages, penalties, actions, judgments, suits, costs, and 
expenses of any kind whatsoever (collectively, "Losses") 
which may at any time be imposed on, incurred by or asserted 
against any Wescourt Person resulting from the performance 
of the Management Services by Wescourt or any act or 
omission which Wescourt is required or instructed to do 
hereunder, except to the extent arising out of such Wescourt 
Person's gross negligence or willful misconduct. 
6.2 Wescourt's Indemnity. Wescourt shall protect, 
indemnify and hold harmless Landmark, its officers, 
employees and agents from and against any and all Losses 
which may at any time be imposed on, incurred by or asserted 
against any such person as a result of (i) any breach or 
default by Wescourt hereunder or (ii) the gross negligence 
or willful misconduct of Wescourt. 
6.3 Limitation of Liability. NOT WITHSTANDING ANY 
OTHER PROVISION HEREOF, IN NO EVENT SHALL ANY WESCOURT 
PERSON BE LIABLE TO ANY PARTY FOR ANY CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 
(MEANING DAMAGES THAT DO NOT ARISE OUT OF THE SUBJECT 
TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES HERETO OR CHASE BUT DAMAGES 
THAT ARISE OUT OF THE DEALINGS BETWEEN LANDMARK OR CHASE AND 
A THIRD-PARTY), INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, ARISING OUT 
OF THE SALE OF THE ASSETS, WHETHER UNDER A THEORY OF 
CONTRACT, TORT, INDEMNITY, OR OTHERWISE; OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
OF ANY KIND. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE TOTAL LIABILITY OF ALL 
WESCOURT PERSONS HEREUNDER EXCEED THE TOTAL COMMISSIONS PAID 
TO WESCOURT HEREUNDER, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SAME 
RESULTS FROM THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR WILLFUL MISCONDUCT OF 
WESCOURT. 
7. No Agency. Wescourt shall be responsible for all 
of its employees and employees of any affiliate, the 
supervision of all persons performing services in connection 
with the performance of all of Wescourt's obligations 
relating to the maintenance and operation of the Assets, and 
for determining the manner and time of performance of all 
acts hereunder. Nothing herein contained shall be construed 
to establish Wescourt as agent of Landmark. 
8. Assignment. Wescourt may not assign this Agreement 
without the prior written approval of Landmark, which 
approval may be withheld by Landmark in its sole discretion. 
This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the 
benefit of the parties hereto and their respective 
successors and assigns. 
5 
9. Communications. All notices, requests, demands and 
other communications under this Agreement shall be in 
writing and shall be deemed to have been given (a) when 
delivered personally, or (b) 48 hours after being sent by 
facsimile with duplicate sent by courier service. Such 
communications shall be directed as follows: 
To Landmark at; 
Landmark Petroleum 
1493 Highway 6 & 50 
Fruita, Colorado 81521 
Att'n: Mr. Richard Means 
Fax: (303) 858-9194 
with copies to: 
The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 
One Chase Manhattan Plaza 
Tenth Floor 
New York, New York 10081 
Att'n: Mr. Stanley M. Guralnick 
Fax: (212) 422-6249 
To Wescourt at: 
Fruita Marketing & Management, Inc. 
c/o Wescourt Group, Inc. 
2401 River Road 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81505 
Att'n: Keith Holder 
Fax: (303) 241-5319 
Any party may change its address for purposes of this 
Section 9 by giving the other party notice of the new 
address in the manner set forth above. 
10. Captions and Headings. The captions contained 
herein are for convenience and reference only and shall not 
affect the meaning, scope, intent, or interpretation of this 
Agreement or its provisions. 
11. Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the 
entire agreement between the parties with respect to its 
subject matter and supersedes all prior agreements and 
understandings, written and oral with respect thereto. No 
prior draft of this Agreement nor any parole evidence shall 
be admissible to prove the meaning or intent of any 
provision of this Agreement. 
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12. Amendment or Modification. This Agreement may only 
be amended, modified or supplemented by a written instrument 
specifically referring to this Agreement and signed by 
Landmark and Wescourt. 
13. Governing Law. This Agreement will be governed by, 
and construed and enforced in accordance with, the laws of 
the State of New York. 
14. Severability. Any provision of this Agreement 
which is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction 
will, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent 
of such prohibition or unenforceability without invalidating 
the remaining provisions of this Agreement or affecting the 
validity or enforceability of any such provision in any 
other jurisdiction, unless such prohibition or 
unenforceability frustrates the overall objective of this 
Agreement. 
15. Counterparts. This Agreement will be executed in 
counterparts, and the several counterparts shall constitute 
one executed Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have executed 
this Agreement on the date first written above. 
FRUITA MARKETING & MANAGEMENT, INC. , 
a Delaware corporation 
By; ^ ^ ^ ^
 (
^d£Z^Z^^~ 
JCciith R. Holder- President 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC. 
a Delaware corporation 
By: 
Richard Means, Vice President 
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12. Amendment or Modification. This Agreement may only 
be amended, modified or supplemented by a written instrument 
specifically referring to this Agreement and signed by 
Landmark and Wescourt. 
13. Governing Law. This Agreement will be governed by, 
and construed and enforced in accordance with, the laws of 
the State of New York. 
14. Severability. Any provision of this Agreement 
which is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction 
will, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent 
of such prohibition or unenforceability without invalidating 
the remaining provisions of this Agreement or affecting the 
validity or enforceability of any such provision in any 
other jurisdiction, unless such prohibition or 
unenforceability frustrates the overall objective of this 
Agreement. 
15. Counterparts. This Agreement will be executed in 
counterparts, and the several counterparts shall constitute 
one executed Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have executed 
this Agreement on the date first written above. 
FRUITA MARKETING & MANAGEMENT, INC. , 
a Delaware corporation 
By: 
Keith R. Holder, President 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC. 
a Delaware corporation 
Richard Means, Vice President 
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Exhibit A 
to Management Agreement 
Additional Services 
1. Wescourt shall perform all day-to-day 
accounting functions of Landmark relating to the ownership 
of the Assets including the preparation and timely filing of 
all tax returns and employment filings. At Landmark's 
request from time to time, Wescourt shall promptly deliver 
evidence of such filings to Landmark. 
2. Wescourt shall be responsible for paying on 
behalf of Landmark, from and to the extent of Sales 
Proceeds, all costs relating to the operation of the Assets 
including, without limitation, the payment of employee wages 
(including, during the first two years of the term hereof, 
the payment of $5,000.00 per calendar quarter to the 
individual appointed to the position of vice president for 
Landmark) ad valorem taxes, all other taxes and benefits 
incurred with respect to the Assets, insurance, and all 
other day-to-day expenses charged to Landmark and related to 
the ownership of the Assets. Such day-to-day expenses shall 
include reimbursement of Landmark for reasonable attorneys' 
fees incurred by Landmark in connection with (i) Landmark's 
continued compliance with the terms of the Management 
Agreement, Marketing Agreement and the Asset Purchase 
Agreement and (ii) the maintenance of the corporate 
existence of Landmark, including the preparation of 
documentation for annual meetings and other customary and 
necessary actions. 
3. Wescourt shall use all reasonable efforts to 
ensure that Landmark complies fully with all federal, state 
and municipal laws, ordinances, regulations and orders 
relative to the Assets and shall prepare and file all 
regulatory filings required to be filed by Landmark to 
maintain permits required for the ownership (in a 
decommissioned state) and sale of the Assets. 
1 it was L.B. Consultants who were the owners of 
2 Landmark, and then they brought in other people 
3 did they? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Who did they bring in? 
6 A. There was quite a few people 
7 involved. As a matter of fact, the people that 
8 went to work at the refinery, they could buy 
9 shares at 5,000 in $8 increments and be a 
10 shareholder in the company. 
11 The three biggest ones were -- well, 
12 I can't remember his name offhand, but he used 
13 to own a chemical company and Chase Manhattan. 
14 I did have those papers that showed all that, 
15 but --
16 Q. Do those papers exist somewhere? 
17 A, Yes. 
18 Q. Where is the location of those 
19 papers? 
20 A. I think I have a copy of them. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. Gordon Smith, that's who the other 
23 one was. 
24 Q. Okay. And where is Gordon Smith? 
25 A. Somewhere in -- I think he's in 
Joppa H. Smith 
RUSK Sc RUSK COURT REPORTERS 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81502 
970-242-3074 
1 there. 
2 THE WITNESS: Oh, okay. 
3 A. Originally I was to stay as a 
4 Landmark employee. Wescourt said they didn't 
5 want to keep me that way because they had to keep 
6 two payrolls, and it was an extra expense, so 
7 Chase Manhattan agreed to put me on the Wescourt 
8 payroll, because Chase was actually paying my 
9 wages. Wescourt was paying my wages, but Chase 
10 was reimbursing Wescourt for my expenses, for my 
11 salary. 
12 Q. Okay. Let's stop there for a minute 
13 and we'll get back into that. 
14 I need just a few names. Who at 
15 Chase Manhattan was the responsible party for 
16 this transaction? 
17 A. At that time it was Charlie, and I 
18 can't think of his last name, but I can find it 
19 in the records probably. 
2 0 Q. Okay. 
21 A. The last person that I talked to was 
22 Nat Worsterstein, he was representing --
23 Q. Could you spell that? 
24 A. Oh, boy. 
25 Q. Nat, N-a-t, I'll help you on that 
Joppa H. Smith 
RUSK Sc RUSK COURT REPORTERS 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81502 
970-242-3074 
1 it to you. 
2 Q. Great. Now, when you said at that 
3 time, are you talking about February of '95? 
4 A. That was in March of '94 that they 
5 decided to do that. 
6 Q. Okay. Now, when you say Chase 
7 Manhattan, you mean the bank? 
8 A. Yes, Chase Manhattan of New York 
9 City. 
10 Q. Okay. What was Chase Manhattan's 
11 relationship to Landmark and to Wescourt? 
12 A. To Landmark Petroleum, they loaned 
13 money to Landmark to run the refinery. They 
14 also owned about 12 percent of the shares in 
15 Landmark. 
16 Q. Okay. How about Wescourt, what was 
17 their relation to Wescourt? 
18 A. They were just -- we were getting the 
19 contract with Wescourt to manage all of the 
20 Landmark assets. 
21 Q. who is we? 
22 A. Landmark and Chase Manhattan. 
23 Q. And were you doing that in February 
24 of 1995? 
25 A. No, that was already done, we started 
Joppa H. Smith 
RUSK & RUSK COURT REPORTERS 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81502 
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1 that -- actually, we started negotiating that in 
2 January of ' 94 . 
3 Q. In February of 1995 had that been 
4 implemented? 
5 A. Yes, it had. 
6 Q. To where you were managing Wescourt's 
7 assets on behalf of Chase? 
8 A. No, I was not managing anything 
9 on - -
10 Q. This whole thing is confusing. 
11 A. Yes, it is. 
12 Q. And I'm trying to get a handle on it, 
13 okay. 
14 A. What I was doing, I was maintaining 
15 the Landmark assets for Wescourt and Chase 
16 Manhattan, to keep them in a sellable condition, 
17 and also to clean up and do environmental work 
18 and do mothballing to -- clean the tanks so they 
19 would be sellable, clean all the oil, get all the 
20 oil pumped out, get the tanks cleaned, get the 
21 units cleaned, so that they would be safe to work 
22 on and sell. 
23 Q. Whose product was in the Joe Mecham 
24 tank in January of 1995? 
25 A. Well, there was a contract, which I 
Joppa H. Smith 
RUSK Sc RUSK COURT REPORTERS 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81502 
970-242-3074 
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DISTRICT COL'R-
JUL ! i 20C0 
JOAi\i\ejvict)>t't CLERK 
;3V rr^Tf ,. DEPUTY 
BARBARA L. MAW #40S1 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorney for Defendant 
Chase Manhattan 
185 South State Street, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-9700 
Fax: rSOn 533-8111 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
-IN-AND-FORrUINTAH- COUNTYTSTSTFOFDTAH" 
JOSEPH MECHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BAND-IT IDEX, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, LANDMARK PETROLEUM, 
INC., a Delaware corporation, 
WESTCOURT MANAGEMENT, INC., a 
Colorado corporation, PORTFIELD 
INVESTMENTS, INC., a Colorado 
corporation, FRUlTA MARKETING & 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, CONSOLIDATED OIL & 
GAS, a Colorado corporation, LARR'S, 
INC., a Wyoming corporation, CHASE 
MANHATTAN BANK, a New York 
corporation, and JOHN DOES 1 through 9, 
ORDER 
Civil No. 960800543 
Judge A. Lynn Payne 
Defendants. 
Defendant, Chase Manhattan Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the 
Honorable Judge Lynn Payne on April 11, 2000, Barbara L. Maw appearing on behalf of Chase 
Manhattan Bank and Wayne Freestone and David Cundick appearing on behalf of plaintiff, 
Joseph Mecham. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Memorandum in 
Support thereof, plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Motion and Memorandum. Oral 
argument was requested and heard. After having read the briefs of counsel, having heard oral 
arguTnFnrarTd"b^lng"fully¥dvised in the premises, the Court finds as follows: 
A. Plaintiff conceded on the following issues. 
1. Chase Manhatten Bank ("Chase") is not an employer or independent 
contractor, so there is no issue in this regard and summary judgment is granted as to this issue in 
favor of Chase. 
2. There is no basis to pierce the corporate veil. As to this issue, summary 
judgment is granted in favor of Chase 
3. No liability arises against defendant Chase Manhattan Bank based upon any 
ownership of stock. As to this issue, summary judgment is granted in favor of Chase. 
4. Plaintiff acknowledges Chase does not have possession of the property, and 
as such incurs no direct liability as a possessor. As to this issue, summary judgment is granted in 
favor of Chase 
? 
B. As to the remaining allegations in which plaintiff claims that Chase Manhatten 
Bank and Landmark Petroleum, Inc., has a principal/agency relationship, the Court finds as 
follows. 
1. Chase did not have veto power over the sale of the asserts, rather Chase had 
the power to agree or disagree. If they disagreed over the sale of an asset, the contract provided 
that the average of the previous two months expenses were used. 
7Z7 Chase exercised some control over the sale of the assets. It did so because of 
its position as a Henliolder, not because of any principal/agency relationship. The Court found 
that a henliolder has a legitimate interest in approving sales of secured assets, otherwise assets 
would just disappear. 
3. The Court acknowledged that Means continued to be employed by Landmark 
Petroleum, Inc., at the insistence of Chase. However, the Court noted that Means' wages came 
out of the approved monthly expenses. Because the wages came from the approved monthly 
expenses, the Court held that this does not establish a principal/agency relationship. 
4. The Court found no allegation or evidence that Chase took part in any 
management of the company or had any input as to how the sale of assets was performed. 
5. The Court determined that having Means onsight to oversee the sale did not 
establish an agency relationship unless Chase exercised some actual control. The Court found 
that Chase did not exert any actual control. 
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6. The Court found that Chase is not a principal of Landmark Petroleum, Inc.. 
The Court determined that Chase acted as a secured party and held that Chase was entitled to 
take steps to secure its interest in the property and to maintain control over it. The Court did not 
find anything unusual about Chase's position in this regard and found that it acted as a 
reasonable secured party under the circumstances. 
7. The Court reasoned that a creditor should not be required to release its 
security interest as the result of a sale unless the amount is appropriate. Otherwise, fraud can be 
perpetrated on the secured party by selling the assets for a nominal amount. For this reason, the 
Court determined that the actions of Chase were appropriate and it did not exceed its position as 
a leinholder. 
8. Lastly, the Court held there was a strong public policy interest in allowing a 
secured party to take reasonable steps to ascertain the value of its security interests and also be 
involved in how those assets are disposed of. In this regard, the Court found there was nothing 
Chase did to cross the line and become other than a secured creditor. 
Based on the above findings, the Court held no principle/agency relationship was 
established between Chase and any other entity or individual and granted Summary Judgment in 
favor of Defendant Chase Manhattan Bank. 
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I 3*4-DATED this 7 davof Jane, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
EA.LYNTs HONORABLE  LYNN PAYNE 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
PARKER, FREESTONE & ANGERHOFER, P.C 
Wayne A. Freeston 
David C. Cundick 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
I hereby certify that on the 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
( /^Kday of 4i jj .l/yxJLS , 2000, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff: 
Wayne A. Freestone 
David C. Cundick 
PARKER. FREESTONE & ANGERHOFER, P.C. 
50 West 300 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant Fmita Marketing & Mst.. Inc.: 
Kevin D. Swenson 
STRONG & HANNT 
Nine Exchange Place 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
o 
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CLARK B ALLRED— 0055 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
McKEACKNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C. 
121 West Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (435)789-4908 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 
CONSOLIDATED OIL £ TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH MECHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BAND-IT IDEX, INC., a Delaware, 
Corporation, SEAL FAST INC., 
a Texas Corporation, KEYWAY 
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Texas ] 
Corporation, MORCON SPECIALTY 
INC., A Utah corporation, RED MAN , 
PIPE & SUPPLY, an Oklahoma ; 
corporation, LANDMARK PETROLEUM, 
INC., a Delaware corporation, ; 
WESTCOURT MANAGEMENT, INC., a ) 
Colorado corporation, PORTFIELD , 
corporation, FRUITA MARKETING & 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Delaware ) 
corporation, CONSOLIDATED OIL & ) 
GAS, a Colorado corporation, J 
LARR's, INC., a Wyoming ) 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, a New York ] 
corporation, THE FIRESTONE TIRE & ) 
RUBBER COMPANY, and JOHN DOES 1 ) 
through 9, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) ORDER 
Civil No. 960800543 
Judge A. ,Lynn Payne 
sr 
The above captioned matter came before the Court pursuant to 
Consolidated Oil & Transportation Company, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss 
for Lack of Jurisdiction. Consolidated Oil & Transportation 
Company, Inc. was represented by its attorneys Clark B Allred and 
Clark A. McClellan. The Plaintiff was represented by his attorneys 
Wayne Freestone and David Cundick. Consolidated Oil & 
Transportation Company, Inc. is the correct name for the Defendant 
identified in the Complaint as Consolidated Oil & Gas. The Court 
had reviewed the pleadings and the memorandum filed by the parties 
as well as the affidavit submitted by Shirley Hebert of 
Consolidated Oil & Transportation Company, Inc. and has also 
reviewed the cases and statutes relied on by counsel. After 
receiving arguments from both parties, the Court finds and orders 
as follows: 
1. The Court has relied on the facts as alleged in the 
Amended Complaint, the attachments to the memoranda and the facts 
set forth in the affidavit. As to any conflict, the Court 
considered those facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff. 
2. The Plaintiff has the burden of proof on jurisdiction. 
3. Consolidated Oil & Transportation, Inc. has had minimal 
contacts with the state of Utah. 
4- The claims of the Plaintiff against the Defendant are 
tort claims arising from an accident. The accident and the 
Plaintiff's injuries occurred in the state of Colorado. 
5. There* is no relationship between the Plaintiff's injuries 
and the minimal contact the Defendant had with the state of Utah. 
6. It is not alleged in the Amended Complaint and there has 
been no showing of any substantial and continuous activity in the 
state of Utah by Defendant that would give the Court jurisdiction. 
7. The case of Arauello vs Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co., 
828 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992) is dispositive of this case. 
S^  There is not a sufficient nexus Detween the injury and" 
the contacts of the Defendant in the state of Utah to give the 
Court jurisdiction under Arauello. 
The Court therefore grants Consolidated Oil & Transportation 
Company, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and 
Orders that the Amended Complaint as to Defendant Consolidated Oil 
and Transportation Company, Inc. is dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction.
 % 
DATED this /Lf day of fcte4eh, 2000. 
^ y"^ A. Lynn 
v ' / /- , **• / District Judge 
ApWq'ved As T6 Form: / / 
David" C. Cu'ndickV^ &ttTOrney 
for Plaintiff 
t:\conscIid\crd2r 
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Wayne A. Freestone, #4481 
David C. Cundick, #4817 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
PARKER, FREESTONE, ANGERHOFER & HARDING, PC 
50 West 300 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-5600 
Fax No.: (801) 328-5651 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UINTAH 
JOSEPH MECHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
BAND-IT IDEX, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, SEAL FAST INCORPORATED, 
a Texas corporation, KEYWAY 
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Texas 
corporation, MORCON SPECIALTY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, RED MAN PIPE & 
SUPPLY, an Oklahoma corporation, 
LANDMARK PETROLEUM, INC. a 
Delaware corporation, WESTCOURT 
MANAGEMENT INC., a Colorado 
corporation, PORTFIELD INVESTMENTS 
INC., a Colorado corporation, FRUITA 
MARKETING & MANAGEMENT, 
INC., a Delaware corporation, 
CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, a 
Colorado corporation, LAIR'S, INC. a 
Wyoming corporation, CHASE 
MANHATTAN BANK, a Delaware 
corporation, and JOHN DOES 1 through 9, 
Defendants. 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Case No. 
1 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Joseph Mecham and for cause of action alleges against the defendants 
and each of them as follows. 
I. PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Joseph Mecham ("MECHAM") is an individual who at all relevant times has 
resided at 2430 East 3500 South, City of Vernal, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant Band-it DDEX, Inc. ("BAND-IT') is a Delaware corporation doing business 
in the State of Utah with its corporate headquarters located at 225 Executive Drive, Moores Town, 
New Jersey. Defendant Band-it is engaged in the manufacturing of clamps and air tools. 
3. Seal Fast Incorporated "("SEAL FAST') is a Texas corporation doing business in the 
State of Utah with its corporate headquarters located at 5603 Harvey Wilson Drive, Houston, Texas. 
Defendant Seal Fast is engaged in the manufacturing and sales of couplings. 
4. Keyway International, Inc. ("KEYWAY") is a Texas corporation doing business in the 
State of Utah with its corporate headquarters located at 515 Stesco Avenue, Wichita Falls, Texas. 
Defendant Keyway is engaged in the oil refining business and has tanks located within the State of 
Utah. 
5. Defendant Morcon Specialty, Inc. ("MORCON") is a Utah corporation with its corporate 
headquarters located at 1222 East Highway 40, Vernal, Utah. Defendant Morcon is engaged in the 
business of, inter alia, attaching couplings and clamps to hoses. 
6. Defendant Red Man Pipe & Supply ("RED MAN") is an Oklahoma corporation doing 
business in within the State of Utah. Defendant Red Man is engaged in the business of selling 
couplings and/or hoses. 
7. Defendant Landmark Petroleum, Inc. ("LANDMARK") is a Delaware corporation doing 
business in the state of Utah. At all relevant times herein Defendant Landmark was the owner and/or 
co-owner, operator and/or co-operator of certain portions of the land and/or petroleum products 
and/or storage tanks on which the incident causing plaintiffs injuries occurred. 
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8. Defendant Westcourt Management Inc. ("WESTCOURT') is a Colorado corporation 
doing business in the State of Utah and the State of Colorado. At all relevant times herein Defendant 
Westcourt was the owner and/or co-owner, operator and/or co-operator of certain portions of the 
land and/or petroleum products and/or storage tanks on which the incident causing plaintiffs injuries 
occurred. 
9. Defendant Portfield Investments Inc. ("PORTFIELD") is a Colorado corporation doing 
business in the State of Utah and State of Colorado. At all relevant times herein Defendant Portfield 
was the owner and/or co-owner, operator and/or co-operator of certain portions of the land and/or 
petroleum products and/or storage tanks on which the incident causing plaintiffs injuries occurred. 
10. Defendant Fruita Marketing & Management, Inc. ("FRUITA") is a Delaware corporation 
doing business in the State of Utah and the State of Colorado. At all relevant times herein Defendant 
Fruita was the owner and/or co-owner, operator and/or co-operator of certain portions of the land 
and/or petroleum products and/or storage tanks on which the incident causing plaintiffs injuries 
occurred. 
11. Defendant Larr's Inc. ("LARR'S") is a Wyoming corporation doing business in the State 
of Utah and the State of Colorado. At all relevant times herein Defendant Larr's was the owner 
and/or co-owner, operator and/or co-operator of certain portions of the land and/or petroleum 
products and/or storage tanks on which the incident causing plaintiffs injuries occurred. 
12. Defendant Chase Manhattan Bank ("CHASE MANHATTAN") is believed to be a 
Delaware corporation doing business in the State of Utah and the State of Colorado. At all relevant 
times herein Defendant Chase Manhattan was the owner and/or co-owner, operator and/or co-
operator of certain portions of the land and/or petroleum products and/or storage tanks on which the 
incident causing plaintiffs injuries occurred. 
13. Defendant Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. ("CONSOLIDATED") is believed to be a 
Colorado corporation doing business in the state of Utah and the state of Colorado. At all relevant 
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times herein Defendant Consolidated was the owner and/or co-owner, operator and/or co-operator 
of certain portions of the land and/or petroleum products and/or storage tanks on which the incident 
causing plaintiffs injuries occurred. 
14. Defendants Westcourt, Portfield, Fruita, Consolidated, Larr's and Chase Manhattan are 
hereinafter referred to jointly as PROPERTY OWNER/OPERATOR DEFENDANTS". 
15. John Does 1 - 9 are defendants whose true names and capacities are unknown to plaintiff 
at this time. PlaintiflF believes that such defendants have been negligent in a duty owed to plaintiff or 
otherwise responsible in some manner for the events and happenings herein referred to, and 
negligently or otherwise caused injuries and damages proximately thereby to the plaintiff as alleged 
herein. Plaintiffs complaint will be amended to include the true identities of John Does 1 - 9 when 
such identities become known to plaintiff. 
n. JURISDICTION 
16. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 15 
as though fully set forth herein. 
17. Plaintiff is a resident of the City of Vernal, County of Uintah. The acts complained of 
occurred, in most part in the County of Uintah. The contract which is the subject of this lawsuit was 
entered into within the State of Utah and many of the witnesses to the events stated herein reside in 
the State of Utah. 
18. The amounts complained of are greater than $1,000,000. Jurisdiction and venue are 
properly before this Court. 
ffl. FACTS 
19. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 18 
as though fully set forth herein. 
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20. At all times relevant herein, plaintiff was employed by Adler Hot Oil Service, Inc. 
("ADLER"). Adler is engaged in the business of cleaning sludge from petroleum storage tanks. 
21. The service which Adler performs consist of pumping hot oil from a truck owned and 
operated by Adler into a storage tank. The hot oil melts the sludge and returns from the storage tanks 
into the Adler truck with the hot oil that was pumped into the storage tank. 
22. Plaintiffs duties included driving the hot oil truck to various storage tanks. Plaintiffs 
procedure in cleaning the storage tanks included connecting a hose between the hot oil truck and the 
storage tank. The hose has a coupling on each end. The coupling is secured by a band. 
23. After Plaintiff fastened the coupling to the hot oil truck and the storage tank, Plaintiff 
would proceed to heat oil in his truck. After the oil was heated, plaintiff would pump the oil through 
the storage tank and back into the truck. 
24. On or about the 10th day of March, 1995, Plaintiff was directed by Adler to pump the 
sludge out of a storage tank owned by the Property Owner/Operator Defendants. 
25. Plaintiff drove his hot oil truck to the Property Owner/Operator Defendants' premises 
and connected the hose to the hot oil truck and the pipe leading to the storage tank. After the oil was 
heated, Plaintiff began to pump the hot oil into the storage tank. 
26. While the hot oil was being pumped into the storage tank, plaintiff observed the coupling 
begin to slip off of the hose. 
27. Plaintiff attempted to rush to the shut off switch on the hot oil truck. Prior to his being 
able to shut off the operation, the hose failed at the coupling area and hot oil sprayed plaintiffs 
person. 
28. The hot oil supplied by the Property Owner/Operator Defendants had an extremely low 
flash point, below industry standards, resulting in a fire and an explosion. 
29. Despite being covered in hot oil and being burned over 50% of his body, Plaintiff 
managed to shut off the operation. 
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in . NEGLIGENCE (ALL DEFENDANTS) 
30. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 29 
as though fully set forth herein. 
31. At all times herein mentioned, Defendants Band-it, Seal Fast, Morcon and Red Man, and 
each of them (hereinafter referred to as "PRODUCT LIABILITY DEFENDANTS"), were engaged 
in the business of manufacturing, designing, assembling, compounding, testing, inspecting, packaging, 
labeling, fabricating, constructing, analyzing, distributing, servicing, merchandising, recommending, 
advertising, promoting, marketing, and/or selling hoses, bands oil, hot oil pumping systems, and/or 
couplings for resale to and use by members of the general public for purposes of use in the business 
of removing sludge from storage tanks. 
32. At all time herein mentioned, Defendants John Does 1 through 9, and each of them, were 
engaged in the business of manufacturing, designing, assembling, compounding, testing, inspecting, 
fabricating, constructing, analyzing, distributing, servicing, merchandising, recommending, 
advertising, promoting, marketing, and/or selling hoses, bands oil, hot oil pumping systems and/or 
couplings for resale to and use by members of the general public for purposes of use in the business 
of removing sludge from storage tanks. 
33. At all times herein mentioned, the Product Liability Defendants, acting through its 
officers, agents, servants or employees, and each of them, knew, or in the exercise of ordinary and 
reasonable care should have known that the said hose, band oil, hot oil pumping system and/or 
coupling was a product of such a nature that if it was not properly manufactured, designed, 
assembled, compounded, tested, inspected, fabricated, constructed, analyzed, distributed, serviced, 
merchandised, recommended, advertised, promoted, marketed and sold, for the use and purpose for 
which it was intended, it was likely to injure the person or persons be whom it was used. 
34. The Product Liability Defendants, and each of them, acting through their officers, agents, 
servants, representatives or employees, negligently and carelessly manufactured, developed, designed 
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assembled, compounded, tested, inspected, fabricated, constructed, analyzed, distributed, serviced, 
merchandised, recommended, advertised, promoted, marketed and sold the said hose, band oil, hot 
oil pumping system and/or coupling, so that it was in a dangerous and defective condition, and was 
unsafe for the use and purpose for which it was intended when used as recommended by the 
defendants, and each of them. 
35. The defective and dangerous character and condition of the said hose, band oil, hot oil 
pumping system and/or coupling, made the hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and/or coupling 
unsafe for the use and purpose for which they were intended when used as recommended by the 
Product Liability Defendants, was known to'such defendants and each of them, or in the exercise of 
ordinary and reasonable care should have been known and discovered by such defendants and each 
of them. Furthermore, the dangerous and defective character and condition of the said hose, band, 
oil, hot oil pumping system and/or coupling was not made known to the plaintiff by the Product 
Liability Defendants and each of them. 
36. Some time prior to March 10, 1995, Adler purchased and obtained the hose, band, oil, 
hot oil pumping system and coupling from the Product Liability Defendants for the purpose of using 
said hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and coupling in connection with the business of cleaning 
sludge from storage tanks. 
37. On or about, March 10, 1995, while plaintiff was using the hose, band, oil, hot oil 
pumping system and coupling for its intended purpose, and as a proximate result of the negligence 
and carelessness of the defendant, the hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and/or coupling failed, 
thereby causing plaintiff to sustain burns over 50% of his body and medical expenses in excess of 
$500,000. Such medical expenses are still accruing and will continue to accrue in the future. 
38. Prior to March 10, 1995, the Property Owner/Operator Defendants retained plaintiffs 
services through Adler to clean out the tanks. The Property Owner/Operator Defendants supplied 
the oil that plaintiff was instructed to use. At all times herein mentioned, the Property 
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Owner/Operator Defendants, were under a duty to supply plaintiff with oil that had a flash point at 
or above industry standards. The Property Owner/Operator Defendants knew, or in the exercise of 
ordinary and reasonable care should have known that the oil supplied to plaintiff to clean the tanks 
had a very low flash point, below industry standards, and was easily combustible causing risk of injury 
to the person or persons who use it. 
39. The industry standards provide that the owner/operator of a refinery is responsible for 
insuring that procedures such as the use and involvement of hot oil trucks are properly supervised to 
insure the safety of the operator of a hot oil truck. 
40. The Property Owner/Operator Defendants had a duty to insure that the hot oil procedure 
was conducted in a safe manner. 
41. The Property Owner/Operator Defendants breached their duty to plaintiff by failing to 
insure that the hot oil procedure was conducted in a safe manner thereby negligently causing the 
injuries suffered by plaintiff. 
42. Plaintiff has suffered severe and excruciating pain and distressing mental anguish as a 
result of the injuries. Plaintiff has suffered, and for a long period of time to come will continue to 
suffer said pain and mental anguish as a result of said injuries. 
43. As a direct and proximate result of said negligence and carelessness of Product Liability 
Defendants and Property Owner/Operator Defendants, and each of them, plaintiff has incurred, and 
will incur, medical expenses, loss of income, wages, and other pecuniary losses, the full nature and 
extent of which are not yet known to plaintiff but which will be shown at trial and are in a minimum 
amount of $1,000,000. 
IV. BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY (PRODUCT LIABILITY DEFENDANTS) 
44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 43 
as though fully set forth herein. 
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45. At all times relevant herein, on and prior to March 10, 1995, the Product Liability 
Defendants and each of them, acting through their officers, agents, servants, representatives, and 
employees utilized advertising media, professional publications and detail person to urge the use and 
purchase of said hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and coupling, and expressly warranting to 
plaintiff by advertisements, directed to the public and particularly to ultimate consumers, that those 
consumers, including this plaintiff, could safely use the hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and/or 
coupling. The Product Liability Defendants, and each of them, urged the use and purchase of said 
hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system, and coupling, and expressly warranted to members of the 
general public, including Alder and the plaintiff that the said hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system, 
and coupling was effective, proper and safe for its intended use. 
46. Plaintiff relied upon the skill and judgment of the Product Liability Defendants, and each 
of them, and on the express warranty representations of the defendants, and each of them, directed 
towards the public, and in particular the ultimate consumer, including the plaintiff, in use of said hose, 
band, oil, hot oil pumping system and coupling, and that the hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system 
and/or coupling could be safely used for the purpose of cleaning sludge from oil storage tanks. 
47. The said hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and coupling was not effective, proper 
and safe for its intended use as expressly warranted by Product Liability Defendants and each of them, 
in that the said hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and/or coupling was defective, thereby causing 
plaintiffs injuries when said hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and coupling were being put to 
their intended use. 
48. As a proximate result of the breach of the said express warranty, plaintiff sustained the 
injuries and damages hereinabove set forth. 
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V. BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY (PRODUCT LIABILITY DEFENDANTS) 
49. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 48 
as though fully set forth herein. 
50. Prior to March 10, 1995, and prior to the time that the said hose, band, oil, hot oil 
pumping system and coupling were being used by plaintiff at the time of the injuries, the Product 
Liability Defendants and each of them acting through their officers, agents, servants, representatives 
and employees impliedly warranted to members of the general public, including the plaintiff herein, 
that the said hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and coupling was of merchantable quality and 
safe for the use for which it was intended by the defendants, namely, for the purpose of use in the 
business of removing sludge from storage tanks. 
51. Plaintiff relied upon the skill and judgment of the Product Liability Defendants and each 
of them in the use of the hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and coupling. 
52. The said hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and/or coupling was not fit for its 
intended use or purpose nor was it of merchantable quality as warranted by the Product Liability 
Defendants in that it failed thereby causing plaintiff the injuries complained of. 
53. As a proximate result of the breach of the said express warranty, plaintiff sustained the 
injuries and damages hereinabove set forth. 
VI. STRICT LL\BILITY (PRODUCT LIABILITY DEFENDANTS) 
54. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 53 
as though fully set forth herein. 
55. Defendants and each of them manufactured, designed, assembled, compounded, tested 
or failed to test, inspected or failed to inspect, constructed, analyzed, distributed, serviced, 
merchandised, recommended, advertised, promoted, marketed, and soled a certain hose, band, oil, 
hot oil pumping system and coupling and its component parts which was intended by the defendants 
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and each of them to be used for the purpose of removing sludge from storage tanks by use of a hot 
oil truck. 
56. Defendants and each of them, acting through their officers, agents, servants, 
representatives and employees, knew and intended that said hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system 
and coupling was to be purchased and used in the condition in which it was sold in an ultra hazardous 
activity, without inspection for defects by plaintiff and the general public. 
57. The said hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and/or coupling was unsafe for its 
intended use by reason of defects in its manufacture, design, testing and components so that it would 
not safely serve its purpose, but would instead expose the users of said product to serious injury 
because of the failure of defendants, and each of them, to properly guard and protect the plaintiff 
from the defects of the said hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and coupling. 
58. Plaintiff was not aware of the defects at any time prior to the injuries sustained by the 
plaintiff. 
59. As a proximate result of the defects of the hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and/or 
coupling, plaintiff sustained the injuries and damages set forth above. 
VIL STRICT LIABILITY (PROPERTY OWNER/OPERATOR DEFENDANTS) 
60. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 59 
as though fully set forth herein. 
61. The Property Owner/Operator Defendants and each of them were involved with the 
operation of a refinery that involved ultra-hazardous materials and the processes associated in 
handling ultra-hazardous materials including the use and operations of a hot oil truck. 
62. The Property Owner/Operator Defendants and each of them, acting through their officers, 
agents, servants, representatives and employees, knew and intended that the hot oil truck would be 
used in a ultra hazardous activity. 
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63. The procedures for which the Property Owner/Operator Defendants retained the services 
of the plaintiff were inherently unsafe and the manner in which the plaintiff was instructed by the 
Property Owner/Operator Defendants to conduct the hot oil pumping process was inherently unsafe. 
64. Plaintiff was not aware that the procedures that he was being directed by the Property 
Owner/Operator Defendants to employ in operating the hot oil truck were inherently unsafe. 
65. As a proximate result of the procedures employed by Property Owner/Operator 
Defendants, plaintiff sustained the injuries and damages set forth above. 
Vffl. FALSE REPRESENTATION (PRODUCT LIABILITY DEFENDANTS) 
66. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 65 
as though fully set forth herein. 
67. At the time when the Product Liability Defendants, and each of them, manufactured, 
designed, assembled, compounded, tested or failed to test, inspected or failed to inspect, constructed, 
analyzed, distributed, serviced, merchandised, recommended, advertised, promoted, marketed, and 
sold the said hose, band oil, hot oil pumping system and coupling, the Product Liability Defendants, 
and each of them, expressly and impliedly represented to members of the general public, including 
the plaintiff herein, that the said hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and coupling were of 
merchantable quality, and safe for the use for which they were intended. 
68. Plaintiff relief upon said representation of the Product Liability Defendants, and each of 
them, in the selection, purchase, and use of said hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and coupling. 
69. Said representations by the Product Liability Defendants, and each of them, were false 
and untrue, in that the said hose, band, oil, hot oil pumping system and coupling were not safe for 
their intended use, nor were they of merchantable quality as represented by the Product Liability 
Defendants, and each of them, in that they had very dangerous properties and defects where such 
defects caused injury and damage to plaintiff, thereby threatening the life of Plaintiff. 
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70. As a proximate result of said false representations by the Product Liability Defendants, 
Plaintiff sustained the injuries and damages set forth above. 
IX. PUNITIVE DAMAGES (ALL DEFENDANTS) 
71. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 70 
as though fully set forth herein. 
72. The conduct and acts of defendants, and each of them, as set forth above, in allowing 
such an extremely dangerous product to used by a member of the general public, include the Plaintiff 
constitute a conscious disregard Of the safety of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to 
exemplary or punitive damages, which would serve to punish and make examples of defendants, and 
each of them. 
X. RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Court: 
1. For judgment on his first claim for relief (Negligence) against all defendants in the 
minimum amount of $1,000,000 as proven at the trial of this matter together with costs, interest and 
such further relief as the Court feels is just and equitable; 
2. For judgment on his second claim for relief (Breach of Express Warranty) against the 
Product Liability Defendants in the minimum amount of $1,000,000 as proven at the trial of this 
matter together with costs, interest and such further relief as the Court feels is just and equitable; 
3. For judgment on his third claim for relief (Breach of Implied Warranty) against the Product 
Liability Defendants in the minimum amount of $1,000,000 as proven at the trial of this matter 
together with costs, interest and such further relief as the Court feels is just and equitable; 
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4. For judgment on his fourth claim for relief (Strict Liability) against all defendants in the 
minimum amount of $1,000,000 as proven at the trial of this matter together with costs, interest and 
such further relief as the Court feels is just and equitable; 
5. For judgment on his fifth claim for relief (False Representation) against the Product 
Liability Defendants in the minimum amount of $1,000,000 as proven at the trial of this matter 
together with costs, interest and such further relief as the Court feels is just and equitable; and, 
6. For judgment on his sixth claim for relief (Punitive Damages) against all defendants in the 
minimum amount of $5,000,000 as proven at the trial of this matter together with costs, interest and 
such further relief as the Court feels is just and equitable. 
DATED this day of June, 1998. 
David C. Cundick 
Plaintiffs address: 
2430 East 3500 South 
Vernal, Utah 
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1 Q. Well, that's what I wanted to ask you about a 
2| minute, if you know. 
Landmark is a defendant in this lawsuit. Did you 
have dealings with Landmark? 
. A. No. 
Q. You had dealings with Consolidated Oil? 
A. Yes. 
Q. They hired you to do what you were going to do on 
the 27th of February '95? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who at Consolidated Oil hired you? 
A. Excuse me? 
Q. What human being did you deal with at Consolidated 
Oil? 
A. Shirley — well, you know, I can't think of her 
last name. Shirley something, Shirley -- seems like Holdis 
or Holquist or something like that. 
Q. Where is Shirley located? 
A. Denver, Colorado. 
Q. Have you ever met her in person? 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. When did you first start getting jobs from 
Shirley? 
A. You know, I'd have to go back and look, I can't 
really -- I know we did one tank, recirculated it, seems like 
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it was in the fall. What the deal was, we heated that tank, 
we circulated it and got it going for him and then he 
released us. And then they have their own heater and their 
own pump, and once we got circulation going, then he used his 
heater, Landmark Petroleum used their heater to heat the tank 
on up. 
Q. Are you telling me about some job other than the 
one — 
A. No, this is it. 
Q. Mr. Mecham's February 27, '95 job? 
A. No, no, that was before. Oh, I'm sorry. Okay. 
That was the first job we did for them. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Joe was on it too. 
Q. Was it at the same general — 
A, Very same location. 
Q. And where was that? 
A. At Landmark, Fruita. 
Q. Fruita, Colorado? 
A, Right. 
Q. Was that in the fall of 1994, keeping in mind — 
A. I believe so. Yeah, I believe it was. And it had 
to have been in the fall that we did that job. I don't think 
there was snow on the ground or anything like that. 
Q. But did Mr. Mecham's accident happen at what I'd 
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PROCEEDINGS. 
THE COURT: Mecham versus Band-It. 
Okay. Ms. Maw, you're here on the — your motion 
for summary judgment. 
MS. MAW: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Cundick's present. 
MR. CUNDICK: Yes, Your Honor, as well as Mr. 
Freestone. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Freestone. Okay. You may 
proceed. 
MS. MAW: Your Honor, I'm sure as you're aware 
this is Chase Manhattan Bank's motion for summary judgement. 
It's our position that Chase Manhattan Bank with respect to 
this refinery in Fruita, Colorado, has always been a lender. 
They have never been in any other relationship with any of 
the parties. 
What controls this relationship are the contracts 
that were entered into between Landmark, Westcourt and only 
with Chase Manhattan Bank's consent. 
Is the court familiar with these contracts? 
THE COURT: I've read your memorandum and your 
references in your memorandum to the contracts have been 
read. And I've read the opposing parties' response and your 
reply. 
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MS. MAW: Okay. Well then I'll make it fairly 
brief since the court has had an opportunity to review this. 
Basically if you look at the agreements the ones 
at issue here, the major ones were the marketing agreement, 
the management agreement, the asset purchase agreement and 
Chase's actual consent. If you look at all those agreements 
with the exception of Chase's agreement they're all between 
Landmark and Westcourt. Those are the parties to that 
agreement. Chase-just consents to it. 
Chase initially loaned a large sum of money to 
this refinery to get it up and running starting back in '90 
and then back again in 1992. In 1993 the refinery closed and 
Dick Means was appointed the plant manager at that time. 
Subsequent to that in 1994 these agreements were 
entered into and in part to avoid foreclosure, levy or any of 
the other remedies that are available to Chase when they 
can't get — they have security interest in this property and 
they can't rely on their loan and get reimbursement on their 
loan. 
So in lieu of doing that the decision was made 
that Landmark would sell the assets to Westcourt Corporation 
and Chase would then benefit from the sale of those assets. 
That is clearly outlined in the marketing agreement. 
THE COURT: Part of the assets. 
MS. MAW: Part of the assets. They retained 
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some of them. Then they transferred assets. Then the assets 
were for sale. Dick Means were appointed to make sure those 
assets were kept in saleable condition so they could be sold. 
In order to deal with the monies and the handling 
of this in the course of the sales they created two bank 
accounts that are reflected in Section 2.4 of that marketing 
agreement, and that included the first one was a special 
purpose account that was set up in Landmark's name — from 
Chase Manhattan Bank. 
THE COURT: Which Chase had complete control 
over. 
MS. MAW: Well, Chase didn't have complete 
control over it. They — it was in Landmark's name. The 
checks that were issued were Westcourt checks on it. Landmark 
had consent in terms of — not Landmark, I'm sorry, Chase 
had consent. Westcourt would make a — there was a second 
account setup on Westcourt's account and that was to transfer 
funds from the special purpose account, the deposit account 
into the Westcourt account. And the purpose of the Westcourt 
account was so they were able to as exclusive representative 
for Landmark, they would be able to pay for the cost inherent 
in the sale of the assets including employees' salaries. 
THE COURT: Let me get this in my mind because 
it has been a time since I read it. As I recall, when the 
assets were sold it went into this account, the first account 
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you talked about. 
MS. MAW: Correct. 
THE COURT: The monies, proceeds, okay. And my 
recollection was that Chase had control over that asset 
account except that if there was a disagreement — well, the 
second bank account was the one that went in to pay the 
operating costs. And that was funded out of the first account 
and Chase and several other parties had to come to an 
agreement as to how much to transfer from the first bank 
account into the second bank account. 
MS. MAW: Correct. 
THE COURT: If there was a disagreement then it 
went according to the average for the last two months, is 
that right? 
MS. MAW: That is correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. And now the other thing I 
recall specifically from the contract is that Chase had 
control of that first account. You tell me it didn't but 
I — 
MS. MAW: Chase had control of that first 
account. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. So I'm clear. 
We're clear on that. 
MS. MAW: Yeah, we're clear on that. It was — 
it was clearly — it was in Landmark's name but Chase was 
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the one who would authorize. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MS. MAW: Or, you know, when Westcourt made its 
demand to transfer the funds into the Westcourt account to 
pay the bills for the sale of these assets. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. MAW: Okay. But even so the agreement if 
there was a dispute as to what got transferred and what 
didn't that was between Landmark, Westcourt and Chase to 
resolve and the court is correct that they based it on if 
there was a dispute the two months prior. What it leaves 
essentially two months prior would make the determination if 
there was a dispute as to the amount. 
THE COURT: Landmark, Chase and Westcourt, the 
three of them. 
MS. MAW: The three of them. 
THE COURT: So, again, the bank's involved in 
that process. 
MS. MAW: Well, the bank's involved in that — 
THE COURT: If they said no they could stop a 
particular amount from being transferred and then you'd have 
to go to the default provisions which would say use the prior 
two months average. In other words unless they said yes, no 
money was coming out unless it was the average that we talked 
about, is that right? 
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MS. MAW: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. MAW: In doing that. But that control over 
their funds, over the monies from the assets is they had 
security interests in all the equipment and everything on 
their. 
THE COURT: I understand. I understand. 
MS. MAW: So that control does not evidence any 
other relationship other than their lender. 
THE COURT: I'm not contesting the matter with 
you. 
MS. MAW: Okay. 
THE COURT: You said something that caused me to 
think that my memory may have been different from what you 
were saying. 
MS. MAW: No. 
THE COURT: So I wanted to make sure that we 
were all right. 
MS. MAW: No. No. The court is correct on that. 
That's kind of one of the major provisions. That 
seems to be one of the major provisions in dispute as to who 
paid Dick Means• salary which then gave to the argument that 
somehow there was an agency principal relationship between 
Chase and Dick Means. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
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MS. MAW: But even prior before you reach that 
issue you have to look at who was the representative here on 
this site to facilitate the sale and that was Landmark 
appointed Westcourt. Westcourt then had Dick Means to aid and 
facilitate in the sale of these assets. There's no 
relationship between Chase and Westcourt in this case at all. 
THE COURT: But you do acknowledge that Means 
was — continued in that position at the insistence of 
Chase. 
MS. MAW: No, I do not. That's — I don't 
acknowledge that. 
THE COURT: That's part of what you contest as 
the facts, is that right? 
MR. CUNDICK: That's correct, Your Honor. 
MS. MAW: Okay. If you look at the agreement, 
that marketing agreement, Landmark was going to produce Dick 
Means if he was still employed with Landmark. Landmark 
appointed Dick Means in 1993 to manage this plant, to 
facilitate the closing, maintain the assets. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. MAW: You know, for the subsequent sale of 
these assets. But I don't know where that — they've not 
produced any evidence to say that Chase has any relationship. 
THE COURT: Well. 
MS. MAW: To Dick Means but at any rate if you 
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look at provision 5.4 in the contract that's entered into 
between Landmark and Westcourt that specifically addresses 
what the relationship is of these parties, and that provision 
provides that Chase is — I mean it is clear, it says that 
Chase's only relationship was that as a lender. 
I think the case law is clear on that issue that 
this — this segment where you have a lender who's trying to 
recoup on the monies they'd loaned out, some millions and 
millions of dollars on this refinery here with all the 
security interests in it, because they had control over the 
sale of the assets — they don't control the sale of the 
assets but the monies and how they're spent to facilitate 
further sales, does not make them an employer, does not put 
him in a principal agency relationship. 
Under our law of principle agency with Dick Means 
there has to be a meeting of the minds. There has to be an 
intent to form that relationship. There has to be authority 
given, and there is no documentation that evidences any 
relationship, any authority given between Chase Manhattan 
Bank and Dick Means in this case at all. 
I believe that the documents are clear on their 
face in this instance. I think that if the — if the court is 
concerned over the manner in which Dick Means was 
compensated, if that becomes an issue I have spoken to him 
and I'll be happy to produce his affidavit and he will 
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explain exactly the understanding that we've had, the two 
purpose accounts that we had, and the transfer between the 
accounts, and that his check was a Westcourt check. It was 
on a Chase Manhattan Bank account but it was a Westcourt 
check. 
And that's the only relationship, the only piece 
of evidence that plaintiff is relying on to keep Chase in 
here. I think it would be a travesty of public policy to take 
a lender who's lending millions and millions of dollars put 
security interests and because they want to control the 
monies from the sale of their assets to realize on their lien 
which they never did realize on, and to protect their 
security interests to then find some kind of an agency 
relationship. 
It's just not supported by Utah law. It's not 
supported by law in any other jurisdiction. 
THE COURT: You said that they didn't have any 
control over the sale of the assets but indeed they did have 
some control over the sale of the assets. And also the cost 
of sales. They had to approve the sale of any asset that has 
certain value, is that right? 
MS. MAW: Well, they had to approve the sale to 
have certain value but it was an unfettered discretion that 
they had to do that. 
THE COURT: What were the criteria then? If it 
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was an unfettered discretion what was the criteria? 
MS. MAW: Well, you went into the — in the 
event they didn't approve the sale it couldn't be 
unreasonably withheld but you go into the regular default 
provisions in that contract. 
THE COURT: What were the default -- I didn't 
see any default provision with respect to what happens if the 
— if the owner wants to sell for a certain price and the 
secured lender said, no, you can't. Just seemed to me that 
they could say we can't sell. 
MS. MAW: Well, I think the contract contains a 
reasonable clause in there and there's an objection provision 
in there as well. 
THE COURT: So what you're saying is that they 
— the obligation of the secured party was to not withhold 
permission unreasonably. 
MS. MAW: Right. And also there's a dispute 
resolution clause in paragraph 2.5 which concerns the sales. 
That goes more to sales expenses or withdrawal. 
THE COURT: Which they had to approve also. 
MS. MAW: Well. 
THE COURT: Initially if they didn't approve it 
then you go into some process for resolving the dispute. 
MS. MAW: Yeah, including putting it before 
Coopers and Lybrand for resolution as well. 
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THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. MAW: The accounting firm. But this isn't 
I mean the bank loans the money. They have security 
interest. They have a right to look at their assets and 
protect those assets. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MS. MAW: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. Who will be addressing the 
issue. 
MR. CUNDICK: Your Honor. 
Your Honor, essentially the plaintiffs argument is 
this and that is that there's one of two theories that we can 
rely under. There's two basis by which to find Chase as a — 
either a principal of Landmark or as a principal of Dick 
Means. If we can show facts which would support a finding of 
control of either of those two then Chase needs to stay in. 
First one is that they were — is the law is quite 
clear that if they step over the line, if Chase steps over 
the line from a lender to running the business of Landmark 
then they lose the status of becoming a creditor and then 
become the principal of the debtor. 
That's set forth in the restatement of agency. And 
we believe that the facts are sufficient to where a jury 
could find that that amount of control was exerted and those 
facts are stated forth in the memorandum which — you've 
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discussed those issues with — 
THE COURT: Some of them. 
MR. CUNDICK: With counsel and I think they're 
— I think — I think there are enough there to show that 
there were control and that is — I think the big one is that 
there's a bank account. 
There's a bank account that Chase setup in Chase's 
bank. Chase is the one that signs the checks on that. Chase 
is the one that approves everything. Any asset, major asset 
that is sold out of the refinery they have the right to 
object to and to nix the deal on. They have the right to 
cancel the whole marketing agreement and management agreement 
if they find a default. 
Page 11 of Exhibit 10 to Chase's exhibits. Bottom 
paragraph." If Westcourt defaults in the performance of any 
of its material obligations hereunder or under the management 
agreement," so the marketing agreement or the management 
agreement," dated as the date hereof between Westcourt and 
Landmark, then Landmark or Chase may give written notice to 
Westcourt thereof. If such default is not corrected then it 
can be terminated." 
So they've retained the right to terminate the 
agreement. They retained virtually the entire control over 
the refinery, over the funds, over the assets that are going 
out, over the marketing agreements and management agreements 
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which are the underlying basis of the relationship. They can 
— they have control over all of that. I think that is 
sufficient to submit to a jury to show they have stepped over 
the line, that they are no longer a lender but they have 
become the principal of Landmark. 
Secondly that Richard Means was the agent of 
Chase. This is from Richard Means' deposition. 
Answer. " Originally I was to stay as a Landmark 
employee. Westcourt said they didn't want to keep me that way 
because they had to keep two payrolls and it was an extra 
expense. So Chase Manhattan agreed to put me on the 
Westcourt payroll because Chase was actually paying my wages. 
Westcourt was paying my wages but Chase was reimbursing 
Westcourt for my expenses, for my salary." 
So what we had was any monies that were collected 
went into this Chase account, okay? And then Chase would put 
— send over the expenses to reimburse Westcourt, and then 
whatever was remaining was Chase's. 
So in the — essentially, yes, Chase was paying 
the salary of Dick Means because they chose to allow that to 
be an expense to ship over to Westcourt. If they wanted 
to — . 
THE COURT: Well, if an expense they're not 
paying. I mean that wouldn't be a credit against the loan, 
would it? Let me put this in — . 
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MR. CUNDICK: Well, it would be a credit against 
the loan. It would have been a credit against the loan but 
for they wanted Dick Means to stay on the property to keep 
the assets in a saleable condition. Chase did. So it was a 
— by paying — by paying Dick Means, insisting that he be 
on Westcourt's salary it ended up to be a net against the 
loan. 
THE COURT: Okay. Because less — 
MR. CUNDICK: Less --
THE COURT: Might otherwise be available. 
MR. CUNDICK: Exactly. And Dick Means — 
THE COURT: That assumes that the loan's never 
paid. If it was paid then it's not an expense. 
MR. CUNDICK: Exactly. Thank you. 
And I think it's clear that it was Dick Means 
responsibility to keep the assets saleable. That was the 
authority that Chase gave to Dick Means. That's where the 
agency between Chase and Dick Means is created in that they 
wanted him to work there and they wanted him to work there 
because they wanted to give him the authority to keep the 
assets in a saleable condition. 
So I think clearly there is evidence by which a 
jury can find that Dick Means was the agent of Chase 
Manhattan. And if he was the agent of Chase Manhattan 
there's the theory of liability. 
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Same with the previous argument, that is, that 
Chase was the principal of Landmark because they stepped over 
the line. There's sufficient evidence on both those issues to 
submit to a jury by which they could come to that conclusion. 
And I would submit it on that, Your Honor. If you 
have any questions. 
THE COURT: I do. And I didn't mention I read — 
I don't know if I read all of the cases. I don't think I did 
but I read your eases on — on situation where a lender had 
been found to be a — an agent. Or that the — 
MR. CUNDICK: Where the lender had been found to 
be a principal? 
THE COURT: A principal, yes. And one was an 
apartment situation in New York, as I recall, or someplace 
like that. 
MR. CUNDICK: Right. Right. 
THE COURT: But it seemed to me that these were 
ongoing businesses and so when you made the statement, you 
said that they have got so far into the business that they 
stepped over the line in running the business, it caused me 
to wonder what business was being run. 
MR. CUNDICK: The business was the liquidation 
of the assets. That's — I think that's — 
THE COURT: Isn't the secured party entitled to 
be deeply involved in how assets they have security interest 
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in are disposed of? 
MR, CUNDICK: I — no doubt that they have the 
right to be deeply involved in that but they still have the 
— the law that states if you then — if you step over the 
line of being deeply involved and start running the business 
of the debtor then you become the principal of the debtor• 
THE COURT: Well, that gets me back to the issue 
of how they were running the business and — 
MR. CUNDICK: And my answer is they were running 
the business because they were the ones that were — the 
business — the entire business of Landmark at that point was 
liquidation. That was their business. Selling off their 
assets. That is carrying on business and Chase was the one 
that was doing that. They were running the business for 
Landmark. 
THE COURT: There were two contracts, one of 
them in essence dealt with how the property would be disposed 
of, and the other one talked about the management of the 
assets to retain their value until the assets could be sold. 
The management aspect of that, how was Chase 
involved in the daily operation or management of the 
company? I couldn't see anything in what you brought to the 
court's attention other than what you talked about in terms 
of what would happen if assets were sold where you allege 
that they were involved in managing that operation. 
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MR. CUNDICK: As far as the day-to-day 
operations the connection — the nexus would be that Chase 
was the one that — I'm sorry. Let me gather my thoughts. 
The nexus is that Chase had Dick Means, their 
agent, working there because they wanted to keep the assets 
in saleable condition. 
Your Honor, if — could I allow Mr. Freestone to 
address the court? 
THE COURT: - Sure. Mr. Freestone. 
MR. FREESTONE: Thank you, Your Honor. One 
thing that I thought of, if the bank actually engages in 
liquidation of an asset they are actually the principal that 
hires an agent in order to liquidate that asset. That's their 
business. And that's what they're doing here is actually 
hiring Westcourt to liquidate this asset. 
THE COURT: So what you're saying is if they 
would have taken over and exercised their rights and security 
interest and then this would have happened there wouldn't be 
an issue. They would be on the line because they would have 
had control over it. 
MR. FREESTONE: Exactly. 
MR. CUNDICK: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm still trying to think in my own 
mind and as I thought this through I said it seemed to me 
that what they were concerned with is not necessarily find a 
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operating the refinery. Westcourt didn't want him. Chase 
demanded that he be there. Their guy is on the site. Okay? 
They've got control over all the expenses that are 
paid because they've got veto power over it. They've got 
control over the sales in excess of two hundred fifty 
thousand dollars. They've got veto over that and I understand 
there's really some more involved. 
So they've got control over every aspect of that 
business and they're -=•- in addition they're communicating 
with Richard Means. He testified in his deposition that he 
was talking — " the last person I talked to was Nat 
Worstenstein. He was representing Chase." 
THE COURT: That's not in your memo. 
MR. CUNDICK: No, it's not. 
THE COURT: You can't bring that up now. 
MR. CUNDICK: Okay. I apologize for that. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CUNDICK: It seemed like there were a few 
things that were being brought up that weren't actually in 
memos• 
THE COURT: And that was really a question I had 
when I went through it. Just seemed to me that it's one thing 
for a secured party to put their person in and in control. 
It's another thing to say I insist upon having somebody there 
that will control. In the first instance you're involved in 
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1 the control of it. In the second instance you're just putting 
2 somebody there who will control it and you^re not exercising 
3 any control over it. 
4 I didn't see anything in your memorandum that 
5 said, look, they exercised control over the operation of that 
6 I thing. You said that they were paying for him but you didn't 
7 I say that he operated under their control. 
8 MR. CUNDICK: I think they are because they're 
9 paying his salary and he testified that they were paying his 
10 salary^ I think that is control. 
11 " THE COURT: So, that in and of itself is enough 
12 to say that there's an agency if you pay the salary. 
13 MR. CUNDICK: I believe so. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. CUNDICK: That in addition to the admission 
16 that he was there to keep the assets in a saleable condition. 
17 He was — he was — 
18 THE COURT: Arguably isn't he working for 
19 everybody on that? I mean, doesn't the owner — doesn't the 
20 owner benefit for somebody if somebody's there keeping the 
21 asset in saleable condition? 
22 MR. CUNDICK: The owner, Landmark, has virtually 
23 no connection with the business at this point. The only 
24 connection with the business of liquidation or the assets are 
25 Westcourt and Chase. Westcourt's interest is they get a 
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commission off what they sell. 
THE COURT: Sure. Sure. And doesn't Landmark 
benefit if somebody keeps the assets so that they're not 
going down in value? 
MR. CUNDICK: They benefit because — yes. 
THE COURT: Because their debt will be less. 
MR. CUNDICK: Debt will be less. But the real 
beneficiary in all of this is Chase. Chase is the one — 
Westcourt's benefit is a commission. Landmark's not got any 
control over this at all at this point anyway. The one that 
has control and the one that's getting the benefit is Chase. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Anything 
further from you? 
MS. MAW: I just want to point out first of all 
Dick Means' testimony doesn't come in unless the court 
determines the contracts are ambiguous because of parole 
evidence rule would prevent that from coming in. 
The second thing — 
THE COURT: Let me stop you there. You're here 
on the motion for summary judgment. 
MS. MAW: Correct. 
THE COURT: And I think it's perfectly — I 
understand what you're saying. You're saying I've got a 
bunch of contracts here and the rules of interpretation for 
contract provide that you don't get parole unless it's 
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ambiguous. But there maybe a situation where the contract is 
perfectly clear and there's no ambiguity but the parties are 
acting differently from the contract. And so you can't 
preclude them from bringing forth their evidence on how the 
parties actually acted by saying what the contract, the 
contract, the contract. 
So I'm not — I'm not interested in whether or 
not it's ambiguous for purposes of interpreting the contract 
I would. I would-be interested but this isn't really an issue 
of contract interpretation. It's an issue of whether or not 
there's an agency relationship outside the contract perhaps 
which is brought into effect through the party's conduct. 
You see what I'm saying? 
MS. MAW: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. So I've heard you say that 
several times. We're bound by the contract and I don't 
believe it. I don't believe we are bound by the contract. I 
think we're — the contract's interesting and I read it and I 
think that there's some things to be learned from the 
contract but if the parties act different from the contract 
then I have to look at that also for purposes of this motion 
at least. 
MS. MAW: I understand that but under Utah law 
of agency principles you don't have the evidence here. You 
don't have the meeting of the minds. You don't have the 
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consent. You don't have the apparent implied authority on 
Dick Means. 
They're making — Dick Means was in that position 
long before the agreements were entered into. Dick Means may 
or may not have worked for Westcourt depending — I mean the 
contract if he was an employee of Landmark, if Landmark 
couldn't produce Dick Means as an employee to Westcourt there 
is no — there is no agreement there is nothing that creates 
a relationship between Chase and Dick Means. 
To import duties between the two Chase was a 
lender, an absentee lender. Chase never realized anything on 
their means. I think they got maybe 50,000 out of this. 
You don't have the apparent implied authority on 
Dick Means. They're making — Dick Means was in that 
position long before the agreements were entered into. Dick 
Means may or may not have worked for Westcourt depending — 
I mean the contract if he was an employee of Landmark, if 
Landmark couldn't produce Dick Means as an employee of 
Westcourt. There is no — there is no agreement. There is 
nothing that creates a relationship between Chase and Dick 
Means. To import duties between the two Chase was a lender, 
an absentee lender. Chase never realized anything on their 
millions. I think they got maybe 50,000 out of this whole 
thing. 
Also if you look at the cash sweep where they have 
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that defined in the contract Chase didn't get anything until 
there were excess proceeds, and then they were applied to the 
Chase claim. So they were — this was not a deal where they 
were going to make all this money on these assets. All this 
was was in lieu of foreclosure. That's what they wanted to 
do. They didn't want to have to foreclose because they'd 
probably get nothing if they threw the refinery into 
bankruptcy. 
So that was the whole purpose behind this. There 
is no agency relationship. The cases they cite out of the 
other states even say that a lender has a right to consent 
when its money is at issue and that's the position we're 
going to take. They have not shown any facts to show we had 
any control over the daily operations or management. To the 
contrary, Westcourt did. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me clarify that last issue 
then we'll get on with this. You made a statement, Mr. 
Cundick, that everything in this account if they didn't send 
it over to the second account all went into Chase but that's 
really not what happened. As I understand that account was to 
exist until the process was to wind up and at that point in 
time if there was excess it would go back to — into Chase's 
account to apply against the loan. Am I correct in that? 
MR. CUNDICK: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anything further? 
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The matter's submitted? 
There are some clean up issues that we need to 
talk about. The plaintiffs conceded that there was no issue 
as to being an employee of an independent contractor, and 
there was — the plaintiff's conceded on the issue of 
corporate veil and also that no liability arises based upon 
the ownership of the stock. And that was in the pleadings and 
so summary judgment will be issued on those — on those 
issues. 
It hasn't been further argued here but there was 
some allegation that there was liability based upon Chase 
having actual possession of the refinery. Actually the 
response from the plaintiff to the motion filed by Chase 
pretty much gave that up I thought in that they said — they 
acknowledged that Chase did not have actual possession of the 
refinery. And so whatever liability with respect to ownership 
would have to be tied in — it wouldn't be direct 
responsibility. It would have to be tied in to their agency 
principals. 
But based upon direct liability the court will 
grant summary judgment on that issue. 
Now, we have two issues based upon the issue of 
agency principals. First was that Means was an employee of 
Chase who was acting under his direction and we've talked 
about that. The one issue that I think is kind of out there 
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but I'm going to accept in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff was that Chase was being — was — you read that 
part of the deposition again that Chase had insisted that 
Means be there. And that Mr. Means' salary was being paid out 
of the operating expenses. 
Paragraph three of your memorandum/ plaintiff's 
memorandum, asserted that Chase exerted much control and 
exercised virtually all the decision making power and then 
referred the court to -Exhibit 10 for authority, and I have 
read Exhibit Number 10. But when the plaintiff referred the 
court to that document for authority they did not specify 
what part of the document they were looking at. 
I am obligated to read that document and I don't 
— I'm not obligated to accept the Plaintiff's 
characterization and submissions providing virtually all 
decision making power with respect to the refinery in Chase. 
In fact it doesn't. It doesn't do that. 
The court also notes that page 5, paragraph H, of 
plaintiff's memorandum indicates that Chase had a veto power 
over the monthly expenses. We've talked about that. Actually 
Chase didn't have a veto power. They had the power to agree 
or disagree. If they disagreed it went back or fall back to 
the position where the average of the previous two months 
expense was used. 
Although the various documents and statements and 
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records do demonstrate that Chase exercised some control over 
the sale of the assets, I don't think that anything that 
Chase did here was unusual in view of Chase's position as a 
lien holder, and I think that a lien holder has a legitimate 
interest in approving sales of secured assets. Otherwise 
assets just disappear. 
And the fact that Mr. Means continued to be 
employed at the insistence of Chase and that Chase indirectly 
— well, I don't-want to say they paid their wages. The way 
I understand it is the way we talked about. Those wages came 
out of the approved monthly expenses. The fact that those 
wages came out of the approved monthly expenses doesn't 
necessarily indicate agency. 
I would have been more interested in what the 
plaintiff may have said as to control outside of the process 
of — of locating buyers and arranging for sales and I didn't 
see any allegation that Chase took any part in the daily 
management of the company as to how the job was done. 
And as I indicate I don't think that having Means 
there and even if Chase insisted that somebody be there to 
oversee this it doesn't indicate an agency relationship 
unless Chase exercised some actual control over those things, 
and I don't see that they did. 
So I'm going to deny — I'm going to grant your 
motion for summary judgment as to the issue of agency as it 
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relates to Mr. Means and kind of for the same issues the 
plaintiff alleges that Chase was a principal of Landmark. 
Again, there isn't really anything outside of what I think 
the — a secured party is entitled to do to secure their 
interest in the property to maintain control over that. 
Plaintiff maintains that Chase had control over the refinery, 
was therefore liable for the acts of Landmark in connection 
with the refinery including, incidently, a breach of duty to 
an invitee on the premises. 
I don't think that there's anything unusual that 
happened or that was outside the usual conduct for reasonable 
secured party under the circumstances. Control over the — by 
the creditor over proceeds of the sale is almost always 
required and creditors should not be required to release 
their security interest as a result of a sale unless there is 
an appropriate amount taken as a result of that sale. 
If it were otherwise, that is if the debt — if 
the secured party didn't have anything to say about these 
things fraud could be perpetrated on the secured party by 
just selling the assets for a nominal amount and certainly 
against that prospect that Chase had a legitimate interest in 
being there. 
I think that there is — Ms. Maw indicated that 
there is a strong public policy in allowing secured parties 
to take reasonable steps to ascertain value in their security 
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interest and also be involved in how those assets are 
disposed of. Nothing in the record indicates that Chase 
crossed the line. 
So I'm going to grant your motion as to that. 
your motion for summary judgment is granted. Okay. 
MS. MAW: Would you like me to prepare the 
order? 
THE COURT: I don't think they will. Would 
do that? Submit-it to parties. Does that take care of 
everything for today? 
MR. CUNDICK: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
(Whereupon, court was held in recess at 3:15. 
had 
. So 
you 
) 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, PAMELA C. SMITH, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Registered Merit Reporter and Notary Public within and for 
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That I was NOT present at the foregoing court 
proceedings;. 
That the foregoing record was preserved by 
videotape;. 
That thereafter, I stenographically recorded the 
requested portion of the video and translated the same using 
computer-aided transcription, followed by a proofreading 
against the video. 
That the foregoing pages contain to the best of my 
ability a full, true and correct transcript of the same. 
In witness whereof, I have subscribed my name and 
affixed my seal this day of , 2001. 
PAMELA C. SMITH, C.S.R.,R.M.R, 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: 
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2 PROCEEDINGS. 
3 THE COURT: Could I ask you to make your 
4 appearances since I'm really old and don't remember 
5 everything I should remember. 
6 MR. SWENSON: Kevin Swenson representing 
7 Portfield Investments, Fruita and Westcourt. 
8 THE COURT: All right. So you'll be 
9 participating on-the motion for summary judgment. 
10 MR. SWENSON: That's correct. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Allred, I do recognize you. 
12 MR. ALLRED: I represent Consolidated Oil and 
13 Transportation Company, Inc. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
15 MR. CUNDICK: Your Honor, Dave Cundick and Wayne 
16 Freestone representing the plaintiff. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Do any of you have any 
18 preference as to which we take first? 
19 MR. ALLRED: I'd suggest the motion for summary 
20 judgment. Mr. McClellan who assisted me on this I think was 
21 hoping to be here so perhaps — I don't know. It turns out 
22 he had to go to Roosevelt. (Inaudible.) 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Swenson. The record 
24 indicate that I've received this morning your reply. 
25 MR. SWENSON: All right. 
THE COURT: And I've read all of the motions. 
MR. SWENSON: All right. 
THE COURT: And the pleadings with respect to 
your motion for summary judgment. 
MR. SWENSON: Okay. This is a 1996 lawsuit. This 
is a case that has been around for awhile and quite a bit of 
discovery has been completed in the case. The facts giving 
rise to the lawsuit occurred on February 27, 1995, in an oil 
field or an oil refinery in Fruita, Colorado. The plaintiff 
sued, among others, Fruita Marketing & Management for 
negligence. 
And part of the discovery is we have identified 
all the witnesses, expert witnesses that will be used in the 
case. The plaintiff's only expert witness is a gentleman by 
the name of Don Stinson, and he is the only expert who will 
talk at all about liability. And we have had the opportunity 
to depose Mr. Stinson a couple of times to get it finished 
and this basically comes down to the plaintiffs cannot prove 
that Fruita had any involvement in the case. 
Don Stinson, again, their only liability expert 
was asked what the — they've defined as property owner 
defendants which includes Fruita and others. Did — that in 
any way caused or contributed to the accident, and he 
responded that there were two things that they did. The first 
one was that the wrong oil was provided to Mr. Mecham. And 
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second thing is that Mr. Mecham was instructed to park or 
hook up to the battery head in the wrong location. 
And for purposes of this motion today we don't 
intend to get into whether or not those things were right or 
wrong. We do expect that those will come up later. 
Mr. Stinson was asked several times after that if 
there was anything else that they did and he said no. Those 
are the two things that the property owner defendants did. 
So we-started taking a look at this and it's clear 
that the two areas where he claims that there's fault Fruita 
had no involvement with either of those areas. The oil that 
was provided was provided to the plaintiff by Mr. Means, 
Richard Means. He was an employee of Landmark and then became 
part of the Westcourt payroll. He provided to the — he 
provided the oil to the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff knew what kind of oil it was and 
approved of using itf and whether it's the wrong oil or not I 
again mentioned we're not going to get into that today. But 
Means was not an employee or an agent of Fruita and the 
evidence in the case is clear. Mr. Means has been deposed. 
Several others have been deposed. He was a Landmark employee 
who was then put on the Westcourt payroll to keep him 
functioning to clean up the refinery is basically what 
they're doing. 
This refinery went out of business in 1993 and now 
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they're just trying to keep it clean enough that they can 
sell the parts off. 
Landmark went out of business. And there were a 
couple of contracts entered into with Westcourt to manage the 
property and then a contract with Fruita to sell the property 
off. To market whatever property they could get rid of. 
Mr. Means when he was deposed indicated he was not 
an employee of Fruita. The plaintiff, however, argues that 
Mr. Means is an agent of Fruita. They acknowledge in their 
brief that he's not an employee, and then they skip ahead and 
say but he is an agent. No support. No backup of any kind. 
The only argument that they have raised is that 
Fruita had some involvement on the property. And Fruita did 
have, like I said based on the contract, the authority to 
market all of the property that was left there that they 
could sell. And they were doing that with, you know, several 
agreements between Westcourt, Fruita, Chase Manhattan and 
Landmark to try to clear up this property. 
But the oil that was provided was not owned by 
Fruita. The property where the incident occurred was not 
owned by Fruita. Dick Means has testified that he was not an 
employee of Fruita or was not acting on Fruita*s behalf. The 
deal came down between Consolidated Oil, who owned part of 
the oil in the tank, and Landmark who owned part of the oil 
in the tank, and they had requested that — or Consolidated 
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had bought that oil. The oil wasn't able to come out of the 
tank because it was so heavy. 
They brought in Adler Hot Oil which is the 
employer of the plaintiff. And the purpose of that was to 
heat that tank and get circulation going so they could bring 
that oil out and then sell it. 
But, again, Fruita had no — no involvement with 
that oil. They were not involved in the sale of that oil. 
They were not involved in the discussions as to how that 
would be brought out of the refinery, who it would be sold 
to, anything to do with Consolidated Oil. 
The second issue is where they — where he was 
instructed — where the plaintiff was instructed to park. 
And, again, that becomes an issue of was Mr. Means an agent 
for Fruita. And there's no testimony at all that the 
plaintiffs can point to, and it's not because we haven't had 
time. Like I said, this is a 1996 case. Mr. Means has been 
deposed. Several other people have been deposed and nobody 
has indicated that in any way Dick Means is an agent for 
Fruita. There's no documentation that indicates that Dick 
Means is an agent for Fruita. 
This is simply a case where the plaintiffs cannot 
make any showing of agency. And without that showing the two 
issues that their expert has claimed we were at fault in or 
the property owners were at fault in do not go to Fruita. And 
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because of that and the lack of evidence that the plaintiffs 
have — have we would move for summary judgment. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Swenson. 
Who will speak for the plaintiff? 
MR. FREESTONE: Wayne Freestone, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Freestone. 
MR. FREESTONE: Your Honor, to cut right to the 
chase, the — the relationship between Fruita and Westcourt 
is pretty muddled at least. As we set forth in our response 
the marketing agreement that was entered into by the property 
owner, Landmark, and Fruita, specifically has or mentions 
that Fruita1s to be referred to as Westcourt. The same thing 
with the management agreement. 
You know, I set forth the language in there. And 
in fact Mr. Swenson in his own words as he was addressing the 
court said that there was a contract between Landmark and 
Westcourt to manage the property. If in fact Westcourt was 
managing the property we know Fruita was managing the 
property because we have waivers that were being signed that 
the court has already — we've already discussed in court 
before. A waiver that Mr. Mecham was required to sign that 
said that Fruita was the one that was managing the property. 
Obviously Westcourt was involved in managing the 
property because Mr. Means who, granted, was on Westcourt's 
payroll, was there and facilitating the extraction of the oil 
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at the time. 
It appears from the documentation from the 
contracts that for purposes of the contracts and it appears 
from their own practice that Fruita and Westcourt were acting 
as the same. Whether they were acting as the same or not our 
expert testifies that there was a duty on the part of Fruita 
who was managing the refinery to make sure that there was 
someone there who could facilitate the extraction of that oil 
in a safe manner.-
There was a duty on the part of the company that 
was managing the refinery to make sure that that was done 
properly. And that duty was breached. Consequently, we have 
Fruita and to the extent that Westcourt was involved in 
management of the property as well who breached a duty 
according to our expert, and consequently there's negligence 
there. There's at least a question that needs to be 
presented, a question of fact as to whether or not there's 
actually an agency relationship there. On its face according 
to these documents there is. On its face they're one in the 
same. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. FREESTONE: That's it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything more from you, Mr. 
Swenson? 
MR. SWENSON: Let me just point out quickly, he 
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says they're one in the same yet they've sued two different 
entities. I mean it's clear that they're two separate 
entities. Westcourt is a Colorado corporation. Fruita is a 
Delaware corporation. They're two separate entities. They've 
known that from the beginning when they filed the lawsuit and 
yet they've still presented absolutely no evidence of agency 
other than to say, well, it's kind of muddled and there may 
be agency. 
ThereLs no showing of agency that — the testimony 
is clear that Dick Means was working as an employee of 
Westcourt and not of Fruita and had no relationship with 
Fruita. 
THE COURT: I knew I was going to do that. I 
would like to ask you a couple of questions, Mr. Swenson. 
MR. SWENSON: Sure. 
THE COURT: Let me indicate to you that my 
feeling is that this is a matter where there are lots of 
issues which are yet to be resolved and I cannot issue an 
order of summary judgment because the issue of agency's not 
clear. The contract that Fruita signed where they themselves, 
I mean they were acting in a capacity of a contracting party 
and referred to themselves in that contract as Westcourt. 
Doesn't that by itself create an issue as to agency that 
can't be resolved through a motion for summary judgment. 
If I have a party that says A, B, C, bracket D, if 
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Fruita is referring to themselves as Westcourt shouldn't they 
be allowed the opportunity to — to use that as evidence that 
at least goes to the issue of whether or not Westcourt and 
Fruita are the same? 
MR. SWENSON: No, I don't think so because what 
the specific acts that they're talking about are the acts of 
one employee and there is no showing that that employee has 
any relationship to Fruita. We're not saying that Fruita 
doesn't have the-role-in the refinery. What we're saying is 
that role in the refinery has nothing to do with anything 
that they have said caused or contributed to the accident. 
THE COURT: You haven1t got to what I want you 
to address. If Fruita is referring to themselves as 
Westcourt, can't they do the same thing? I mean that's 
something that Fruita themselves did. If it's a problem that 
was created it was created by them, and I think that that 
creates a problem of whether or not there is an agency 
relationship because they're referring to themselves in a 
contract under two names, both Fruita and Westcourt, and 
according to what you've told me Mr. Means is an employee of 
one. 
If those two have either an agency or a 
relationship or they are the same entity in fact that 
confusion can only — is only apparent because of what they 
themselves did by referring — referring to themselves as 
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Westcourt. My way of thinking about it. 
MR. SWENSON: Okay. Well, they referred to 
themselves as Westcourt but there•s a separate company that 
is Westcourt Management, Inc., which is a separate 
corporation. I don't see the reference to Westcourt as 
muddying that. 
THE COURT: Is — is there three entities here? 
Is there a Westcourt Management and a Westcourt and Fruita or 
is there just two corporations here? 
MR. SWENSON: There are several Westcourt 
entities. 
THE COURT: Involved on the property there in 
Colorado? 
MR. SWENSON: Yes. And they're separate from 
Westcourt, Westcourt Management, Inc., which is kind of the 
parent holding company. Westcourt Labs and several other 
parts, Westcourt Marketing. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm ready to rule unless 
you have — the motion I think needs to be denied, will be 
denied based primarily upon the reasons that I've already 
indicated. 
It's your obligation with respect to a motion for 
summary judgment to convince me that there is no material 
issue of fact and the defendant or the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
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When I went through this, looked to me like there 
was a real fact issue in view of the fact that we have Mr. 
Means passing out the waiver of liability at the gate, the 
Westcourt employee seeking to insulate Fruita from liability. 
In view of the fact that Mr. Means provided the oil, and 
that's part of the record. That's in dispute. 
MR. SWENSON: Your Honor, you mentioned Mr. 
Means handing out the liability release. 
THE COURT: Well, somebody was there. 
MR. SWENSON: Yeah, there's a private security 
company that's there. Has nothing to do with Mr. Means. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SWENSON: All right. 
THE COURT: The issue rather is whether or not 
Means is an agent of Fruita and I'm not convinced that you've 
— it's not clear enough in my mind that I feel like they 
shouldn't have their chance. 
You brought up something that really hadn't been 
brought up to me that there's several Westcourts but that 
wasn't part of what I saw anywhere in your pleadings. And 
based upon the fact that at least Mr. Means is a person who's 
alleged to have done a couple of things that led to the 
liability, and based upon the fact that he was an employee of 
a Westcourt, I don't think — you really haven't put me in a 
position where I feel like I can issue — can grant a motion 
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for summary judgment. 
I think the issue is open based upon the fact that 
Fruita Management is referring to themselves as Westcourt. 
And if you've got something more, then convince me that there 
are two or three Westcourts, this is a different one, I guess 
I'd be glad to do it. Sorry. Motion is denied. 
The other motion — are you resolved, Mr. Sam, on 
your issue? 
MR. SAM: There's an issue that (Inaudible.) 
THE COURT: We'll wait until we've taken care of 
these folks then. That's fine. 
Mr. Allred. 
MR. ALLRED: Thank you, Your Honor. I indicated 
I represent Consolidated Oil and Transportation Company, 
Inc., an entity served the latter part of December of 1999. 
Apparently this case had been going on for several years. 
Our motion is to dismiss this defendant now for 
lack of jurisdiction in the State of Utah. The pleadings — 
and there's also an affidavit we submitted indicate the 
accident occurred in Colorado, in Fruita, Colorado, was on a 
refinery and real property in the State of Colorado. The 
product and conduct alleged to have caused liability for 
Consolidated Oil all occurred in Colorado. The injury to the 
plaintiff and his damages occurred in Colorado and 
Consolidated Oil is a Colorado corporation with its offices 
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in Colorado and its employees and everything there. 
Based on that we fail to see anything that would 
provide State of Utah jurisdiction over this particular 
defendant. We've gone into extensive discussion in our 
memorandums. Some case law and I will — this court indicates 
it's read so rather than go through that I'm going to just 
touch briefly on the issues. 
THE COURT: I've read the pleadings and I think 
I only read two or three cases. I read the one you kept 
referring to. The old federal case that you — . 
MR. CUNDICK: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Yes. But I'd like when you talk to 
me to distinguish — you never referred to Mr. Allred's case 
which I thought may be dispositive. So I'd like you to — 
I'd like you to in your discussions with me when you get an 
opportunity whoever is going to present that — it wasn't 
done in the pleadings. And I was surprised that I didn't have 
any reference in the pleadings to Arguello versus Industrial 
Woodworking Machine Company, and I have read those two cases 
at least. 
MR. ALLRED: Well, in summary state can claim 
jurisdiction over a defendant, an out of state defendant, a 
nonresident defendant under one of two areas, either specific 
jurisdiction or general jurisdiction. 
Specific jurisdiction generally is tied to Utah 
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Code Annotated 78-27-24 which says that if the injury arises 
out of some specific acts enumerated therein then you claim 
jurisdiction. 
Basically what — to claim jurisdiction you've 
got to show that an act occurred in the State of Utah that 
gave rise to the injury or to the cause of action and that 
also there's a requirement of significant mental contact. 
In this case the accident, the injury, everything 
was in Colorado. - Doesn't seem to be any basis to be claiming 
specific jurisdiction. So that gets you to the general 
jurisdiction issue, and in that the plaintiff has to show the 
defendant conducted substantial continuous local activity in 
the state. That's language out of Arguello and Nuway case and 
several others. 
There's a case we didn't cite called Bundadick, 
something like that — actually it's fact for the court to 
look at in determining that — suggesting that you look at 
whether the defendant engaged in business in the state, was 
licensed in the state, owned property in the state, 
maintained employees, agents, bank accounts in the state, had 
shareholders residing in the state, had phone listing in the 
state, advertised in the state, traveled to the state, paid 
taxes, recruited employees, or created a substantial 
percentage of national sales income in the state. That fact 
is Bundadick versus State Line Hotel case looked at. 
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Really the only contact it appears that the 
general manner that Consolidated has in the State of Utah 
that's been addressed by the plaintiffs, one is set forth in 
an affidavit is that occasionally Consolidated would make 
spot sales in the sale of petroleum products. 
The other is an argument they made that somehow a 
web site creates jurisdiction in the state. Neither of those 
come anywhere near the conduct and substantial continuous 
local activity in the state that's required to have Jones 
jurisdiction. The case on the web site versus federal, once 
we refer to those in general they say that by just common 
informational type web site does not give general 
jurisdiction. That's really what this web site was was 
information about the company, the numbers you could contact 
if you were interested in their products. 
Spot sales are unrelated to the injury here. Again 
do not show a continuous and substantial activity in the 
state. There just is not sufficient basis to sue the 
defendant in the state. If Consolidated Oil is liable it 
ought be sued in the State of Colorado where the accident 
occurred, where property and everything occurred. 
It appears to us the only thing in this state is 
that the plaintiff happens to live here and that does not 
give the state jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 
THE COURT: There was a contract communication. 
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MR. ALLRED: Not between the defendant and the 
plaintiff. There is an argument that Consolidated had 
contacted the plaintiff's employer about doing some — the 
work in Colorado. But there's no contact between the 
plaintiff — 
THE COURT: The same person that signed your 
affidavit that — 
MR. ALLRED: That. There was some spot sales. 
THE COURT: Asked them to come down twice so 
there's — there is something in the State of Utah. It's not 
well — 
MR. ALLRED: I think the affidavit that's signed 
by our person says that — I've got it here. That there were 
occasional purchases made by Consolidated of petroleum 
products in the state which are unrelated to this particular 
matter. 
THE COURT: Somewhere in there, Mr. Allred, 
probably (Inaudible) they said that they had contacted the 
employer of the plaintiff on two occasions to come down and 
use the hot oil truck, Adler, I guess. 
MR. ALLRED: That's correct. 
THE COURT: So that there was some contact in 
the State of Utah. 
MR. ALLRED: The affidavits of Consolidated 
contact in Utah are limited to electronic communications to 
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accomplish purchase of transfer involved product and then 
there is the pleadings of the matter and the involvement as 
alleged by the plaintiff says that Consolidated contacted 
Adler Hot Oil to go do some work occasionally in Colorado. So 
that would be the extent of contact. 
There was no contact between Consolidated and the 
plaintiff and the lawsuit doesn't — isn't a claim of some 
violation of contract but as a tort claim arising out of an 
accident and injuries in Colorado. So I don't see that those 
contacts give the State of Utah jurisdiction over this 
defendant. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ALLRED: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Cundick. 
MR. CUNDICK: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Your Honor, a — . 
THE COURT: You know I saw you frantically 
trying to get a hold — 
MR. CUNDICK: I've got it. 
THE COURT: Are you ready to deal with — 
MR. CUNDICK: I'm ready to deal with it, Your 
Honor, and perhaps — perhaps I could just start out by 
saying what part of the Arguello — what is the issue that 
concerns you and let me address it. 
THE COURT: Okay. What I'm concerned about is — 
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I don't know if its fair to you — as I went through here, 
here are my problems. 
It looked like according to all the definitions 
that I could see that there wasn't general jurisdiction. That 
is that there must be specific, some kind of specific contact 
with the State of Utah. I couldn't see that you alleged facts 
which would show — 
MR. CUNDICK: So if there's no jurisdiction — 
THE COURT: General jurisdiction that's 
specific. 
MR. CUNDICK: Your Honor, while you're looking 
at it let me just address general jurisdiction first. 
THE COURT: All right. This is what the 
Arguello case says about general jurisdiction. There must be 
substantial and continuous local activity. That's in the 
State of Utah. Substantial and continuous. And I just — I 
didn't see anything that I could look at and even come close 
to what would be substantial and continuous local activity in 
the State of Utah. So I — I'll let you address that issue. 
And you ought to be aware that as I read through what I saw 
that I just didn't see enough for general jurisdiction. 
And then my problem is is that the contacts here, 
and this is I think really the holding of Arguello is that 
you look at the nature of the contact and the claim. The 
nature of the contact here was a contract action. If this 
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were a suit in contract I would feel great about it* 
MR. CUNDICK: Sure. 
THE COURT: But this isn't suit in contract. The 
contacts with the State of Utah didn't directly relate to the 
tort action which arose in the State of Colorado. And I think 
that's what Arguello says that there's not only got to be 
contact but for specific jurisdiction there needs to be a 
relationship between the contract and the cause of action. 
It's not a " but-for" test. 
MR. CUNDICK: I agree. 
THE COURT: It's not " but for" them calling we 
wouldn't have gone to Colorado. And so I, you know, quite 
frankly that's the issue that I have and that's why I think 
Arguello is the controlling case in this matter. 
MR. CUNDICK: And let me speak to those then. 
Thank you very much, Your Honor. 
Speaking first to the specific jurisdiction. I 
need to show for specific jurisdiction to be asserted I've 
got to rely on Utah's long arm statute, and the first item 
that I need to show is the defendant was transacting business 
in the State of Utah. 
THE COURT: I'll give you that. 
MR. CUNDICK: We both agree with that. 
THE COURT: I'll give you that. 
MR. CUNDICK: Okay. So let's move on to the 
21 
next one. I've got to show — once I show that it's 
transacted in the State of Utah then I have to show that the 
claim arises out of that transaction. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. CUNDICK: And that's what you're struggling 
with and that's what I'd like to answer. And it's — our 
view is that Consolidated calls up Utah Adler Oil, Hot Oil, 
and says we want you to perform ultra hazardous activity in 
the State of Utah. Adler says, okay, we'll do it. So they go 
to — they send in — State of Utah. State of Colorado. 
What did I say? 
MR. ALLRED: Utah. 
MR. CUNDICK: Thank you. So Adler says, Adler 
Oil sends their representative, Joseph Mecham goes to 
Colorado to perform the contract, and it's in performing the 
contract, this ultra hazardous activity that he's injured. 
So the nexus right there is the performance of the contract 
caused the injury. That is — 
THE COURT: Because it was ultra hazardous? 
MR. CUNDICK: Exactly. And that's what our 
complaint states, too, in paragraphs 60 through 65 there — . 
THE COURT: If this were just a call to service 
a xerox machine under the same circumstances only for some 
reason the machine blew up the minute the person touched it 
then you would say there's no jurisdiction. 
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MR. CUNDICK: Right. Because there's no 
relationship there. Here there's a direct relationship. 
They're asking him to perform an ultra hazardous contract. 
They're asking him to go on to a hot oil site or on to a 
refinery where it's very rare to even have an open flame, 
take a hot oil truck that's full of flame and perform an act 
of heating up this oil to take it out. 
So it's the contract itself that they've — that 
they asked — they asked Adler to perform an ultra hazardous 
activity. And that — and the injury occurs in performance of 
that ultra hazardous activity. Clearly then to us the claim 
arises out of the activity in Utah. The activity in Utah is 
arranging for the contract and then performing it, it clearly 
arises out of it. 
Once that's established then we just go on to the 
fundamental fairness whether it was foreseeable that 
litigation relating to that contract could be brought in 
Utah. This was discussed in (Inaudible). I think we're 
clearly in that one, too. We're clearly in the transacting 
business. We're clearly in the fundamental fairness and 
notions of fair play and substantial justice. The only 
question is did it arise out of it. I think it's clear that 
it did. I think it's clear that it did. 
And, Your Honor, let me move on to the general 
jurisdiction. 
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THE COURT: So you are arguing general 
jurisdiction. 
MR. CUNDICK: Yes, excuse me. 
THE COURT: What have you pled that would say 
that there's (Inaudible) and substantial business in the 
State of Utah? 
MR. CUNDICK: Thank you. This Arguello case was 
decided back in 1992 before the Brash and International, 
okay? Now in my response memorandum I quote a case from Utah 
which quotes a Zippo case. The Zippo case is a fairly famous 
case. It's referred to in virtually every 
Internet/jurisdiction case. It's kind of set down the law, 
and it says there's a scale here of jurisdiction. 
There's the — there's the personal jurisdiction 
is established when a defendant clearly does business over 
the Internet such as entering into contacts which require the 
knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the 
Internet. 
Well of course this would — this would satisfy 
that presence in the State of Utah. I can flip on my 
computer, pull up a site. Everybody in Utah can pull up a 
site on their computer from Consolidated Oil, from the 
defendant. 
Now — but that in and of itself is not enough. 
Just pulling up the site that's not a presence in Utah 
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because that would be similar to just an advertisement. 
THE COURT: Well, didn't those cases also 
distinguish between — and you talked about the transference 
of files. 
MR. CUNDICK: Exactly. 
THE COURT: And I looked at the Internet site 
and it wasn't interactive. In other words you don't log on to 
that and make an order onto that Internet site. 
MR. CUNDICK: They request you to contact them 
to setup an order. 
THE COURT: Okay. But that's different than the 
case that you cited. Said if there is an electronic 
transference of files. 
MR. CUNDICK: Exactly. 
THE COURT: And — 
MR. CUNDICK: But if — Your Honor, if you look 
at their — if you look at their memoranda their opening 
memoranda and the affidavit that's attached thereto you look 
and it's paragraph eight of the affidavit of Sherry Ebert, 
Consolidated contacts with Utah are limited to electronic 
communications that accomplish purchase and transportation of 
both product, that seems to be exchanging Internet file are 
or computer files over the Internet which satisfies the 
general jurisdiction test for — that was set out in Zippo. 
Now, Your Honor, I don't know if that statement in 
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the affidavit of Sherry Ebert in and of itself is enough. 
Okay? Because it doesn't really clearly say that they're 
doing it over the Internet, that they're exchanging computer 
files, and I don't know if it's enough. 
So what I am here is requesting this. I think 
there's enough for the court to find specific jurisdiction so 
it doesn't even have to meet the general jurisdiction issue. 
I think the fact that they asked Adler to perform ultra 
hazardous activity and the plaintiff was injured in 
performance of that ultra hazardous activity satisfies the 
arising out of test that's set forth in Arguello and also 
restated in Novamud (phonetically). 
I think there's enough there to find specific 
jurisdiction. If the court feels that that is not enough, 
that we have not shown specific jurisdiction then I would 
request the court give us leave to conduct limited discovery 
on the issue of this Internet. Because if they are — if 
Consolidated Oil is transacting business in the State of Utah 
over the Internet they have satisfied the general 
jurisdiction issues. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) fair, Mr. Allred, I kind 
of tipped my hand and said I don't think you've got it here 
and now you're arguing that you should be given more time and 
you only argue that after I say, well, I don't think you've 
got general jurisdiction. You didn't file a Rule 56(f), I 
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think it is, request for additional discovery. 
MR. CUNDICK: No, I did not. 
THE COURT: It seems like it would be highly 
unfair to somebody to allow you to come in and argue the case 
and listen to what I have to say and then say, well, I can 
kind of see, judge, that you're not in agreement with what — 
what I think as to general jurisdiction so what I really want 
is some more time to develop that. I think you have to do 
that before you get here. 
MR. CUNDICK: Your Honor, that may well be but I 
think — I certainly think there's enough for specific 
jurisdiction. I think we also have set out a case for general 
jurisdiction. 
I think that what has been stated in the affidavit 
of Shirley Hebert and what's been stated in the opening 
memoranda by Consolidated gives rise to general jurisdiction 
just over the relatively new Internet law. They have now 
made a presence in Utah because they have a site where they 
give — it's more than a passive site. It's just not an 
advertisement. It's something where they've got — it was 
attached to our reply memorandum, or response memorandum. 
There's page after page giving information about 
the company and urging you to contact them to contract with 
them, and I think that plus the affidavit of Sherry Hebert 
where she admits that they're — they're making electronic 
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communications over the Internet — over the Internet gives 
the court sufficient evidence to find general jurisdiction. 
I think we've got specific jurisdiction. I think 
we've got general jurisdiction. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Allred, do you have 
anything else you'd like to say? 
MR. ALLRED: I might, Your Honor, touch briefly 
on that Internet issue. First of all I note that all the 
cases that have been cited out of the federal circuit are all 
specific jurisdiction cases generally involve something in 
addition to a web site and the use of it. Might also indicate 
basically what the courts are saying is you've got 
informational which is — doesn't give any jurisdiction. 
You've got interactive, which does, and then you may have 
something in between. 
Patriot case that's attached to our memorandum, a 
Federal case, actually talks about a web site very similar to 
this. On page seven there it cites a case out of the Second 
Circuit, Bunsen Restaurants versus King which says defendants 
maintenance of an Internet web site with a telephone number 
to order allegedly infringing product is insufficient to 
support jurisdiction of the defendant. 
That's what we had here. We had information that 
said if you're interested here's a number to call. It wasn't 
interactive. It didn't meet any of the rest. There just is 
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really no basis here for general jurisdiction. 
The court noted, I think, Arguello is the most on 
point Utah case here. Also I think Roskelly and Nuway also 
have some involvement there. I don't think there's basis for 
specific jurisdiction. The argument by counsel being made is 
that Consolidated made a phone call, made a contract with 
Adler who was the employer of this guy who then went over to 
Colorado and was injured. That's kind of a bootstrapping 
theory. 
Again the Patriot case, the federal case rejected 
that kind of argument. Said you can't bootstrap into it. 
The cause of action you claim has got to rise out of the 
conduct. 
And here's a tort claim for ultra hazardous 
activity as to type for specific jurisdiction. The conduct 
that causes the injury or gives rise to the claim has to 
occur in Utah. It didn't. The conduct that is alleged to 
have occurred being the owning of a product or ultra 
hazardous activity in Colorado. All occurred in Colorado. 
There just is very limited involvement of our 
client in this state. And really I'm at kind of a loss as I 
got into this case why it wasn't ever filed in Colorado where 
everything happened. We'd ask the court to grant our motion. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. CUNDICK: I just — and I appreciate the 
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court letting me just on — if you just look at the pages and 
pages off the Internet, approximately eleven, twelve times 
they're requesting that you contact them or E-mail them. 
They even have a place where they say click here to E-mail. 
Mr. Freestone indicates it's 21 times they invite 
you to — I think that's more than just a passing (Inaudible) 
on passive advertisement on the web site. 
THE COURT: As you point out I think that 
there's a certain aspect to developing law. The underlying 
ideas whether or not there's fundamental fairness to — I 
think that's not going to change the mechanism to apply the 
fundamental fairness doctrine will be tweaked with as we have 
developing technology. 
The issue when you get right down to it is whether 
it•s fair for someone in the State of Utah who contacts Adler 
Oil and asks them to come over and perform a hot oil 
treatment on the oil in Colorado, whether or not they should 
be required to defend themselves in the State of Utah. It's 
not dispositive as to a cause of action. It's only 
dispositive as to the location of the action and it means a 
great deal, I think, to the attorneys and to clients also, I 
believe, especially the plaintiff in this case who is a 
resident of, I think this community. I think he's a resident 
of the Vernal area. 
He'd have to go down, and I don't know whether or 
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1 not his lawyers from the State of Utah would have — would 
2 have the ability to go down or whether or not that would even 
3 be financially practical for them to go down and to represent 
4 him in the State of Colorado. But it doesn't dispose of the 
5 action. 
6 And I do and I'll — I read, I think, the two 
7 cases that I think I need to read. And I read all of the 
8 motions. I've read all of the paperwork and I don't think 
9 that there's jurisdiction. I — I think that there needs to 
10 be a closer connection between the cause of action and the 
11 Utah contacts. And where the Utah contacts at best can be 
12 described as purchasing things in the State of Utah over the 
13 web — not over the web but over the Internet and receiving 
14 orders over the Internet from the State of Utah, I don't 
15 think — this is what I view my obligation here. 
16 I think that Justice Zimmerman made it clear that 
17 I am to resolve all conflicts in this matter in your favor, 
18 plaintiff's favor as to jurisdiction. But it remains the 
19 burden of the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction. So if there's 
20 no conflict I just take the facts as I find them. If there is 
21 a conflict then I take the facts in the light most favorable 
22 to the plaintiff. And then I must find that jurisdiction has 
23 been established according to the due process requirements 
24 that I've outlined. 
25 I — there's nothing in the affidavits or any 
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place. They talk about some Internet contact but there's 
nothing (inaudible) which would show substantial and 
continuous local activity in the State of Utah. 
The volume I think is important and the affidavit 
— is it Stinson? Is that her name? The lady that provided 
the affidavit, and also referring to what Mr. Allred said in 
his memoranda which you referred to, viewing those things 
even in the light most favorable where there is a conflict 
and where there's not a conflict I'm just taking — when 
there's not a conflict there's no — there's no dispute as to 
the evidence. 
So I'm not weighing the evidence but I must make a 
finding that the plaintiff has met it's burden of showing 
jurisdiction, and I do not think there's been substantial and 
continuous local activity within the State of Utah such to 
give the court jurisdiction over any cause of action. 
You must remember I think that what they're 
talking about in general jurisdiction is that you can serve 
sue that person for any reason in the State of Utah 
based upon their contacts in the State of Utah. It doesn't 
have to relate to anything that happened in the State of 
Utah. It just has to relate to that person who's conducting 
substantial and continuous local activity in the State of 
Utah, and I just can't see that. 
The long arm statute I think that there is a — 
32 
1 there's no allegation that the tort action occurred in the 
2 State of Utah. But there is an allegation that the defendant 
3 conducted business in the State of Utah. I think that's 
4 sufficient to meet the first step of the analysis that's set 
5 forth in the Arguello case. But then the court after looking 
6 at that as the court found in Arguello, I must find that 
7 there's a relationship between the contacts and the cause of 
8 action, and it's not just a " but for" analysis. 
9 And I-think that the same thing could have been 
10 argued in the Arguello case where these people came to the 
11 State of Utah and advised a person in Logan as to the wood 
12 making machine as I recall, didn't perform any services on it 
13 but told them what to do in order to correct a mistake. And 
14 I guess you could argue that that was a contract to come to 
15 the State of Utah to advise somebody as to substantive — as 
16 to fixing a machine that may be very destructive. In fact 
17 Mr. Arguello was, I think, according to the case, was 
18 seriously injured as a result of that. 
19 The language that I'm referring to in the Arguello 
20 case is on page — well, this page number won't help you. 
21 Says," These cases demonstrate that due process is not 
22 satisfied by the quantity of context." And I note here that 
23 there's very, very — there's not a real high quantity of 
24 contacts. 
25 Continuing." Satisfied by the quantity of contacts 
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with the state but rather their quality and nature of the 
minimum contacts and their relationship to the claims." 
And I just don't think that there's a 
relationship. I think that calling somebody to perform a 
contract in the State of Colorado does not, based upon these 
facts, grant jurisdiction for a tort that subsequently 
happens in the State of Colorado. This is something that my 
views I guess don't matter, and it may be a matter that you 
want to visit with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court 
on, and I'm certainly not offended by that. 
I just — I mean, I read it. I looked at it. I 
considered it, and sometimes I really have to struggle with 
things, and my only struggle really, to be honest with you, 
is I think it's hard on this plaintiff. My decision if I — 
if I had to choose personally between corporations and people 
I'm probably going to choose people. 
But based upon the law I'm convinced that this 
court doesn't have jurisdiction. And I think that to go 
through this and for me to deny this motion and even go up to 
the point of judgment and jurisdiction is something that can 
be raised any time. It's been specifically raised in this 
case and in my judgment I've done you a favor because if you 
got the judgment it wouldn't be any good in my — at least 
against this plaintiff who's — (Inaudible). 
I — like I say, I didn't mind handling the case 
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and I don't invite appeals but if you'd like to take this up, 
that's fine. Frankly, I didn't think it was that close of a 
legal issue when I got into it. 
So I'll grant the motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
The pleadings have been supplemented by the 
affidavits. Your other ground was that they failed to plead. 
I'll grant your motion on the issue of general jurisdiction 
because I don't think they even pled that. Specific 
jurisdiction, I think that that was adequately raised by the 
pleadings. 
And, Mr. Allred, would you prepare court's — 
findings are not appropriate because this is something that 
the Supreme Court will review as a matter of law. So, 
findings are in order. I suppose there's a degree in there 
where I have to evaluate the contacts, and I think that they 
were minimal. To that extent you better have some findings 
that I just — I just thought that they were minimal. 
Didn't have base. But you prepare that. 
Mr. Freestone, you prepare the court's ruling on 
the motion for summary judgment. 
MR. ALLRED: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: What can I do to help you? Anything 
further? I guess I've wrecked some ships here today. 
MR. CUNDICK: Your Honor, probably what we need 
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1 to do is get Barbara Maw on the line and setup a time for her 
2 motion for summary judgment. She wanted to appear by phone 
3 today. 
4 THE COURT: Oh. 
5 MR. SWENSON: As well other scheduling issues 
6 which we had agreed to discuss. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. I wonder if you'd come into 
8 chambers. I'd like to take care of Mr. Sam and this young 
9 lady back there. 
10 (Whereupon, court was held in recess at 2:51.) 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, PAMELA C. SMITH, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Registered Merit Reporter and Notary Public within and for 
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That I was NOT present at the foregoing court 
proceedings;. 
That the foregoing record was preserved by 
videotape;. 
That thereafter, I stenographically recorded the 
requested portion of the video and translated the same using 
computer-aided transcription, followed by a proofreading 
against the video. 
That the foregoing pages contain to the best of my 
ability a full, true and correct transcript of the same. 
In witness whereof, I have subscribed my name and 
affixed my seal this day of , 2001. 
PAMELA C. SMITH, C.S.R.,R.M.R. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires:. 
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(holding that the employer must "ascertain whether he has some job that the employee 
might be able to fill.") 
See Hendricks. 154 F.3d at 693; 
Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Sch. 100 F. 3d 1281, 1286 (7th Cir. 1996). 
Third,, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on a very important case of disability 
discrimination, where a Non-disabled employee won a ADA case. The Court held that an 
employee who was not, in fact, disabled, but who the employer "regarded as disabled" as 
a result of his workers compensation claim, is still protected from discrimination under 
ADA... On June 26 
HOLIHAN. v. LUCKY STORES. INC.. No. 95-55409, 9th CA, (96C.D.O.S. 4714) 
Sutton v. United Airlines. Inc.. 527 U.S. 471, 119SCt. 2139, 2143 (1999), 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1960 sec 12111(9) of the ADA requires an 
employer to reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position for which the employee 
is otherwise qualified. 
See Gile. 95 F.3d at 499: Hendricks-Robinson. 154 F.3d at 694-95; 
Dalton v. Subaru-Isum Automotive. Inc.. 141 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir. 1998); 
DePaoli v. Abbott Laboratories. 140 F. 3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1998). 
Hendricks-Robinson. 154 F. 3d at 694 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Robin Burgener appeals for a judgment from the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Rule 54(b). This appeal is from an order in a multiple multiple claim case in which the order has been 
certified as a final order by the Utah Labor Commission pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The Utah Court Of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 Utah Code 
Ann. 1953 As Amended 
LabCorp employed more than 15 employees and Robin R Burgener filed this 
complaint within 180 days from the last date of the harm. Thus, all jurisdictional 
requirements have been met as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, as amended, Utah AntiKhscrmiination Act Utah Code Ann. Title 34A. Chapter 
5) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I SSUE 1: Whether Ms Burgener has met the prima facie case of discrimination 
based upon her disability and. was disabled under the meaning of the applicable 
statues; 
a. and her impairment sustantially limited one or more major life activity. 
b. and her impairment is either permanent and or long-term 
c. and that her medication does not "cure" or "correct" 
d. and that LabCorp both knew of her disability, and acknowledged that, they 
"regarded as" [Ms. Burgener] to be disabled" 
e. that Ms. Burgener repeatedly requested reasonable accommodation with a 
transfer to the day shift from the graveyard shift because of her disability. 
ISSUE 2: Whether Ms Burgener was discriminated against when she was denied 
a reasonable accommodation based on her disability and that LabCorp knew of 
her disability 
ISSUE 3: Whether Ms Burgener was farther discriminated against when she was 
denied a day shift position stating she was not qualified for it; 
a. in favor of a non-disabled employee who was selected to "underfill" the 
position and transferred from the night shift, who had exactly the same education 
STATUTES AND RULES 
28 U.S.C. » 1291 1 
42 U.S.C. ' 2000e-2(a)(l) and (3) 3 
42 U.S.C. ' 1981a(b)(l) 17 
FED. R. CIV. P. 50 3 
FED. R. CIV. P. 51 19 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Course of proceedings and disposition in the court below. 
On September 23, 1997, Burgener filed a complaint with the EEOC 
the UALD charging that her termination effective September 24, 1997, violated The 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1960. as Amended, and the Utah Anti-discrimination 
Act of 1965. as Amended, because she believed she was discriminated against based on 
her Disability; Anxiety Disorder (with Severe Panic Attacks), Major Depression and 
Sleep Disorder. 
On May 5, 1999 a fact finding conference was scheduled by the Utah Labor 
Commission, Anti-discrimination and Labor Division to determine "the merits of the 
Charge of Discrimination"; and "whether the respondent (LabCorp) should be ordered to 
provide relief to the Charging Party (Robin Burgener) as authorized by Section 34A-5-
107(5)(d), U.C.A". LabCorp requested a continuance. The initial hearing was finally 
conducted on May 18, 1999 
At the conclusion of that hearing as well as an extensive investigation conducted 
by Bel J. Randall, Presiding Officer of the Anti-discrimination and Labor Division, a 
Findings Of Facts and Determination was submitted for review and re-evaluated by both 
his immediate supervisor, and the Utah Labor Commission Director of the Anti-
discrimination and Labor Division, Joseph Gallegos Jr. (76-86). It is important to note 
that the merits and facts of Burgener's case passed all three individuals re-evaluations, 
1 
and all three concurred with the decision On Apr il 1 7, 2000 a Determination was 
that the 
Respondent (LabCorp) failed to provide reasonable accommodation to the 
Charging Party (Robin Burgener) and that the Charging Party (Robin Burgener) 
sufficient for the Division to conclude that the Respondent's (LabCorp) position 
that not having provided a reasonable accommodation in the form of a transfer to 
j j i e c |ay gjjjfj. jvfedical I echnoiogist position was she not (pialilu il is unworthy of 
credence." (76-86) 
On May 5, 2000 LabCorp wrote a letter of formal request to appeal the Order 
dated April 17, 2000. 
H • « ' • . L!:. ;; , , .UL,- ;kirgener AL, n wronaiy 
reversed the prior Decision and Ordei by die adiudir.r • 
Commission stating their reason to be because: 
Burgener factually and ieagliy failed to qualify as disabled under 
I i i i i Il IjMk ( (tile il 'I < I  IH f'. 
The rational used to derive at that conclusion was and T <|iiote: 
Ms Burgener's initial onset ol depression an>* «IM *•<. i * in fact constituted an 
impairment that substantially limited her with respect to the major life 
activities of: (1) sleep; (2) self care; (3) parenting, and; (4) management of her 
household. However, after the first six weeks following the death of her 
mother, Ms. Burgener successfully corrected and mitigated her depression with 
Prozac. 
Burgener filed a Motion for Review on May 25, 2002 and recieved a denial on . 
Burgener 
filed a motion for reconsideration on September 19, 2002 which also was denied on 
October 31, 2002. 
Burgener filed a petition for review with the Utah Court of Appeals and assigned 
appellative court number 20021000-CA, on November 29, 2002. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Robin Burgener graduated from Bear River High School in 1974. After working 
over thirteen years as a Receiving Supervisor and Industrial Engineering Technician at 
American Greetings, the company closed all of it's Utah operations and relocated to the 
State of Kentucky. Rather than transfer to Kentucky, she decided to return to school and 
continue her Collage education. Ms. Burgener enrolled at Weber State University, in the 
Clinical Laboratory Sciences Program, where she successfully earned a Associated Of 
Science Degree on With a GPA of 3.40 
Burgener worked over six years for LabCorp as a Medical Laboratory Technician 
3 
in the I lematology depai tment a t the M u n ay , Utah facility i 'Vfter earning an ,\NSOC{UUAL , 
Society oi Clinical Pathoio^,), Registry, Burgener was very happv with her 
position at LabCorp. 
Although IJurgener w t - k u the graveyard shift r i inning from 8:00 p.m.. t o ^ •-1 
ii in iihiil vulli! ill 1 ittiiplaiii! i n n Ihr \\v\\ live ymrs she \v\ \i\\n\ CM dllnil |Hkrloiin.iiii c 
evaluations describing her as a "excellent employee" "a \ aluable asset" and a "very 
competent, thorough and accurate employee", Burgener had. been full time employed at 
K-jpi . ei six ) • sa r s, vv as fi ill) \ e: ::....... !ie company and had e\cr> mu ni; ..; . ; 
remaining with the company i mtil reti rement 
Subsequent to her Mother ' s death, ( her Mother had lived with Burgener for all but 
five years ot i i u i g e n e i \ hie and continuos for the seven years prior to her death), 
.l...:.i . ' — •-. • , 2 1 th, 199 7; ii i 11V h i t: < 1: , 2 1 l \ IS S ' \ 
Burgener attempted to return to work on Frid;n\ \ l a i d h 28 th, 1997, and had an emotional 
"breakdown" at work. She started crying uncontrollably and told - H \ m \ o i Y\ nine 
I lendi ick' s that she " 'thought she was losing her mind' ', Burgener tried resting foi a spell 
then reti irning to v oi k. bi it v as still I inable to 11 n • 11 '•, * • 11i n a i 11; 11 < n n n I ie 11 I 1 >c i \ \ I i. i I s 11 < \\',. i s 
doing, as well as, again experiencing severe Anxiety and Panic Attacks, She was sent home 
by her supervisor, Yvonne Hendri.ck.son. 
Ilurgeni i .illciiipkMll 1 i 1 I i I in in in I ill ilillii I  I > M o w i n g n i ^ m . .. . w a s a g a i n 
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unsuccessful. Burgener was still unable to focus, concentrate, or remember what she was 
doing, experiencing the same symptoms of severe Anxiety and Panic Attacks. She was once 
again sent home by her supervisor, who had told her that in fact she was not released to 
return to work as yet anyway, and that she needed to go to her doctor for an evaluation 
prior to attempting to return to her duties for the third time. Burgener was able to get an 
appointment with her then family physician, Dr. Douglas Douville on April 3rd, 1997. 
Burgener reported to her doctor her feelings of hopelessness and helplessness and how 
she suffered from insomnia and constant anxiety. She slept only a few hours a day, 
struggled to perform routine household chores, got lost while driving and felt 
perpetually fatigued, was irritable, was easily distracted, and had difficulty with the 
ability to focus and concentrate. After a complete examination, tests and evaluation with 
Dr. Douville, Burgener was diagnosed with "Severe Depression" and he wrote a note to 
LabCorp which stated she should be excused from work until April 6th, 1997. On April 3rd, 
1997 Dr. Douville's notes stated that: Since her Mother's death, she has significant grief 
reaction with all of the classic signs of depression". [Exhibit "P-l 1"] 
On April 7th, 1997, Burgener returned to her doctor prior to her shift for further 
follow up. At that time Dr. Douville determined that she was still suffering from "Severe 
Depression" Dr. Douville observed that" Burgener had significant problems sleeping" 
and prescribed Valium.[id.]. On that date he recorded in his notes: "The depression 
persists and is very problematic as she cannot concentrate". ASSESSMENT: Grief 
5 
I ahCoip which stilted slit" was slill nnahli IMIIIIIIIIII "nil (lliiii iliilln "Sr^rrr I lqn\ , IKIIII 
He further stated, she should probably be able to return to work on April i I , LJ^ ,. 
°~ V—*1 097 Rurgcner again had .s A>]> >w up appointment prioi io \ h I was 
: » • - M . ! . , , orsevera, medical tests, . :. .. - .le 
determined III nil ltiii"cnci vuis slill >iillrnn" h »in \im<h mil Sn i i c hrpirssioii" 
v\ liicli continued to make her unable to return to work. On that same date, Dr. Douville 
began Biirgener on Prozac 10 mg, and advised her that she had suffered a complete 
1* r w motion e years of gr^veva , ,, Je 
stated her bodv ^ 
0— :* oik _ 0IA . c jard shift. He stated that her Mothei s death *AA L*e middle of the 
night quite probably was the final trigger point coupled with the sleep deprivation that she 
.penencing ior M-MT«O W& ie again u . u i.uU orp a nole whuli stated >>tie 
• ^ • - . . -
c. he transferred lo A daytime position when she returns to work. (Please see note 
from Dr. Douville dated 4/18/97 in the first hearing file with Bel Randcll). Dr Douville's 
ill ili st.ilnf l''nhiii "in \ if (in 1  il 1  ill illi  |HVSMMII 1111II ill 111 in I , I  i n ill 1 lllliiiiiiiii 11 u n a b l e 
work...Recommend she be mo veu u> day time woi* YM 
ASSESSMENT: Grief reaction which is looking more like a major depression. 
OnApin i<S' i *'•>.. iimiicdiately following her doctor appointment, Burgenerwent 
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to LabCorp with her note from Dr. Douville, which stated she was still unable to return to 
work and with his recommendation for a transfer from the graveyard shift. While at 
LabCorp, Burgener went to the Human Resources Department and made a request for a 
transfer to a day shift. She stated to the Human Resource Manager, Vicky Romero, that it 
was at her doctors Medical Advice which was documented in his note. Romero immediately 
responded to Burgener, "that it was not possible for her to change shifts".Romero further 
stated that if Burgener was "not able to immediately return to her graveyard shift, her only 
option was to go on Short Term Disability". 
On April 28th, 1997, Burgener once again returned to her doctor for follow up. Dr. 
Douville again stated that Burgener continued to suffer from "Severe Depression" and 
was still unable to return to evening or night shift work. On that same date Dr. Douville 
provided Burgener with a work release note with the stipulation that she was able to 
return to work as long as it was to a daytime shift. He advised her that she still remained 
unable to work the graveyard shift and most likely would not ever be able to work 
nights again. After four weeks of unsuccessful treatment for the Major Depression, He 
[Douville] referred her to a mental health professional for further evaluation and treatment 
if necessary He further stated she would be re-evaluated on May 12th, 1997. When she 
submitted her Medical Note to LabCorp she again requested a transfer to a day shift position 
so that she could return to work as soon as possible. Once again. Burgener was told that she 
would not be able to transfer to a day shift. Burgener also contacted her Human Resources 
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•lion* cUn,iu ilk s.,np., a t ASMSIUI^C i *iogramprovider and was given 
I I'll I )imnu Mmlcy I 'asllclnii • nanir 
. o n May 2nd, 1997 . Bnrecner saw Dr. Donna Mox \c\ Castleton, DSW, LCSW, B C D 
for counseling [Exhibi t 'T < • > • O. Casileton noted (Iv.i n, v
 wener "could not concentrate" 
andwas "loij-vllul , ) . , ^ i i ^ u ^ .iiinaliy diagnosed Burgener with. I)SM II 
, « „ ; • % , I , .
 : - i • 
300.00 Anxiety Disorder 
309.28 Adjustment Disorder 
Vbi.Hi Bereavement 
\ \ i s 11: "I i Ill (III1!11 No Diagnosis 
Axis. Ill: Mental and Physical Exhaustion 
Axis T*7: . Severe 
On ]\fay 12th, 1997 . Burgener was once :r;asu re-evaluated by Di . L/OI -1 * lc 
explained t o . Burgener that the combination of work i n g nights for six years, suffering from 
sleep deprivat ion for the few years prior, along with all the stress with her Mother's care 
. in in i Il mi. in i s i n ,i» il  i mi 1 1 1 1 1 v 1 1 1 ( i i - 1 " II s 1 II i j.' I i" in " m i i.' 1 1 1 i 1 1 II 11 mi in I ) ii II I i Mi I I I II 1 Ill 1 HI ill ill ill ill i i ii ill ill, ,,S i v e i e 
Depression", "Anxiety" and "Panic Disorder". He went on to say, that her Mother's death 
in the middle <*r the nighU (which would have been during her graveyard shiff if ii IKJU not 
«;Uu i^;' day ^ . v.«.., *,„ ;.nui trigger point causing the b reakdown. Dr. Douvillc likened 
it to PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder). At the conclusion of that visit Dr. Douville 
stated yet again, that. Burgener was still unable to work evening and night shifts due to 
"Serious Depression". He further advised . Burgener that for health reasons she was no 
longer able to work evening and night shifts. 
On May 15th, 1997 Dr. Douville stated "Robin continues to be unable to work night 
shifts due to 'Severe Depression" [Exhibit P-ll"] 
On July 3rd, 1997 Dr. Castleton wrote a note to LabCorp, Human Resource Manager, 
Vicki Romero which stated: "Robin Burgener has been a patient of mine since May 2nd, 
1997 for Major Depression following her Mother's death. She stated . Burgener is 
medically unable to work evenings or nights, [id]. 
On August 29th, 1997 Dr. Castleton wrote a letter stating: "Robin Burgener has been 
under my care for the treatment of Depression and Panic Disorder since May 2nd, 1997.1 am 
coordinating treatment with her family physician who is monitoring her medication. He 
recently increased Robin's anti-depressant medications in an attempt to stabilize her current 
condition. Given Robin's current psychiatric state, I, (Dr. Castleton), am exploring more 
intensive treatment alternatives which may include day treatment and/or possibly an 
inpatient stay", [id] 
Burgener testified at both hearings that her depression affected her in a manner she 
equated to feeling like she "living underwater". She stated that: " nothing came into 
focus for her". Burgener said she "got out of bed late or not at all." She stated that she 
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o r g r o o m ing"? and "perfoi med no housework" Burgener further testified, that because 
"lost the ability to handle her finances", she lost her home to forclosure. 
Burgener stated thai "because her mind drifted" "she couldn't watch tv""or read 
h o o k s " S h e I in tin 'i iirslilii il .IIMIIII IIIII • In JJOI lost (iiiiiiiiiii \ ilk iiiinir mi I IIIII III iiiiiiiiiiiiii| iiiiiiiiii III i ill 
neighborhood" Burgener further testified about "Ihr problem* * -
sleeping" 
Dr Douville made several written statements in the record 
tt ,. i- I • ,. t ' 3 19 7 ; si t t i I ' ' ' ' ' " ' -
significant grief reaction" "with all of the classic signs of depression" 
"that on 4/7/97 the depression persists and..." "is very problematic as she..." 
"cannot concern .. . ' 
His assess 
"Grief reaction which is looking more like..." 
"Major Depression" 
"Anxiety and Depression continue to make her unable to work" 
"Recommend she be moved to day time work when she returns" 
On April. 18th, 199 7 after several medical tests ih -. M .- 11 ic determined that. Burgener was 
"still suffering from Anxiety and Severe Depression" 
"advised her she had suffered a physical and emotional breakdown"... 
"as a result of years of graveyard work" 
"her body and mind were reacting to complete burnout" 
"that she should no longer work a graveyard shift" 
He further stated on that date, that her Mother's death 
"unable to return to evening or night shift work" 
"quite probably was the final trigger point" 
"coupled with the sleep deprivation that she had experienced for several years" 
"made the recommendation that. Burgener be transferred to a daytime 
position when she returns to work" 
Dr. Douville's notes stated 
"Robin's Anxiety and Depression continues to make her unable to work" 
"Recommend she be moved to daytime work when she returns." 
"prescribed lOmg of Prozac" 
On April 28th, 1997 Dr. Douville advised . Burgener that she 
"still remained unable to work the graveyard shift" 
"and most likely would not ever be able to work nights again" 
On April 28th, 1997, Dr. Douville referred . Burgener to Dr. Donna Moxley Castleton for 
evaluation and counseling if needed. 
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 ' T D i the Major Depression and Anxiety" 
"I h i lli.it s ; t t t i c ( I . l i e , A p r i l '•'ll 1 ( ) r mm i l l r p i i h m i n i I  i i i i j ' n i n i illllli i i r o i k i d l e s t * 
note which stated ". Burgener continues to suffer from Severe Depression" 
That work release note further stipulated that Burgener was: 
"able to return to work as long as it was to a daytime shift" 
I I n III1 II I V ),,a l l i i h ' i ' l l t i s , i ' I  III I  In in i l 1 11 I M n > l r y ( ,i Mi I n n i i iiliiii i l i u m I I'll I ' t" t l r l n i l l l i t l o d 
"could not concentrate" "was forgetful" 
Dr Castleton initially diagnosed . Burgener \* "ll. 
"Majoi Depression5'1" i " • Adjustment p | s o r c | e r w 
III!: i i n i i rmeiil ' "Mental ' s 
"Severe" 
On May 12th. Dr Dom ille explained to . Burgener that the coiiibination of working nights 
loi M \ ytv Iiiiiii \ Jiliinii il i il 1 II in v lew years pnoi along uilh 
"nil llif stre<- ' if! ' ' Mother 's siiiil ilrii ilc.illli iiiii Hi i middle of 
the night" ano raising her daughter as a single parent" t nil to the "burnout" 
"Severe Depression" " ^ nxiety" Gallic Disorder" "final breakdown" 
II H'li II i'1 I  mi 'ilk' 11hi;iit'll ill In 
"PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) 
On May 15th, 1997, Dr. Douville stated 
"Robin continues to be unable to work night shifts due to Severe I topression > 
On July 3rd, 1997, Dr. Castleton wrote a note to LabCorp which stated . Burgener has 
"been a patient of mine since May 2nd, 1997" 
"for Major Depression" "following her mother's death" 
"and is medically unable to work evenings or nights" 
"She is anxious to return work but requires a day time job". 
On July 7th, 1997, Dr. Douville wrote a note to LabCorp which stated: 
"Robin continues to be unable to work night shifts secondary to Depression and 
Anxiety associated with working these shifts" 
On August 20th, 1997 Dr. Douville wrote a note to LabCorp which stated: 
"Robin continues to be unable to work nights" 
"I am referring her to a psychiatrist" 
"and increasing her medication" 
On August 29th, 1997 Dr. Castleton wrote a letter stating: 
"Robin Burgener has been under my care for the treatment of Depression and 
Panic Disorder since May 2nd, 1997." 
"I am coordinating treatment with her family physician who is monitoring her 
medication*" 
"He recently increased her medications in an attempt to stabilize her current 
condition" 
"I have many concerns about her mental health at this time to effectively cope 
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111 i I Tiidmi Iiirtlirrslntol in IIKII IrllH il.ilnl Aiijzusl N> I'i'h1 nil ml 
"Given Robin's current psychiatric stale, 1" ' (Dr. Castleton) 
"am exploring more intensive treatment alternatives" 
"which may include day Irealnu (ill 
"and/ 
Burgener told both her family Doctor and her Therapist that she had been able to sleep only 
a few hours a day for the past few years prior to her Mother's death She funher reported 
dial sin "'"it i mill HI linn inn pinpeils" itiitl ki( like was """"going r^az^  .tuvi,,. anu 
Dr. DonnaMoxley-Castleton diagnosed Bi lrgener with Deprr-x.ion . H \,.. , • 
and Panic Disorder because Burgener was suffering from feelings of "hopelessness and 
ijciplessness" CApcnciicint -«*«Uti:*~ distractibility, [and] difficulty 
roiK'eittnttin^ ", - - - ^ ' 
Dr. Castleton noted that Burgener's anticipatory anxiety over getting enough sleep 
each night and the sheer exhaustion from insomnia exacerbated Burgener's condition, and 
she couiintiousl v !»"'" li iicleil Burgener to seek a transfer to a day time shift 
Continue u- - ' 
maintained the medical opinion that she was medically unable to continue \\ oiling at night,. 
and went on to state that it was "unlikely she would ever be able to work nights again", 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. First, LabCorp claims that there lacked sufficient evidentiary basis to find that 
Burgener was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. Specifically, LabCorp 
argues that Burgener did not provide them with a reasonable basis to find that her requested 
accommodation—a transfer from the night shift to a daytime shift—would have enabled her 
to perform the essential functions of her job. The ADA requires accommodation only for a 
"qualified individual with a disability" who can perform her job with or without reasonable 
accommodation. See Voilmen v. Wisconsin Dep't ofTransp.. 197 F.3d 293, 297 (7th Cir. 
1999). The ADA thus mandates that an employer make reasonable accommodations only 
if accommodation would permit the disabled employee to perform her job, and an employer 
need not grant a disabled employee's request for an accommodation that would be an 
"inefficacious change." Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin.* 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th 
Cir. 1995). In Weigel v. Target Stores. 122 F.3d 461, 469 (7th Cir. 1997), 
Burgener repeatedly demonstrated that she was a qualified individual under the 
ADA., and " that she could return to work with her requested accommodation of a 
change of shift from graveyard to a day shift, which the employer had rejected.. 
Unlike LabCorp, Ms. Burgener presented an endless stream of documentation 
from her Doctors as well as her medical records concerning both her physical and 
psychological symptoms including the need for a transfer to a daytime shift. 
enough sleen each nipht 
[Burgener's] condition. Dr Castleton and Burgener explained to Romero that regular 
daytime work would have stabilized her sleep patterns and reduced the anxiety and 
Although a shift transfer may not have cured Bui'w IHT\S condition UHOJ'HIHT 
a rational decision easily could conclude that a shift transfer would have alleviated her 
symptoms such that Burgener could have performed her job. Indeed, once Burgener 
from the regular work and sleep schedule. Burgener sufficiently established that she 
was a qualified individual with a disability who could have performed her job with 
reasonable accommodation. 
N!
- •• • iii'iutricks-Robuisuh >. /„Ut/ i .,,-/* tV* * < 3 y ) , 
Hu rc^pectrw obligations of employer JIA^ ~~ icJ employee in executing the 
accommodation process, The employee first must act by informing the employer o r her 
titsjbililv SM nl Itiiii'nn i illlliiil'i imlihed 1 <ih< mi Il llliini i l isaluhh .iiml h quis led 
accommodation, in excess of 16 times Dr Douville wrote ovei 8 medical notes to 
LabCorp and Fortis (LabCorp's Long and Short Term Disability provider), over a nine 
month period, stressing the need for Burgener to be transfered to a day shift due to her 
disability. In .ulililmii . Dr Caslli I mi iiii inn [MM urtl to LabCorp |as p«iri ol ilk" hmployee 
/& 
Assistance Program evaluation for fitnees for duty), and wrote 3 notes and 1 letter, also 
stating the necessity for LabCorp to transfer Burgener to a day shift. At that point, the ADA 
obligates the employer to "engage with the employee in an 'interactive process' to determine 
the appropriate accommodation under the circumstances." Bombard v. Fort Wayne 
Newspapers. Inc.. 92 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1996). This step "imposes a duty upon 
employers to engage in a flexible, interactive process with the disabled employee needing 
accommodation so that, together, they might identify the employee's precise limitations and 
discuss accommodation which might enable the employee to continue working." Hendricks-
Robinson. 154 F.3d at 693 (internal citations omitted); see also Miller v. Illinois Dep't of 
Corrections. 107 F.3d 483, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the employer must 
"ascertain whether he has some job that the employee might be able to fill."). Although 
LabCorp argues that Burgener's proposed accommodation would have been ineffective, 
LabCorp had the affirmative obligation to seek Burgener out and work with her to craft a 
reasonable accommodation, if possible, that would have permitted her return to work. See 
Hendricks. 154 F.3d at 693; Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Sck. 100 F.3d 1281, 
1286 (7th Cir. 1996). 
LabCorp failed its obligations under the ADA. In the face of Burgener's repeated 
pleas for a shift transfer. LabCorp refused her request for a modest accommodation, 
then did nothing to engage with Burgener in determining alternative accommodations 
that might permit Burgener to continue working. Romero provided no help at all except to 
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suggest that 
"Ms Burgener just go on Short-term Disability. LabCorp's only action in the subsequent 
months was to terminate Burgener on September 24, 1997«a move that LabCorp 
subsequently denied was related to her disability. LabCorp made no effort to 
accommodate Burgener. 
Third, On June 26, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on a very important case 
of disability discrimination, where a Non-disabled employee won a ADA case. The Court 
held that an employee who was not, in fact, disabled, but who the employer "regarded as 
disabled" as a result of his workers compensation claim, is still protected from 
discrimination under ADA... 
In Holihan v. Lucky Stores, the employee was on medical leave of absence when he 
started working two other jobs. The company terminated his employment. He reapplied for 
employment but there were no openings at his level. Rather than accepting a lower job, the 
employee sued. Management then offered Holihan a choice of either suspension pending 
Lucky's investigation into the allegations, or a standard leave of absence if he contacted 
Luckyfs Employee Assistance Program (EAP) for counseling. Holihan contacted the EAP 
and began a medical leave of absence. The EAP referred Holihan to Dr. Jonathan Strickler, 
a psychologist, who diagnosed Holihan as "experiencing stress related problems precipitated 
by work" and recommended he not return to work for about 6 months. This diagnosis was 
forwarded to Lucky., The Court of Appeals held that Holihan was not disabled under the 
\8 
Americans with DisabiUties Act (ADA) because his mental impairment did not substantially 
limit any of his major life activities. Even if Holihan couldn't perform his store manager job, 
the fact that he worked in the sign-making business and in real estate showed that he was not 
disabled. However, the Court went on to hold that even if Holihan were not actually 
disabled, the ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals "regarded as" disabled. 
If Lucky regarded Holihan as disabled, Holihan would have a "disability." 
Since Lucky knew about the doctors1 reports diagnosing Holihan with 
depression, anxiety and stress, Lucky could have regarded Holihan as suffering from 
a disabling mental condition that substantially limited his ability to work. Therefore, 
the Court ordered Lucky to go to trial on the case. Holhan v. Lucky Stores. Inc No. 
95-55409, 9th CAy (96 C.D.O.S. 4714) 
This case has significant impact on management's response to employees with 
disabilities. It indicated that even where management applies policies consistently for 
legitimate business reasons, there is potential liability involved in even routine decisions 
about firing employees who have been on workers compensation. 
When Romero provided no help at all except to suggest that "Ms Burgener just go 
on Short-term Disability Benefits, and in fact placed Burgener on Short Term Disability 
until her termination on September 24,1997, LabCorp proved they "regarded [Burgener] 
as" disabled, and as such, Burgener was still protected from discrimination under ADA.. 
Since LabCorp regarded Burgener as disabled, Burgener would have had a 
"disability". Fourth, LabCorp's argument raised only in appeal, said that the 
assessment of Burgener's disability was made without regard to mitigating measures, 
namely the medications that Burgener took to treat her depression and anxiety. A year after 
the initial hearing's close, the Supreme Court decided in Sutton v. United Airlines. Inc.. 527 
U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2143 (1999), and held that "the determination of whether an 
individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures that mitigate the 
individual's impairment." 
LabCorp alleges only that Burgener's condition improved under medication, 
and therefore the conclusion that Burgener was not disabled when medicated. In fact, 
Burgener suffered significant impairment despite the medication. Burgener began 
taking medication in April 1997, and nearly all the relevant events of the case occurred 
while Burgener was taking regular medication but still suffering serious depression 
and anxiety. Burgener continues to suffer from Major Depression (Chronic and 
Recurrent), Severe Anxiety (Chronic and Recurrent) and Panic Attacks (Recurrent). She 
continues to be treated for the Major Depression, Severe Anxiety, and Panic Attacks, and 
continues to be prescribed a daily antidepressant and anti-anxiety medication, as evidenced 
by copies of her medication (Prozac) labels for as recent as last month.. Please note the 
dosage is now 40 mg per day compared to the 10 mg dosage she was on when this claim was 
initially filed. Over the past seven and a half years Burgener's medication dosage has 
been increased four times thus far, each time because the medication level was 
%t> 
ineffective in minimizing the severe symptoms associated with the Chronic Major 
Depression , Anxiety Disorder and Panic Attacks* 
It is Burgener's contention that Sutton in the context that it has been cited for this 
case does not support the denial of disability determination. The Court in Sutton, concluded; 
[i]t is apparent that if a person is taking measures to correct for or. or mitigate, a 
physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures- positive and negative-
must be taken into account when judging whether that person is "substantially 
limited" in a major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act. 
To be sure, a person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by 
mitigating measures still has an impairment, but if the impairment is corrected 
it does not 'substantially limi[t]' a major life activity .id 
The medication helps to reduce the symptoms of her diagnosed Major Depression, 
Severe Anxiety and Panic Attacks. It does not cure gj* 'correct' the Major Depression, 
Severe Anxiety and Panic Attacks. Even with the medication, Burgener remains unable 
to work the " graveyard" and " night" shift. Those shifts increase and elevate the 
symptoms of the Severe Anxiety and Panic Attacks, which in turn causes her to 
experience a Major Depressive Reaction With Anxiety State Features. Burgener's 
current employer has provided. Burgener with the same reasonable accommodations 
she requested from LabCorp, that is a day shift laboratory position. 
The Court in Sutton went on to hold that: 
The term "substantially limits" means among other things, "fulnable to perform a 
major life activity that the average person in the general population can 
perform;" or 'Tslignificantlv restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration 
under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared 
to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the 
general population can perform that same life activity. (Citation omitted). Finally, 
"[m]ajor [l]ife [activities means functions such as caring for oneself, performing 
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working/YCitation omitted), id 
The average person in the general population is able to perform their job duties on the 
graveyard shift without experiencing episodes of the disabling symptoms of severe 
Anxiety and Panic Attacks and most often resulting in a Major Depressive Reaction With 
severe Anxiety and Panic Attacks.. Burgener was at the time she filed her charge of 
discrimination, [and remains even today], unable to work the graveyard shift without 
experiencing episodes of the disabling symptoms of severe Anxiety and Panic Attacks 
and which most often do result in a Major Depressive Reaction With Anxiety and 
Panic Attacks.. 
Fifth, The ALJ correctly ruled in part that "the preponderance of evidence in this 
case confirm that after the death of her mother on March 24, 1997 Ms Burgener 
suffered a bout of severe disability, anxiety, and bereavement". The ALJ went on to say, 
"the undisputed facts in this case confirm that"..."the impairment caused by Ms 
Burgener's depression and anxiety limited her major life activities of: (1) sleep; (2) self 
care; (3) parenting, and; (4) management of her household.. 
The part that is in dispute is where the ALJ erred when he ruled that "after the 
first six weeks following the death of her mother, the preponderance of the evidence in 
this case demonstrated tha Ms Burgener successfully managed her depression with 
Prozac". 
The medication helps to reduce the symptoms of her diagnosed Major Depression, 
Severe Anxiety and Panic Attacks. It does not cure or 'correct' the Major Depression, 
Severe Anxiety and Panic Attacks. Even with the medication, Burgener remains unable 
to work the " graveyard" and " night" shift. Those shifts increase and elevate the 
symptoms of the Severe Anxiety and Panic Attacks, which in turn causes her to 
experience a Major Depressive Reaction With Anxiety State Features. Burgener's 
current employer has provided. Burgener with the same reasonable accommodations 
she requested from LabCorp, that is a day shift laboratory position. 
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Sixth, LabCorp failed to provide Burgener weth the reasonable accommodation of 
a transfer from the graveyard shift to a day shift. LabCorp concedes that a daytime position 
was vacant throughout the period during which Burgener was requesting a transfer, but 
stated that Ms. Burgener was not qualified for the position that she requested. The late part 
of August and early of September, 1997, Burgener applied for a day shift Medical 
Technologist position in the Hematology Department at the Murray facility. 
Burgener was not selected reportedly because she did not have a four year degree, 
and therefore, reportedly, did not meet the minimum qualifications for the position. 
However, it is important to note that LabCorp selected another employee for that same 
Medical Technologist position who did not meet the minimum qualifications in that she also 
did not have a four year degree. LabCorp's rationale for selecting another employee for the 
position in question was that even though the employee did not meet the minimum 
qualifications for the position, she was assigned the position temporarily because she had 
experience working in the Hematology Department. Burgener had been employeed by 
LabCorp in the Hematology Department continuously from August 26th, 1991 as a full time 
Medical Laboratory Technician, thus had six (6) years experience. LabCorp asserted that 
Burgener did not have the necessary experience and therefore, was not as qualified as the 
selected employee and that Ms. Burgener would have required some additional training to 
make her proficient in the position. In addition, LabCorp further asserted that there are 
certain functions which the selected employee could not perform because she is not a 
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Medical Technologist. LabCorp stated those functions are assigned to other Medical 
Technologists from other Departments. 
A review of the selected employee's performance file and her appraisal dated 
November 12, 1997, reflects the employee needed additional training to become proficient 
in this temporary assignment". Insert source pg . A review of Burgener's employment 
history and educational level, reflects she had the same two year degree, a degree in 
Clinical Laboratory Science, fulfilled all of the knowledge and competency 
requirements to be certified as a Medical Laboratory Technician by the Board Of 
Registry, American Society of Clinical Pathologist. In addition, Ms, Burgener had 
more experience as a Medical Laboratory Technician and had been employed by 
LabCorp longer than the selected employee. Furthermore, LabCorp's representatives 
testified at the initial hearing, that Burgener was an excellent employee. 
The preponderance of the evidence clearly shows that both Dr's Douville and 
Castleton repeatedly and continuously wrote notes to LabCorp stating that Ms. 
Burgener was unable to return to work on the graveyard shift, and that Ms. Burgener 
needed a transfer to the day shift. .Dr. Douville wrote EIGHT Notes to LabCorp 
repeatedly telling them [ LabCorp] that Burgener needed to transfer to a day shift. 
Dr.Castleton wrote THREE Notes , 1 letter and verbally reported to LabCorp (as 
LabCorp's Employee Assistance provider and evaluator for employee's fitness for 
duty), on a regular basis, each time reemphasizing Burgener's inability to work 
graveyard shift and the need for Burgener to transfer to a day shift. In addition, 
Burgener formally asked LabCorp for a transfer to a day shift from the graveyard 
shift over 16 times. 
LabCorp made no determined attempt to provide a reasonable accommodation 
for Burgener by allowing her to under fill the day shift Medical Technologist position. 
The record further reflects LabCorp allowed another Medical Technician to under 
fill the position but did not consider Burgener. despite her superior qualifications. In 
addition, LabCorp provided no evidence to suggest that to allow Ms. Burgener to 
under fill the position would have created an undue hardship. LabCorp's position has 
been that Burgener would have required additional training to be proficient in the 
position. The record reflects that the employee who was ultimately placed in the 
position also required additional training. Furthermore, the temporary assignment 
which was given to Medical Technician began in September, 1997 and continued until 
the incumbent resigned her full time employment with LabCorp, in February, 1999. 
LabCorp acknowledges that a daytime positions was open throughout all the 
events of this case prior to her termination, and that Burgener had applied for it. 
Under the circumstances, the ADA requires that LabCorp transfer Burgener 
to a vacant daytime position. Although the ADA does not obligate employers to 
"bump" other employees or create new positions, sec. 12111(9) of the ADA requires 
an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position for which the 
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employee is otherwise qualified. See Gile. 95 F.3d at 499; Hendricks-Robinson. 154 F.3d 
at 694-95: Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive. Inc.. 141 F.3d 667,678 (7th Cir. 1998); 
DePaoli v. Abbott Laboratories. 140 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1998). The employer is 
obligated to "identify the full range of alternative positions for which the individual satisfies 
the employees legitimate, nondiscriminatory prerequisites" and consider "transferring the 
employee to any of these other jobs. " Dalton. 141 F.3d at 678. is wrong to say that it 
constitutes "affirmative action" to reassign Burgener to a vacant position for which she was 
entitled by equal qualifications and seniority and which would have accommodated her 
disability. 
Although the ADA does not require the employer to abandon its legitimate policies 
regarding job quaUfications and entitlements to company transfers, LabCorp cannot 
seriously claim that the procedural requirement of selecting the other employee with exactly 
the same educational credentials and less seniority was too important for LabCorp to bypass 
when a daytime position was open and Burgener had applied for it. In Hendricks-Robinson. 
the defendant's policy of posting job openings and insisting that disabled employees 
independently learn of and apply for new positions was insufficient to satisfy the employer's 
duty under the ADA to investigate the possibility of transferring disabled employees. 
Hendricks-Robinson. 154 F.3d at 694. LabCorp did not notify or invite Burgener of the 
posted position opening. Burgener saw it posted on the bulletin board one of the many times 
she went into Human Resources requesting a transfer to a day shift. Likewise, LabCorp 
failed its duty of reasonable accommodation because it took no action other than to reject 
Burgener's request. By refusing her request and assuming no further duty to accommodate 
her requests for a shift transfer failed its ADA obligation. 
Seventh, The ALJ erred when he ruled that Burgener's disability only lasted six 
weeks. It was four weeks before Dr Douville "referred, Burgener to a mental health 
professional for evaluation and treatment if necessary", because Dr. Douville was 
unable to stabilize any of Burgener's disabling conditions, which included but were not 
limited to her Major Depression, Anxiety Disorder, Panic Attacks and Sleep Disorder as 
well as the numerous disabling problems associated with the above, with the "mitigating 
medications ". 
Burgener remained in therapy with Dr Castleton, at her own expense, nearly two 
months after she was terminated .as evidenced by the attached billing statement dated 
12/01/97. From March 24. 1997 through December 1, 1997. is in excess of seven 
months, considerably longer than the six weeks the ALJ claimed, that point in time, 
Burgener's medical and prescription records since December 1997 verify that 
Burgener is still being treated for the Major Depression and Anxiety Disorder. 
Employee Assistance benefits terminated along with her employment, and since Burgener 
was wrongfully unemployed, [she] did not have the financial resources to continue her 
therapy treatment with Dr. Castleton. Burgener continues to be treated for her Major 
Depression, Anxiety Disorder and intermittent Panic Attacks, by her family physician who 
evaluates, prescribes and monitors Burgeners medications. Burgener has remained in treatment for 
the Major Depression, Anxiety Disorder, and Panic Attacks continuously since April 3, 1997. as 
well as treatment for her sleep disorder 
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anxiety, and panic attacks. 
Burgener continues to be treated for her Major Depression, Anxiety Disorder and 
intermittent Panic Attacks, by her family physician who evaluates, prescribes and monitors 
Burgeners medications. Burgener has remained in treatment for the Major Depression, Anxiety 
Disorder, and Panic Attacks continuously since April 3, 1997. as well as treatment for her sleep 
disorder. Burgener now uses a C-Pap Maching each night to help 
The medication does not cure or correct the depression or anxiety disorder. Even 
with the medication., and even now, more than seven years after [her] charge of io 
discrimination. Burgener remains unable to work the "graveyard" and night shifts. Those 
shifts increase the elevation of symptoms associated with the depression severe anxiety 
disorder, causing the panic attacks, which in turn causes Burgener to experience a major 
depressive reaction and anxiety state. 
Burgener's medical doctors have advised Burgener that these conditions are a lifetime 
diagnosis, which medication which medication and therapy will help, but not cure or correct. 
The diagnosed conditions are chronic and recurrent. Burgener was disabled within the 
meaning of the Act when this UALD/EEOC AND ADA charge of discrimination was filed 
on September 24,1997, and Burgener continues to be "disabled" within the meaning of the 
Act today, now a full seven years later. Burgener met the test of "disabled" within the 
meaning of the Act, when {she} was repeatedly diagnosed and treated for both physical and 
mental impairment which substantially limited her with respect to several major life activities 
. of: ( 1) sleep; (2) self care; (3) parenting, and; (4) management of her household*. 
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.Burgener was entitled to reaasonable accommodations by LabCorp in order for [her] to be 
able to return to gainful employment. Burgener was, and remains able to work in her field 
on a daytime shift, (The reasonable accomodation she requested from LabCorp over 16 
times, that Dr. Douville also requested over 8 times, on her behalf from both LabCorp 
and Fortis, and that addition, and finally, that Dr. Castleton, LabCorp's EAP therapist 
also reported the need for Burgener to transfer to the day shift from the grave yard 
shift. 
Burgener was able to work in her field on a day shift "(the reasonable accommodation" 
Burgener filed this chsrge of discrimination case over) as evidenced by her successful daytime 
position at the University Hospital which Burgener has held for the past six years 
Eighth, 
a)This appeal should be decided based on whether Burgener met the definition of 
"disabled" from April, 1997 when Burgener had her breakdown and requested 
"reasonable accommodation", and 
b)when [she] was denied an opportunity to underfill a day shift position she applied 
for in the Hematology department, in favor of an individual who was selected to 
under-fill the position, who had exactly the same educational degree and training, 
with less seniority than Burgener; and who was not disabled. That position was filled 
the early part of September, 1997, just prior to Burgener's wrongful termination. 
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c)whether Burgener is entitled to the remedies, including but not limited to loss of 
wages, benefits, retirement etc, [she] was origionally awarded as a result of the first 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, along with compensation for all costs and 
expenses, spent or incurred thus far to defend this charge of discrimination against 
LabCorp, and to make Burgener whole, along with any and all other rememedies This 
Court may find beneficial to Burgener, as a resit and consequence of LabCorp5 s 
discrimination against Burgener 
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I hereby certify that the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT has been respectively 
submitted and filed in the office of the Clerk for the Utah State Court of Appeals ££r\ 
Utah Court of Aofceata 
this 26th day of June, 2003. ^ ^ 
NOV 0 6 2003 
Pauiette Stagg 
Clerk of ttie Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT has been filed in the 
office of the Clerk for the Utah State Court of Appeals for the Third District, and a 
true and correct copy of the same has been provided to counsel listed below in the 
manner indicated on this 26th day of June, 2003. 
ALANHENNEBOLD 
Utah Labor Commission, UALD & EEOC 
Office of General Counsel 
PO .BOX 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
Hand Delivered To Office 
Mark Morris, ESQ 
Snell & Wilmer 
15 South Temple, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
For LabCorp 
Hand Delivered To Office 
RZbinRBurgellej^ 
Mich*c) 0 L«avUt 
LABOR COMMISSION 
UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION & LABOR DIVISION 
R Le< Ellertaon 
Coram miorwr 
Robin F. Burgener, 
Charging Party 
Ja«±ph Gtltrgro. Jr 
Director 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floo|r 
PO Box 146G30 
Sail U k * City, Utah $4jH-6|530 
(801)630-6801 
TbllFr** (800) 222-1238 
(801) 530-7609 (PAX) 
(801) 530-7685 (TDD) 
vs. UALD No. 97-0722 
EEOC No. 35C-97-0844 
Lab Corp. 
Respondent. 
DETERMINATION 
Under the authority vested in me by the Utah Antidiscrimination Act of 1965, as amended, I 
issue for the Division the following Determirtation as to the merits of the subject charge. 
I JURISDICTION 
Lab Corp. employed more than 15 employees and Robin F. Burgener filed this complaint within 
180 days from the last date of the alleged harm Thus, all jurisdictional requirements have been 
met as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, and the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Act of 1965, as amended. 
II, SUMM4RY OF CHARGE 
On September 23, 1997, Robin F. Burgener, hereinafter "Charging Party," alleged that Lab 
Corp., hereinafter "Respondent," discriminated against her based on her Disability, Anxiety 
Disorder and Depression. 
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III, SUMMARY OF RESPONSE 
Respondent categorically denies that the Chalrging Party was subjected to any discriminatory 
treatment. Respondent cites that Charging Party's position was eliminated due to business needls 
and a reduction in the stee of their workforce1 at their Murray, Utah facility as the reason for 
terminating the Charging Party. 
IV. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION 
A. Charging Party's Allegations 
Charging Party alleges from April 28,1997 through September 1997, she made requests for 
reasonable accommodation in the form of being transferred to a day shift. In addition, she allegds 
a day shift position that she was qualified for'became available. Charging Party alleges she was 
told by the Respondent that she could not transfer into the position because she did not meet the 
minimum qualifications for the position. Charging Party alleges she was told that she could not 
be assigned to the position because the minimum qualification were being changed and she 
would need a Bachelor of Science degree in irder to qualify for the position. Furthemiore, 
Charging Party alleges that the Respondent transferred an unqualified employee into the positioh. 
Charging Party alleges that the employee wh6 was transferred into the position had an Associate 
Degree and had less seniority than the Charging Party. 
B. Respondent's Answer to Charging Patty's Allegations 
Respondent indicates that Charging Party be*an Medical Leave of Absence (Short-Term 
Disability) on March 24, 1997. Respondent akserts that Charging Party's position was eliminated 
due to business needs and a reduction in the slize of the workforce in its Murray, Utah facility. 
Respondent acknowledges that on April 28, !l997 it received a note from the Charging Party's 
physician which indicated that the claimant remained unable to return to her third shift position 
and would be evaluated on May 12, 1997. 
Respondent asserts that in May 1997, Chargihg Party contacted the Respondent's Human 
Resource Representative and informed them ihat she could return to perform her duties as a 
Medical Technician. The Charging Party theil reminded the Human Resources representative that 
she could not work a night shift and it would 'be necessary to transfer her to the day shift. The 
Human Resources representative informed thle Charging Party that there were no open Medical 
Technician positions available on the day shijft. 
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Respondent asserts that there were three (3) options available to the Charging Party: 1) she could 
continue to receive Short Term Disability (STD) benefits (not to exceed six months) until she 
was released by her physician to return to her third shift position; 2) she could transfer to an 
equivalent position on the day shift, provided Respondent had an available position; or 3) she 
could apply for any other available position ori the day shift for which she was qualified. 
Respondent asserts that the Charging Party elefcted to continue receiving STD benefits. 
Respondent indicates that in June 1997, corporate 
various departments at its Murray, Utah facility 
reduction in the volume of work being performed 
during the first week of July 1997, 
facility. Respondent also states that between 
positions were eliminated. Charging Party's 
management to be eliminated. 
i jcjfb 
management made the decision to downsize 
in order to remain cost effective due to a 
at the laboratory. Respondent also states that 
management began downsizing various positions at the 
and September 1997, a total of thirteen (13) 
was one of the positions authorized by 
July 
Respondent explains that it refrains from eliminating positions when an employee is participating 
in the Company's STD plan. The employee continues to receive disability benefits as long as the 
disability is certified by its insurance carrier, lit addition, Respondent asserts that upon the 
employee's return to work, the employee's position is then eliminated in accordance with the 
Company's severance policy. Respondent statles that this is done in order to give the employee 
the benefit of continued disability payments, furthermore, Respondent claims that in the event 
disability continues to the end of the Plan's qualifying period, the employee is removed from the 
active payroll and becomes eligible to apply fir long-term disability benefits. 
Respondent indicates in early September a Medical Technologist position became open on 
the day shift in the Hematology Department, alnd Charging Party submitted an in-house 
application for the position. Respondent states! the minimum qualifications for the Medical 
Technologist position required the employee tp have a 4 year degree; and the Charging Party had 
a two year degree and, therefore, was not qualified for the position. 
i 
Respondent submits that on approximately September 22 or 23,1997, Charging Party called the 
Respondent's Human Resources Representative and informed her that her STD benefits would 
end on September 23, 1997 and requested Huinan Resources guidance regarding her employment! 
options with the Respondent, In addition. Respondent states Charging Party informed Human 
Resources once again that she wanted to returh to work on a day shift. After contacting the 
Corporate Human Resources office, the local Human Resources representative informed the 
Charging Party that there was not a Medical Technician position available in the Hematology 
Department on the day shift, and that the Changing Party had two options: 1) she could accept an 
available position on the day shift at a lesser pay rate; or 2) she could accept a severance package 
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because her position had been terminated. 
Respondent indicates on September 24,1997,: Charging Party informed the local Human 
Resources representative that she would accent the severance package because she would not 
accept a day position at a lesser pay rate. 
Respondent states the Charging Party's allegation that the position of Medical Technologist was 
given to a technician with a two year degree ahd less seniority is not factual. Respondent asserts 
that a Serology Department Medical Technician was temporarily assigned to assist with certain 
duties on the day shift. Respondent asserts thd Medical Technician was assigned to this position 
because she had experience working in the Hctmatology Department. Respondent asserts that the 
Medical Technician assigned to this position i^as trained to work in all areas of the laboratory 
and had experience running STAT (emergenc^) tests for all the departments and Charging Party 
did not. Respondent asserts that had Charging1 Party been hired into this temporary position, it 
would have required training the Charging Party to perform all functions. 
Furthermore, the Respondent asserts that therd are functions which the Medical Technician who 
was given the temporary assignment cannot perform because she is not a Medical Technologist. 
Therefore, Medical Technologists from other departments are providing coverage for these 
functions in the Hematology Department, Respondent asserts that at the time it submitted its 
position statement, the open position had not been filled and Respondent's management 
continues to evaluate the need for a regular position. Respondent asserts that the minimum 
qualifications for the Medical Technologist polsition were not changed, and that the position has 
always required a Bachelor's Degree in Medidal Technology or a related field. 
Charging Party brought this action against the Respondent alleging violation of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, and the Utah Antidiscrimination Act of 1965, U.C.A. 
§34A-5-i01 et seq., which provide that it is urilawfiil to discriminate on the basis of Disability, 
Depression and Anxiety Disorder. 
A. Prima Facie Case of Discrimination 
In order to prove a prima facie case of discrimination based upon disability, Charging Party must 
show she is disabled under the meaning of the applicable statutes and that the Respondent knew 
of her disability. Charging Party must also shdw that she is qualified for her position and could 
perform the essential functions of her position With or without a reasonable accommodation. 
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Further, Charging Party must: a) have requested a reasonable accommodation and/or been 
subject to an adverse employment action; and b) show that Respondent failed to provide a 
reasonable accommodation and/or that there fs a causal connection between the adverse 
employment action and her disability. 
A disability is defined as a "physical or mentW impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities;' The impairment must bie substantial, as distinct from minor, and must limit 
a major life activity such as seeing, hearing, ipeaking, walking, breathing, performing manual 
tasks, learning, caring for oneself, and working., There is sufficient medical evidence in the file to 
indicate the Charging Party is an individual With a disability. Further, the record reflects 
Respondent was aware of Charging Party's nliedical condition and does not dispute the fact that 
Charging Party was on Short Term Disability Leave (STD) for six months. 
The record indicates that Charging Party could perform the essential functions of her position 
with an accommodation, which was to work the day shift. The record further indicates that 
Charging Party requested this accommodation on more than one (1) occasion. 
The Charging Party was subjected to an advefrse employment action in that she was subjected to 
a reduction in force. The reduction in force was necessitated due to business needs and a 
reduction in the size of the workforce at the Respondents Murray, Utah facility. Her position 
was one of thirteen (13) positions eliminated! from the facility. 
Regarding evidence of a causal connection bfetween the Charging Party's disability and the 
adverse employment action, the record refledts Charging Party received a medical release to 
work a day shift by her physician as early as April 18, 1997, April 28, 1997 and again on May 
13, 1997. On each of these occasions Charging Party requested a transfer to the day shift-
Respondent has articulated that on each requfest for a transfer made by the Charging Party, they 
had no available open positions as a Medical Technician on the day shift. 
The record reflects that the Charging Party applied for a day shift Medical Technologist position 
in September 1997, and was not selected because she did not have a four year degree and, 
therefore, did not meet the minimum qualifications for the position. A further review of the 
record reflects the Respondent selected another employee for the Medical Technologist position 
who did not meet the minimum qualification in that she also did not have a four year degree. 
Respondent's rationale for selecting another temployee for the position in question was that even 
though the employee did not meet the minimiiiri qualifications for the position, she was assigned 
the position temporarily because she had experience working in the Hematology Department and 
the employee was trained to work in all areai of the laboratory, and had experience running 
STAT tests for all the departments. Respondent asserts Charging Party did not have the 
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necessary experience and, therefore, was not as 
Party would have required some additional trailing 
addition, the Respondent asserts that there are 
cannot perform because she is not a Medical 
are assigned to other Medical Technologists fr 
qualified as the selected employee and Charging 
to make her proficient in the position. In 
cfertain functions which the selected employee 
Technologist. Respondent has stated these functions 
other departments. rotn 
A review of the selected employee's personnel file and her performance appraisal dated 
November 12, 1997, reflects the employee needfcd additional training to become proficient in this 
temporary assignment. In reviewing the Charging Party's employment history and educational 
level, it reflects she had a two year degree, a degree in Clinical Laboratory Technician and had 
fulfilled all of the knowledge and competency requirements to be certified as a Medical 
Laboratory Technician by the Board of Registx4, American Society of Clinical Pathologists. In 
addition, the Charging Party had more experience as a Medical Laboratory Technician and had 
been employed by the Respondent longer than fie selected employee had been employed. 
Furthermore, according to Respondent's representative, Charging Party was an excellent 
employee. 
The preponderance of the evidence suggests th*t the Respondent made no determined attempt to 
provide a reasonable accommodation for the Charging Party by allowing her to under fill the day 
shift Medical Technologist position. The recordl reflects Respondent allowed another Medical 
Technician to under fill the position but did not! consider the Charging Party, despite her superior 
qualifications. In addition, the Respondent provided no evidence to suggest that to allow 
Charging Party to under fill the position would have created an undue hardship. Respondent's 
position has been that Charging Party would halve required additional training to be proficient in 
the position. The record reflects that the employee who was ultimately placed in the position also 
required additional training. Furthermore, the temporary assignment which was given to another 
Medical Technician began in September, 1997 land continued until February, 1999, at which time 
the incumbent resigned her position. 
vr. COLLUSION 
The evidence is sufficient for the Division to conclude that the Respondent failed to provide 
reasonable accommodation to the Charging Paifty and that the Charging Party was subsequently 
discharged resultant from her disability. The e\|idence is also sufficient for the Division to 
conclude that the Respondent's position that not having provided a reasonable accommodation in 
the form of a transfer to the day shift Medical technologist position because she was not 
qualified is unworthy of credence. 
THE LABOR COl^MISSION OF UTAH 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION & LABOR DIVISION 
UALD NJO. 97-0722 
EEOCNOJ35C-97-0844 
Robin F Burgener 
Charging Party, 
vs. 
Labcorp 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
„ the Antidiscrimination & L^bor Division (Division) of the Labor Commission 
(ComiAisJon) issued a determination that the Respondent has violated the Utah Antidiscrimination 
Act, Chapter 5, Title 34A, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, as amended. 
In order to conclude this matter, Bel J, Randal! will contact Labcorp within 10 days of the date of' 
this order to schedule a conciliation conference, The purpose of the conference is to provide relief1 
to the Charging Party. The Respondent is ordered to provide relief. 
Minimum relief includes, but is not limited to, (the following: 
RELIEF 
L Placing the Charging Party in a position Commensurate to the one previously held, Medical 
Laboratory Technician, effective immediately. 
2. Payment of all lost wages and benefits, less Interim earnings, plus interest, since November 23, 
1997. As of April 15,2000, this has been computed at $33,042_j>5. Lost wages and benefits will 
accrue at the rate of $ 14.11 P^rday (including interest) until the Charging Party is placed in a 
commensurate position. "" • • • » • • 
3. Reimbursement of reasonable, applicable, ind relevant costs for attorney's fees and associated 
expenses. 
4. Cease and desist any further discriminatory treatment based on disability. 
5. Non-retaliation against the Charging Party llbr having exercised his/her right to file this request 
for agency action. 
6. Expungement of the Charging Party's personnel file of any and all documentation pertaining to> 
her charge of employment discrimination. A separate file may be kept for legal purposes only. 
7. Take such affirmative steps as may be necefcsary to eliminate and keep from its environment any 
employment discrimination prohibited by Ithe Utah Antidiscrimination Act. 
Failure to reach satisfactory resolution in this matter may result in the commencement of a civil 
enforcement action. 
The Respondent may appeal this Order by filing a written request for a formal hearing with the 
Director of the Division within 30 days frorrJ the date of this Order. If the Director receives no 
timely request for a hearing, this Order becomeis the final order of the Commission and is not subject 
to further appeal. 
Director 
'ilnlz. 
Date I 
S •" 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on April 17, 2000,1 mailed a coriy of the attached Determination and Order by 
putting them into the state mail system to the following parties at the following addresses: 
Robin F Burgener 
11302 Bell Ridge Dr 
Sandy UT 84094 
Linda I. Woody 
LABCORP 
P O Box 2230 
1447 York Court 
Burlington NC 27216 
ela Pavia 
Robin F Burgentr v. Ubcorp.UALD No. »?-0722 
f/ortii 
Fort/'s Benefits 
Insurance Company 
Large Case Claims Team 
P.O. Box 419876 
Kansas City, MO 64141 
WATS (800) 909-8717 
Fax (816) 881-6060 
April 29, 1997 
Robin Burgener 
2744 S Centerbrook Dr 
W Valley City, UT 84119 
Re: LabCorp Managed Disability Program, Notice of Disability Benefits 
Dear Ms. Burgener: 
This letter is in reply to your request for disability benefits. We have provided the following 
information to your employer: 
Date we received request: April 4, 1997 
Your last day worked: March 21,1997 
Your first day of disability: March 24, 1997 
Return to work date: Undetermined 
We have approved your disability through 5/4/97 as long as you remain disabled from your job. If you 
are able to return to work before this date please contact your employer or our office to avoid any 
overpayment on your claim. Extension of your disability will be based on contact with your attending 
physician, review of medical records and/or other relevant information. 
LabCorp has asked us to inform you that this leave of absence will run concurrently with any leave to 
which you are entitled under the Family Medical Leave Act. Please contact your Human Resources 
Department for more specific information about your FMLA entitlement. 
If you have any questions, or if you feel you have additional information, please do not hesitate to contact 
us at the toll-free number listed below. 
Sincerely, 
Karen Kinnett 
Benefit Specialist - Large Case Team 
(800) 909-8717 Ext. 8924 
cc: Yvonne Hendrickson-Supervisor-FAX#801-269-8811 
Vicki Romero-Human Resources-FAX#801-269-8811 (Org. 42) 
May 9,1997 ffortis 
Fortis Benefits 
Robin Burgener Insurance Company 
2744 S Centerbrook Dr RO^OXZ^JT 7e°m 
West Valley City, UT 84119 Kansas City, MO 64 74 7 
WATS (800) 909-8777 
Fax (876) 887-6060 
LabCorp Managed Disability Program, Notice of Disability Benefits 
Dear Ms. Burgener: 
This letter is in reply to your request for disability benefits. We have provided the following 
information to your employer: 
Date we received request: April 4, 1997 
Your last day worked: March 21,1997 
Your first day of disability: March 24, 1997 
Return to work date: Undetermined 
We have approved your disability through 5/18/97 as long as you remain disabled from your job. If you 
are able to return to work before this date please contact your employer or our office to avoid any 
overpayment on your claim. Extension of your disability will be based on contact with your attending 
physician, review of medical records and/or other relevant information. Medical records will be needed 
for any further certification of benefits. 
LabCorp has asked us to inform you that this leave of absence will run concurrently with any leave to 
which you are entitled under the Family Medical Leave Act. Please contact your Human Resources 
Department for more specific information about your FMLA entitlement. 
If you have any questions, or if you feel you have additional information, please do not hesitate to contact 
us at the toll-free number listed below. 
Sincerely, 
Karen Kinnett 
Benefit Specialist - Large Case Team 
(800) 909-8717 Ext. 8924 
cc: Vicki Romero-Human Resources-FAX#801 -269-8811 (ORG 42) 
Yvonne Hendrickson-Supervisor-FAX#801-269-8811 
June 6.1997 
Robin Burgener 
1378 Green St 
Salt Lake City, NV 84105 
ffortif 
Forth Benefits 
Insurance Company 
Lory* Case Claims Team 
P.O. Box 419376 
Kansas C/ty, MO 64141 
WATS (800/ 305-3717 
Fax (81SJ 881-6060 
Re: LabCorp Managed Disability Program. Notice of Disability Benefits 
Dear Ms. Burgener: 
This letter is in reply to your request for disability benefits. We have provided the following 
information to your employer: 
Date we received request: April 4,1997 
Your last day worked: March 21,1997 
Your first day of disability: March 24,1997 
Return to work date: Undetermined 
We have approved your disability through 7/13/97 as long as you remain disabled from your job. If you 
are able to return to work before this date please contact your employer or our office to avoid any 
overpayment on your claim. Extension of your disability will be based on contact with your attending 
physician, review of medical records and/or other relevant information-
LabCorp has asked us to inform you that this leave of absence will run concurrently with any leave to 
which you are entitled under the Family Medical Leave Act Please contact your Human Resources 
Department for more specific information about your FMLA entitlement. 
If you have any questions, or if you feel you have additional information, please do not hesitate to contact 
us at the toll-free number listed below. 
Sincerely, 
Karen Kinnett 
Benefit Specialist - Large Case Team 
(800) 909-8717 Ext 8924 
cc: Yvonne Hendrickson-Supervisor-FAX#801-269-8811 
Vicki Romero-Human Resources-FAX#801-269-8811 (Org. 42) 
July 18,1997 
Robin Burgener 
1378 Green St 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
ffortis 
Fortfs Benefits 
Insurance Company 
Large Case Claims Team 
P.O. Box 419744 
Kansas City, MO 64141 
WATS I800) 903-8717 
Fax (816) 88U6060 
Re: LabCorp Managed Disability Program, Notice of Disability Benefits 
Dear Ms. Burgener: 
This letter is in reply to your request for disability benefits. We have provided the following 
information to your employer: 
Date we received request: April 4,1997 
Your last day worked: March 21,1997 
Your first day of disability: March 24, 1997 
Return to work date: Undetermined 
We have approved your disability through 8/17/97 as long as you remain disabled from your job. 
If you are able to return to work before this date please contact your employer or our office to 
avoid any overpayment on your claim. Extension of your disability will be based on contact with 
your attending physician, review of medical records and/or other relevant information. If a 
return to work date is listed above and you arc not able to return to work on that date, you 
will need to contact our office and your Human Resources within 3 consecutive working 
days of the return to work date to avoid possible termination. 
LabCorp has asked us to inform you that this leave of absence will run concurrently with any 
leave to which you are entitled under the Family Medical Leave Act Please contact your Human 
Resources Department for more specific information about your FMLA entitlement. 
If you have any questions, or if you feel you have additional information, please do not hesitate 
to contact us at the toll-free number listed below. 
ren Kinnett, Benefit Specialist - Large Case Team 
(800) 909-8717 Ext. 8924 
cc: Yvonne Hendrickson - Supervisor FAX# 801-269-8811 
Vicki Romero - Human Resources FAX* 801-269-8811 (Org. 42 ) 
August 21,1997 ffortis 
Fortfs Benefits 
Robin Burgener fnsunince Company 
1 ^ 7 8 Clr>f**>n Qt Large Case Ctoims Team 
u / s ureen st
 pQ Box 4 T$$76 
Salt Lake City, UT K9ns9$ dry, MO S414 I 
WATS 1800} 309-8717 
Fax (816) 881-6060 
Re: LabCorp Managed Disability Program, Notice of Disability Benefits 
Dear Ms. Burgener: 
This letter is in reply to your request for disability benefits. We have provided the following 
information to your employer: 
Date we received request: April 4y 1997 
Your last day worked: March 21,1997 
Your first day of disability: March 24,1997 
Return to work date: Undetermined* 
We have approved your disability through 9/23/97 as long as you remain disabled from your job. If you 
are able to return to work before this date please contact your employer or our office to avoid any 
overpayment on your claim. Extension of your disability will be based on contact with your attending 
physician, review of medical records and/or other relevant information. 
*You mil be receiving a Long Term Disability Claim Statement under separate cover from LapCorp in 
Burlington, N. G You should complete the employee protion of the form and have your physician 
complete the Attending Physician portion. The entire form should then be sent to tJiis office as soon as 
possible to avoid any delays in handling your Long Term Disability claim. If you do not receive this 
form, please contact Kim Beck in the Burlington office at 1-800-222-7566 ext 4173. 
LabCorp has asked us to inform you that this leave of absence will run concurrently with any leave to 
which you are entitled under the Family Medical Leave Act. Please contact your Human Resources 
Department for more specific information about your FMLA entitlement. 
If you have any questions, or if you feel you have additional information, please do not hesitate to contact 
us at the toll-free number listed below, 
Smcerely, / 
Karen Kinnett 
Benefit Specialist - Large Case Team, (800)909-8717 Ext 8924 
cc: Yvonne Hendrickson-Supervisor - FAX#801-269-88ll 
Vicki Romero -Human Resources - FAX#801 -269-8811 (Org. 42 ) 
September 23, 1997 '" C / / / / - J 
r, u- r, Fortis Benefits 
R o b i n B u r g e n e r Insurance Company 
1 3 7 8 Green St Large Case Team 
Sal t L a k e C i t y , U T 8 4 1 0 5 PO BOX 419744 
Kansas City, MO 64141-6744 
OTT T UP T T r v uv+ Fax (816) 474-2408 
RE: LabCorp Long Term Disability 
Gr#67599 
Dear Ms. Burgener: 
We have reviewed your claim for Long Term Disability benefits. 
Long Term Disability benefits provide coverage for loss of income under the following 
definition: 
During the first 24 months of a period of disability (including the qualifying period), an injury, or sickness 
or pregnancy requires that you be under the regular care and attendance of a doctor, and prevents you from 
performing at least one of the material duties of your regular occupation; 
Based on a review of the medical information received from Dr. Douville, we can find no 
evidence of limitation preventing you from going back to your occupation of a medical 
technician. According to Dr. Douville, you can preform the material duties of a medical 
technician in a day time position. Since you are able to perform the material duties of you 
regular occupation, no benefits would be available. 
Enclosed is Benefits Insurance Group Claim Denial Review Procedure. This represents your 
notification of denial as well as the applicable claim denial review procedure in the event you 
wish to appeal this decision. 
Sincerely, 
Karen Kinnett 
Benefit Specialist 
Large Case Team 
cc: Kim Beck, LabCorp 
Jane Wagoner-LabCorp 
Vicki Romero-LabCorp 
To the Claimant: 
As you will note from the attached letter, we have found it necessary to deny all or a portion of 
your claim for benefits under the plan. Please refer to the contents of the letter for the specific 
reason(s) for the denial as well as the extent of the denial. We regret that we were unable to 
reach a more favorable decision on your behalf^ but hope that you can understand that our claim 
decisions must conform to the requirements of the plan. 
The procedure set forth below is a general statement of the Group Claim Denial Review 
Procedure which may be used by any claimant who desires a formal review of a claim denial. If 
you wish a formal review of the claim denial and have any questions regarding the procedure, 
please contact the Plan Administrator (normally, the person to whom you submitted your claim 
initially), or, of course, you may contact us directly. 
FORTIS BENEFITS INSURANCE COMPANY 
GROUP CLAIM DENIAL REVIEW PROCEDURE 
The claimant is entitled to a full and fair review of the denial of the claim, which may be 
obtained by making a request to the Plan Administrator or appropriate named fiduciary, if other 
that the Plan Administrator. The procedure for such review is as follows: 
1. The request for review must be in writing and made within 60 days 
of receipt of written notice of denial 
2. The claimant may review pertinent documents and submit issues and 
comments in writing. 
3. The Plan Administrator will forward the request for review to 
Fortis Benefits Insurance Company. 
4. Fortis Benefits Insurance Company will make a decision upon review 
within 60 calendar days after its receipt of the request for review, unless 
special circumstances require an extension of time for processing, in which 
case the time limit shall not be later than 120 days after such receipt. The 
decision on review will be in writing, will include the specific reasons for the 
decision and specific references to the pertinent plan provisions on which the 
decision is based. 
*"Tf *' 
%ijy%^ 
RX: 6267124 DATE: 05/20/1999 
PATIENT: BURGENER, ROBIN 
DOCTOR: OTT, DARIN 
DRUG NAME: PROZAC 20MG CAP DIST 
SHOPKO PHARMACY #2083 
2165 E. 9400 SOUTH 
SANDY CITY UT 
RPh-DAHL, KIM 
(801)942-8555 
GENERIC NAME: FLUOXETINE (floo-OX-uh-teen) 
COMMON USES: This medicine is a selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitor (SSRI) used to treat depression, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD), or bulimia. It may also be used to treat other 
conditions as determined by your doctor. 
HOW TO USE THIS MEDICINE: Follow the directions for using this 
medicine provided by your doctor. TAKE THIS MEDICINE WITH POOD if it 
upsets your stomach. STORE THIS MEDICINE at room temperature, away 
from heat and light. CONTINUE TO TAKE THIS MEDICINE even if you feel 
better. Do not miss any doses. IF YOU MISS A DOSE OF THIS MEDICINE, 
skip the missed dose and go back to your regular dosing schedule. Do 
not take 2 doses at once. 
CAUTIONS: UP TO 4 WEEKS MAY PASS before this medicine reaches its 
full effect. Do not stop taking this medicine without checking with 
your doctor. DO NOT DRIVE, OPERATE MACHINERY, OR DO ANYTHING ELSE THAT 
COULD BE DANGEROUS until you know how you react to this medicine. 
Using this medicine alone, with other medicines, or with alcohol may 
lessen your ability to drive or to perform other potentially dangerous 
tasks. THIS MEDICINE WILL ADD TO THE EFFECTS of alcohol and other 
depressants. Ask your pharmacist if you have questions about which 
medicines are depressants. BEFORE YOU BEGIN TAKING ANY NEW MEDICINE, 
either prescription or over-the-counter, check with your doctor or 
pharmacist. This includes any medicines which contain 
dextromethorphan. 
POSSIBLE SIDE EFFECTS: SIDE EFFECTS, that may go away during 
treatment, include nervousness, trouble sleeping, headache, 
drowsiness, fatigue, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, loss of appetite, dry 
mouth, sweating, dizziness, lightheadedness, muscle spasms, or changes 
in sexual function. If they continue or are bothersome, check with 
your doctor. If you notice other effects not listed above, contact 
your doctor, nurse, or pharmacist. 
The information in this monograph is not intended to cover all 
possible uses, directions, precautions, drug interactions, or adverse 
effects. This information is generalized and is not intended as 
specific medical advice. If you have questions about the medicines you 
»TP> takincr or would like more information, check with your doctor. 
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April 18, 1997 
Robin Burgener 
2744 S Centerbrook Dr 
W Valley City, UT 84119 
(forth 
Fortit Sanaffts 
Insurance Com piny 
Large Case CJa/ms Team 
P.O. Bex 419876 
Kansas O'ry, MO 64141 
WATS (800/ 909*8717 
Fax (815} 88U6060 
Re: LabCorp Managed Disability Program, Notice of Disability Benefits 
Dear Ms. Burgener: 
This letter is in reply to your request for disability benefits. We have provided the following 
information to your employer: 
Date we received request: April 4, 1997 
Your last day worked: March 21,1997 
Your first day of disability: March 24, 1997 
Return to work date: April 16, 1997 
We have approved your disability through 4/15/97 as long as you remain disabled from your job. If you 
are able to return to work before this date please contact your employer or our office to avoid any 
ovexpayment on your claim. Extension of your disability will be based on contact with your attending 
physician, review of medical records and/or other relevant information. 
LabCorp has asked us to inform you that this leave of absence will run concurrently with any leave to 
which you are entitled under the Family Medical Leave Act Please contact your Human Resources 
Department for more specific information about your FMLA entitlement. 
If you have any questions, or if you feel you have additional information, please do not hesiiate to contact 
us at the toll-free number listed below. 
Sincerely, 
Karen Kinnett 
Benefit Specialist - Large Case Team 
(800) 909-8717 Ext. 8924 
cc: Yvonne Hendrickson-Supervisor-FAX#801-269-8811 
Vicki Romero-Human Resources-FAX#801-269-8811 (Org. 42) 
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WEL. OINT BEHAVIORAL HEALTH 
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(619) 571-8300 or (800) 728-949; 
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NAME "Bur 
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JLA^ 
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LETTER NUMBER 
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Alcohol (Client) 
Drug (Client) 
Impacted by Alcohol use of Family/Significant Other 
Impacted by Drug Use of Family/Significant Other 
Emotional/Psychological (Client) 
1. Adjustment disorder 
2. Anxiety disorder 
3. Attention deficit disorder 
4. Bereavement 
5. Depression 
6. Impulse control problem 
7. Significant threat to others 
8. Significant threat to self/gravely disabled 
F. Impacted by Emotional/Psych Problem of Family/S.O. 
G. Eating Disorder 
H. Family Problems 
1. Child behavioral problems 
2. Blended family 
3. Extended family 
4. Reaction to divorce/separation 
5. School problems 
6. Single parent 
I. Marital/Couple Problem 
J. Violence/Sexual Abuse 
1. Abuse of child 
2. Abuse of adult 
K. Medical Problem 
L. Legal 
1. Bankruptcy 
2. Divorce/custody 
3. DUI/arrest/possession 
4. Landlord/tenant 
5. Real Estate 
M. Financial Problem 
N. Work Related Concern 
1. Absenteeism/tardiness 
2. Career/vocational 
3. Critical incident 
4. Interpersonal: co-worker(s) 
5. Interpersonal: supervisor 
6. Layoff 
7. Perceived harassment/discrimination 
8. Performance/production 
9. Reorganization/change 
10. Retirement 
11. Termination 
12. Work related injury 
O. Dependent Care 
1. Adult-disabled 
2. Child 
3. Elderly 
P. Other Issues 
1. Ethnic/racial 
2. Religion 
3. Gender/sexual orientation 
4. Stage of life 
5. Problem pregnancy 
6. Nicotine addiction' 
7. Weight control 
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D. 
E. 
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Medical doctor referral 
Psychiatric meds. eval/tx 
Alcohol/drug detoxification 
Inpatient alcohol/drug treatment 
G. 
H. 
I. 
J. 
K. 
L. 
M. 
N. 
Partial hospital alcohol/drug treatment 
Structured outpatient alcohol/drug treatment 
Non-hospital residential facility 
Community based recovery program 
Inpatient psychiatric treatment 
Partial hospital psychiatric 
Outpatient mental health (office) 
Psychological testing 
O. 
P. 
Q-
R. 
S. 
T. 
U. 
V. 
Social agency, public program/mental health 
Self-help/support group 
Employer, H.R., management, benefits, etc. 
Childcare/eldercare resources 
Legal resource 
Financial resource 
Career/vocational counseling 
Education 
DR. DONNA MOXLEYrCASTLETOIjL 
3468 BROCKBANirOraVE 
SALT LAKE Ctrr, UT 8 4 1 2 4 - 4 7 5 9 
(801 )278 -9890 
Aug. 29,1997 
Salt Lake County Youth Services Staff: 
Robin Burgener has been under my care for the treatment of depression and 
panic disorder. I am coordinating treatment with her family physician who is 
monitoring her medication. He recently increased Robin's anti-depressant 
medications in an attempt to stabilize her current condition. 
Given Robin's current psychiatric state, I am exploring more intensive treatment 
alternatives which may include day treatment and/or possibly an in-patient stay. 
I have many concerns about her mental health at this time to effectively cope 
with added stress and worry about Randy's safety. I request that you consider 
this in your treatment/discharge planning for Randy. I understand that Randy 
may enter Job Corps in 3 weeks time and is reluctant to remain at home during 
these weeks. I have never met Randy and certainly cannot make treatment 
recommendations however, I view Job Corps as the choice of last resort for a 
young women who has had no anti-social or management history in the past. 
I would like the Youth Services team to consider a 45 day 
residential/foster/group home placement to see if this family could work on their 
issues with the goal of the family reuniting and Randy returning to her home. I 
have discussed this with Robin and this is her desire as well. 
Please feel free to contact me at 278-9890. 
Thank you. 
onna Moxley Castleton, DSW, LCSW, BCD 
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DR. DONNA MOXLEY CASTLETON 
3468 BROCKBANK DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY, U T 84124-4759 
(801)278-9890 
Aug. 29,1997 
Salt Lake County Youth Services Staff: 
Robin Burgener has been under my care for the treatment of depression and 
panic disorder. I am coordinating treatment with her family physician who is 
monitoring her medication. He recently increased Robin's anti-depressant 
medications in an attempt to stabilize her current condition. 
Given Robin's current psychiatric state, I am exploring more intensive treatment 
alternatives which may include day treatment and/or possibly an in-patient stay. 
I have many concerns about her mental health at this time to effectively cope 
with added stress and worry about Randy's safety. I request that you consider 
this in your treatment/discharge planning for Randy. I understand that Randy 
may enter Job Corps in 3 weeks time and is reluctant to remain at home during 
these weeks. I have never met Randy and certainly cannot make treatment 
recommendations however, I view Job Corps as the choice of last resort for a 
young women who has had no anti-social or management history in the past. 
I would like the Youth Services team to consider a 45 day 
residential/foster/group home placement to see if this family could work on their 
issues with the goal of the family reuniting and Randy returning to her home. I 
have discussed this with Robin and this is her desire as well. 
Please feel free to contact me at 278-9890. 
Thank you. 
-Donna Moxley Castleton, DSW, LCSW, BCD 
Dr. Donna Moxley Castleton 
3468 Brockbank Drive 
Salt Lake City, ut 84124-4759 
(801) 272-4875 
Statement No.: 3304 
Robin 
1378 Green St. 
Salt Lake City 
Burgener 
UT 84105 
Account: 471 
Date: 12/1/97 
Previous Balance: $10,035.00 
Session Charges 
Date Client Insurance Billed Session Time (Hrs) Charge 
Total Charges $o.oq 
Date 
| 11/1/97 Robin Burgener 
Payments Received 
Client Payment Type 
Credit 
Amount 
$10,012.50 
Total Payments : I $10,012.50| 
New Balance $22.50) 
Dr. Donna Moxley Castleton 
3468 Brockbank Drive 
Salt Lake City, ut 84124-4759 
(801) 272-4875 
StatemenjgJNo.: 3304 
Robirt 
1378 Green St. 
Salt Lake City 
Burgener 
UT 84105 
Account: 471 
Date: 12/1/97 
Previous Balance: $10,035.00 
Session Charges 
[ Date Client *»»™*™« Session Time (Hrs) Charge | 
Payments Received 
Total Charges: 'Wodj 
P Date 
11/1/97 
Client 
Robin Burgener 
Payment Type 
Credit 
Amount 
$10,012.50 
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$22.50] 
MRN: 09994369 
Robin Burgener 
DOB: 11/06/1955 Age: 45 Sex: F 
on iron tablets 300 mg b.i.d. with vitamin C to promote absorption. 
Thirdly, she has a possible obstructive sleep apnea, although her 
recent polysomnography was normal. Polysomnography can be quite 
variable from night to night, and the scoring of upper airway 
resistance syndrome can be very difficult. Therefore, one negative 
polysomnogram does not rule out clinically significant upper airway 
obstruction and sleep. Finally, she also has sleep paralysis. I do 
not know if this is familial or associated with her sleep schedule 
disorder and sleep fragmentation due to possible periodic leg 
movements as described by the bed partner and snoring arousals 
during sleep. Therefore, she agreed to check with the Dental Clinic 
about fitting of a dental device for mandibular advancement in sleep 
to see if we could treat the snoring. She agreed to this plan 
including a follow-up visit in three weeks to review her sleep logs. 
I encouraged her to get as much bright light in the morning and as 
much dim light in the evening as possible. 
Christopher R. Jones, M.D. 
CRJ:slmt/3/7798 (f7/9) 
cc: Joseph Schoenhals, M.D. 
250 East Broadway, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Darren Ott, M.D. 
Northeast Family Clinic 
70 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
07/06/1998 Christopher Jones Sleep Disorder Center - Other Ancillary 
04/28/1998 Pamela Faye Farrington Ancillary Daily - Other Ancillary 
04/08/1998 Pamela Faye Farrington General Gynecology Clinic (Office Visit Notes) 
ID: Ms. Burgener was referred by Dr. Terrence Loftus for 
evaluation of abnormal bleeding. 42-year-old white female, Gl 
P0101, LMP is uncertain as Ms. Burgener has had persistent bleeding 
off and on of varying volumes over the past year. Prior to that 
time she states that her menstrual periods were very regular and she 
had no significant gynecologic complaints in the past. She 
conceived her single pregnancy without difficulty. She was on birth 
control pills for approximately 3 1/2 years when in her 20's. About 
two years ago she had a Pap smear which was mildly abnormal and a ^ 
repeat Pap smear was normal and had a normal Pap smear approximately 
1 year ago. At that time at an initial evaluation for her irregular 
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2. Wrote her a script for the gloves she needs and wrote her 
a script for the Votec so she can get some retraining for 
supervisory position and hopefully that will allow her the 
time to be in gloves. 
3. Gave her a prescription for Elocon ointment. She can 
aPPly that once a day at night and she can wear socks or 
gloves wherever she has that. 
HQR Cynthia Flugrad, P.A.-C. 
09/01/1998 Jay Aldous Ancillary Daily - Other Ancillary 
07/23/1998 Christopher Jones Sleep Disorder Center - Other Ancillary 
07/06/1998 Christopher Jones Neurology - Clinic (Letter) 
CLINIC NOTE 
PATIENT: Robin Burgener 
MRN: 999436-9 
DATE OF VISIT: July 6, 1998 
REFERRING PHYSICIAN: Joseph Schoehals, M.D. 
The patient is a 42 -year-old white female working as a laboratory 
technician. She complains of difficulty initiating sleep, snoring 
and gasping according to her bed partner, after she falls asleep, 
with fatigue and sleepiness the next day. 
She has always been a "night owl". She would never wake up feeling 
cheerful in the morning. She was able to stay up later than her 
parents when she was a child, and in her 20's was sleeping from 
midnight to 4:30 a.m. and feeling "okay" on that little amount of 
sleep. Then in her late 30's, she found she could sleep in from 9:00 
a,m. to noon. Now she is working from 2:00 p.m. to just after 
midnight. Bedtime is about 1:00 a.m., lights out is about 1:30 a.m., 
but she watches television until she falls asleep at 3:00 a.m. The 
television distracts her so she can "quite down my mind" from the 
worries and stress that she has. Once she is asleep, there is a 
frightening episode of "trying to wake up, but I can't move". 
Sometimes this is out of a dream. It occurs about 6:00 or 7:00 a.m., 
but only about twice per month, which is a decrease in frequency 
from before. Her final morning wake up time is 9:00 a.m. because of 
an alarm, otherwise she could easily sleep until noon without the 
alarm. 
Even if she did sleep until noon, she would still be tired and could 
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DOB: 11/06/1955 Age: 45 Sex: F 
still take a nap the next day. In Dr. Schoenhal's office, her 
Epworth's sleepiness score was 19. She told me that she does not 
like to take naps, because she does not like how she feels when she 
wakes up from them. She keeps moving at work, but in the afternoons, 
especially, she could easily take a nap if she wanted to. She has 
not noticed herself fighting drowsiness while denied any close calls. 
In the evenings, the fatigue and sleepiness subsides somewhat. I 
could not elicit any convincing description of cataplexy or sleep 
onset dreams, but she does have sleep paralysis in the middle of the 
night. 
At about 3:00 a.m., when she is most relaxed and starting to get 
sleepy, she has a leg movement that is "hard to explain". She feels 
there is almost a "restlessness" in her legs as if she cannot get 
comfortable. Sometimes this makes her walk about the house for a few 
minutes, which is helpful in terms of relaxing her legs. It only 
happens when she is lying down relaxing at about 3:00 a.m. By 
Robin Burgener 
July 7, 1998 
Page 2 
9:00 a.m., it seems to be gone. It is a "involuntary movement". It 
is a brief twitch of short duration, but does bother the bed partner 
who has complained about these leg kicks and jerks. She is only 
aware of it herself about one night per week. 
In terms of the snoring that has been observed, it is loud, but her 
bed partner is deaf in one ear and sleeps on the good ear. The 
snoring is clearly variable from night to night, and there are some 
gasping awakenings that the patient is not aware of, but her bed 
partner thinks that she does partly wake up. Discontinuation of 
cigarettes six months ago has improved the snoring, but it is still 
present. A nasal airway dilator also helped somewhat but not 
completely. She has had dreams about breathing but mostly these 
relate to the episodes of sleep paralysis and her history of asthma. 
It is difficult to blame them on possible obstructive sleep apnea. 
She also does have morning headaches, but these last all day and 
occur about three times per week. She wakes up with a dry mouth and 
a cough and believes that she is mouth breathing. Her nasal airways 
are usually well treated during hay fever season with Vancenase 
topical nasal steroid. Sometimes, she will also use Benadryl to help 
keep her nose open. She starts out sleeping lateral but ends up 
sleeping supine, flat and level. She has never been on a dental 
device for mandibular advancement in sleep. She did have a 
polysomnography recently, no obstructive hypopneas, apneas or 
periodic leg movements were scored. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: Is notable for iron deficiency anemia as a 
child and also as an adult without any history of gastric bypass 
surgery. I did not ask her about a vegetarian diet, but she does 
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have "severe menstrual bleeding". She believes her hemoglobin is 10-
11, and her hematocrit is about 30. She stopped smoking cigarettes 
six months ago after a 10-pack-year history. She has asthma 
controlled with Flovent with exacerbations treated with Albuterol, 
Vancenase for the nasal congestion, Prozac 30 mg per day is helpful 
for anxiety, depression, and mood swings. In the past, she tried 
Melatonin 6 mg, but this caused "weird dreams" and she stopped that 
medication. Her TSH and chemistry panels have all been normal. 
FAMILY HISTORY: Includes bouts of depression in her mother when the 
patient was young. Her mother is now deceased. Her father had 
crescendo snoring and breath holding at night, but there is no known 
family history of restless legs syndrome and no other history of 
daytime sleepiness or insomnia. 
SOCIAL HISTORY: Includes stress related to home, finances and 
"parenting". She states her work is okay. 
PHYSICAL EXAM: She is 65" tall, 203 pounds with a 36.5 cm neck 
circumference and blood pressures of 158/104 to 110, with a heart 
rate of 70. I checked the blood pressure three different times 
during the exam, including with a large cuff. The breath sounds are 
clear on inspiration and forced expiration. Heart sounds are regular. 
The nasal airways are widely patent, she can sniff in through 
either side. The oral pharynx is unremarkable. There is no 
enlargement of uvula, soft palate, 
Robin Burgener 
July 7, 1998 
Page 3 
tonsils, or tongue. There is no overbite. The chin is not recessed. 
The strength of facial, jaw, tongue, palate, and neck muscles is all 
good. The diaphragms move normally by abdominal palpation. There is 
no tibial edema, and arterial pulsations are easily felt over the 
feet. In the lower extremities, formal strength testing is quite 
good throughout . Rapid alternating movements of the feet and heel 
to shin maneuver were accurate. Plantar responses are downgoing. 
Vibration sensation at the ankles is good. Deep tendon reflexes are 
present at the knees and ankles. There is no clonus. The tandem gait 
was performed fairly easily and the Romberg was stable. 
SUMMARY: In summary, this 42 -year-old white female probably has a 
combination of three or four factors disrupting her sleep. First of 
all, she has a constitutional sleep phase delay tendency and is only 
getting about six hours of sleep per night. As a result of a late 
sleep onset time, this may not be adequate sleep time for her. 
Therefore, I discussed the use of early morning bright light, late 
evening dim light, how to keep sleep logs, and the possibility we 
would talk about low dose (0.5 mg) Melatonin for sleep. Secondly, 
she may have restless legs symptoms associated with iron deficiency 
and, therefore, she agreed to check a ferritin level today and start 
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Albuterol, at that point she can drop down to 1 puff bid. I 
suspect that she is not going to be able to do that and she 
agrees with me. She is comfortable with staying at the 2 
puffs bid. Additionally, she is to go 2 days without any 
antihistamines and start on Allegra D samples (bid for 5 
days). If these seem to help more than the Claritin has, she 
can call for a prescription. If they do not I need to know 
about it. She is okay with this plan. 
HQR:amt 
O 
Janet Williams, P.A.-C. 
04/18/2000 Roland G Ruegner ARUP Clinic (Office Visit Note) 
Provider 
Date of Enc. 
Type of Doc 
Patient Name 
MRN 
Location 
RUEGNER, ROLAND G 
04/18/2000 
OFV 
Robin Burgener 
9994369 
UOFU1 ARUP - EHP AR04 
Provider ID U1871 
S: This is a 44 year old female here with an asthma exacerbation. 
She has had asthma for 5 years, also has SAR. She was a 
smoker, quit 1 1/2 years ago. She has been using Flovent and 
Albuterol, also was using Accolate for a while, has had none 
of this for months. States that her asthma had been what she 
considered to be well controlled until 2 weeks ago when it 
started worsening. Apparently at that time she was moving to 
a new home, developed an upper respiratory infection and 
noticed a change in the weather. She attributes her 
exacerbation to these 3 things. She has not really had much 
of a cough with her cold, feels like the coughing she is doing 
now is from her asthma. She has been using only 1 puff bid 
of the Flovent (110 meg) and under normal conditions uses 2 
puffs of Albuterol only 1-2 times per week. Over the last 2 
weeks it has increased, she is now using 2 puffs 3-4 times a 
day and feels like she needs more than that. She is 
additionally taking Claritin D 1 tab per day and Prozac 30 mg 
q day. She has not had any nocturnal asthma for a number of 
months until the last few days as well. 
O: BP: 150/90 
General: This is pleasant woman in no distress. 
Lungs: End inspiratory and expiratory wheezes, both upper and 
lower. Air exchange is poor. P02 is 95. Peak flow is 
310, 300 and 350 (her last of Albuterol was 2 hours ago). 
She was given a nebulizer treatment, subsequent to that 
her lung exam was only slightly improved. However her 
peak flows were 400, 440 and 440. The patient reported 
subjectively feeling improved. 
A: Asthma exacerbation. 
P: Given a prescription for Prednisone 20 mg, 3 tab qd x 5 days 
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Patient Name : Robin Burgner 
MRN : 9994369 
Location : UOFU1 ARUP - EHP AR04 
S: Patient is a 44 year old who punctured herself, with a 
capillary tube that was full of blood, in her left thumb. She 
did have her gloves on. It bled pretty good. This was from 
a tiny infant newborn. As far as we know there are no 
problems with this child, though we will call the university 
and have them investigate that. We discussed blood born 
pathogen exposure with Robin at length and we are going to go 
ahead and do the test as per our protocol and she will follow 
up with us as per the protocol. She was counseled. We will 
follow up with her in a couple of days with the results on the 
initial draw, 
HQR: Roland Ruegner, P.A.-CD 
10/00 Reviewed by Dr. Miller. 
=======Revised: 24-Oct-2000 16:30======= 
05/04/2000 Roland G Ruegner ARUP Clinic (Office Visit Note) 
Provider : RUEGNER, ROLAND G Provider ID : U1871 
Date of Enc. : 05/04/2000 
Type of Doc : OFV 
Patient Name : Robin Burgener 
MRN : 9994369 
Location : UOFU1 ARUP - EHP AR04 
S: This is a 44 year old female here following up on asthma 
exacerbation. She has finished the Prednisone and has 
continued to use her Flovent 3 puffs bid. She reports feeling 
much improved, she has not had to use any Albuterol for 3 days 
now. Previous to this exacerbation she would use Albuterol 
1-2 times per week, it became every few hours during the 
exacerbation. She is quite happy with the response in that 
way. On the other hand, she has been taking Claritin D for 
her allergies, states that this does not appear to be helping 
at all this year. She is suffering quite a bit from her SAR 
symptoms. The Claritin had worked well last year however. 
She has not tried any other prescription medications for 
allergies. She also takes Prozac, no other medications. 
O: 
General: Robin is her usual pleasant self and is in no distress. 
Lungs: Peak flows today are 500, 500, and 450. Lungs are 
bilaterally clear to auscultation and air exchange is 
good. 
A: 1. Asthma exacerbation resolved. 
2. SAR. 
P: She is to stay on 3 puffs bid for 2 weeks without using any 
Albuterol. At that point she can drop down to 2 puffs bid and 
stay at that dose unless she can go 1 month without any 
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GENERAL INTAKE QUESTIONNAIRE 
CHARGING PARTY INFORMATION: 
Date: 
Name: "RoB/*J f - 3"*&€&&fL 
Address: I37f l G£(re/J Smeerr Apt. #_ 
Citv: Sfi<-T UH«£ CiTy State: UT*H ZIP: SHldS Countv: Sfttr LaKe 
Telephone Number: fhome^: H^-3sciC> (daytime number): ?f\&£(L ; 2 6 7 - 2 9ff6 
Social Security Number: ££E - 9 6 - ^bo3 
Date of Birth: i(-U~3<5 Gender: F 
^i White (not Hispanic) • Pacific Islander 
• Black (not Hispanic) • American Indian 
Q Hispanic • Alaskan Native 
• Asian 
Please provide the name of someone AT A DIFFERENT ADDRESS AND PHONE NUMBER who 
will always be able to tell us how to contact you. 
Name: Relationship: Telephone Number: 
Address: City: State: ZIP: 
RESPONDENT/EMPLOYER INFORMATION: 
I believe I was discriminated against by (check those that apply): 
^Employer • Union • Employment Agency • Other (Specify) 
Work Site: 
Organization Name: LA & Co A? Telephone: <3 88 - 'ioco 
Address: 5~/9<? GRJCS^KJ STA^T Highest Official (at work site>: fAiK^ fER6c$£> tJ 
City: Mu££./><^ Approximate # of Employees: In Utah: So -f 
State: UTAH ZIP: Outside of Utah: THOUSA^K 5 
Corporate Office: 
Organization Name: Lft&coAP Telephone: C9K> > 9SH-S-I71 
Address: HZO SOUTH SfMhl6 ST. Highest Official: ? K® 
City: &ufi-L//J6rc/J A<-So AT : 
State:J±C ZIP: Q73,s : T o I X * ^ 3 o 
EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION: 
\HH1 Y c e < Center 
Dates that Discrimination Occurred: Began: H ^8- 7? Ended: T~o T&e£^/OT 
If Not Hired: Application Date: Rejection Date: 
If Employed: Date of Hire: & " ^ I Date of Termination: Ending Pay: 19. • Q5~ f££ 
DISCRIMINATORY ACT: 
In your own words describe what happened and why you beleive it was discrimination. Please be as 
specific as possible (including dates and names). You may attach additional pages to this questionnaire. 
Z tins /OCT TZLP M? />65/7?CAJ AJ/IS /^/y^/A^/pr^2>^ AJ^ Q)A9S ^Z" #FAf/?eP &AJ 
&&ou&c£ flee- AA)D J/m Uuo LAB MA/Q**<F/? AT /c:3o CL^ gn 9'/.%-97 To D&coi5^ 
m (^ £mf>loyt>ie-fiJTt X frGfrttJ gT/^TCP X >UCST LOAIQT TO fceru^td TO A Vrty SH/FT 
^cB A5 fl <3 V/g TFCR ijJUicH L Aw QuALlflE2> fofis X U)f)5 OFFiCiALcy //dFOG/vi£J 
OF rm iZeofcGAfO irLATtoK) of &uc\*5T rue T>A^ P/e/o/e T O This hi^£T//06 'By 
\UtKie Rometzo, &r rne //Q Pe&sori Heert/^G X a)ft5 -HLD -VMUT TUc6 oPLy cf£t 
/*> Pf\y ([a +a H T?OLLf\fl5 L<£5S {>££- K o U ^ ) > U ( C k l g fcorr^&O 3 A IV S ^ <£~ P *P 
\$VT 'veuesie X QupittFi ev AS MA^I/OG A ~vi5AetL/Ty /^ox> too OTK&IZ-
AfcTgrfi/J ATIl/g-_S lOg£€ fiVfliCA&CG TO w€ , X / O ^ u i ^ ^ t ) iF X UJA5 
eL\G\yL£ P&ft. THE JSAMF f)S EMe&yorig ELSE OJFlS oF/uZfcerD //0 ~/6ve/>7<? 
6f THF ^FK/E^FJA)CE ?K& . ( ^ u)*cj> SAS£ Pay A/OV t o)K P^y F^/^ e.f\CM V/^A/ZL 
Of S&Ulc^)* Si+t SAiX> SU£ - p ID/^ 'T KK>OU± > JL HA\)e CFiLC£V> fir 
L£<°>ST -TtOiCe "DAtCy — 3 T / U . /OO ^/OSc06Ty^JS . \)lCKi£ &Orvie/ZO TOLD MF 
TO " A ^ r fiFt*)t ^ TUP OJoRtV UJC^T E/^y XUESOrtY' Cfta^f" ^ ^ L*ST T>*Y 
of my r>\^fi0tt-\T*-i)
 % X- ACA/,0 £e<$utf<;r^2> f\ x^/^y ^o^ s^y/A^c X 
- ^ . 
Have 6iLL$ TO P&Y 5^e SAW &FLL- X n a m ? 9 m mu p ^ c ^ ^ r r j ^tx«s£ 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO COMPLETE THIS FORM IN ITS ENTIRETY. IF YOU HAVE 
NOT PROVIDED THE INFORMATION WE NEED, WE MAY BE UNABLE TO TAKE ANY 
ACTION ON YOUR BEHALF. 
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DISCRIMINATORY ACT: 
In your own words describe what happened and why you beleive it was discrimination. Please be as 
specific as possible (including dates and names). You may attach additional pages to this questionnaire. 
PcfiL /*£, -7?^c^^T-^^ A/y ^uStfei/zreA^ VI/OAJAJ/Z //^A//?jrSc<;6AJ <2#AJ'7»cr^£> 
rr?6 AA/D A/?t//s£Z> /y?£ TC rfPA>ty /&# 77S£ z>s?y S/Y//?S~ //£>r)AT6L6ey Pcf/rye* 
~n//?7 tO#5 Go/tOG T£> &£ i//9C/9A^T. £ COAJ7-/1CT<£I> //K/nS)*) /?£SO<U/?c£S A/3QU7 
TH£ Pef/T/a/J A»JT> IOAS -775^Z>_ /7~ lO/JS ~ft£/*JG CA/S)»)C£Z> TO Pfe~<£u //?£ si V V^ 
~7ecH. -Z* A/* A <ay# TtrcA/ So TA/£V J>/)/Z> JL~ n,r>AJ'7- <Durtt//=y , _Z~z>,o 
APPiy Po& T/S£ /bf/7-/a/J /9A>yA)/iy CTA£ ^ y -rH£ Pes/?-/*») 0&r^>/=z>). X 
rt^rtrtV AJ6TH/A)£ PsecAt £/)&C6fi?r /?£<£A/?2>/AJ£ -77//S A^S/7?a/0. 0/0 8-28-9 7 
Z /?£c/£t/£p AJQ7/C£ T/s/?r /ny SMc/emF*** z>/SA0/£.sry &£><J'/*s-s JJet/tr. 
P/>JD a A) ^ - ° ? J - 9 7 ^ &L/7- 7?S#T Z Ccucx> APPiy / ^ v P ^/OC-Ttt/V 3?/S/LA/6; 
TAf XtH>*r-T*r*ft 7>/SA£/<L/ry e>/?/?/c£ PAo&r/s) At&£Any /AJ£egst£2> .Z cJot4.t.z> AJOT 
(DUAI/^Y A&* /*A)C-T£**S 73£AJ/A?/TS Ss^cf Z AA* A£6£ ~r<s &><?/?* 7>/>ys. TH£ 
Lerrez T. tec/etfep ox/ 8-28-9? ALSO JST-ATB-Q :Z* too^/.z> -B£ -7A-#*,,*)AT£& 
P&sn £AAro#p AS cA~ 7?s£ 2>A-7TZ my . ?&0gr- 7~£A/-f 7>rt*0/£,/rV %6^/£/r5 £AJT> £?- 2 
7 HAI/£ /£A£A)£I> fTmcu.6H AAcr»£/e. £^A6oy££') TAAr -7?v£ T?AV Pcy/r/^/U /•*) 
P£/fAT£>LO£y /HAS P/666P By A A V/e rt£p 7?c# /Ortc AAZ> &££*) c*J Ttf£ A)/GAT 
SH/fZ. TA/'S frfP/cy&g /?£<>o A A3 COAJ <>/?£/>A/3/.y ££~SS S£A)/c/2fTy77S/**J _Z a>&. 
1 /?e<urAJTLy £e/f/>/0£j? 7~HAr /J AUGUST TA£/e<? UJAS A /e£z>ucr/osJ o*. &£O/?GAM 
ZA77Q/0 6£ Paf/r-seAJS. £*if£.ojA£~J b)£/Z(f CPf£/?£P VAK/oU5 OPr/aAJS TH^y COL<CZ> 
6CMP Q77S£T/e £•/*?/?*cy/?£~? /}cco£z>//06 T& ^£AJ/o£/ry- 7~//£y IdF/e^ c^^je&H 
Q77S<f/€ PoS/r/<2/US AT <2&<r7f££A0t6: U)/KZ£5 AjOp PuT/£5 A>>& 7V£y CQU£-Z> 
ACC&/>7~ A 3&y£~£A/i>c£ PA*C/<A<Z£ 4AJ7> T>£S>L3 TH&//1 /JAJ^At^yfil^y^r #&U/frS. 
T rttoA/z? 0#r T7/£j?£ a*r/0AJj 77S#r AJ&e/f 0/cA<&e£Z> <?T7*&e &y/>MY£'A'* ^ g £ r &)&r* 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO COMPLETE THIS FORM IN ITS ENTIRETY. IF YOU HAVE 
NOT PROVIDED THE INFORMATION WE NEED, WE MAY BE UNABLE TO TAKE ANY 
ACTION ON YOUR BEHALF. 
Signature: I declare with my signature that this statement is true and correct Date 
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DISCRIMINATORY ACT: 
In your own words describe what happened and why you beleive it was discrimination. Please be as 
specific as possible (including dates and names). You may attach additional pages to this questionnaire. 
My Mcrm^/e. PASSED #u>ay o/d 3-<2v~ct7 < -£" HHV ~3€&tJ CGOKK/SQG 
AT Lf\3ccKP FcH 5~'/a Y/^s a/Q ^(GHTS. X t^m off U)CKK & i^eeK FOB. 
THF fUdZfLAL fiiOV ReLn^rev BuSirdes/&&&rt/^Gem£rOT5~ U)U£/d X R(ETUR/Qei> 
TO U)C/Zk X fciAKlD X UdftS 6onOT(ord^LL^ P**V VW5\CALCy UtO&&t£ 7~Q, H U)A5 
S£\JFR£ty VGPRGsseo fi/QT> cQ/is HAUJ/QG / > A ) I C ATTACKS . X u3^/or To *ny 
DoCTdR (Vd. DouyJiLLt? ) AiOO He Gf\\)£ m£ Pi t^OT^ £tCU5l /OG m£ fRpmn jjdCR fc 
U^TtC V ^ < ? 7 < X K<£rua*$eD TO m6 3)ft « TU6 fOLtoWlAJG Od£<£K AT COHfCN 
Ttrvi£ He PKeScRl&&X> A<0 ft/ur/1^fle£55 4A)T" m^D(c /^r /o /0 A/Qr> EKCU5BD M£ 
ffLQM (X>oai< uioric V - / 7 - 9 7 . AT THAT T/^?e JZ &&/)/'*} Arn^MpTeo TO 
fteruRrd TO udcRK. XAGfind eKpe&ifZ/$c£T> £X7te&/)M£ p/ox/^Ty PfOv P^/Otc 
ATTACk A>Ot> U)A5 UA)fl6Le Tb Qjoi£>Cj£ryr&ATg * JZ A?F<LT 77S/5 S<ri/<=TA£'Ly £/sn/T<ZT 
my tff><L/Ty TO f^/ZfCZryi /r?iy ^0S , JT *)/?? &AJ/?#^ TO SCtfef <#T £££ 
7>u/e/A)G T/-/<? z?/?y tf/eesr) ru/ir /*c//ur CAJ , /te/o/Z TO sny sncrMf/es Vs^Tvy 
T £i)A<i l/A)/?/$^ 7~C Jfce^T/? /*7c/?<^ T/S*?sd J3 -r-o V /S/23 td/S/C/S &)&/UT C /0 
/3>/e .s£\/£:/Z&t mcAJr/7>5 /9 A) v> tdH/c/y /Z^sutr^z? /A) /*tfc&6.&*vs Assoc/&r<F£> 
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PLEASE REMEMBER TO COMPLETE THIS FORM IN ITS ENTIRETY. IF YOU HAVE 
NOT PROVIDED THE INFORMATION WE NEED, WE MAY BE UNABLE TO TAKE ANY 
ACTION ON YOUR BEHALF. 
Signature: I declare with my signature that this statement is true and correct Date 
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DESCRIPTIVE TITto 
EGREE ASSOCIATE OF APPLIED SCIENCE 
WARDED WEBER STATE UNIV 
OGDEN, UT 
ATE JUNE 07, 1991 
AJOR CLINICAL LABORATORY TECHNICIAN 
AUTUMN QUARTER 1974-75 
NGL 101 EN ENGL COMPOSITION 3.00 C 
THSCI 111 BIOMED SCIENC CORE 5.00 B 
THSCI 120 INTRO MED SCIENCE 3.00 B 
ATH 105 AR INTERM ALGEBRA 5.00 E 
QUARTER GPA 2.73 
WINTER QUARTER 1974-75 
COURSE 
NGL 
EALTH 
THSCI 
fflSCI 
E 
SGL 
&TH 
3YCH 
103 EN ENGL COMPOSITION 3.00 B 
200 AR FIRST AID 2.00 D 
112 AR BIOMED SCIENCE COR 5.00 D 
130A AR INTRO PATHOPHYSIOL 3.00 E 
121 PE JUDO 1.00 W 
QUARTER GPA 3.00 
SPRING QUARTER 1974-75 
250 HL INTRO LITERATURE 3.00 C 
101 AR 1ST COURSE ALGEBRA 5.00 E 
101 SS INTRODUCTORY PSYCH 5.00 C 
ACADEMIC PROBATION 
QUARTER GPA 2.00 
WINTER QUARTER 1989-90 
ACADEMIC RENEWAL 03/20/90 
LS 
LS 
FHSCI 
LS 
FHSCI 
FHSCI 
•lEM 
rIEM 
-iEM 
101 INTRO CLINICAL LAB 
232 CLINICAL SEROLOGY 
112 BIOMED SCIENCE COR 
QUARTER GPA 
SPRING QUARTER 1989-90 
121 INTRO HEMATOLOGY 
113 BIOMED SCIENC CORE 
120 PD INTRO MED SCIENCE 
QUARTER GPA 
SUMMER QUARTER 1990-91 
111 PS GEN CHEMISTRY 
112 PS ELEM ORGANIC CHEM 
113 PS ELEM BIOCHEMISTRY 
QUARTER GPA 
AUTUMN QUARTER 1990-91 
4.00 A-
3.00 B+ 
5.00 A 
3.73 
5.00 A 
5.00 A-
3.00 A 
3,88 
5.00 A-
5.00 A-
5.00 B+ 
3.57 
MICRO 
CLS 
CLS 
CLS 
CLS 
CIS 
CLS 
CLS 
CLS 
CLS 
CLS 
CLS 
CLS 
CLS 
205 
210 
286H 
286S 
286L 
LS PRINCIPLES MICRO 
CLIN MICROBIOLOGY 
PRACT/HEMATOLOY 
PRACT/SEROLOGY 
PRACT/LAB PRACTICE 
QUARTER GPA 
WINTER QUARTER 1990-91 
170 PD MICROCOMPUTER APPL 
202 CLINCIAL CHEMISTRY 
215 TECH CLIN MIBIO II 
QUARTER GPA 
SPRING QUARTER 1990-91 
201 INTRO IMMUNOHEMAT 
286M PRACT/MICROBIOLOGY 
286C PRACT/CLIN CHEM I 
2861 PRACT/BLOOD BANK 
299 CORRELATN SEMINAR 
302 ADV CLIN CHEM I 
QUARTER GPA 
5.00 B+ 
5.00 A-
1.00 CR 
1.00 CR 
1.00 CR 
3.50 
4.00 A 
5.00 A-
5.00 B+ 
3.64 
5.00 A-
1.00 CR 
1.00 CR 
1.00 CR 
1.00 CR 
5.00 A-
3.70 
GRADUATION QUARTER HOURS 
TOTAL QUARTER HOURS 
103.00 
103.00 
WSU GPA HRS: 96.00 GPA PTS: 326.70 GPA:3.40 
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is*-COURSE DESCRIPTIVE TITLE CR. HR. GR COURSE DESCRIPTIVE TITLE CR.HR.GR 
IEE ASSOCIATE OF APPLIED SCIENCE 
tDED WEBER STATE UNIV 
OGDEN, UT 
E JUNE 0 7 , 1991 
)R CLINICAL LABORATORY TECHNICIAN 
AUTUMN QUARTER 1 9 7 4 - 7 5 
EN 
SCI 
;ci 
ENGL COMPOSITION 
BIOMED SCIENC CORE 
INTRO MED SCIENCE 
INTERM ALGEBRA 
QUARTER GPA 
WINTER QUARTER 1974-75 
101 
111 
120 
105 AR 
,TH 
!CI 
;ci 
103 EN 
200 AR 
112 AR 
130A AR 
121 PE 
JH 
ICI 
!CI 
;ci 
ENGL COMPOSITION 
FIRST AID 
BIOMED SCIENCE COR 
INTRO PATHOPHYSIOL 
JUDO 
QUARTER GPA 
SPRING QUARTER 1974-75 
250 HL INTRO LITERATURE 
101 AR 1ST COURSE ALGEBRA 
101 SS INTRODUCTORY PSYCH 
ACADEMIC PROBATION 
QUARTER GPA 
WINTER QUARTER 1989-90 
ACADEMIC RENEWAL 03/20/90 
101 INTRO CLINICAL LAB 
232 CLINICAL SEROLOGY 
112 BIOMED SCIENCE COR 
QUARTER GPA 
SPRING QUARTER 1989-90 
121 INTRO HEMATOLOGY 
113 BIOMED SCIENC CORE 
120 PD INTRO MED SCIENCE 
QUARTER GPA 
SUMMER QUARTER 1990-91 
111 PS GEN CHEMISTRY 
112 PS ELEM ORGANIC CHEM 
113 PS ELEM BIOCHEMISTRY 
QUARTER GPA 
AUTUMN QUARTER 1 9 9 0 - 9 1 
3.00 C 
5.00 B 
3.00 B 
5. 
2. 
3. 
2. 
5. 
00 E 
73 
00 B 
00 D 
00 D 
3.00 E 
1.00 W 
3.00 
3.00 
5.00 
5.00 
2.00 
4 . 0 0 A-
3 . 0 0 B+ 
5 
3 
5 
5 
3 
3 
5. 
5 
5. 
3. 
. 00 A 
.73 
.00 A 
.00 A-
.00 A 
,88 
.00 A-
00 A-
00 B+ 
.57 
MICRO 205 LS PRINCIPLES MICRO 5.00 B+ 
CLS 210 CLIN MICROBIOLOGY 5.00 A-
CLS 286H PRACT/HEMATOLOY 1.00 CR 
CLS 286S PRACT/SEROLOGY 1.00 CR 
CLS 286L PRACT/LAB PRACTICE 1.00 CR 
QUARTER GPA 3.50 
WINTER QUARTER 1990-91 
CIS 170 PD MICROCOMPUTER APPL 4 . 0 0 A 
CLS 202 CLINCIAL CHEMISTRY 5 . 0 0 A-
CLS 215 TECH CLIN MIBIO I I 5 . 0 0 B+ 
QUARTER GPA 3 .64 
SPRING QUARTER 1990-91 
CLS 201 INTRO IMMUNOHEMAT 5 . 0 0 A-
CLS 286M PRACT/MICROBIOLOGY 1 .00 CR 
CLS 286C PRACT/CLIN CHEM I 1. 
CLS 2861 PRACT/BLOOD BANK 1. 
CLS 299 CORRELATN SEMINAR 1. 
CLS 302 ADV CLIN CHEM I 5 . 
QUARTER GPA 3 . 
00 CR 
.00 CR 
00 CR 
00 A-
70 
GRADUATION QUARTER HOURS 
TOTAL QUARTER HOURS 
103.00 
103.00 
WSU GPA HRS: 96.00 GPA PTS: 326.70 GE>A:3.40 
END OF TRANSCRIPT 
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MEDICAL LABORATORY TECHNICIAN EXAMINATION MLT(ASCP) 
EXAMINATION CONTENT GUIDELINE 
This document should serve as a useful guide for ex-
amination preparation. The Board of Registry 
criterion-referenced examinations are constructed 
to measure the competencies described in the Pro-
fessional Levels Definitions (Laboratory Medicine, 
May, 1982). These competency statements are 
specified into task definitions, linked to each of the 
content outlines, and measured by the test items. 
It should be noted that, for the medical laboratory 
technician, the Professional Levels Definitions refer 
to skills and abilities expected at career entry, not 
those that may be acquired with subsequent ex-
perience. The Professional Levels Definitions for the 
technician as published by the Board of Registry are 
as follows: 
Knowledge 
The technician has a working comprehension of the 
technical and procedural aspects of laboratory 
tests. 
Technical Skills 
The technician is able to read and follow directions 
and perform those tests in a clinical laboratory that 
are considered to be of a straight-forward nature. 
The technician has a practical understanding of 
quality control which is sufficient to determine 
whether or not tests are within control limits and 
to make the requisite adjustments according to 
specified procedures. The technician is capable of 
performing simple instrument maintenance. 
Judgment and Decision-making 
The technician is able to recognize the existence 
of common procedural and technical problems, and 
take corrective action according to predetermined 
criteria. 
Communication 
The technician communicates straight-forward in-
formation such as reporting test results and quoting 
normal ranges and specimen requirements. 
Teaching and Training Responsibilities 
The technician is capable of demonstrating learned 
technical skills. 
THE EXAMINATION MODEL 
The Board of Registry criterion-referenced examina-
tion model consists of three interrelated compo-
nents: 
Competency Statements which describe the entry 
level skills and tasks performed by Medical Labora-
tory Technicians and measured on the examination. 
Content Outline which delineates general catego-
ries or subtest areas of the examination. 
Taxonomy levels which describe the cognitive skills 
required to answer the question. 
TAXONOMY 1 - Recall: Ability to recall or recognize 
previously learned (memorized) knowledge ranging 
from specific facts to complete theories. 
TAXONOMY 2 - Interpretive Skills: Ability to utilize 
recalled knowledge to interpret or apply verbal, 
numeric or visual data. 
TAXONOMY 3 - Problem Solving: Ability to utilize 
recalled knowledge and the interpretation/appli-
cation of distinct criteria to resolve a problem or 
situation and/or make an appropriate decision. 
Certificate of Achievement 
awarded to 
ROBIN BURGENER 
for completion of the Coulter Trained Operator's course on the 
COULTER® STKS 
conducted 
March 3-7,1997 
Coulter Education Center • 5920 N.W. 142nd Street, Miami Lakes, FL 33014 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing CORRECTED BRIEF OF APPELLANT has been filed 
in the office of the Clerk for the Utah State Court of Appeals for the Third District, and a true 
and correct copy of the same has been provided to counsel listed below in the manner 
indicated on this ! IH'' day of September, 2003. 
ALAN HENNEBOLD 
Utah Labor Commission, UALD & EEOC 
Office of General Counsel 
PO .BOX 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
Hand Delivered To Office 
Mark Morris, ESQ 
Snell & Wilmer 
15 South Temple, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
For LabCorp 
Hand Delivered To Office 
ROBIN F. BURGENER, PRO SE: 
6910 South Fargo Road 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Hand Delivered To Residence 
r, Pro Se Appellant 
